

The Origins of Chinese Dissidents in American Foreign Policy

Kathryn Botto

ABSTRACT: Although figures such as Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng are frequently invoked as human rights champions by American politicians today, this was not always the case. The use of human rights advocates abroad as political tools was reserved for Soviet dissidents prior to 1989, and thus Chinese dissidents were largely ignored. This remained the status quo until the Tiananmen Square protests, after which prominent dissident Fang Lizhi became the first Chinese dissident to receive as high profile attention from the American public and executive branch as Soviet dissidents had previously. Through analysis of Fang’s memoir, diplomatic cables, and first person accounts, this paper argues that the Fang Lizhi incident at President George H.W. Bush’s 1989 banquet in Beijing was the event that eventually led Bush to reluctantly support Chinese human rights champions, which made Fang the first in a long line of Chinese dissidents to be entangled in the US-China relationship.

Keywords: diplomatic history, China, U.S.A., Fang Lizhi, George H.W. Bush.

Introduction

In February, 1989, President George H.W. Bush made a 40-hour visit to China which culminated in what Winston Lord, then the US Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, would later refer to as “a dinner party that turned out to be a revolution.”¹ In crafting the guest list for Bush’s state dinner in China, Lord and members of three sections of the American embassy in Beijing suggested that astrophysicist Fang Lizhi be invited. However, the embassy intended Fang’s presence to represent more than his background as a renowned scientist.² Rather, the thinking went, Fang’s status as a prominent political reformer would allow the President to allude to an overall concern with human rights without upsetting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) too much. This thinking proved flawed; as Fang himself put it, President Bush’s “brain trust forgot (or perhaps never knew) about the Chinese traditions of political banqueting ... Everytime Peking opera comes to the line ‘Let there be wine and feast!’ you know that the climax is around the corner.”³

1 Chris Sibilla, “A Dissident for Dinner – George H.W. Bush’s Ill-Fated Banquet in China,” *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*. <http://adst.org/2015/09/a-dissident-for-dinner-george-h-w-bushs-ill-fated-banquet-in-china/>.

2 Ibid.

3 Fang Lizhi, *The Most Wanted Man in China*, trans. Perry Link (New York: Henry Holt and Company,

Kathryn Botto is currently pursuing a Master of Global Affairs and Policy with a major in Security and Foreign Affairs at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies in Seoul, South Korea. She received a B.A. in Sociology, East Asian Studies, and International Studies from Johns Hopkins University. E-mail: katie.botto@gmail.com

Indeed, on his way to the banquet, Fang Lizhi was repeatedly blocked from attending by Chinese police, an incident that proved embarrassing for the Bush administration.

The explosive reaction that Fang predicted was not similarly anticipated by Lord and others at the American embassy, much to the Bush administration's *chagrin*. The significance of this lack of foresight was then amplified by the events of June 4, 1989, which the CCP attempted to blame on Fang. Fang's role as a prominent scapegoat in the Tiananmen massacre, and subsequent stay at the American embassy made Fang an unavoidable topic for the Bush administration. This sequence of events led Fang to become an instrumental part of the US public diplomacy strategy after Tiananmen, and the first in a long line of Chinese dissidents to have an impact on US-China relations.

The focus on Fang in 1989 set the tone for the prominent role of later Chinese dissidents in American foreign policy and public diplomacy. Before Fang, high profile events like Congress' attempt to rename the road in front of the Chinese Embassy in Washington "Liu Xiaobo Plaza," or the publicity given to Chen Guangcheng after his escape from house arrest to the American Embassy in Beijing, were bits of political theater reserved for Soviet Dissidents. These Chinese dissidents, and many others like them, are an integral part of the US-China relationship today. They serve as attractive and convenient vessels for politicians and officials to convey the US's stance on human rights to the American Public and Chinese government. This paper will argue that dissidents were not a part of US-China relations until the incident at Bush's banquet, and that the subsequent and transformative involvement of Fang in the relationship was the product of a diplomatic miscalculation and unavoidable circumstances rather than a conscious decision on the part of the Bush administration.

Double Standard: 1970 – 1989

In 1987, after Fang Lizhi was expelled from the Communist Party for the second time, many foreign journalists and scholars began referring to him as "China's Sakharov."⁴ The comparison was apt in many ways - both were prominent scientists who turned to activism and were persecuted by their governments - but in terms of their treatment in US foreign policy prior to 1989, their cases differed greatly. While dissidents played an important part in US strategy towards the Soviet Union, Chinese dissidents were often overlooked. In 1990, after Fang was permitted to leave China, he prominently accused the Bush administration of having a "double standard" for dissidence and human rights in the Soviet Union and China - being much softer on the latter than the former. Bush denied Fang's claim, but Fang was indeed correct - it was not until 1989 that Fang became the first Chinese dissident to play a role in American foreign policy, after a long line of Soviet

2016), 277.

4 Orville Schell, "China's Andrei Sakharov," *The Atlantic*, May 1988.

dissident *causes célèbres*.⁵

In Bush's defense, by 1989 human rights did not yet have a long history in US policy. Although the principle of human rights has ostensibly been a part of the American consciousness since the country's founding, it did not become a formally integrated aspect of foreign policy until Jimmy Carter's Presidency. Even before President Carter famously articulated his support for human rights abroad in his 1977 inaugural address, Congress was attempting to elevate the defense of human rights as a policy objective. Amidst anger over American handling of the Vietnam War and controversy over Kissinger's affinity for Realpolitik, which resurged during his confirmation hearing for Secretary of State, many members of Congress such as Donald Fraser (D-MN), Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), Dante Fascell (D-FL), and Harold Hughes (D-IA), began referring to themselves as the "New Internationalists" and publicly questioning the amoral and perhaps immoral direction of American foreign policy. From August to December 1973, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs' (SCFA) Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements held 15 landmark meetings on the role of human rights in American foreign policy.⁶ In 1974, the Subcommittee - also known as the Fraser Committee after its chair Donald Fraser - issued a report entitled *Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for US Leadership*. The report was a thinly veiled critique of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy and called for human rights to be elevated as a concern in diplomacy. After its publication, both liberals and conservatives in Congress began fighting an "out and out war" with the Executive branch for integration of human rights concerns into foreign policy.⁷ In a moment representative of his attitude towards Congress's newfound conscience, Kissinger went so far as to refer to the New Internationalists' concerns as "'sentimental nonsense.'"⁸

Nevertheless, Congress continued to push the human rights agenda through a number of initiatives, including the creation of a human rights bureau within the state department, towards which Kissinger's disposition "fluctuated between wholly uninterested and completely hostile."⁹ Human rights initiatives were supported by both Republicans and Democrats in the house and senate, but for different reasons. Liberals and the new internationalists saw creating a more human rights-focused foreign policy as an opportunity for "transcending the Cold War and developing a new, global foreign policy," while conservatives saw it as a means to "overcome détente and to reinforce the containment of the Soviet Union."¹⁰ For both camps, elevation of the human rights agenda

5 "President Bush's Response On Fang Lizhi, 1990," USC US-China Institute. <https://www.china.usc.edu/president-bushs-response-fang-lizhi-1990>

6 Joe Renouard, *Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 76.

7 Roberta Cohen, "Integrating Human Rights in US Foreign Policy: The History, the Challenges, and the Criteria for an Effective Policy," *Project on Internal Displacement, The Brookings Institute, University of Bern* (2008): 3.

8 Ibid.

9 Renouard, *Human Rights in American Foreign Policy*, 85.

10 Umberto Tulli, "'Whose rights are human rights?' The ambiguous emergence of human rights and the

had Cold War motivations and implications.

As the Fraser Committee convened, conservatives against the Kissinger-Nixon détente turned their attention to Soviet and Eastern European dissidents. Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) in particular pushed this initiative. He proposed a \$250 million program to resettle Soviet Jews in Israel, and introduced an amendment to the 1972 trade agreement between the USSR and the United States that would require trade relations with non-free market states to be contingent upon free emigration policies. The apex of Jackson's dissident defense strategy came when Alexander Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the USSR in 1974, a move which the administration was reluctant to condemn. Additionally, when Solzhenitsyn was invited to speak at the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations dinner by the strong anti-communist George Meany in 1975, President Ford declined to attend. Jackson publically reprimanded the administration for its inaction, stating "that the administration has narrowed its conception of détente to exclude issues of human rights." Conservatives and liberals alike joined him in his campaign against Ford's treatment of Solzhenitsyn. The backlash against the administration was so large that it is often credited as a factor in the downfall and discrediting of the détente strategy.¹¹ Solzhenitsyn's case was one of the first high-profile appearances of a foreign dissident in American political discourse.

It was not until Jimmy Carter's election in 1977 that Congress' agenda was finally met with a cooperative attitude from the executive branch. When Jimmy Carter became president, he embraced the human rights policy advocated in *Human Rights in the World Community*, rejected Kissinger's "linkage" argument that promoting human rights would jeopardize other foreign policy goals, and began to use public statements and private diplomacy to promote human rights as an international norm.¹² One of his early actions after taking office was to send a letter to Andrei Sakharov, in which he stated: "you may rest assured that the American people and our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our own country but also abroad."¹³

But even after Carter's elevation of the human rights agenda, application of criticism remained uneven on many dimensions, including dissidence. Carter and Reagan both continued their support for Soviet dissidents, as Congress had set precedence for that norm. However, Chinese dissidents were more or less ignored by both administrations.¹⁴ This was not due to a lack of active dissidents in China that could have been human rights champions in the US, a prominent example being Wei Jingsheng. Wei was the face of the

demise of Kissingerism," *Cold War History* 12 (2012): 585.

11 Renouard, *Human Rights in American Foreign Policy*, 85.

12 Cohen, "Integrating Human Rights in US Foreign Policy," 4-5.

13 Christopher S. Wren, "Sakharov Receives Carter Letter Affirming Commitment on Rights," *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1977.

14 Mark P. Lagon, "Promoting Human Rights: Is U.S. Consistency Desirable or Possible?," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2011.

Democracy Wall Movement from 1978 to 1979, in which thousands of people posted “Big Character Posters” pointing out political and social issues in China on a wall on Xidan Street in Beijing. Wei authored the essay “The Fifth Modernization,” which referred to the inability of Deng’s and Zhou’s four modernizations to create progress without a fifth modernization - democracy.¹⁵ He spoke to many foreign reporters during the movement and eventually was arrested on charges of giving state secrets for supposedly leaking military secrets to a foreign journalist, for which he received a sentence of 15 years imprisonment.¹⁶ Despite Wei’s predicament, he did not receive any attention from the US administration. Even the media, engagement with which sent Wei to jail, hardly mentions him. A search of Time Magazine’s archive for his name yields only two articles in which he is mentioned pre-1989. Sakharov, in contrast, was mentioned in 36 articles.

The reluctance to address human rights issues in China publicly during the Carter and Reagan administrations grew out of the needs of the US and China’s recently established strategic cooperation. Nixon’s visit to China was a huge step towards normalizing relations with Beijing, but it was not the end of the battle. Nixon’s visit established China and the US’s mutual interests against the Soviet Union, but it was not until 1979 when the US officially transferred diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the PRC that embassies were actually established in Beijing and Washington. The acceptance of a US embassy in China and the increased contact with Chinese people that it provided was an important factor in the US being able to develop a well-informed public diplomacy strategy towards China. However, the primary threat to both countries continued to be the Soviet Union rather than each other, leaving little incentive for the US to criticize China’s human rights record publically. As such, both the Carter and Reagan administrations focused on cultivating a friendly rather than adversarial relationship with China.¹⁷

Unavoidable Circumstances: Bush and 1989

Bush became president at a time when relations with China were warming. Human rights had hardly been publicly addressed in the relationship, and he saw no reason to change that - Bush was far from a human rights champion.¹⁸ After years of moral progress in US foreign policy, Bush seemed to be reverting somewhat to a realpolitik foreign agenda of which Kissinger would approve.¹⁹ This reluctance to inject morals into foreign policy concerns was potent, from his statements urging Eastern Europeans not to break ties with

15 Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power: China’s long march to the twenty-first century* (Hatchet UK, 2013), 286.

16 Ibid, 288.

17 Geoffrey Wiseman, *Isolate or Engage: Adversarial States, US Foreign Policy, and Public Diplomacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 70.

18 “Assignment China: Tiananmen Square,” USC US-China Institute. <http://china.usc.edu/calendar/assignment-china-tiananmen-square-and-%E2%80%9C25-years-tiananmen-then-and-now%E2%80%9D>.

19 Lagon.

Moscow in the 1991 “Chicken Kiev” speech, to refusing to support the military ouster of Saddam Hussein during the US occupation of Iraq after the dictator had gassed his own Kurdish citizens.²⁰

Bush’s comments on and actions towards these two incidents are very telling of his opinions of human rights in foreign policy. The horrors of the Tiananmen massacre are often spoken about in the context of the government’s use of military force on its own citizens. However, this was historically not a very moving incentive for Bush to criticize a nation on its human rights record. Stalin’s Massacre in Ukraine killed millions,²¹ and Saddam Hussein murdered at least 5,000 Kurds in the Halabja chemical attack and about 180,000 more over the course of the two years of the genocidal Anfal campaign against Kurdish civilians.²² The report from the Secretary of State that Bush received on the morning of June 4, 1989 estimated the death toll in Beijing to be between 180 to 500 persons.²³ If Bush failed to strongly condemn the loss of life at the hands of authoritarian regimes totaling in the hundred thousand and millions, it is difficult to imagine that he would have cared to address publically 180 to 500 people dead in Beijing.

Fang described Bush in 1989 as having to “decide whether to treat Soviet and Chinese human rights in the same way, thereby risking offense to the Chinese government, or for now, to apply different standards, side-stepping China’s human rights issues and preserving the “old friend” relationship between the government that Bush himself had helped to establish during his stint as Chief of The United States Liaison Office in Beijing in 1974-75.”²⁴ This was probably a generous reading of Bush’s attitudes at the time. Rather than deciding whether or not to treat Chinese dissidents the same as those in the Soviet Union, Bush seemed to be looking for ways to avoid doing so. There was no precedent in US foreign policy for involving Chinese dissidents on the same level as the Soviets - it had never been done before, and Bush was not willingly going to be the one to change that. However, the CCP’s reaction to the treatment of Fang by the US Embassy was so explosive that, despite Bush’s efforts to the contrary, his administration did see the first instance of a Chinese dissidence significantly impacting US-China relations. Why was it Fang that changed the pattern?

Fang’s impact on the US-China relationship began early in 1989 when he was invited to a farewell banquet to be held on February 26 culminating Bush’s trip to China. By this time in 1989, Fang was a seasoned dissident. He had twice been expelled from the CCP, sent down to the countryside for re-education four times, and lost his position as Vice

20 Ibid.

21 “Holodomor: Memories of Ukraine’s silent massacre,” *BBC*, November 23, 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25058256>.

22 “Halabja Genocide,” Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. <http://www.us.gov.krd/aboutkurdistan/halabja-genocide/>.

23 Secretary Morning Summary for June 4, 1989. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/13-01.htm>

24 Fang, “Open Letter to Deng Xiaoping,” 277.

President of The University of Science and Technology of China after supporting student movements there. On top of all this, just one month prior to receiving his invitation, Fang had authored an open letter to Deng Xiaoping asking him to grant amnesty to all political prisoners, including Wei Jingsheng.²⁵ As a result, he had been issued a warning and put on surveillance.

Fang was savvy enough to know that, given his status and recent events, he should accept the banquet invitation cautiously. He commented that from the moment he received the invitation, he could “sense that the stakes were high.”²⁶ To find out whether the authorities would disapprove of his attendance, Fang contacted the Chinese Academy of Sciences to let them know that he and his wife, Li Shuxian, had received invitations. He contacted the CAS for this purpose because the CCP had used the institution to communicate their wishes to him before, such as when they wished to ban him from foreign travel.²⁷ However, no prohibitions arrived from the CAS, and the CCP authorities at the Beijing Observatory even offered to provide a car for Fang and Li to travel to the banquet.²⁸ Although Fang still maintained a healthy level of suspicion about the event, commenting that it felt “a bit eerie,” he nevertheless decided to attend.²⁹

Ambassador Lord was confident that Fang’s attendance at the banquet would go unopposed. He commented that Fang was selected for the guest list because “although clearly pushing the envelope on political reform, he was not some wild-eyed radical trying to overthrow the government, but obviously was someone of some controversy. At the same time, he was a widely respected scientist, a world-class astrophysicist. Three different sections of our embassy individually recommended Fang be on the list.” However, when the guest list was sent to the Foreign Ministry for approval, Lord was surprised to find that they vehemently rejected to Fang being present. At one point, the Chinese leadership, including President Yang Shangkun, refused to attend the dinner unless Fang was disinvited. Nevertheless, after assuaging tensions the leadership in Washington and Beijing both agreed to have Fang attend the banquet, and Lord and others at the American Embassy proceeded planning with Fang still on the guest list, albeit seated at a table far from the president.³⁰ For 48 hours before the banquet, Lord “didn’t hear anything from the Chinese,” and “began to feel pretty good and figured this wasn’t going to be a problem.”³¹

Lord’s complacency reveals a major misreading of the situation. Lord failed to notice a sign given by the CAS that Fang would not be welcome at the dinner. Short on time, the embassy had relied on the CAS to orally invite its employees, including Fang, to

25 Ibid, 274.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid, 278.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable, “*President’s Banquet – Chinese Guest List*,” February 18, 1989. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/>

31 Sibilla, “A Dissident for Dinner.”

the banquet before getting physical invitations to the guests. The CAS was supposed to issue the oral invitations on February 21st, but on the 22nd Lord says that the embassy received “some confused report about somebody saying Fang wasn’t actually on the list.”³² Lord mistook this as an error, perhaps administrative but in reality someone from the Foreign Ministry had contacted the CAS and told them that Fang wasn’t invited.³³ This explains why, although invitations were supposed to be received on February 21st, Fang did not receive his invitation until it was hand delivered to him on February 22nd.³⁴ This disconnect, if identified at the time, could have potentially corrected the pattern of events to avoid the diplomatic debacle that ensued. Perhaps, knowing that the CAS had received word that he was not invited, Fang would have chosen not to attend.

It is difficult to explain, however, why the CAS did not inform Fang that he had been disinvited. Perhaps the Chinese leadership felt that they had already made their objection to Fang’s attendance clear, as they had strongly objected many times, and that the US’s persistence in inviting him had crossed a line which they needed to correct. It is impossible to know what the thought process truly was. In my findings, there were no Chinese primary sources that referenced Fang’s invitation to the banquet. Whatever the authorities’ opinion on the matter was, their next action was, according to Fang, so severe that “no person of normal intelligence could ever have anticipated.”³⁵ When Fang and Li departed for the banquet with Perry Link, an academic and friend of Fang’s, they were blocked by “five stunning counter measures” from attending the banquet.³⁶ Their car was blocked by hundreds of police and they were surrounded by more police when attempting to travel to the banquet on foot, public transportation was stopped, they were tailed by police when attempting to continue on foot for the second time, and were again followed after deciding to seek out journalists to explain what was happening.³⁷

It is clear from the severity of these measures that some authority was absolutely opposed to Fang attending the banquet. While there are no sources on the authorities’ opinions of Fang in February, The Tiananmen Papers reveal a bit about what Chinese officials were thinking about Fang during the student movement a few months later. At a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on April 28th, Politburo member Song Ping commented that “it’s really true that there are a few people who want to exploit the student movement in order to oppose the party and socialism. On the twenty-fifth, Fang Lizhi told the *Asian Wall Street Journal* that if China’s human rights situation doesn’t improve, foreign companies should pull out their capital. This is nothing but brazen, naked treason.”³⁸ Chen Xitong goes on to describe Fang and his wife as “the backstage

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Fang, “Open Letter to Deng Xiaoping,” 277.

35 Ibid, 278.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid, 279-280.

38 Liang Zhang, et al., *The Tiananmen Papers* (Public Affairs, 2008), 88.

directors of the democracy salon at Peking University” and as having a “big influence on the student movement.”³⁹ These statements reveal an acute sense of paranoia in the highest levels of the Chinese leadership over Fang’s power to inspire, going as far back as the beginning of the democracy salons at Peking University in late 1988. It’s likely that the paranoia surrounding Fang was already present when he received his invitation to the banquet, and very acute after his open letter to Deng was beginning to prompt other intellectuals to write letters as well. Fang indeed had a gift for inspiring and organizing people that he had demonstrated many times before, and that was a major concern for the Politburo. The Bush administration, on the other hand, was outraged by the incident at the banquet, though more so at what they perceived as the embassy’s poor handling of the situation than the Chinese reaction. Bush was so angry at Lord for the debacle that he was not even invited to subsequent meetings discussing how to handle it.⁴⁰

The events that unfolded in the next four months would make any attempts by the Bush administration to recover from the Fang Lizhi affair impossible. When Fang and his wife began appearing at the top of China’s most wanted lists in April, it became clear that authorities were attempting to blame Fang as the mastermind behind the student movement in a “justification in-waiting for the moment when an order to crush the movement might arrive from the top.”⁴¹ At this point, Fang and his wife needed protection, and the American embassy was ready to provide it. The sources are unclear on who exactly offered the Fang’s asylum in the embassy, attributing it only to “the staff” and mentioning that Perry Link and CBS Television helped to coordinate.⁴² The vague attributions of this indicate that it was likely a broadly supported initiative, and Fang Lizhi had become so entangled in the US-China relationship after the banquet that the US had no choice but to protect him, lest they risk the uprising being pinned on Fang and by some extension, the United States.⁴³

Conclusion

The establishment of the US’s diplomatic ties with China came at a time when the American public and congress were beginning to rethink the morality of their involvement in world affairs, which would lead human rights to become an important aspect of the American world view. However, it took 15 years from the New Internationalists’ elevation of the human rights agenda for this concern to enter US-China relations. Human rights is a major source of conflict in the US-China relationship today, and the role that dissidents play in it began with Fang Lizhi.

Fang had an amazing mind and a knack for inspiring the masses, but he was not the

39 Ibid.

40 Sibilla, “A Dissident for Dinner.”

41 Fang, “Open Letter to Deng Xiaoping,” 284.

42 Ibid, 290.

43 Wiseman, *Isolate or Engage*, 73.

only prominent dissident in China at the time of Bush's visit to Beijing. Many members of the Democracy Wall Movement, including Wei Jingsheng were imprisoned at the time, and student leaders were already involved in popular protests in Beijing. A few dissidents were even invited to the banquet along with Fang. Author Ma Bo in particular would later flee China after actively participating in the Tiananmen Square protests, in which Fang and his wife were never actually involved.⁴⁴ Needless to say, had the Bush administration wished to, there were many dissidents that could have been transformed into human rights champions and presented to the American public prior to 1989. However, the Bush administration's association with Fang via the banquet incident, and the amplification of his endangerment after being blamed for the Tiananmen protests, made Fang the only dissident sufficiently and publically entangled in the US-China relationship so as to make him impossible for the executive branch to ignore.

It is, of course, true that the gravity of the massacre in Beijing was such that, with or without Fang Lizhi, it would have been condemned by the Bush administration. Whether dissidents had become a concern or not, Tiananmen would still have marked the first time since the normalization of relations with China that human rights concerns prevented US-China cooperation.⁴⁵ The strong presence of foreign media in China during the massacre thanks to the coincidence of the timing of Gorbachev's visit made sure that the entire world watched as the CCP sent tanks into the city and ordered the army to attack civilians, regardless of Bush or Fang.⁴⁶ The Bush administration's response was even seen by many as forgiving of China, as he "dispatched senior aides to reassure and toast Beijing's leaders shortly after the Tiananmen Square massacre."⁴⁷ However, it likely would have been more forgiving if not for the misreading of the political context within which Bush's farewell banquet occurred, which led to the administration's reluctant association with Fang, and subsequently first inclusion of a Chinese dissident in US foreign policy, even before Tiananmen's student leaders. The advent of high-profile inclusion of Chinese dissidents in US foreign policy and public diplomacy towards China was, therefore, likely a product of unavoidable circumstances rather than a conscious decision by the Bush administration.

44 U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable, "President's Banquet – Chinese Guest List," February 18, 1989.

45 Ibid, 75.

46 "Assignment China: Tiananmen Square."

47 Lagon, "Promoting Human Rights."

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