Islamist Forces, Political Reordering of Libya and Exiles in Cairo

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ABSTRACT: An inevitable outcome of modern warfare and a contemporary political punishment, exile is also a political process aiming at returning to the home country, and even at reacquiring a share in the political arena. For the hosting government, exiles could be ready instruments and a bargaining chip in its domestic and international political competition. In understanding Libya's post-2011 political dynamics and possible future scenarios, this paper directs the attention beyond the geographical boundaries to Libyan political exiles in Cairo, examining their presence and activism, as well as Egypt's policy toward them from 2012 to 2015, a time period when Egypt itself was in the midst of political transformation and constitutional reform, and the political landscape of North Africa at large was witnessing a new wave of Islamist revival prompted by the Arab Spring. Heavily drawing on firsthand materials, this paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach (mainly of political anthropology and political discourse analysis), and proceeds surrounding three clusters: the political exiles' existential contour within the Cairene Libyan transnational migrant community; the pendulum of their fate alongside Egypt's political landscape changing; and a meso-level case study of the LPNM's activism in exile.

Keywords: *Activism, media politics, North Africa, political reconciliation, transnational migrant community.*

Introduction

Muammar Qaddafi's violent demise on 20 October 2011 signals the institutional collapse of the *Jamahiriya* regime. Instead of a scenario accompanied by peaceful democratic transition as the February revolutionaries and many observers envisaged, post-Qaddafi Libya witnesses armed power struggle, mainly between Islamist-military alliances, secular forces, town- and city-states, and tribes. To understand the complexity of such a chaotic episode, most of the scholars fixate on the local actors and factions that once allied as the February revolutionaries and were led by the National Transitional Council (NTC) in ousting the *Jamahiriya* regime, in addition to regional (non-)state actors backing each respectively. Few, if any, address the (possible) role of the *fulul* (the remnants of the *Jamahiriya* regime) in the configuration of the country's current domestic political dynamics. This is not surprising, given the fact that the political purge by means of adopting lustration legislation,[1] and personal revenge

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occurring within Libya due to the *fulul*'s affiliation with the former regime's patronage network have forced the majority of them to take refuge overseas since 2011.

However, seeking and being in exile should not be hastily understood as indicative of the *fulul*'s political extinction, nor of an inevitable end to their domestic political career. While an outcome of modern warfare and a "contemporary political punishment,"[2] exile is also a "political process,"[3] whose activism, aiming at their returning to the homeland, and even to the domestic political arena, could be ready instruments and a bargaining chip for the Libyan political groups in their mutual competition on the one hand, and on the other, for the hosting governments to intervene in the affairs of their enemies.[4] Then, how could the narratives of political exile, which are upheld by a tripartite connection between the two domestic political competitors of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), the Tripoli-based GNC, and the regional actors, contribute to our understanding of Libya's post-2011 political dynamics and possible future scenarios?

As a response, this paper provides an empirical study, directing the attention beyond the geographical boundaries to Libyan political exiles in Cairo, and examines their presence and activism, and Egypt's policy toward them from 2012 to 2015, a time period when Egypt itself was in the midst of political transformation and constitutional reform, and the political landscape of North Africa at large was witnessing a new wave of Islamist revival prompted by the Arab Spring. The research question is: which of the political values do the Libyan political exiles present for the Egyptian government's domestic governance and regional strategic deployment, and how does Egypt's policy toward them affect Libya's post-2011 domestic political dynamics? It is argued that albeit the resilience of the legacy of the *Jamahiriya* regime and of the *al Fateh* revolutionary ideology in post-2011 Libya, the Libyan political exiles' fate is determined by the value which Egypt, as the host state, could exploit in the favor of its own political interests. Their presence in exile was the ready instrument and bargaining chip in Egypt's domestic and international political competition. Their activism, in particular against the militant Islamist forces since 2011, while constituting a quest for survival and a strategic maneuver in their power struggling for a share in the post-Qaddafi Libya's political reordering, functions as Sisi government's proxy propaganda tool for the latter's state security maintenance. My localizing the Libyan exiles in Egypt is based on Egypt's capacity as the most influential (Arab) state player in the Libyan crisis,[5] the host country for the largest Libyan community

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strengthening the revolutionary system.

2   Edward W. Said, "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on Exile," *Harper's Magazine* 269 (1984): 50-1.

3   Anthony Glees, *Exile Politics During the Second World War: the German Social Democrats in Britain*, (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1982), 3.

4   Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of The Nation-State*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), xiv.

5   European Council on Foreign Relations, "A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players," accessed 12 December, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.

overseas,[6] the contemporary home for most of the *fulul*,[7] the primary geographical base for main Libyan exile political groups, and the transit hub for pro-*Jamahiriya* forces' transnational political activism.

In the interest of fully exploring the research question, three sub-questions are proposed. First, what is the existential contour of Cairo's Libyan political exiles? This inquiry deals with the most basic concern--who are they? The problem of developing the discussion begins with definition. Researchers conduct theoretical delimitation of political exile differently in constructing their own argumentation and analysis. While reflecting the discipline with which they work, putting the definition clarification first as an intellectual foundation fails to capture the complex, and sometimes even contradictory spectrum of this identity, which matters in analyzing the Libyan case. My observations in the field indicate several mobile spaces of betweenness with which the identity of political exile involves simultaneously. Hence, instead of presenting a definitive description, I place this (conceptual) group in dialogue with the broader Cairene Libyan transnational migrant community, to underline the latter's agent in Libyan political exiles' identity recognition, expression and practice in their attempt to regain a share of power in post-2011 political reordering.

As asylum seeker in the host country, exiles hold no *carte blanche* to direct their fate--the survival and success of their political activism depend on the extent of their political value, to which the Egyptian authorities could take benefit from in its political competition, both domestically and internationally. Therefore, the second sub-question treats exile as passive subject, braiding the pendulum of its fate with the narrative of Egypt's alternation of regimes, in particular the Islamist political force's ups and downs in it. How does Egypt's political landscape change since the Egyptian revolution of 2011 affect Libyan political exiles' fate? Then, I choose the Libyan Popular National Movement (LPNM), the first pro-*Jamahiriya* political organization in exile, as a case study, to explore how the LPNM's activism contributes to the Egyptian government's national and regional interests. This meso-level scrutiny sheds light on the resilience of the *Jamahiriya* regime's legacy in the post-Qaddafi era's Libyan political arena.

This paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach (mainly of political anthropology and political discourse analysis), drawing heavily on primary sources, which comprise the LPNM's official statements and documents, its internally circulated 470–pages conciliation proposal, interview scripts on Internet forums, records of several Libyan political exiles' Facebook posts, two audio clips and one video in which the *Jamahiriya* regime's spokesperson Moussa Ibrahim speaks about the LPNM, 38 videos of political television programmes in which the LPNM's then-spokesperson Asaad Zahio participated, copies

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6   "*Munāshida limuhajirīn al-lībiyīn bimasr*," SoundCloud, posted by "Moussa Ibrahim," accessed December 28, 2014, https://soundcloud.com/moussa-ibrahim/mke5bgi523df.

7   From my personal conversation with Dirk Vandewalle on 22 January, 2015 in Amsterdam.

of Libya Resolutions No. 36, 37, 17 and 13 issued by the NTC and the GNC respectively, and field notes of my direct observation on the Cairene Libyan community. The collection of these firsthand materials was done in 2014 and 2015 through two channels: 1) a 14-week Cairo-based anthropological fieldwork; 2) a two-year online tracing, on a daily basis, of the LPNM's activities, the continuity and changes of its political discourse, and several of the leading Libyan political exiles' Facebook page updates. The secondary sources include English language monographs, academic essays, and online news reports in Arabic. They offer historical context and conceptual framework to probe political exiles' activism, and the LPNM's maneuver of media politics.

Political Exile and the Transnational Migrant Community

Identity Recognition among the Community

Pre-2011 Libya was not a migrant sending country. Apart from dissidents taking exile in the 1970s and 1980s, most of the Libyans living abroad were business sojourners. The 2011 Libyan civil war interrupted this transnational population movement tradition. Many people were forced to leave their home country since then, escaping the war. Consequently, Egypt, one of the closest neighboring countries to Libya, witnessed a noticeable population expansion of the Libyan transnational community from fewer than 30,000 in 2006 to 825,000 by 2012.[8] Pre-migration association with Egypt, mainly including Egyptian intermarriage, established businesses, and ownership of real estate, is the first and foremost pull factor that accounts for the Libyan migrants' prioritizing Egypt as their destination to flee to and specifically to settle.

Following a similar trajectory, political exiles are among this conflict-generated transnational community. By 2013, the Libyan government had identified a total number of 88 *fulul* residing in Egypt for extradition and trial.[9] Ascribing the identity label of political exile solely to judicial categorization overlooks the complex property of the revenge culture in post-2011 Libya. In reality, many migrants off this list dare not to return to Libya because of the risk of being revenged, a personal affair which inextricably involves, to different extents, their political association with the former regime's patronage network for governance. In addition, the word "exile," as an identity label, malfunctions in micro-level Libyan cases from time to time. For example, Moussa Ibrahim, the *Jamahiriya* regime's spokesperson during the 2011 civil war, took exile in Germany, his wife's home country, and was formerly wanted on Interpol's list.[10] In February 2015, Interpol's red

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8   "Egypt," Migration Policy Centre, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Egypt. pdf. "Liqāʾu qanāt al-āṣima maʿa ali al-ṣalābiyy," YouTube video, 42:30, posted by "LibyaChannel," on 3 June, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcJvhbpTsvw.

9   "*Manṣūr al-Qadhāfi wa māriya fi sijni biṭarābulus baʿda taraḥurīhimai min maṣr*," al-sharq al-Awsat, 27 March, 2013, http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=722347&issueno=12538#. VRm4sPnLcfs.

10 In the time of attending the LPNM's conference in October 2014, Moussa Ibrahim was on Interpol's red list. However, Interpol's red notice on him has been withdrawn in February 2015.

notice on him has been withdrawn. Zahio, the then spokesperson of the LPNM and the Secretary-General of the Libyan National Assembly, a Tunisia-based oppositional political organization, had been in exile for four years or so, active in Egypt, Tunisia, and Oman. However, in 2015, with clandestine arrangement from within Libya, he was able to return to the homeland, although staying for only a few days for political initiatives.

Given the fluidity of political exile identity's reference in the Libyan case, it is both impossible and unnecessary to attempt to put this identity and the individuals in accurate and full correspondence. Instead, Libyan political exiles are treated as one segment of the transnational migrant community in which their existence is personified through two interlocked mechanisms: tribal kinship and organization. By 2016, there have been at least three Egypt-based political organizations established and led by the *fulul* who are also on the list of wanted persons issued by the GNC: the Association of Libyan Brothers in Egypt (ALBE), founded in 2013 by Ali Ahwal, the sheikh of al Warfalla tribe, the second largest (pro-Qaddafi) tribe after Tarhuna; the LPNM, established in February 2012, and under a collective leadership which is composed of at least 400 elite members of the former regime; and the Libyan National Struggle Front (LNSF), the Coordinator of Political Affairs and Foreign Relations of which is Ahmed Qaddaf al Dam, the cousin of Muammar Qaddafi, and the former coordinator of Libyan-Egyptian relations.

Identity Practice of the Divergent Political Exile Groups and Collective Memories

Like a pride of lions splitting into various dens, there have been divergences emerging among exiles and exile groups, with each tendency having its own scheme of socio-political activities. As Moussa Ibrahim admitted, the LPNM is one part of a wider "green resistance [implying to the supporters of the *Jamahiriya*]."[11] In the absence of a single powerful figure or the binding force of a state, the interests of exiles converge and diverge, a process largely occurring behind a veil of secrecy. However, the multi-layers, which have existed among Egypt's Libyan political exiles due to the variety of their political relevance, all have intersection with the wider Libyan transnational migrant community in Egypt (as well as in other countries) in terms of collective memory.

As aforementioned, the 2011 Libyan civil war has turned Libya into a migrant sending country. The forced migration is reminiscent of the one which took place when Libya was an Italian colony. During the period from 1911 until 1943, anti-colonial resistance, alongside with disease, starvation, and thirst, had forced over 250,000 Libyans to go into exile in neighboring countries.[12] One demographic consequence is that the population

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11 "Dr Moussa Ibrahim's first public address since Nato's War on Libya in 2011," YouTube video, 4:13, posted by "Tri Continental," on 17 January, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdwJcqA-AhI&app=desktop.

12 Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya* (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 1.

of Libya in 1911 was roughly the same as in 1950.[13] The second collective memory is fresher and nostalgically-framed: four decades of stability in Qaddafi's *Jamahiriya* in contrast to Libya's present chaos.

It is these "histories" that the Libyan political exiles most immediately avail of binding their existence and activisms of different types in exile with the interests of assumingly all Libyan people—Libya's national interest, which constitutes part of their strategy of claiming political legitimacy among the Libyans. The LPNM's media manipulation by invoking Libyan people's nostalgia for the Qaddafi regime in its articulation of anti-Islamism presents a typical example (I further probe this aspect in section three of this paper). Compared to the LPNM's straightforwardness in pronouncing its political aspirations, Ali Ahwal seems much more low-key, devoting to the social issues of the migrant community. His ALBE focuses on solving Libyan migrants' daily problems in Egypt, such as working to facilitate Libyan students' enrollment in Egyptian universities. While the ALBE claims to welcome all Libyans and serve all Libyans, people perceive of and judge it based on tribal affiliation of Ali Ahwal and several other senior organizers. The tribe, as an informal organizational unit in the Libyan society, remains a cohesive role in the internal stratification of the community.

Extradition versus Political Reconciliation

October 2011 – June 2012: Conciliatory Outlook during the Power Vacuum Period of Egypt

On 8 May 2013, the GNC passed the Political and Administrative Isolation Law (Legislation No. 13), detailing the scope of those Libyans who are targeted in political purge by listing 22 categories that are intended to define a representation of the Qaddafi regime's patronage network.[14] This legislative measure has been interpreted by many observers as a derailment of Libya's democratic transition. In fact, the Islamist-military alliance, which had been strictly oppressed under Qaddafi's four-decade reign, played a vital role in the February revolutionaries' overthrowing the former regime, and continues, after 2011, to exercise a dominant influence on the the NTC and later the GNC. The Islamist forces hold a zero tolerance policy from the very beginning toward the *fulul*'s participation in post-Qaddafi transitional arrangement. Illustratively, the violent pressure Libya's Islamist forces, the most well-known of which is the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party, imposed to the government leads to a series of diplomatic and legislative actions. As early as directly after Qaddafi's demise, in October 2011, the NTC had made a request to the Egyptian authorities of prohibiting the departure of some *fulul* who had fled to Egypt, and of freezing their property and other assets held

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13 Ibid.

14 Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs,* 90 (2011): 2.

in Egypt.[15] The same month, the Libyan Crisis Management Committee led by Abdul al Aziz al Husadi, then the attorney general, was established, working on identifying the overseas whereabouts of the *fulul*, for legal document preparation for extradition and trial.[16]

In stark contrast, Egypt's initial reaction toward the political exiles seemed moderate and procrastinative. This is not surprising, since on the one hand, historically-rooted ideological affinities of the 1910s's Pan-Islamism and the 1950s and 1960s's Pan-Arabism let Egypt be sympathetic to the *fulul* and to their political aspirations in exile,[17] and on the other hand, Egypt was itself in a messy political transition, being led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). In this power vacuum period, it was not until the Libyan government's pronouncement of its first lustration legislation to which Egypt had presented a qualitative reaction. On 2nd May 2012, the NTC approved Legislation No. 36, indirectly giving some indications about the scope of the list of wanted persons. A total of 241 persons, including Qaddafi family members, are on the list, and their properties in Libya have been confiscated.[18] Legislation No. 37, issued the same day, designates as a crime the propagandization and gloryfication of Qaddafi or his sons, as well as his regime and his ideas, during the eight months of warfare in 2011.[19] On 13 May 2012, the issue of conciliation between Libyan factions was discussed at a meeting of the Arab Affairs Committee under the People's Assembly of Egypt, with the resulting decision to establish a parliamentary committee functioning for conciliation.[20] As a progressive player attempting to fill the political vacuum created by the Egyptian 2011 revolution, al-Azhar Chiefdom agreed to engage in the conciliation process.[21]

On 26 May 2012, the first round of negotiations to attempt conciliation between Ali

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15 "*Al-nāi'b al-a'm abdu al-a'ziz al-ḥuṣādiyy yuqadim linaẓīrihi al-masriyy mustanadāt i'dāna azlām al-niẓām al-sābiq wa taslīmihim lilsulṭāt al-lībiyya*," Government of Libya, 1 March, 2012, http://www.pm.gov.ly/news/item/305.

16 "*Lajna lībiyya khāṣa tulāḥiq rumūz al-niẓām al-sābiq bilkhārij*," Libya al-Mostakbal, 1 April, 2012, http://libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/20788.

17 When Italians invaded the Ottoman Libya in 1911, aiming at incorporating Libya as Italy's fourth shore, the common Islamic religion had inspired a Libyan-Egyptian alliance, including the military involvement of Egyptian volunteers, press campaigns in Egypt and anti-Italian demonstrations in Alexandria and Port Said, for anti-colonial resistance in the context of widespread Pan-Islamism. Naturally, the NATO-led military intervention to Libya in 2011 was bound to carry historical resonance in Egypt. In addition, Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the towering figures of Egypt's 20th century, is also regarded as the "father" of Libya's *al Fateh* revolution. His advocacy of Pan-Arabism produced far-reaching influence on Qaddafi and the ideology of his 42-year regime.

18 "*Bila'smā'i: qa'ima al-lībiīna al maṭlūb tajmīd a'mwālihim fi masr*," Shaffaflibya, 4 February, 2012, http://www.shaffaflibya.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1267:g--------&Itemid=199.

19 "*Qānūn raqmi 37 lisana 2012 bisha'ani tajrīm tamjīd al-ṭāghiyy*," National Transitional Council of Libya, http://www.ntc.gov.ly/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=27.

20 Narmīn Abdu al-Ẓāhir, "a*l-a'zhar uwāfiq a'lai al-mushāraka fi lajna al-muṣālaḥa al-lībiyya .. wa musai'da al-khārijiyya a'mām nuwāb al-shaa'b: al-jānib al-lībiyy umāṭil fi taḥsīn al-a'lāqāt wa ḥal mushkilāt al-u'māla..wa mumathil lībiya yerud: 'al-quwaw al-ā'mila' masū'la a'n al-azma,*" youm7, 13 March, 2012, http://www.youm7.com/story/2012/5/13/.

21 Ibid.

al Sallabi,[22] the (self-proclaimed) representative of the NTC, and five Libyan political exiles took place in Cairo under the sponsorship of the Al-Azhar Chiefdom and Arab Affairs Committee of the People's Assembly of Egypt, the chairman of which is Mohamed Saeed Idris.[23] Dramatically, the NTC later denied the legitimacy of Ali al Sallabi as its representative.[24] By the same token, the LPNM, which was reported to be one party in this meeting, denied its participation, and clarified that the negotiation was held "between the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood representative Ali al Sallabi and members of the former regime, who only pursue guaranteeing themselves, and cannot represent anyone in Libya."[25] This episode, while demonstrating al-Azhar Chiefdom's positive role as a conciliatory agent, highlighted the existence of fissures not only between different factions, but *within* the same Libyan political entity.

Political actors from several other countries were also concerned with the existence of Libyan exile groups in Egypt. During the first half of 2012, the former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi sent a delegate to Egypt, as well as to other countries in which the Libyan exile community exists, approaching the exiles with an intention to mediate between Libyan factions.[26] Operating under the same rationale, the French government established contact with some members of the LPNM.[27] Noteworthy, Rashid al Ghannushi, himself a political exile in Europe for decades before returning to Tunisia in 2011, and co-founder of the Tunisian moderate Islamist political party Ennahda Movement (in government 2011-14), also proposed to sponsor the conciliation. However, his efforts met with no noticeable success.

July 2012 – June 2013: Morsi's Economic Expediency in Transition Management

In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the presidential election. While closing post-Mubarak Egypt's power vacuum, Morsi's one year presidency failed to lead the state's transitional period toward an inclusive direction. The Morsi government adopted several means, including the enactment of the political isolation law and the insertion of the Muslim Brotherhood members into key official positions,[28] to

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22 He is a Libyan Muslim cleric, religious scholar and Islamist politician.

23 "*Mubāda'a lilḥiwār baina al-thawra wa al-inqilāb*," Democratic Arabic Center, 24, accessed 16 March, 2015, http://democraticac.de/. These five political exiles are Ahmad Qaddafi al Dam, Ali al Ahwal (from Warfalla tribe, the chairman of the Association of Libyan Brothers in Egypt, and the chairman of Libyan tribes in the *Jamahiriya*), Abd al Hamid Bezan (the vice chairman of the Association of Libyan Brothers in Egypt, and once one of Qaddafi aides), Mohamed Jibril al Arifi (in the *Jamahiriya*, he was the chairman of *shu'ūnu al-naqābāt wa al-itiḥādāt wa al-rawābiṭ al- mahaniyya*, and the assistant secretary of the LPNM's Executive Committee), and Omra Bukraa.

24 Ibid., 241.

25 Ibid., 24.

26 Ibid., 23.

27 Ibid.

28 Abdel Monem Said Aly and Karimi Elkady, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Egypt's Political Transition," Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 3-4.

consolidate the Islamist's dominant presence in the state apparatus. This political culture of exclusion and Morsi's tendency of replacing the system with an Islamist one deepened the ideological rift among Egyptian political groups, and in particular deteriorated the long-lasting tense relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Azhar.[29] Therefore, it is no surprise to see the latter's discontinuing the conciliation efforts between Libyan Islamists, nationalist-seculars and the Egyptian authorities.

In spite of his ambition of strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood's foundation in the Egyptian political arena, as well as of his pleasure to see the growing influence of Islamist forces in Libya, Morsi did not respond to his Libyan counterpart's requirement of extradition in a partisan way. This is apparent through a brief comparative overview of several countries' responses. Al Baghdadi al Mahmoudi (the former prime minister, 2006-11) was extradited from Tunisia on 24 June 2012; and Abdullah Senussi (the former director of military intelligence and the husband of Gaddafi's sister-in-law) from Mauritania on 5 September 2012. Similarly, Egypt returned two Libyan exiles. This result could hardly satisfy the Libyan authorities, given that Egypt accommodates the largest Libyan exile group, and the total number of the wanted persons on the Libyan government's list for extradition from Egypt had reached 88 by 2013.

Furthermore, a scrutiny of the Egyptian case of extradition reveals a dramatic detail, which demonstrates the volatile nature of the Morsi government's stance on the issue of Libyan political exile. On 19 March 2013, the Egyptian forces arrested Ahmad Qaddaf al Dam, Mohamed Ibrahim Qaddafi (the brother of Moussa Ibrahim), and Mohamed Amin Maria (the former Libyan Ambassador to Egypt), acting in accordance with Interpol's demands. Whereas Mohamed Ibrahim Qaddafi and Mohamed Amin Maria were returned to Libya before long, the Egyptian authorities officially claimed that they would not extradite Ahmad Qaddaf al Dam until he had first stood trial in the Cairo Criminal Court,[30] even though Libyan authorities were apparently ready to pay up to two billion dollars for the extradition.[31] It is not certain whether the transactional analysis was inaccurate, because the deal soured, or because Egyptian internal politics interfered. After nine months of detention and when Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power, Ahmad Qaddaf al Dam was acquitted and released by the Egyptian court.

Morsi treated the Libyan political exile as bargaining chip in Egyptian-Libyan relations, which he availed of ameliorating Egypt's economic problems. The extradition constituted a transaction, with Egypt receiving in return an agreement with the Libyan Oil Corporation for the refinement of one million barrels of oil on a monthly basis to supplement diesel consumption inside Egypt. Moreover, Libya also agreed to make a deposit of two billion

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29 For a systematic overview of its relations, please refer to http://www.mideasti.org/content/grand-sheikh-and-president.

30 "*Manṣūr al-Qadhāfi wa māriya fī sijni biṭarābulus ba'da taraḥurīhimai min maṣr*," http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=722347&issueno=12538#.VRm4sPnLcfs.

31 Ibid.

dollars in the Central Bank of Egypt to support the Egyptian economy.[32] Still, Ahmad Qaddaf al Dam's case spanned Morsi's and Sisi's governments, and that the extradition of him did not finally occur indicates the existence of political forces which Morsi was feeble to overcome or circumvent in coping with the Libyan political exile issue.

June 2014 – 2015: From Official Impartiality to pro-Exile

On 15 February 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) released a video in which it claimed to have kidnapped and beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians working in Libya, in vengeance for "the kidnapping of Muslim women by the Egyptian Coptic Church."[33] On the next day, the Egyptian military conducted airstrikes on locations alleged to be used for ISIL training and weapons stockpiles in Derna and Sirte, two reported ISIL bases in Libya.[34] This is "the first time Egypt has acknowledged any kind of military intervention" in Libya since the 2011 armed conflict.[35] Since then, for the state's domestic and regional security interests, Egypt supports Tobruk-based HoR in fighting against the Islamist militants in Libya, becoming the most influential regional actor in the Libyan issues. The Libyan political exiles, due to their advocacy of Libya's nationalist-secular forces (the HoR), received Sisi's acquiescence of their activism in exile.

Before the determined opposition of the Sisi government to letting Islamist forces play any important role was assured by the Egyptian Coptic incident, Egypt presented officially an impartial stance on the Libyan political exile issue. This is self-evident in an event that became public on 26 October 2014. After three years out of the spotlight,[36] having taken exile in Germany, Moussa Ibrahim attended the LPNM's First General Conference which was held clandestinely in Cairo's downtown on 25 October 2014. The reemergence of Moussa Ibrahim, publicized through the broadcasting of Libya's satellite TV channel SOUT Al Qabael, drew substantial attention from the HoR. On 29 October, Libya's then minister of interior Omar Salem Ramadan issued an official letter to his Egyptian counterpart Mohamed Ibrahim,[37] requesting the extradition of Moussa Ibrahim to Libya for either judicial prosecution or to serve a prison sentence.[38] Soon after, the Egyptian authorities asked Moussa Ibrahim to leave the country,[39] instead of arresting

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32 Ibid.

33 Zeinab El-Gundy, "Islamic State Publishes Report on Coptic Egyptian Workers Kidnapped in Libya," *Ahram Online*, 12 February, 2015, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/122903/Egypt/Politics-/Islamic-State-publishes-report-on-Coptic-Egyptian-.aspx.

34 "Egyptian Air Strikes in Libya Kill Dozens of ISIS Militants," *the Guardian*, 17 February, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/egypt-air-strikes-target-isis-weapons-stockpiles-libya.

35 Ibid.

36 In exile times and before attending the Conference, he posted political messages on his Facebook page, uploaded audio clips to SoundCloud as well, but did not step into the spotlight, neither accepting English-language media interview, nor attending occasions held in public.

37 Alfars News Network, Facebook post, October 31, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/69Alfars/photos/a.1402423443343108.1073741828.1402417656677020/1508685096050275/.

38 Interpol, accessed December 22, 2014, http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2012-1454.

39 "Former Gaddafi Spokesman Expelled from Egypt-State Newspaper," *Reuters*, October 31, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/31/egypt-gaddafi-spokesman-idUSL5N0SQ43O20141031.

him for extradition, which was the fate of his brother Mohamed Ibrahim in March 2013.[40]

"In order to protect the host's own political interests," as Yossi Shain reminds us, "a partisan stance [on the political exile]" is always hidden behind the host state's official impartiality.[41] This is true for Sisi's Egypt. Since the Egyptian army deposed Morsi, narratives casting the Muslim Brotherhood in a negative light have been a mainstay of government discourse under Sisi.[42] Sisi has been quoted as saying that "the Muslim Brotherhood is the origin of all Islamic extremism."[43] The presence of powerful Islamist tendencies in Libyan politics is seriously detrimental to the interests of the Sisi government and its sense of the security of its borders. In dealing with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Sisi kept distance from them. In December 2014, a delegation of three prominent Libyan advocates of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood travelled to Cairo, meeting a high official of the *Jamahiriya*. This is "the first time that these representatives ask those supporting the Muslim Brotherhood by means of money, tribes, and regions, to start a conversation with the polar opposites represented by the 'Gaddafi regime' and the 'new parliament'."[44] This delegation, through an intermediary, expressed their desire to meet with Egyptian authorities, but the Egyptian side responded in an indirect fashion, stressing that "as regards the Libyan leadership, which rejects extremism and wants to withdraw from its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, it should at least take practical action on the ground before it knocks at the door of Egypt."[45]

Egypt did not cease its participation in conciliation. On 13 April 2014, the first preparatory committee meetings for the initiative of the Libyan national dialogue were held in Malta. Attendees included Maltese former health minister John Dalli, former NTC Libyan health minister Fatima Hamroush, representatives of the LPNM, and delegates from the Egyptian foreign ministry and Tunisian moderate Islamist Rashid al Ghannushi. What drives the Egyptian officials to accept the Libyan political organization in exile and the LPNM to be one party of the multilateral conciliation dialogue is their assessment of Egyptian state security issues, a question on which Islamist forces are a central issue. Noteworthy, during these meetings, the LPNM advised attendees that the next preparatory committee meetings would take place in Egypt.[46] This implies that the Libyan political exiles have successfully approached several key political players from the Egyptian side.

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40 "*Manṣūr al-qadhāfi wa māriya fi sijni biṭarābulus baʿda taraḥurīhimai min maṣr*," al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 27, 2013, http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=722347&issueno=12538#. VRm4sPnLcfs.

41 Shain, *Frontier of Loyalty*, 122.

42 Ibid.

43 "Egypt President Sisi: 'Muslim Brotherhood is the Origin of all Islamic Extremism,'" *Pamelageller*, accessed March 22, 2015, http://pamelageller.com/2015/02/62975.html/

44 Abdul Sattar Hatita, "*ijtimāʿt lībiyya siriyya fi al-qāhira liʾzli jamāʿa al-ikhawān wa mīlīshiyātiha*," al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 2, 2014, http://archive.aawsat.com/details. asp?section=4&article=796672&issueno=13153#.VQgr4vmUe4Q. My translation.

45 Ibid.

46 "*Badaʾu al-jalasāt al-taḥḍīriyya lilḥiwār al-waṭaniyy al-lībiyy bimāliṭa bihuḍūr al-muhajirīn wa al-nājiḥin*," al-Hadathu al-Ajwādiyy, 14 April, 2014, http://h-azawad.com/ar/?p=17005.

LPNM and the Host Government's anti-Islamist Extremism

LPNM and the Jamahiriya: a Mitigated Claim of Continuity

The LPNM officially announced its establishment on 12 February 2012 through reproducing its Founding Statement in different languages on several web pages, including the Russian communist political newspaper *Pravda* (in English), the Italian NGO Centro di Iniziative per La Verità e la Giustizia (CIVG) (in Italian), the LPNM's Wikipedia page (in English), and pro-*Jamahiriya* WordPress blog page "Libya 360°Archive" (in Arabic). As the then only publicly announced political opposition to the GNC and western intervention in Libya, and being led by the *Jamahiriya*'s advocates, some of whom were on the list of wanted persons by Interpol or the Libyan authorities, the LPNM is isolated by the international community, with only a few countries allowing its presence,[47] the best known of which is Egypt. Politically, the LPNM can be conceived as a direct continuation of the *Jamahiriya* regime in three aspects: collective leadership components, alliance with tribes inside Libya, and continuing *al Fateh* Revolution practice.

The LPNM's collective leadership is composed of at least 400 elite members of the *Jamahiriya*, active politically, economically, or intellectually, most of whom fled the country over the course of the 2011 conflict.[48] On account of the high confidentiality under which the organization operates, only the identities of a few leading members had been officially made public before 2016.[49] Although then incarcerated in Libya, Saif al Islam Qaddafi, as a "captive Mujahid,"[50] has also been appointed by the LPNM as the Deputy Secretary-General.[51]

In terms of recruiting new members, the LPNM's policy demonstrates its attempt to maintain ideological purity by the use of gatekeeping to restrict its membership to members of the *Jamahiriya* social and political elite. Prior to the suspension of the LPNM's official website by WebHostingPad in the middle of December 2014, in theory anyone could have applied to join the LPNM by submitting an online application form, which is composed of a set of compulsory questions indicating the selective nature of the recruiting policy--dependence on interpersonal trust. In addition to six mandatory profile

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47 Alexandra Valiente, "*al-nāṭiq al-rasmiyy bismi al-haraka al-shaʿbiyya al-waṭaniyya al-lībiyya lilshurūq*," Libya 360 Archive, 15 June, 2012, https://libyadiary.wordpress.com/2012/06/15/.

48 "*Ḥadīth ductūr mūsai ibrāhīm ḥawla al-haraka al-waṭaniyya al-shaʿabiyya 31/08/2013*," SoundCloud audio, 7:00, August 31, 2013, posted by "Moussa Ibrahim ," https://soundcloud.com/moussa-ibrahim/31-08-2013.

49 These public members include Captain al Khuwaildi al Hamidi, the LPNM's then Secretary-General and a former member of 12-person Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC); Mustafa al Zaidi, the then coordinator of the LPNM's Executive Committee and a former health minister; Ali Sulaiman Kanna, the then secretary of the Executive Committee and former commander of Ali Kanna Brigade; al Saqr Mukhtar al Saqr al Sahuli, ex-secretary assistant of the Executive Committee and a former senior executive of Libyan investment company in Egypt; and Mohamed Jibrilal Arifi, the then secretary assistant of the Executive Committee.

50 "Communique 8 From the Libyan Popular National Movement," https://libyadiary.wordpress.com/2012/05/20/communique-8-from-the-libyan-popular-national-movement/

51 Ibid.

items (i.e. the applicant's full name, date of birth, occupation and skills, current country of residence, e-mail address, and social status), the applicant is prompted to mention at least one LPNM member that s/he knows in person.[52] In this manner, closeness to former power and elite social class are monitored and assured to a considerable degree.

As a political body operating outside Libya, the LPNM keeps in touch with its domestic roots through its sustained connection with the Council of Libyan Tribes and Cities (CLTC), a social organization which has been active inside Libya since the 2011 Libyan civil war. These two groups are under the same leadership of 622 political figures inside and outside Libya, and operate in cooperation with each other.[53]

The LPNM's practice of its nationalist responsibility complies to the *Jamahiriya*'s nationalist version of Libyan history. First, the real and popular pro-Qaddafi support within Libya has been accentuated in the LPNM's account of the 2011 civil war. For many Libyans, after 19 March 2011, the foreign intervention meant that the 2011 civil war could be understood as a Libyan struggle of resistance against foreign military attack. According to the LPNM's Conciliation Proposal, millions of people joined a peaceful march in Tripoli on 1 July 2011 in support of Qaddafi, and similar marches were organized on 8 July as well in Sabha and other cities.[54] In the view of the LPNM, the evolution of the situation in Libya indicated that the overthrow of Qaddafi had been plotted in advance. On this account, Libya's *al Fateh* revolution and wealth made the country the object both of enmity for resisting Western domination and covetousness as a country of substantial resources.

Second, by declaring itself as being "proud of Qaddafi's persistence, courage and contributing his soul to Libyan affairs and its independence,"[55] the LPNM grants Qaddafi the same historical status as Omar al Mukhtar, setting him up as Libya's nationalist symbol, and adopting the *al Fateh* Revolution as its political inspiration. In other words, to justify its legitimacy of being the representative of *all* Libyans, the LPNM creates an equation between national identity and loyalty to, and continuation of, the *al Fateh* Revolution.

LPNM's Activism

Compared to any other kind of external assistance provided by the host country, the asylum granted by Egypt is of critical necessity for the political organization of Libyan

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52 This requirement was mentioned in the LPNM's membership online application form. However, since the suspension of its official website in the middle of December 2014, no source of this piece of information is accessible.

53 "Dr Moussa Ibrahim's first public address since Nato's War on Libya in 2011," YouTube video, 4:00, posted by "Tri Continental," on January 17, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdwJcqA-AhI&app=desktop.

54 "*Mubāda'a lilḥiwār baina al-thawra wa al-inqilāb*," 11-3.

55 Alexandra Valiente, "Communique 1 From The Libyan Popular National Movement," *Libya 360 Archive*, February 16, 2012, https://libyadiary.wordpress.com/2012/02/16/communique-1-from-the-libyan-popular-national-movement/.

exiles,[56] in that a precondition of the LPNM's territorial base for activities in exile, rather than just being a refugee sanctuary, has been guaranteed. As being domestically isolated and internationally marginalized, the LPNM struggles for legitimizing its being one party to Libya's national dialogue mainly through two strategies: seeking ideological alliance globally and conducting media politics.

Seeking Ideological Alliance Globally

Taking advantage of the legacy of the *al Fateh* Revolutionary ideology, the main tenets of which include Arab nationalism, the Third Universal Theory, pan-Africanism, positive neutrality, socialism, direct democracy, *jihad*, and *Jamahiriya*, the LPNM seeks rapprochement and ideological alliance both inside and outside Arabic countries.

On 28 October 2012 in Egypt, the LPNM's base, Ahmed Shartil, then the LPNM's officer in charge of refugee issues, attended the press conference of "Strategic Dimensions of the New Middle East Project and the Role of NATO and its Repercussions on the Arab National Security" organized by Palestine and the Normalization Resistance Committee of Arab Lawyers Union in Cairo.[57] On that occasion, through Shartil's sharing of the disastrous situation of his fellows Tawergha people,[58] the Libyan experience is incorporated into the discourse of anti-imperialism and Pan-Arabism. On 17 February 2015, in his Cairo office, Mustafa al Zaidi met with the secretariat members of the Arab Youth Union after its re-founding.

In addition to borrowing elements of rhetoric and forging alliances with Pan Arabism, *jihad* and direct democracy discourses of the Arab world and non-Arab countries, the LPNM uses discourses on anti-imperialism from the decolonial Third World camp. On 14 March 2015, the first annual anti-imperialist Malcolm X Film Festival was held in Belfast. The themes were of civil rights and black power, global unity and internationalism, legacy, continuities and challenges. As one of the speakers, Moussa Ibrahim gave a speech, via webcam, on "Libyan resistance,"[59] in which he elaborated the *Jamahiriya*'s contribution in pursuing Africanism, a good example of which was Libya's role as "driving force" in the foundation of the Africa Union. He praised Qaddafi as the "true son of Africa."[60] He also made the claim, frequently encountered in Libya, that one of the main reasons behind the West's unseating Qaddafi was his insistence on a united currency in Africa based on the gold standard, which supposedly would have constituted a threat for the West.[61] In his

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56 Shain, *Frontier of Loyalty*, 120.

57 "*Itiḥād al-muḥāmīn al-arab uhājimūna al-thawra al-lībiyya*," YouTube video, posted by "shabaka raṣdi," on 28 October, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZaxTjOxXs3E.

58 Tawergha is assumed by many Libyans as a pro-*Jamahiriya* city in Libya. The people from Tawergha has faced genocide and forced migration since the 2011 armed conflict.

59 "First Annual Malcolm X Film Festival," Facebook Post, by the Malcolm X Movement, https://www.facebook.com/events/373869066125833/.

60 "Malcolm X Film Festival-Belfast Moussa Ibrahim," YouTube video, 6:50, posted by "2Pakr," March 17, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HCBQ41dlRc.

61 Ibid.

speech, he positioned Libya's anti-imperialist struggle as being part of the global legacy of Malcolm X.[62]

Similarly, on 27 February 2015, Mustafa al Zaidi was interviewed in English, appearing on the Latin American TV channel TeleSUR. As a public TV channel sponsored by several Latin American governments, its objective is to provide information promoting the integration of Latin America. On 19 November 2013, through the facilitation of the Greece-based Libyan non-governmental organization Libyan Observation for Human Rights Alrassed Alliby, the LPNM delegation joined the London Workers revolutionary party anti-imperialist rally. On 12 January 2015, Moussa Ibrahim addressed, again via Webcam, the UK's Houses of Parliament on an event organized by the TriContinental organization. His subject was "NATO's untold story." These sorts of alliances and appearances have an opportunistic side, but they also illustrate the wide variety of narratives which can incorporate the perspectives of the LPNM narrative into their view of NATO militarism and imperialism imposing a permanently unjust world order under the ideological cover of democracy.

Media Politics and Egypt's Proxy Propaganda Tool

For the LPNM, media politics is an important mechanism which it has utilized since its establishment in the pursuit of its overall political vocation. Its Resolution No.8, concerning the designation of the High Command, specifically states that one of the High Command's missions is "to determine the quality of discourse on the media and speak on behalf of the movement [the LPNM], and to deliver its voice to the world."[63] Zahio actively sought this position, becoming LPNM's mouthpiece in press conferences, news releases, and TV programs. In total, until 12 November 2014 and before his quitting the position, he participated in ten news-related TV programs produced and broadcast by four Arabic-language satellite TV channels frequently,[64] giving commentary and analysis on Libyan political events and issues.

In an overview of the ten TV programs in which Zahio participated, amounting in total to twenty-nine episodes, the program structure is found to be similar, operating as a dialogue. Half of the dialogues are structured in a question and answer format in which Zahio, as the sole invited guest, takes part in a one-on-one interview with the anchor, while the rest are conducted in a multilateral dialogue and/or debate model, whereby Zahio and other Libyan political analysts present their different points of views surrounding the

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62 Ibid.

63 Valiente, "Communique 8 From The Libyan Popular National Movement." My translation.

64 According to my review of all the programmes, Zahio's participation consists of two appearances on France 24 Arabic's *al-niqāsh* (Discussion), and three on *wajha liwajhi* (Face to Face); two on Iraqi Al Hadath's *niqāt sākhina* (Hot Points) and four on *madārāt yuwmiyya* (Daily Orbits); three on Emirati Al Ghad al Arabi's *milafāt* (Files), one on *baina al-nās* (Between the People), and four on *aḥāddth maghāribiyy* (Maghrebi Talks); and three on Lebanese Al Mayadeen's *ḥiwār al-sāʿ* (Hot News Dialogue), two on *al-akhbār al-masāiyya* (Evening Newscast), and five on *ākhir ṭabaʿ* (Latest Trace).

same Libya-related political topic, subject to the moderation of the anchor.

There are two major features in Zahio's TV exposure. Contextually speaking, there are always competitive moments either between Zahio and the anchor, or Zahio and other Libyan analysts invited by the same TV program. According to my observation, during the one-on-one interview program episodes, "a primary mode of political engagement" in Geoffrey Baym's eyes,[65] the anchor raised an either "what" or "how" question, both functioning as enquiries into Zahio's comments regarding the news event introduced in the beginning of the program. Instead of challenging or even criticizing the analysis offered by Zahio, the anchor continued the interview by either asking for further elaboration on certain points which Zahio had briefly mentioned in his last analysis, or by raising a new question--which had little to do with his previous answer. Without exception, when Zahio was answering *each* question, the anchor had to interrupt him at some points, by repeating explicit words, such as "*wasal fikra* (your idea has been conveyed)," "*waadih* (your idea has been clearly expressed),"[66] so that Zahio would stop talking, and the anchor could continue with his or her prepared questions. Zahio's verbose and unceasing talk demonstrates that he was striving to gain more time to speak on the program, in order to benefit from televisual resources to the largest extent. In the programs which were structured as multilateral dialogue, this sense of tension, sometimes even of antagonism, was perceivable in the interactions between Zahio and other Libyan analysts, principally due to their conflicting perceptions of the characteristics and import of the 2011 civil armed conflict and its aftermath.[67]

In terms of the structure of Zahio's propaganda discourse, it is deliberately linked with a clear institutional ideology and objective, which aims at providing "the audience with a comprehensive conceptual framework for dealing with social and political reality."[68] This appears to be salient through the lens of topics and local semantics respectively.

For a propagandist, that picking topics is not in his control might seem problematic. But this is not the case for Zahio. A complete examination of his responses to all the sixty-six questions reveals another set of foci to which he shifted, depending on which time period (past, present, or future) had been broached. In commentary on the past, he consistently reminded of the safety and security under the *Jamahiriya*, which supports his argument of

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65   Geoffrey Baym, "Political Media as Discursive Modes: A Comparative Analysis of Interviews with Ron Paul from Meet the Press, Tonight, the Daily Show, and Hannity," *International Journal of Communication* 7 (2013): 507.

66   "*Asa'd zahuw al-nāṭiq bismi al-haraka al-waṭaniyya al-lībiyya al-sha'abiyya fi barnāmij wajha liwajhi biqanāt faransa 24,*" YouTube video, 10:46, posted by "adham ali," accessed December 15, 2014, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=a3aZ-EZwGmc.

67   For example, on the occasion of the 2nd anniversary of Qaddafi regime's downfall, on 23 October 2013, France 24 Arabic's *Face to Face* brought Zahio (based in Cairo) and Mahmoud Ismail (a Libyan political activist based in Tripoli) together via camera interview, discussing the achievements, if any, in the last two years. In this eighteen-minute episode, the two guests launched into a severe verbal attack on each other twice, each of which lasted for at least thirty seconds in spite of the anchor's moderation.

68   Paul Kecskemeti, "Propaganda," in *Handbook of Communication*, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), 849-850.

the supposedly conspiratorial nature of the 2011 armed conflict; for the present situation, mass exodus, the tragic situation of an ongoing civil war, the penetration and danger of terrorism etc.; and for the future, the necessity of a countrywide nationalist dialogue. By executing these shifts, the fact that he was given time to speak on TV becomes more meaningful than what he was expected to answer based on the content of the questions. Usually, Zahio first answered the question quickly and in a perfunctory way, then shifted to the topics and discourse that he had pre-prepared. For instance, on 6 March 2014, Qaddafi's fourth son Saadi al Qaddafi was extradited from Niger to Libya. The anchor asked Zahio whether "the extradition of Saadi Qaddafi was a transaction, and [if so,] between which two sides?"[69] After a few words stating, "We cannot know the details of the transaction," Zahio immediately gave his utterances a more general turn, saying, "But what we know is that nowadays Libyans have been sold and bought around the world."[70] By the same token, when being asked to give comments on the shutting down of the Tunisian embassy in Tripoli on July 2014, Zahio said, "What I have been made aware of is the same as what you have reported just now."[71] Following this brief and direct answer, he continued to enumerate the foreign companies and international organizations that have withdrawn from Libya due to security reasons. Then, he ascribed the fault for this decline solely and unambiguously to the non-legitimacy of the GNC.

Regarding the local semantics, Zahio's utterance shows clearly that, as in much political discourse, "all information that is detrimental to the ingroup will tend to remain implicit, and information that is unfavourable to the outgroup will be made explicit and vice versa (our negative points and their positive points will remain implicit)."[72] From his consistent utterances, one gains insight into the biased conceptual model which ideologically controls Zahio's speech patterns regarding the situation of Libya.[73] As predicted by this model,[74] functional relations of generalization and specification, as well as of contrast and example are employed by Zahio.

These two pairs of functional relations share the same borderline drawn by Zahio. He selects as his positive baseline the *Jamahiriya*, juxtaposing it with a negative proposition and situation, namely the state of Libya after the 2011 civil armed conflict. The examples he most frequently uses are the security situation and the difficulties of forced migration, both factors substantiating Libya's present instability in contrast with the (nostalgically-

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69 "*Liqā'u asa'd zahuw ḥawla jarīma taslīm al-muhandis al-liwā'i al-sā'adi muamar al-qadhāfi wa al-a'ḥdāth fi lībiya,*" YouTube video, 00:26, posted by "libya libya," accessed January 23, 2015, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n-LN-r7lPZs [translated by the author].

70 Ibid., 00:48 [translated by the author].

71 "*Liqā'u asa'd zahuw a'lai qanāt al-mayādīn al-juz'u al-thāni 2014/7/19,*" 03:06 [translated by the author].

72 Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis," in *Language and Peace*, ed. Christina Schäffne, and Anita L. Wenden (New York: Routledge, 2005), 27.

73 Ibid., 26.

74 More about this model, see van Dijk, "Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis," 26-7; Van Dijk, "What is political discourse Analysis?," 32.

framed) stability in the *Jamahiriya*. Zahio sticks to this fact, attributing all the negative realities of today's Libya to the reason of instability and thus creating a generalization which elides any specific nuances. It also becomes a tool Zahio uses in his argument. For example, when confronting accusations from other politicians about how autocratic Qaddafi was over the past four decades, Zahio defends himself by presenting a pair of figures: during the *Jamahiriya*, the Libyans who were forced into exile numbered in the hundreds, whereas now, millions of Libyans have had to leave their home country because of the civil war.[75]

Pan-Arab satellite TV channels constitute the LPNM's main medium for the advancement of its particular rhetoric regarding Libyan politics, society and history. As a general rule, LPNM's public pronouncements ascribe the "grave crisis" in Libya to the Muslim Brotherhood,[76] Operation Libya Dawn, etc. Hence, these Islamist groups, like al Qaeda, are designated as Islamist extremists and terrorists from the LPNM's standpoint. The GNC's employment of Islamist militias had become one of the main avenues for LPNM rhetorical attacks. Therefore, despite being a source of tension in the Egyptian-Libyan bilateral relationship, the LPNM does not represent a security threat for Egypt, but a welcome presence in strengthening Egypt's narrative of opposition to Islamist extremism, and decimating Islamist militants' political power.

Conclusion

A direct outcome of the 2011 Libyan civil warfar and an immediate manifestation of the political punishment, for many *fulul* of the *Jamahiriya* regime, being exile is also a political process heading toward their future of returning to the home country's political arena. In Egypt (and quite likely also in other host countries for Libyan exiles), the Libyan political exiles' existential contour and activism diverge structurally, discursively and operationally, with each tendency having its own political capitals, survival strategies and scheme of sociopolitical activities. While indicative of the fracturing of their interests in the absence of a single powerful figure or the binding force after Qaddafi's demise, this heterogeneity, emergent among one homogenous (vis-à-vis the February revolutionaries and post-2011 main political actors in terms of identity labeling) segment of the broader conflict-generated Libyan transnational community in Cairo, demonstrates the resilience of the legacy of the *Jamahiriya* regime and of the *al Fateh* revolutionary ideology, in particular Libyan fidelity to tribal kinship ideologies and Pan-Arabism respectively, in the *fulul*'s struggling for a share in post-Qaddafi Libya's political reordering, as has shown the case study of the LPNM in its seeking ideological alliance globally and doing media politics through the Arabic satellite TV channels.

75 "*Liqā'u al-a'kh asa'd zahuw a'lai qanāt al-ghad al-arabiyy fi barnāmij maghārībiyāt 20/2/2014,*"
     15:49.
76 "Egyptian Air Strikes in Libya Kill Dozens of ISIS Militants," *the Guardian*, accessed Apil 1, 2017,
     http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/egypt-air-strikes-target-isis-weapons-stockpiles-libya.

However, the Libyan political exiles' fate is determined by the host state; and to be precise, by the value which Egypt could exploit in the favor of its own political interests. Al-Azhar perceived sponsoring the conciliation between the exiles, Libyan Islamists, nationalist-seculars and the Egyptian authorities as a process leading toward its re-emergence as an influential player in Egypt's power vacuum. Thus, while Egypt was being led by the SCAF, under al-Azhar sponsorship, Libyan exiles were accepted by the Egyptian officials and several other regional actors in the multilateral conciliation dialogue. The Morsi government's political culture of exclusion deteriorated the long-lasting tense relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Azhar, resulting in the latter's discontinuing the conciliation effort. Instead of an opportunity to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood's alliance with Libyan Islamist forces, in his response to the Libyan authorities' requirement of extradition, Morsi treated the Libyan political exile as a bargaining chip which he availed of ameliorating Egypt's economic problems--an economic expediency in the Muslim Brotherhood's transition management. Since Sisi's taking power, Libyan political exiles turned to be a welcome presence. Their activism, in particular of media politics, functions as Egypt's proxy propaganda tool in strengthening the state's narrative of opposition to Islamist extremism, and decimating Islamist militants' political power, which is a central issue in the Egyptian authorities' assessment of the national and regional security maintenance. Sisi is likely to continue the pro-exile policy, as long as Islamist extremism remains a threat, both ideologically and operationally, to the state.

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