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Dear Readers and Contributors,

It is with great pleasure we announce to you that, as of today, Global Politics Review has become an Open Access Journal. There will be no more paywalls, subscription fees, transfer of copyrights, or restrictive licenses. GPR will be available for free, for everyone, at anytime.

Our previous business model based on subscriptions was, simply put, short-sighted. As a young non-profit journal, we were short on funding and hoped to be able to cover our expenses by charging the readers a fee. Subscriptions were, at least we thought, a fair compromise. We were wrong. Hiding our articles behind a paywall damaged the dissemination of the journal and discouraged new authors from submitting their manuscripts. At the same time, the paywall did not generate any meaningful financial return since most of the revenue was held by intermediaries and distributors.

We offered a subscription waiver for students enrolled in universities worldwide, but only a few dozen of them ended up applying to our waiver program. Looking at the user behavior flow on our website, we noticed that most users, even those eligible to the waiver program, were simply leaving the website after visiting the page listing the subscription fees. We also noted that the articles outside of the paywall were the most read, with, on average, five times the downloads of those published within our paywall.

Despite all the limitations and obstacles caused by our paywall, we still experienced dramatic growth over the past two years. The number of monthly visitors to our website continues to grow, downloads of our articles via university libraries are on the rise, and submissions of abstracts and manuscripts have sharply increased since the introduction of our online submission form for peer review. Most importantly, our articles are cited more frequently and have proven to be a vehicle for new ideas and perspectives in the academic community.

By becoming an Open Access journal, we hope to reach an even broader audience that transcends the boundaries of academia. We want our work to be available to everyone, everywhere—regardless of their affiliation or geographical location. We want Global Politics Review to nurture new generations of scholars, deepen how research is practiced across disciplines, and mobilize knowledge on relevant public issues. Most importantly, we want the ideas and findings of our authors to spread and be a source of social innovation.

We believe social science still has an important role to play in informing citizens and scholars alike. Too often it is ignored and misused by practitioners. Too often it is used to justify policies behind a pretense of neutrality and scientific rigor. Development projects, foreign policies and defense budgets will always find a social science study to justify themselves. And also for this reason, it is important that we are all aware of the multitude
of studies and academic debates that validate or contradict the foundations on which policies are made. Free open access to academic publications is not only a necessity to academics across the world, but also a necessity to all those who want to make conscious civic decisions and participate in the public debate. Information is, indeed, power.

We only see one viable future for our publication. One in which GPR is available to everyone, everywhere, for free. It took us a while to understand this, but as we say here at our secretariat in Italy: *meglio tardi che mai.*

The Editorial Board
Letter from the Editor

The theme for the October 2017 Issue is “Populism in Foreign Policy.” Over the last year, the rise of populism has become a hotly debated topic—particularly in the West. Brexit and the stunning election of Donald Trump as president of the U.S. are widely considered to be evidence of a populist surge. In Europe, populist parties on the left and right side of the political spectrum have gained influence and threatened to upset traditional politics. And while defeats for populist leaders in Austria, the Netherlands, and France may suggest the rise of populism has been exaggerated, its presence outside the Western world and its potential influence on foreign policy cannot be ignored.

Generally defined as the struggle between “the people” and “the elites,” in the global context, populism is viewed as a backlash against the economic and cultural effects of globalization. Recently, this populist backlash has been criticized for having links to nativism, jingoism, and authoritarianism. However, populist leaders have emerged in various forms across a wide range of political and geographical terrain. In this issue, we want to focus on how these various manifestations of populism have played a role in foreign policymaking.

For this issue, which comes in a reduced size, we have focused on collecting insightful and provocative papers and essays that survey the intersections between populism and foreign policy. In a time when many are increasingly aware of the US decline in the international order, David A. Tizzard argues the opposite and explains how international regimes, capitalist market economy, defence spending and soft power will allow the US to remain the point of reference of a unipolar intranational system for years to come.

Ela Goksun focuses on the rise of populism and its effects on the erosion of liberal values in the EU. She ties the link between national level politics, public opinion, migration, liberal values, and EU foreign policy.

Catherine Kane and Caitlin McCulloch look at the international level and analyse the intersections between transnational populism and international affairs. In particular, they trace nativism and anti-establishment sentiments among Western countries as a source for change in diplomacy and foreign politics attitudes.

Finally, Phillip Gary Schrank studies the implications of the rise of populism in the United States for NATO and Europe. As he explains, NATO in its current form is inimical to populism and, in order to survive, it must re-invent itself by retrenching back to its borders and by engaging with Russia.

On behalf of the Editorial Board of Global Politics Review, I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to our editors, reviewers, scientific committee members, and the authors.
I hope that all readers of this issue find its contents informative and engaging.

Cesare M. Scartozzi

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American Unipolarity: The Uneven Distribution of Power

David Andrew Tizzard

ABSTRACT: Polarity is an often used and yet frequently under-analyzed term in International Relations. It is designed in its usage to shed light on the distribution of power in the global system. This paper seeks to understand the order of the world at the systemic level in a descriptive manner while recognizing the challenges that arise from attempting to do so. It comes to the conclusion that the hierarchical structure remains unipolar in form – dominated both materially and ideationally by the United States. Moreover, this unipolarity is likely to continue over the next half a century and see a whole host of nations become more and more organized under the direction of one global power. Whether or not this is desirable remains to be seen.

Keywords: Polarity, Neorealism, Unipolarity, Military Domination, Ideational Control.

Introduction

Thus it is possible...for the contemporary student or practitioner of international politics, contemplating the vast and amorphous world body politic, to distinguish the relations among the great powers as its essential skeleton.


Determining the polarity of the global system is notoriously difficult. Despite such difficulties, in the world of International Relations, scholars are prone to “rely on polarity to measure the distribution of power.”¹

Knowing, then, that polarity is rather commonplace as a concept among those that examine the world and seek to answer questions of war and peace, it would serve us well to ensure that we understand it as best we can. Of course, man is often wont to try and reduce the vast and teeming perplexity of the world to simple logic and formulas. The desire to put into concise boxes the fuzziness of the world is one of the traits of science and reason.

Though we face such difficulties, polarity is important because it helps us understand not only the hierarchical positions of the various state actors on the international stage, but also the very nature of the rostrum itself. Whilst Shakespeare famously observed that “all the world’s a stage,” he did not provide us with much information regarding the type


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of platform upon which people made their entrances and exits.

Polarity is also significant because through a fuller understanding of the international situation, we will be better equipped to handle the challenges and prospects that lie ahead in terms of war and peace. Such problems and prospects may arise in a multitude of areas: nation-states, non-state actors, the climate, global financial stability, or the misuse of technological advances. Many of these difficulties are not bound by national boundaries and will thus require a unified approach to combat successfully. Such a method only comes from a holistic and systemic view. The more accurate the comprehension and grasp of International Relations (IR) and the resultant polarity, the more likely it is that well-informed decisions can be made in all of these areas and beyond.

This paper will briefly explain the concept of polarity, explore the various forms in which it exists, and then attempt to ascertain the level of global polarity today. In doing so, it makes the following claims: Despite the claims of many that we have witnessed a transformation in the global structure, the polarity remains unipolar. That is, one country has a far larger share of the distribution of power than any others. As a result of both its material and ideational forces, utilizing both military hardware and the success of its culture and entertainment industry, the United States continues to sit atop the systemic hierarchy and will remain that way for some time. While challenges to its position do exist, the presence of such rivals and the work spent tracing their advances serves only to confirm that it is the US that remains the world’s hegemon.

What is Polarity?

It will serve us well to engage in a brief explanation of polarity. This will ensure we are better able to ascertain the most accurate description of where the systemic level is at today. Polarity in IR is a concept that can be traced back to Thucydides. The Greek historian Thucydides documented the inevitable war that arose from Athenian growth, in terms of political and military power, and the resultant fear that this produced in the state of Sparta. Harvard Professor Graham Allison describes the situation thus: “This is the phenomenon that I have labeled Thucydides’s Trap: the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one.”

Both Athens and Sparta at the national level reacted in various ways to the turbulence caused by the ever-changing political situation and hierarchical tension. As Allison notes, it is the “structural stress” that results in the likelihood of war. The structure of which he speaks is the stage of IR: polarity.

Another important way of understanding polarity is through the work of scholar Kenneth Waltz. He draws our attention to three levels of analysis in terms of International Relations: the individual level, the national level, and the structural level. Each of these

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is distinct from each other. The individual needs the least explanation for it appears self-evident. Leaders, politicians, and powerful figures are involved in the act of International Relations and they make decisions which have ramifications often well beyond the borders of their own state. The second level, the nation, is a little trickier. Whilst we are all familiar with the nation-state as a concept in the modern age, it does not have any real physicality of which to speak. A landmass may have mountains, rivers, and other geographical features. It may have inhabitants, places of governance, and architectural features. The actual nation, however, is a combination of all of these things and many more: the insignia and anthems that present themselves in societies’ collective consciousnesses. The third is the most difficult to comprehend for it exists solely as a theoretical concept. Global polarity as such has no tangible qualities with which to associate it. Waltz says of the difference: “Changes in the structure of the system are distinct from changes at the unit level. Thus changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security.”

Polarity is thus a global term. It describes not any individual number of states but instead the entirety of them all and the form in which they exist. Moreover, it provides those that analyze it with an understanding of hierarchy and how the states are arranged inside such a structure. We know naturally that some states have a larger influence on world events than others. It then follows that we will want to know the order in which influence can be exerted. According to the interior make-up of the major powers inside, we are also able to understand whether the structure is determined to be complex, symmetrical, or singular: determined by multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar arrangements, respectively.

Three Main Polarity Types

There are the three main strands of polarity that have been attributed to the world’s systemic architecture: unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. There are others that have been suggested, most notably nonpolarity and tripolarity. However, for fear of being lost in a never-ending sequence of numbers, we will begin our exploration from the firmly-established set of three. We defend such a choice by affirming that history has given evidence of these three existing and that common sense sees them as indispensable to the exploration.

Unipolarity is said to occur when one state dominates the globe in terms of military might, cultural force, and economic power. This can also be seen as hegemonic position, as it is controlled by a single actor. With the fall of the Soviet Union towards the end of the twentieth century, the global structure became unipolar, with the United States taking the reins. When such a situation occurs, the superpower has the ability to act all around the world – often with impunity and in a way that does not always accord with national interests. A

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unipolar system is said to be unstable because many will seek to challenge and usurp its hegemonic control and create a state of multipolarity. The necessary commitment needed to see off all changes for a prolonged period of time is often out of the reach of even the most powerful of states.

Bipolarity is when this domination of various factors is distributed between two – normally competing – states. As a result of such competition between the two, other lesser states are liable then to fall in line behind one or the other for security. Such limited alliance potential provides states with less room to maneuver and provides a more secure international structure. The United States and the Soviet Union have somewhat recently both been contributing factors to a bipolar hierarchical structure. Moreover, the Cold War – despite its name – provided a relatively peaceful time in our history as there were no major hot wars or armed conflicts between any of the larger powers. There was, of course, a large rivalry which produced a lot of unpleasant politics, as well as proxy conflicts in Africa and Asia. However, the battlegrounds during this period of bipolarity were predominantly economic. This time of bipolar stability came to an end with the abandonment of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and finally, the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991.

Multipolarity takes place when more than two states have an equal distribution of the world’s resources and exert military, cultural, and economic pressures upon each other. Such a system raises the possibility of tension and conflict as rival nations and states compete with each other for power and influence. The hostility and friction that exists between large powers in such a systemic structure is a key feature of multipolarity. Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the abdication of Napoleon I, The Congress of Vienna in 1815 divided territories and split spheres of power between the major powers of the time: Austria, Britain, France, Russia, and Prussia. This multipolar global system resulted in such rivalry and hostility that it finally unraveled in the first half of the twentieth century through two devastating wars.

Influenced by the geographic make-up of the region, the cultural diversity, as well as the theorizing of scholars like Acharya, people in Southeast Asia – as well as in other traditionally less powerful countries – might tend towards multipolar views of the international system. They see the world as a series of cultures and peoples, each with their own sovereignty, power, and right to not only act on the world stage, but also to move the system and the other second image nations through the force of their will and ideas.

Which is said to be the most accurate description of the world’s polarity is left to be debated, for the polarity of the international system is not something that lends itself to being readily tested in an empirical manner. It floats above us in an almost ephemeral form; elusive, yet there. It is seemingly constructed socially in the world of academic exploration and the minds of scholars yet still remains very real for the nation states.
that play out their games on the world’s chessboard and move their military pieces in accordance with how they view the world’s architecture.

Kenneth Waltz has said that in terms of understanding the polarity of any age “one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt about marginal cases.” The United States is clearly a great power today. That much seems certain. How great a power and how strong a hold it has on the global polarity is to be assessed. Whether it has a dominant share of the world’s power distribution will determine whether the system still remains hegemonic.

How to Measure Polarity

Various architectures can be championed from a normative position in the hope of bringing about greater global security at a systemic level as well as increased peace and freedoms at both the individual and national levels. The multipolar system and the constant, ever-nagging, possibility of war may be seen as far more desirable than a stagnant and repressive tyranny under the promise of peace. A bipolar world from a theoretical perspective provides greater hierarchical stability as it keeps a single hegemon in check. Bipolarity is a system composed of two poles (rather than one or many) and often focus on alliances, a balance of power, and lower levels of economic interdependence.

At the moment, however, we concern ourselves only with the descriptive nature of the third image polarity. It is not our duty here to move beyond merely attempting to describe how the global architecture is seen. Like Hedley Bull and his 1977 text *The Anarchical Society*, we simply seek to understand “order” in world politics. The order that manifests itself exists independently of any organization, law, or normative dimension.

To find a solution to the problem of the measurement of polarity, the most direct route would be that espoused by Waltz in the previous section: “general agreement” and common sense. Pole status can be said to be attributed to a state not solely by itself, but instead by others. If other states treat the actor as if it is a great power and the possessor of a large share of the world’s influence, then it is likely to be so. States do not willingly relinquish power or cede authority to others without good reason. However, because polarity is determined by both material and ideational attributes, the search for accurate measurement of the global system should be widened.

Polarity has been measured according to material factors before. Such analysis can been in the arms race between Germany and England around the turn of the twentieth century. Both of these European states competed with each other in terms of how many naval destroyers they were able to produce. The number of ships they possessed gave an indication to the state leaders of their respective power (or lack thereof) against the other. The Cold War also saw an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union with

6 Allison, *Destined for War*. 
both participants pushing both their nuclear and space capabilities so as to intimidate and out-gun the other.

Efforts therefore might be made to truly ascertain the global systemic polarity by the measurement of certain competing variables. This provides a more quantitative dimension. Perhaps the most formulaic assessment of polarity was provided by J. David Singer in 1972. This particular attempt to determine such polarity pitted the number of states in the system against the power possessed by various states. Other ways might include, but not be limited to, gross domestic product, defense budget spending, military armaments, nuclear capabilities, population, percentage of global trade, position and authority in various supra-national and transnational organizations, and engagement and victories in military conflicts.

This brings us to the ideational form of measuring polarity. As has already been asserted, the global systemic structure, known in IR as polarity, is essentially created by individuals that inhabit the various nation states around the world. It does not exist in a physical or tangible form, which allows for objective or empirical verification. Were there no people, it is somewhat safe to say that there would be no polarity.

Our description of the polarity of the international system may therefore be affected by where we perceive it to be from; it might also change according to how it is perceived by different people endogenously and exogenously. For example, when ideas are formed of the various states’ power, they will likely be informed by the political orientation of those that assess the structure. Those steeped in the world of realism and the works of scholars such as Waltz and Mearsheimer see the world as an anarchic battleground for warring states and clashing billiard balls. Such theoretical starting points might produce markedly different notions of polarity when held in contrast to more liberally-inclined thinkers such as Keohane or Nye who favour cooperation and integration. The lens through which the structural polarity is observed will in turn often determine the structure that is seen by the observer.

Such understandings of a state’s relative power is created by a mirrored action by other states. Only when a variety of states engage in this behavior, assessing their own image of power as well as that of others, do we truly get the ideational understanding of a global hierarchy. For polarity to be truly understood we need to understand – as in the work of Thucydides and later analysts of his work – both the growth of Athens and, simultaneously, the fear that this produced in Sparta.

Thus, we might work from an initial starting point that in the third image of systemic analysis the polarity is semi-relative. It is a combination of both material and ideational aspects. We, from a specific and subjective position in a second image perspective,

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compile the material aspects of power of a state, and add to them those ideational features with which we associate it. Then, that is compared to our perception of other states, for were there just one we would not need to talk of either international relations or polarity, and the concept we know as global polarity is understood. Here we are treading close, it would seem, to Alexander Wendt and his work regarding the anarchy of states.9

**Polarity is what States Make of It?**

* A state that wins a war has acquired what can usefully be thought of as a sort of “windfall” of power assets.

G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (2016: 4)

Let us try to find justification for our initial answer to the world’s current polarity as that remains a cornerstone of this work. To do so, we step back a little in order to provide some perspective. Following on from the Congress of Vienna in 1815, major powers in Europe created multiple poles of power. This systemic distribution and volatile hierarchy eventually unfolded into two armed conflicts at the start of the twentieth century. The end of the Second World War saw the arrival of a bipolar world. The United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other in a cold war that saw proxy battles, an arms race at home and abroad, and the division of much of the world into two distinct spheres of influence. Following the Second World War in Europe, many of the elites and those in positions of power – such as Winston Churchill and Jean Monnet - had not only an affinity for America, but also deeper family, business, and cultural ties. And thus before the Schuman Plan for Europe was ever written, the American Marshall Plan was enacted.

Otherwise known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), this American-led initiative was designed to aid in the reconstruction of the region following the devastation of the war. Beginning on April 8, 1948 it provided more than $13 billion to the continent so as to support the required trade and industry developments as well as integrate the states with each other and act as a barrier against a communist threat which was perceived from the east. The Russian designs on Europe were known as the Molotov Plan and this was said to have been in place since before the end of the war and aimed at Russian domination of the European markets.10

Both Russia and the United States had specific visions for the European market and neither of these were that disguised. The Marshall Plan stood against the Molotov Plan and one would be enacted so as to provide the interested countries with what they desired from Europe – regional control and a greater influence on the systemic level polarity. As Brzezinski would later spell out, “It is axiomatic that the security of America and Europe are linked.”11

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The United States, France and Great Britain chose to side and give money to a country they had just engaged in two world wars against – Germany – rather than a country that had not only been an ally in the previous conflict but one without which victory could not have been assured, the Soviet Union. Lord Palmerston’s observation of there being no permanent allies or enemies, but only permanent interests, rarely rang truer than in that particular moment.

Fawcett spells this clear global division and quest for supremacy over a troubled region clearly in saying that, “Regional agencies were subordinated to the broader purposes of the East-West conflict, indeed many were specifically designed to serve the interests of one of the two superpowers.”\textsuperscript{12} Hurrell, from a theoretical perspective, supports this idea and references the work of Kenneth Waltz in doing so: “Regionalism is understood by looking at the region from the outside in and by analyzing the place of the region in the broader international system.”\textsuperscript{13} The broader international system is thus made up of actors within a structure and as Wyatt-Walter indicates, the actors primarily involved in the process of European regional integration were the United States and the Soviet Union: “After US attempts to establish the Bretton Woods system in the early post-war years failed, the USA promoted a solution more in keeping with its security objective of anchoring Western Europe in a firmly anti-Soviet alliance.”\textsuperscript{14}

More evidence of the American and Soviet conflict being the key idea behind European integration can be found in Mayall: “After 1945 an attempt was made to design an international order based on principles of co-operation rather than conflict. The intention was to reconcile rival claims and interests at the national, regional, and universal levels, but the East-West conflict quickly overshadowed this attempt.”\textsuperscript{15}

This bipolar world was to come to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire. With the newly-formed Russia facing dramatic economic, military, and social problems, as well as an ever-encroaching NATO and expanding EU, the world became unipolar. But what made it so? Kenneth Waltz’s above assertion of common sense still rings true. In the early 1990s, no other countries had anywhere near the prominence that the United States did in world affairs. Most, if not all, nation states perceived the US as being as an undisputed superpower on the world stage – and there were few, if any, that would have been perceived as an equal superpower by others. The American system, composed of its economic power, soft-culture, and military strength, touched nearly every part of the globe. Almost nothing could or would occur

\textsuperscript{13} Andrew Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” in \textit{Regionalism in World Politics} (Oxford University Press, 1995), 47.
\textsuperscript{14} Andrew Wyatt-Walter, “Regionalism and World Economic Order,” in \textit{Regionalism in World Politics} (Oxford University Press, 1995), 81.
without it being of some importance to American interests. The concept of “American Exceptionalism” was pushed forward and there was a sense that the United States would engage in military conflict if and when it saw fit rather than whether or not it had the support of the wider global community. Such an attitude is adopted only by a state that considers itself to be the single authority in a unipolar world.

The new millennium has seen social and political changes in the West, as well as the rise of developing countries elsewhere. Such progressive movement has led to talk of the multipolar world or even a “multiplex world.” This championing of multiple nodes of influence, however, would appear to be based on notions of individualism, representation, and sovereignty that reflect the humanitarian spirit of the modern age rather than any true reflection of the world’s systemic architecture. There has been the arrival of non-western IR theory (NWIRT) as well as the increased representation of minority groups in both the media and political sphere. This has led many to feel that a sea-change has arrived; this paper suggests that in realer terms, however, no such thing has occurred.

American President Donald Trump has signaled his intent to increase the defense budget of the country by an extra $54 billion dollars in 2018. The country’s total spending is around $600 billion: approximately one-third of the entire globe’s total expenditure. Such large amounts point to a clear military supremacy. And not just that, one that seeks to further maximize its position through the use of economic might and budget reallocation. America retains a strong nuclear presence in Europe designed to thwart any potential Russian adventurism. Figures are said to be “between 150 and 200 warheads based in Italy, Turkey, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands” according the 2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength. This is supplemented by major bases in Asia (including South Korea and Japan) designed to thwart any prospect of China asserting claims on regional hegemony. The use of a two power standard means that a superpower will work towards creating a military force that is equal to its two nearest competitors combined. In doing so, it helps secure the position in the global hierarchy and discourage any rivals from disrupting the polarity or balance of power. This is in line with the “two power standard” adopted and carried out by Britain for its naval fleets in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Just as the superpower of Britain previously adopted such an approach, the United States seems to be following in those footsteps.

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Overall totals are, however, often confined to a single snapshot and do not provide any sense of longitudinal analysis. The United States’ continued focus on military might has come in response to not only China’s newfound economic power but rather the dramatic increased spending on defense. Whilst the total spending on China remains far behind that of the US – as well as its forces being confined primarily to the East Asian region – the total increase in spending on products of war and peace has been estimated to be as high as 61 percent.20

**Other Poles in the Global Structure?**

Such dramatic increases in China’s material resources were enhanced in an ideational manner by its staging of a massive military parade in late 2015 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and the defeat of Japan. This huge national event was not simply designed for a domestic and internal audience – it was one very much aimed at the outside world. As more than 12,000 troops paraded through Tiananmen Square – along with other armored vehicles and nuclear weapons – Xi Jinping delivered a speech notable for its anti-Japanese rhetoric as well as a promise to “never seek hegemony or expansion.”21 Russian President Vladimir Putin was in attendance as was former Communist party president Jiang Zemin and, perhaps surprisingly, then South Korean President Park Geun Hye. The United States and Japan both declined to attend the event.

Vladimir Putin has attempted to reign in American unilateral decision making. In his well-documented 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, he lambasted the US for attempting to subvert democratic practices through the seeking of unipolarity. Perhaps more interestingly, Putin suggested that the ontological origins of the term – or at least their re-envisioning following the end of the Cold War – was a form of ideational, rather than material, hegemonic action. The very term itself was being discussed in both politics and the academic world to give credence to the very world that the US either sought (in Putin’s view) or, more likely, possessed: “what is happening in today’s world – and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.”22

Despite Putin’s best efforts to reassert Russian dominance on the world stage – something that he sees as part of a necessary balancing act – his country remains encircled by American forces and weapons. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 under President George W. Bush and then created the Missile Defense Agency. NATO has expanded into Eastern Europe on three separate occasions:

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20  Defense spending by country 2012 - 2016.
2004, 2009, and 2017. These expansions saw countries previously under some degree of Russian influence move close to American control. The most recently recognized NATO states in 2017 (Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) have served to increase the tension between Russia and the US but also demonstrate the latter’s growing supremacy in the region.

American vessels also patrol off the coast of Alaska, and so Russia finds itself with little place to go and is likely to be further diminished by events in the continuing “Great Game” of the Middle East in which it is historically, politically, and – to some extent – geographically embroiled.

**Global Polarity vs Regional Polarity**

In International Relations, there is no higher power above the various self-interested states able to keep them in check. Thus, the possibility of war will always remain. Because of this, many states constantly find themselves operating under the umbrella of mightier powers who play the role of the structure’s security. The polarity police, if you will forgive both the alliteration and metaphor.

China is no-doubt asserting itself. However, it cannot be said to rival the United States on a global systemic level. Regionally, the competition for hegemony has grown stronger with North Korea’s latest nuclear missile test in September 2017 as well as the deployment of the THAAD battery in South Korea. However, this regional struggle is not repeated the globe over. And polarity refers to the distribution of power at a global systemic level rather than a regional level. The Cold War bipolar systemic image had countries siding with both the US and the Soviet Union and thus essentially producing two main blocks of influence (while also accounting for the non-aligned movement). Today though, lesser states do not seem to be siding with China at a noticeable rate – either in terms of bandwagoning or balancing against threat. Russia asserts itself frequently – both in its rhetoric and via proxy in the Middle East; however, such movement seems more of a form of posturing than any real trend towards genuine challenge of the established hierarchical order. There is seemingly no evidence of what was witnessed in a previous age in terms of bipolarity and its characteristics.

Neither is the systemic level multipolar – as demonstrated by the ease with which America dwarves other states in terms of spending and force. Countries that pride themselves on their economic development and global standing do not enjoy any real sense of sovereignty or freedom. Their claims to multipolarity tend to remain mainly aspirational or steeped in more social and democratic ideals of individual rights and state sovereignty rather than any authentic power. Some point to Japan as a possible node of multipolarity because of its recent imperialistic history, technology, and finance. This,

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however, ignores the structure of East Asia.

The East Asian region remains one of the world’s most interesting and volatile places – home to democracies, communist countries, friends, enemies, and nuclear weapons. Henry Kissinger observed that no Asian language even had a term for this collective continent until the arrival of Western powers and influence. The very idea or notion of “Asia” is thus one that has been created by the West to better understand and, consequently, manage this disparate and yet vitally important part of the world.

Hans Morgenthau specifically identified Korea as a prime example of the balance-of-power theory in action; a land in which theoretical ideas are given life and validity as they are acted out. In doing so, he described it as a country in which more powerful external states, such as China and Japan, fought for control – and when one’s grip loosened, the other looked to take advantage: “Thus, for more than two thousand years the fate of Korea has been a function of either of the predominance of one nation controlling Korea, or of a balance of power between two nations competing for that control.”

Therefore, while systemic realism may be true for a great military and global power such as the United States, the concept of an anarchic world does not necessarily apply to the Korean Peninsula. That particular world is not anarchic. It is not anarchic because there is a clear regional hegemon - the United States - and a challenger to its position - China. Northeast Asia for Korea, therefore, has and continues to be hierarchic. Kang has noted: “Hierarchy can be global as well as regional, and the United States is clearly the dominant state both in the international order and in Asia.”

When a superpower, such as the United States now or previously the Soviet Union, observes the third level international system from a second level perspective (that of the state), it sees nothing above it. It sees, as realists and others posit, nothing more than anarchy. A self-help world in which there is no sovereign actor other than the state itself. And yet when a country such as South Korea or Japan looks from the second to the third level image, they do not see such anarchy. They see only hierarchy. The nature of this hierarchy of course may change over time; however, the fundamental principle remains the same. There is a barrier for these states between the second and third level images. There exists another level: image 2.5 – the control.

This image has been willingly neglected since inception by the main practitioners, among them Waltz: “It would be... ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica... A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers.” And yet the image certainly does exist and as

the world becomes ever smaller in terms of knowledge and understanding, it is perhaps time that such an image becomes acknowledged in the systemic analysis of international relations and political science.

This control is akin to the concept of the “glass ceiling” that is well-known in more cultural and social realms. It refers to a barrier and obstacle to progression and development – often one which is discriminatory in nature. The glass ceiling is established by the ruling power in order that it might protect its interests and prevent any others from challenging such hegemonic control. It protects polarity; in this case, unipolarity.

Many lesser states attempt to use regional, economic, or even political integration so as to try and counter the balance of much stronger and more powerful nations. This has not been possible in East Asia, however, as America has continued to favour the hub-and-spoke method of bilateral relations to stop any major blocs from forming.

Polarity and Perpetual Promises

The conclusion reached by the author is that the world remains today undoubtedly unipolar. Regardless of whether it is observed endogenously or exogenously, the same interpretation applies. The United States dominates the global systemic architecture. It is also likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. That is not to say that such a state is desirable – it is merely to state what exists. We might, looking far enough afield, also determine according to the experience of history that the American unipolar world will, too, one day come to an end.

Such a cessation of events, however, does not seem likely to occur within the next few generations. Even with the rise of nuclear weapons among non-aligned states (such as North Korea and Pakistan) the world remains very much at peace. This is not to say that the entire world enjoys such basic qualities – much of the Middle East has been ravaged by US foreign policy and the subsequent actions of all other actors on the stage. For, whenever the United States moves, the stage reverberates and this affects both the delivery of others’ lines as well as their placement.

Rather than any rise of multipolarity or any other form of systemic world order, it is concluded here that the world order is likely to become more unipolar over the next half a century. American influence will become more ingrained through the continued spread of its soft power. Such mediums will tell the story of the twentieth century in a manner that best suits the needs and interests of those making the films. Hollywood after all is neither peer reviewed nor is it subject to historical fact-checking or criticisms.

But the very real and tangible material and empirical factors are important. The United States has recently taken pride in dropping “the mother of all bombs” on Afghanistan in April 2017 and it will continue to advance its military in a way that other states are simply unable or unwilling to do. The US has created a republic in which the military industrial complex in a capitalist system has thrived as it seeks to maintain its two power

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28 Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective.”
standard. The necessity of competition has driven it to make staggering developments and advancements in offensive and defensive capabilities. Moreover, such technological developments as well as the structure of the economic capitalist system will perhaps see military action encouraged abroad so as to continue the growth of the industry and profits rather than face stagnation.

In this final sense it is the capitalist economic system that will push the American military further and further around the globe, seeking new fields and blue oceans for continued expansion and development. This will engulf any form of completion and suffocate much of the globe. The presence of nuclear weapons has ensured that there will likely be no hot war between nations of any size – and such absence of war may result in the total unipolarity of the world – for better or for worse.

Despite such a prediction based on an analysis of the global system and its polarity, let us close with some words from a scholar that always deserves our attention. Kenneth Waltz: “A series of nation-states with a perpetual danger of war is preferred by some to a world state with a perpetual promise of peace but likely tyranny.”

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29 Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War.
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Influencing the EU’s Foreign Policy on Asylum and Migration: Populist Political Dynamics and Cooperation with (Un)safe Third Countries

Ela Goksun

ABSTRACT: The rise of populism and its effect on the erosion of liberal values in the EU is a current prime focus in international politics. This paradigm shift also brings with it another important question related to the EU’s foreign policy priorities. Such an angle is of particular importance in the current international environment, where a multitude of exogenous factors are resulting in responses which appear to be rooted in political realism. The EU’s external policy towards the current asylum and migration crisis is one such example. The EU has opted for an increasingly inward looking foreign policy that prioritizes cooperation with third countries as an exclusionary tool. Outsourcing the issue may appease the rising populist sentiments in the short term. In the long term, however, it raises questions about safeguarding the EU’s liberal values vis-à-vis using leverage to achieve cooperation with potentially unsafe third countries of origin and transit. This essay recognizes that populism at the central and national level in the EU is pulling the center further right and influencing public opinion. In turn, this is resulting in an increasingly closed and intolerant foreign policy. This essay acknowledges that international politics cannot be solely based on normative judgements. Going forward, however, the EU should balance a pragmatic migration strategy with the founding values of an open and liberal Europe.

Keywords: EU, Foreign Policy, Asylum, Migration, Liberalism, Populism.

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Influencing EU’s foreign policy on asylum and migration

Rising right-wing populist influence within the EU brings with it questions related to its effect on the EU’s foreign policy. Populist parties now hold an important decision-making power in the European Parliament and have increased their significance across more than half of the EU member states. Given that anti-immigration is a central component of right-wing populism, the rise of populist parties at both the EU and national level is contributing to the normalization of populist rhetoric and the implementation of illiberal practices as the political center gets pulled further right. The outcome is a foreign policy response which ranks the protection of national sovereignty

1 Whilst populism exists in both the political left and right, this essay focuses on right-wing populism.

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and external borders vis-à-vis shared values related to the protection of human rights; the very principles on which the EU is founded on.

At the central level, the European Parliament is a co-legislator in asylum related legislation and therefore plays a critical role in the EU’s foreign policy. Right-wing populist parties “increased their vote share from around 15% in 2009 to 20% in 2014.”3 Coalitions such as the Europe of Nations and Freedom, European Conservatives and Reformists Group and the European Freedom and Direct Democracy group are increasingly at the forefront of criticizing the EU’s migration response. This is exemplified through the push for tougher anti-migration policies.

At the member state level, populist parties such as the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and the French National Front are challenging the status quo. They have made anti-immigration and xenophobia a central component of their political platform and have gained support from a wide voter base who are dissatisfied with traditional political parties and feel let down by the EU. This has led mainstream political parties such as the Dutch liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy to adopt a similar mindset. Indeed, in a climate characterized by increased political (and social) cleavages, a unifying factor has appeared out of a consensus to develop a stronger external EU immigration policy.

The question is: how are populist political dynamics influencing the EU’s foreign policy choices on asylum and migration as the political center is being pulled further right? This essay looks at the relationship between the normalization of populist rhetoric and the evolving partnerships with potentially unsafe third countries to answer this question. It argues that such partnerships are harmful to the EU’s liberal safeguards and contradict the principle of non-refoulement. This is not only detrimental to the effective protection of refugees and asylum seekers, but pragmatically speaking may also lead to the loss of the EU’s future influence in the neighborhood. Rather than buying into overtly simplistic populist rhetoric and focusing on short term solutions, the political center should retain its position and ensure that the EU acts as an interlocutor, entrenching the normative values of the EU in its foreign policy agenda on migration and asylum.

**Rising right-wing populism and migration in the EU**

Literature does not prescribe a uniform definition of right-wing populism. Looking at commonalities between different parties, however, demonstrates that right-wing populism is “essentially illiberal and prescribes a nativist ideology that syndicates xenophobia and nationalism.”4 According to Betz, right-wing populism entails the rejection of “social

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integration of marginalized groups, and [an] appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism.”

Wodak et al. identify issues of “race, immigration, national identity, welfare and social inequality” as central components of this ideology. At the supranational level, such parties share a “distrust of all EU institutions, a desire to return power to national institutions, opposition to further EU enlargement and calls for reduced immigration.”

With regards to the latter, there is a common exploiting of the fear of the “other.” This is coupled with the rejection of the EU’s response to the refugee crisis since the 2014 watershed moment when the migration crisis peaked in Europe. The EU has increasingly found itself under pressure to develop large-scale solutions to the rising number of people trying to enter the EU. The proximate response agreed on in 2015 focused on emergency measures to manage the physical influx of refugees and asylum seekers. However, ineffective central policy responses did not prevent the continued high number of people attempting to make the dangerous journey. Public criticism of the EU’s refugee response coupled with rising terror attacks in member states allowed populist parties at the central and national level to use their position to heavily criticize the EU’s seeming inability to protect its own borders and keep out people who pose a threat.

In an increasingly fragmented and disgruntled union, consensus has transpired on the issue of pursuing tougher anti-migration policies. Consequently, the center is being pulled further right as populist sentiment is getting stronger and gaining widespread public support. This is causing the EU’s normative foreign policy to be shaped by self-interest vis-à-vis the effective protection of fundamental rights of refugees. Indeed, the evolving relationship between the EU and third countries of origin and transit demonstrates this claim.

The evolving relationship with third countries in the EU’s migration policy

Cooperation with third countries first appeared on the EU’s agenda in 1994 when the Commission registered the need for cooperation with non-EU states on migration rooted

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in mutually beneficial partnerships. This followed with the Seville European Council conclusions of 2002 that called for a targeted approach to migration through “closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention.” The aim of the approach was to promote prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reduce the underlying causes of migration flows.

In 2008, the Commission re-expressed cooperation as a priority because “effective management of migration flows requires genuine partnership and cooperation with third countries [...]. The EU should work in close tandem with partner countries on opportunities for legal mobility, capacities for migration management, identification of migratory push factors, protecting fundamental rights, fighting illegal flows and enhancing possibilities to let migration work in service of development.” The approach highlighted the notion of genuine partnership and cooperation which indicated the EU’s recognition that effective migration management cannot be rooted only in immigration control. It must also entail the development of reciprocal partnerships that reflected the interest of all parties concerned.

This is especially interesting given the shift in the EU’s migration policy in the aftermath of the 2014 mass influx of refugees. Examining the current principles for cooperating with third countries shows that the EU’s reciprocal focus has shifted towards increasingly draconian measures. The 2016 Migration Partnership Framework, which seeks to establish a more coordinated systematic and structured cooperation with third countries such as Mali and Niger, for example, “raise awareness of partner countries on the consequences – the sticks – that may arise if they do not fully cooperate on readmission and return.”

It could be argued that many factors outside of rising populism can explain the shift away from reciprocity towards the carrot and stick approach with third countries. However, never before in the history of the union have the EU’s core values been under such forceful threat from right-wing ideology. In this current political climate, it is even more critical that European external policies combine a pragmatic approach with respect to human rights. Instead, an examination of the EU’s current partnership approach demonstrates

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13 Geddes, “Migration as Foreign Policy? The External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum,” 12.
that priority is placed on the effective administration of repatriation and return rather than on the protection of those fleeing instability and conflict.

The EU and third countries: carrot and stick

A shift from reciprocity towards a realpolitik response could be in part facilitated from growing populist influence on the political center of the EU. This shift is detrimental to the EU’s liberal values of the protection of human rights and especially the principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement is the cornerstone for the protection of refugees under international refugee law. It is enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Related to the Status of Refugees which states “no Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

The principle is also a central component of the EU’s fundamental rights regime, reflected in Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Charter and is also further specialized in secondary EU law. The EU acquis communautaire further prohibits the return of a person to real risk of serious harm deriving from indiscriminative violence in a situation of armed conflict. Non-refoulement not only prohibits the removal, expulsion or extradition to a country where a person may be at risk of persecution or serious harm, but also to “countries where individuals would be exposed to a serious risk of onward removal to such a country (indirect refoulement).” Both countries may bear responsibility in cases of indirect refoulement of returning an asylum-seeker to an alleged ‘safe’ third country. An examination of the EU’s foreign policy within the scope of readmission agreements and ‘safe’ third countries calls into question the EU’s full and effective protection of this principle.

Readmission agreements

EU readmission agreements are a foreign policy tool designed to increase the third country cooperation to facilitate higher return numbers of rejected asylum seekers. In the 2017 renewed Action Plan on a more Effective Return Policy in the European Union, the EU details that readmission agreements should focus on using EU assistance as an incentive to stimulate third countries to negotiate new readmission agreements. Presented as mutual engagements, these agreements favor the EU by imposing readmission clauses in all forms of development aid and economic and commercial cooperation. The current plan prioritizes Nigeria, Tunisia and Jordan as target countries and strives towards engaging

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16 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Guidance on how to reduce the risk of refoulement in external border management when working in or together with third countries,” 2016, Vienna.
For the EU, these readmission agreements derive their legitimacy from the fact that they are designed to facilitate the return of rejected asylum seekers to their country of origin based on the principle of state sovereignty. Whilst such agreements are not inherently bad per se, Giuiffre details two concerns. The first is related to when asylum-seekers are apprehended while illegally crossing the border, especially in situations of emergency with massive arrivals of mixed influxes. This leaves questions about whether the individual has gone through a fair identification procedure on a case-by-case basis as required in an effective asylum procedure.

The second concern is related to situations when asylum procedures are denied to those asylum-seekers who have transited through a ‘safe’ third country before soliciting protection within the borders of an EU member state. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe confirms that “if the state of return is not the state of origin, the removal (readmission) order should only be issued if the authorities of the host state are satisfied, as far as can reasonably be expected, that the state to which the person is returned will not expel him or her to a third state where he or she would be exposed to a real risk.” However, readmission through the ‘safe’ third country clause opens the way for a situation in which a person may be returned to a transit state with the risk of being deported back to the country of origin. This dangerous legal vacuum can occur when transit states enter into similar agreements with other countries of origin to continue the process. For example, Turkey and the EU signed a readmission agreement in 2011. Since then, Turkey has sought to establish bilateral agreements that are similar in nature to the EU’s readmission agreement with other third countries. Consequently, persons currently returned to Turkey under the EU-Turkey agreement may be subjected to deportation back to the country they fled from.

Recognition of safe third countries

Whilst readmission agreements are not a novel foreign policy instrument in the EU’s engagement with third countries, they have proven difficult and time-consuming to negotiate, with an average negotiation period of three years. Furthermore, it is difficult to issue an accelerated decision procedure due to complex legal requirements. And

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19 Ibid.
even if a forced return decision has been made, returnees then have the right to appeal a return decision thereby prolonging the procedure further. To circumvent this, the EU is developing more flexible and quicker types of agreements. One such approach is the development of a common list of safe third countries. The aim of this is to support the swift processing of asylum applications originating from countries designated as ‘safe.’

The European Agenda on Migration developed in 2015 includes a proposal of having an EU-wide common list of safe countries previously determined at the national level. In the period of 2015-2018, member states will be able to suggest to the EU Commission which other safe third countries should be added to the list. The aim of developing a common list of safe third countries is to enable asylum seekers to be sent back to the countries through which they transited before their arrival to the EU. According to the EU Asylum Procedures Directive:

> A country is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in [the recast Qualification Directive], no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.

Akin to the concerns raised above, this concept has serious detrimental consequences to the right to seek asylum. For example, it may facilitate the expedited examination of an application at the border or transit zone and possible return to the country from which the person transited. When migrants are sent back to a country of which they are not nationals, the transit country becomes de facto country of destination where a foreign national is at risk of being stranded there without a legal status or indeed being sent back to the country of origin from which they fled.

Using Turkey as an example again, the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement aims to halt the large-scale irregular movement of refugees and migrants from Turkey to Greece. Under the agreement, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece are to be sent back to Turkey and in exchange for each Syrian returned, another Syrian refugee will be resettled in the EU. As of June 2017, 1,798 people have been returned from Greece to Turkey; a figure which the EU views as a success. In his speech to the European Commission on June 13, 2017, Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner of Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, stated that “despite sometimes challenging circumstances [the deal] continues to deliver steady results.”

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22 Currently the EU’s list of safe countries of origin comprise of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.


At minimum, the EU’s recognition of Turkey as a ‘safe’ third country can be considered an obfuscation of international and European law protecting refugees and asylum seekers. First, Turkey has traditionally been a country of origin and consequently has little experience in being a country of transit or destination.\(^{25}\) This is reflected in its legal migration structure, which puts a geographical limitation on asylum seekers not originating from Europe. Instead, Turkey grants Syrians a special status of temporary protection, which is indefinite and prevents access to the full asylum procedure.\(^{26}\) Therefore, there is a need for Turkey to re-evaluate the limits imposed on the Geneva Convention.\(^{27}\) Second, there are concerns about the “speed of the procedure in Greece and whether a full individual assessment of a person’s claims can be completed in such a short timeframe.”\(^{28}\) Third, it is questionable whether there is sufficient connection between the asylum seeker and Turkey, a requirement under the Asylum Procedures Directive Article 37 (2a).\(^{29}\) Fourth, the deal carries the risk of indirect refoulement from Turkey on account of rejected asylum seekers being sent back to their country of origin as explained above.\(^{30}\) Fifth, there are also concerns about Turkey’s treatment of refugees and its ability to guarantee protection to asylum seekers. This includes a lack of infrastructure to accommodate returnees, a lack of capacity to process individual status determination and a lack of judicial capacity to review asylum cases.\(^{31}\)

Despite these concerns, the EU is looking to reach similar agreements with third countries, with a current focus on Egypt and Tunisia and potentially Libya, Afghanistan and Pakistan.\(^{32}\) In France and Germany’s “A crisis-resistant Common European Asylum System” recommendation note dated February 2017, it is stated that the EU-Turkey agreement is “a blueprint for future European asylum policy, also vis-à-vis other neighboring states.”\(^{33}\) The note mentions that the EU’s current Common European Asylum

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\(^{30}\) Jenny Poon, “EU-Turkey Deal: Violation of, or consistency with, international law?” *European Papers* 1, no. 3 (2016).

\(^{31}\) “No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey,” 16.


System (CEAS) does not allow for concluding such agreements due to high requirements which must be met in order to implement the forced return of asylum seekers. The note recommends that “in case of a crisis, a State may also be considered as a safe third country if it respects the non-refoulement principle and […] provides to returned or transferred asylum seekers safe and humane living conditions […]. Both a transit state and a third state ready for reception could qualify as a safe third country.”

In sum, readmission and safe third country agreements are focused on facilitating a robust migration policy of repatriation and forced return, thereby shifting the burden from the EU towards the third country of origin or transit. The conclusions of the European Council meeting of June 22-23, 2017 state that “further efforts shall also be made to achieve real progress in return and readmission policy […]. Well-functioning readmission agreements and pragmatic arrangements with third countries shall be put in place at EU level without any further delay by using all possible levers, including by reassessing visa policy towards third countries, as needed.” Reassessing visa policy here refers to making the visa procedure for regular migration tougher for uncooperative countries.

First, negative leverage is a clear dismemberment from the reciprocal cooperation approach previously prioritized by the EU. Second, by making return the cornerstone of migration, the EU’s approach disproportionately focuses on preventing irregular migrants arriving in Europe and facilitating quick forced return. This risks undermining fair and effective asylum. Third, the EU is looking to use the EU-Turkey agreement as a blueprint to circumvent the hefty and time-consuming obligations mandated under readmission agreements. This will mean reaching quick agreements with several priority countries that lack the necessary mechanisms and safeguards to protect the returned (non) national refugees and asylum seekers. Such concerns raise the question of whether these agreements result in the de facto breach of the principle of non-refoulement. Regardless of the influence of populist rhetoric, the EU has a legal obligation to protect refugees. It is therefore imperative that cooperation with third countries does not endanger the fundamental right to seek asylum and international protection.

Implications of the EU’s foreign policy on asylum and migration

In sum, the EU is facing diverging pressure from political actors and the wider public to manage the migration crisis. Anti-immigrant and xenophobic standpoints have risen in popularity as a result of a loss of trust in traditional political parties to deliver adequate policy response to complex challenges vis-à-vis the increased influence of right-wing populist parties. Mounk and Foa (2017) describe this as a trend where “citizens […] have less faith in the democratic system […]. And they vote for anti-establishment parties and

34 “A crisis-resistant Common European Asylum System (CEAS)”.
candidates that disregard long-standing democratic norms in ever greater numbers.”36

Populist parties have leveraged this discontent and are making use of political volatility and widespread distrust to pressure the political spectrum further right. This is resulting in the redefinition of a stark anti-immigration policy. Indeed, a unifying factor among political (and to a certain extent social) cleavages has appeared out of a consensus regarding safeguarding the EU’s borders and reducing the number of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in the EU. In response to this, it is clear that the EU has found it difficult to balance an increasingly fragmented union with adequate protection of asylum seekers.

What poses a greater danger to the EU than the influx of mass migration, however, might very well be the EU’s external migration policy itself. By pursuing such a foreign policy with third countries, the EU faces the danger of a more regressive and illiberal Europe in which key principles are rooted in increasingly protectionist, nationalistic and intolerant measures. Such a shift is especially relevant for a union that has traditionally relied on soft-power tactics in its foreign policy relations. Consequently, this essay advocates that in addressing the migration crisis, the EU should not only seek populist measures of protectionism and nativist ideology, but should also keep in mind its historical values and not compromise these for short-term gains. Whilst it would be naïve to believe that international politics can be based solely on normative judgements, foreign policy should strike a balance between values and interests. Going forward, the EU should ensure that any agreements reached with third countries adheres to the principle of non-refoulement and the full protection of asylum seekers—as should be expected from a union founded on the liberal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and respect for human rights.

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Populism and Foreign Policy: Deepening Divisions and Decreasing Efficiency

Catherine Kane, Caitlin McCulloch

ABSTRACT: With the rise of populism across the global system, gauging populism’s impact on foreign policy becomes more and more important. One particular form of contemporary populism especially on the rise in the West is radical right populism, blending nativism and anti-establishment sentiments. Using new survey data from the United States and qualitative interviews with foreign policy experts in the Republic of Georgia, we show that this form of contemporary populism has two major implications for foreign policy. First, that the nativist rhetoric and proposed policies of populist leaders deepen divisions in foreign policy attitudes among the electorate and make compromise by lawmakers on matters of foreign policy and immigration difficult. Second, that the anti-establishment demands of populists will lead to new, inexperienced foreign policy officials, producing a foreign policy apparatus that is fickle and inefficient, especially in crisis situations.

Keywords: Populism, Foreign Policy, Nativism, Public Opinion, Anti-establishment Sentiments.

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Introduction

In contemporary political discourse, populism is a central topic of both domestic and international politics. Despite its popularity, the wide-ranging definitions and understandings of populism make it tricky to explore. This has renewed academic interest in the concept of populism, including its sources, defining features, and consequences. One potential consequence of populism, which is not well understood, is its impact on foreign policy. We focus on radical right populism, a strain of contemporary populism that is nativist and anti-establishment, and draw on recent public opinion data in the United States and interviews with foreign policy officials in the Republic of Georgia to


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show that these two facets of populism produce deep divisions in foreign policy attitudes and inefficiency at the policymaking level.

The definition of populism is still up for debate. Populist movements and leaders have drawn on various themes and issues, from both the traditional left and right, to appeal to potential supporters and distinguish the good, pure people from some set of immoral, corrupted elite. One form of populist politics gaining widespread support and international attention is radical right populism. Radical right populism draws a distinction between the people and the elite along authoritarian, nativist and anti-establishment lines. Authoritarian meaning the maintenance of a strict social and moral order, nativist meaning the view of non-natives as fundamentally threatening to the nation, and anti-establishment indicating a focus on overturning existing political institutions and providing an “antidote” to political elitism through a “bold infusion of popular will.” At its foundations, all political populism seeks to fix social and political ailments by claiming a true understanding of the remedy and exclusive representation of the pre-defined people, and therefore is exclusionary and anti-establishment. This essay will focus specifically on contemporary radical right populism, which is exclusionary of non-native individuals and groups (nativist) and discontented with the political status quo (anti-establishment). Our research points to a bleak foreign policy characterized by division, gridlock, inefficiency, and minimized crisis preparedness if this populist trend continues.

**Nativist Component of Populism and Potential Impacts on Foreign Policy**

Donald Trump campaigned on and is implementing nativist populist policies, including a Muslim travel ban, deportation of illegal immigrants, increased border patrols, and significant cuts to diplomatic and foreign aid funding. He is part of a wave of populist leaders who foster racial or ethnic resentment and insecurity as they distinguish the native, good people from the foreign, threatening “other.” A major consequence of this political separation between native and other is hardened divisions among the populace on issues of foreign policy and unwillingness on the behalf of elected representatives to

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2 Muller, *What is Populism*, 1-7.


5 It should be noted that radical right populism is by no means the only game in town in contemporary politics. Despite recent gains, populist radical right leaders face resistance and have been defeated by a range of alternatives. In some cases, traditional parties have maintained power while in others, anti-establishment sentiments allowed for new, non-radical right actors to prevail. Additionally, populism is not only a far right phenomenon. Left-wing populism has gained traction in the U.S. and in European countries such as Spain and Greece. Here, populism still involves a distinction between us and them, but usually along economic rather than cultural lines. Thus, our hypotheses of the impact of radical right populism on foreign policy may extend to other types of populism that also rely on exclusion of some “other” and a rejection of established politics.
compromise on such matters.

During the presidential campaign, when Trump turned to nativism his polling numbers jumped and support from various race-based hate groups increased. American white nationalist groups rarely give public support to a candidate, suggesting that normally candidates are too far from their interests. Yet, four white nationalist leaders formally endorsed Trump. A white nationalist journal claimed Trump tapped into the fears of all white Americans, and that his “support comes from people who are more like [white nationalists] than he’d like to admit.”

According to one white nationalist leader, Trump espouses “the closest thing to [white] nationalism that we have seen since the Jingoistic era,” when non-European life was considered “absolutely incompatible with the existence of civilization.” A former Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leader claimed a direct spike in website visits after Trump proposed a Muslim ban, saying Trump had “clearly been a benefit” to the KKK and attracted more people to the white supremacist cause. Research groups monitoring white supremacist groups in America, including the Southern Poverty Law Center, note the marked increase in the ranks of white nationalist and alt-right groups since Trump’s campaign and election. The connection between Trump and nativist groups in America was strengthened after deadly clashes in Charlottesville, Virginia during a white nationalist rally in August 2017, where a former KKK leader demanded Trump remember his “White American” supporters.

The nativist component of contemporary populism is also evident in the rhetoric and proposals of populist parties across Europe. France’s National Front’s 2015 manifesto stated that immigrant assimilation is no longer possible and called for a relentless fight against immigration, including severe limits on legal immigration, increased requirements for citizenship, priority for French citizens in public services, a ban on dual nationality, and increased punishment for “anti-French” crimes. In reference to the refugee crisis, the party’s leader Marine Le Pen lamented France’s “migratory submersion” in “bacterial” migrants, signaling to her supporters the perceived status of refugees as inherently


9 Becker, “White Supremacists are Loving Donald Trump’s Presidential Campaign.”


11 Party manifesto was updated in February 2017 prior to the French presidential elections, so the 2015 Manifesto can no longer be accessed on the party website. Le Pen’s 2017 “144 Presidential Commitments” includes many of the same reforms, if with slightly altered language.
threatening.\textsuperscript{12} The party is one of the most popular in France and Le Pen ultimately lost in the 2017 presidential runoff, but only after garnering widespread attention, shaping the election’s discourse, and attaining a record high 10 million votes for the party. In Germany, the formerly unelected Alternative for Germany party, which called for police to shoot refugees crossing the border in 2016, now holds seats in 10 state legislatures. In Poland, the governing Law and Justice Party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński warned that Muslim immigrants would cause epidemics in Poland due to parasites they carry that are dangerous to Poles.\textsuperscript{13} Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vowed to make Hungary an “illiberal state”\textsuperscript{14} open only to “genuine” Hungarians.\textsuperscript{15} In the 2016 Austrian presidential elections, the nativist populist Freedom Party advanced to the run-off and lost by only 31,000 votes.\textsuperscript{16}

These examples show the nativist strains of contemporary populism prevalent across America and Europe.\textsuperscript{17} This component of populism has major repercussions for political attitudes, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. An understanding of politics, and the world, as a battle between natives and non-natives translates to foreign policy attitudes that are skeptical of the intentions and actions of foreign countries and peoples. The diffusion of such attitudes, made possible by the legitimation of radical right populism, produces a fervent reaction to such attitudes. This results in deeply ingrained divisions on matters of foreign policy amongst the electorate. We can see that this is the case in the United States based on findings from the University of Maryland’s Critical Issue Poll, a


\textsuperscript{17} While outside the scope of this essay, it should be noted that the contemporary popularity of nativist populism is connected to widespread, pre-existing racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments. The November 2016 Eurobarometer, a biannual survey of European Union (EU) citizens, found that a majority of Europeans have a negative feeling toward immigrants from outside the EU. Recent Gallup polling in the U.S. shows that race relations and immigration are top concerns of the American public. The 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) found 56 percent of white Americans and 80 percent of Republican respondents think all illegal immigrants should be identified and deported. A majority of Americans disagree that it is hard for black Americans to overcome discrimination, including 85 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of independents/minor party supporters. This survey was conducted in the fall 2015, early in the Trump campaign, suggesting these represent pre-existing feelings prevalent among American voters, especially white Republicans and independents.
public opinion survey of American citizens with a focus on issues of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{18} It is also likely that such divisions are monitored and reflected by representatives and manifest into unwillingness to compromise on matters of foreign policy by policy-makers.

University of Maryland’s Critical Issues Poll surveys spanning 2016-2017 display the effect of Trump’s nativist populist rhetoric on a range of issues relating to foreign policy. For example, an April 2017 poll shows a deep partisan divide over attitudes toward Muslim refugees, with 88 percent of Republicans supporting a Muslim ban and 86 percent of Democrats opposing one.\textsuperscript{19} In another example related to immigration, the survey found that 84 percent of Trump voters support a border wall with Mexico while 87 percent of Clinton voters oppose the wall.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, Trump supporters display nativist foreign policy attitudes while non-supporters’ attitudes appear in firm opposition.

This gap between Trump supporters and non-supporters widened over the last year, especially on the topic of refugees. Between May 2016-April 2017, the percentage of Democrats that support accepting Middle Eastern refugees after security screening increased from 77 percent to 83 percent, while 63 percent of Republicans remained opposed over the same time.\textsuperscript{21} As Shibley Telhami argued, while this may be because Trump’s success emboldened his supporters, it is more likely because it united those in opposition to him and his proposed policies. As Telhami puts it, “the more one side emphasized the issue...the more the other side took the opposite position.”\textsuperscript{22} In another example of the increasing gap resulting from nativist populist rhetoric, between October 2016-April 2017, the percentage of Republicans with an unfavorable view of the Muslim religion increased from 63 percent to 73 percent while the percentage of Democrats with

\textsuperscript{18} The Critical Issue Poll (CPI), started in 2016, conducts multiple public opinion surveys a year to examine American attitudes on salient political topics and potential attitude shifts in response to recent events. The survey focuses on foreign policy questions, especially related to the Middle East, and domestic issues such as race and demographic change. The study’s director is Shibley Telhami, The Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, and the associate director is Stella Rouse, director of the Center for American Politics and Citizenship at the University of Maryland. Survey panels consist of a probability-based representative sample, recruited by Nielsen Scarborough from its probability-based national panel, contacted by mail/telephone using a random sample provided by Survey Sampling International. Responses weighted by age, gender, income, education, race, geographic region, and partisan identification. CPI findings recently appeared in Politico, NBC News, Reuters, The Washington Post, Foreign Policy, and Defense News and were presented at the Brookings Institution.

\textsuperscript{19} The Critical Issues Poll results and reports can be accessed online at: https://criticalissues.umd.edu/landing/Research. The April 2017 survey included 2,138 respondents; the margin of error is 2.12 percent.


a favorable view of the religion remained consistent at 65 percent.\textsuperscript{23} This division extends beyond foreign policy issues relating to refugees. Surveys carried out between 2014-2016 show that over time Republicans remained stable in the attitude that the U.S. should do nothing in response to new Israeli settlements, with 86-88 percent agreeing, while Democrats gradually coalesced in opposition, from 48-49 percent in 2014 and 2015 to 60 percent in 2016.\textsuperscript{24} In all, we see a widening gap and hardened divide between opposing attitudes on a range of foreign policy issues since the emergence and legitimation of Trump’s nativist populism.

While opinion surveys provide limited insight into policy formation, it is plausible to expect representatives to respond to and reflect this deepening divide between constituents. This is especially likely given that foreign policy issues, like fighting the Islamic State, poll as top concerns of the American public, making the stakes on these issues high for elected officials. It is also plausible that as policymakers and opinion leaders take a stance on a foreign policy issue, it will gain traction in the media and further divide the electorate.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the nativist underpinning of contemporary populism in America deepens divisions within the electorate on critical issues of foreign policy and makes compromise among partisan policy-makers harder to come by on issues relating to foreign policy, immigration, and diplomacy.

It is reasonable to expect these predictions apply beyond the U.S for a few reasons. First, as discussed earlier, nativist populism is present in the rhetoric and proposed reforms on issues of foreign policy and immigration in other democracies. Second, across Europe, immigration and terrorism poll as top concerns of the electorate, signaling the high salience of foreign policy related issues.\textsuperscript{26} Third, individual support for populist parties in Europe is remarkably stable and, like in the U.S., recent campaigns have been notably contentious on issues of foreign policy, immigration, and national sovereignty. Finally, the incentives facing elected representatives in the United States are consistent across democratic countries, where policy makers have a vested interest in the views of their constituents. Overall, from this survey data we see widening and hardening divisions over foreign policy that discourages compromise among representatives involved in foreign policy development.

\textsuperscript{23} The October 2016 survey included 1,528 respondents and a 2.5 percent margin of error.
\textsuperscript{26} The May 2017 Eurobarometer. Reports can be accessed online at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index?p=1&instruments=STANDARD.
Anti-Establishment Component of Populism and Potential Impacts on Foreign Policy

The anti-establishment facet of modern populism blames established political leaders for failing the people and demands new alternatives to traditional party actors and policies. American’s contemporary dissatisfaction with parties, expressed desire for a third party, and high levels of independent identifiers all signal discontent with politics as usual. These trends also appear in other countries as evidenced by increased voter volatility and recent party system shake-ups in countries such as the United Kingdom, Austria, and France. Anti-establishment demands can lead to an infusion of new people into government, but this infusion can have a negative impact on creating clear and concise foreign policy.

Donald Trump says he will “drain the swamp,” signaling the perceived unsavory nature of those in power and the need to eliminate them. In France, one of Le Pen’s selling points is that she is a political outsider, supported by people who wanted to “[send] all those people who have been elected since 1981 back to nowhere,” despite her party’s forty plus year history in French politics. Le Pen argues that, “the French need new people who break free from bad habits. We are in a system that is a little rotten. We need a fresh pair of eyes.” In public criticism of former President Hollande in 2015, Le Pen accused him of serving as “vice chancellor” to Angela Merkel and allowing Germany to administer the “province of France.” By propagating this image of established political leaders as weak, corrupt, and co-opted against the interests of the native people, Le Pen and other populists spur anti-establishment sentiment and delegitimize the political status quo.

Such rhetoric cannot be expected to evaporate upon election, as Muller notes, “populists can govern as populists.” When populist demands for new political actors are implemented, we can expect diminished expertise and experience among those involved in policy development and implementation. Often this means high-level officers picked

for loyalty rather than experience - or even picked for their inexperience, untouched by the presumed corruption of a career in politics. Trump has been noted by both Elizabeth Saunders\(^\text{34}\) and Daniel Drezner\(^\text{35}\) for his tendency to surround himself with inexperienced foreign policy advisers and agents. Under Trump this has led to a “vacuum of leadership” in the State Department and numerous high level vacancies.\(^\text{36}\) While other populist leaders like Wilders and Le Pen were unsuccessful in their bids for power, their rhetoric suggests they would have taken similar action, displacing long-standing foreign policy experts in exchange for new, less-corrupted officials, had they entered office. What happens then, when foreign policy is turned over to those with limited expertise and experience?

We collected thirty-five open-ended interviews with foreign policy officials in the Republic of Georgia, including multiple ex-Ambassadors, ex-advisors and current high-level foreign service officers, on the topic of foreign policy formation and the impacts of inexperience. We found evidence that inexperience results in unclear policy direction and decreased crisis management, with elites suggesting inexperienced decision-makers lack the ability to “own” policy and correctly calculate crisis response.

Georgia is an excellent case study for the question of limited expertise and impacts on foreign policy for several reasons. Georgia is a small country, with many high-level political actors who are extremely open to interviews. The importance of this accessibility cannot be underestimated, as it widens the breadth of possible interviews and therefore strengthens the generalizability of any conclusions. Georgians also consider themselves Western actors and see themselves as having a Western identity, especially those involved in the government.\(^\text{37}\) As an ex-Deputy Minister said, “Geography [...] very much creates the identity of Georgians, which means that, we are leaned towards the West, Georgians have that mindset, we are someone of the West.”\(^\text{38}\) Georgia is an open democracy, comparable to Hungary and considered more open than Ukraine and Moldova, and is actively working to join the European Union.\(^\text{39}\) The formation of foreign policy in Georgia is very similar to other democracies, largely originating with the bureaucracy through a Foreign Minister and Foreign Department, with additional foreign policy powers vested

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\(^\text{37}\) In-person interviews conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #2-6380, #3-7600, #4-9149, #5-1464, #6-5261, #9-8577 for some examples. McCulloch (2017) data.

\(^\text{38}\) In-person interview conducted on April 19th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #9-8577. McCulloch (2017) data.

in its executive and legislative bodies. While the United States and Georgia have different foreign policy concerns due to size, alliances, and international position, they do share comparable institutions. Overwhelmingly, interviewees suggested that while international context (the threat of Russia, alliance positions, etc.) is important in informing foreign policy, the process of policy formation was largely dependent on regime type.\textsuperscript{40} Georgia therefore offers a rare chance to question top foreign policy leadership about foreign policy formation while allowing a degree of generalizability to other democratic nations.

The dilemma of foreign policy inexperience is ever present in Georgia, although for different reasons than the populist influx of new officials. In such a small country, there is a limited amount of experts to pull from. This, as well, makes Georgia an ideal case for identifying issues caused by inexperience. When the top leadership in the foreign service is purged with government changeover or older foreign policy experts retire, it is hard to recruit experienced officers. An ex-foreign policy adviser to the president said simply “in Georgia we have problems with qualifications” and finding those who possess them.\textsuperscript{41} This regular influx of inexperienced officials takes time to overcome; as an ex-Ambassador pointed out “new people come and they need to learn new skills, [learn the] alphabet of foreign policy, [the] alphabet of security policy - talking to people, foreigners, et cetera, et cetera… that takes time.”\textsuperscript{42} To overcome inexperience, intelligence is not enough; the same ex-adviser also stated: “being the foreign minister of the country and being the main guy to shape foreign policy requires something more than being a smart guy.”\textsuperscript{43} It requires years of training and experience to make the types of decisions required of foreign policy officials.

While the root of the inexperience may be different in this situation from the problem in more populist governments, the impact is similar. Elites suggest that lack of experience leads to two major things. First is a lack of clear foreign policy direction, making it hard for audiences to follow and engage with foreign policy. Second is a lack of efficiency in foreign policy response, especially in security and crisis situations.

Elites strongly suggested that having a coherent and transparent foreign policy is a “matter of skills more than actual process”\textsuperscript{44} and that these skills are built up over time by experience. Lack of experience was linked repeatedly to both less governmental ownership of policy direction and lack of transparency. This is because inexperienced foreign policy elites are unwilling to make and then stand firmly behind foreign policy

\textsuperscript{40} In-person interviews conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #2-6380, #3-7600, #4-9149, #5-1464, #13-7020, #36-4100 for some examples. McCulloch (2017) data.
\textsuperscript{41} In-person interview conducted on June 26th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #36-4100. McCulloch (2017) data.
\textsuperscript{42} In-person interview conducted on May 10th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #13-7020. McCulloch (2017) data.
\textsuperscript{43} In-person interview conducted on June 26th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #36-4100. McCulloch (2017) data.
\textsuperscript{44} In-person interview conducted on May 10th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #13-7020. McCulloch (2017) data.
decisions, and when they do make decisions, they are more prone to being wrong. This confuses domestic and international audiences as it draws away from having a central foreign policy message.\textsuperscript{45} These fluctuations in policies are often seen as fickleness, and lead to uncertainty among voters and foreign countries about government positions and policy direction.\textsuperscript{46}

The lack of efficiency, however, is more worrisome. In crises, policy from less experienced foreign policy professionals was seen as less effective and less responsive. Another ex-Ambassador pointed out that inexperienced foreign policy elites simply “cannot make quality calculations in [this] difficult environment”\textsuperscript{47}—a statement backed by two other elites, who also pointed out that inexperienced foreign policy advisors are not capable of properly calculating responses, and that this is exacerbated under the pressure of a crisis.\textsuperscript{48} Previous academic work agrees, arguing that it is common for inexperienced leaders to commit “serious errors” in foreign policy, unable to form sound calculations of risks and opportunities - especially unable to “skillfully manag[e] a crisis.”\textsuperscript{49}

While these interviews are specific to the Republic of Georgia, we argue that inexperience and its impacts are fairly universal. It is human nature to learn through trial and error, and the generalizable predictions from interviewed experts are that inexperienced foreign policy elites result in more extreme fluctuations in foreign policy decisions and governments that are less prepared to deal with crisis. Trump’s presidency has, thus far, been in line with such predictions. He has not set a clear foreign policy path for the United States, and has in general demonstrated fairly fickle foreign policy, from his movement on the obsoleteness of NATO\textsuperscript{50} to his shifting foreign policy towards major powers like China.\textsuperscript{51} These elite interviews suggest that Trump’s current foreign policy is not a political or tactical trick but simply a sign of his and his advisers’ inexperience. Foreign policy is a game of weighing many different simultaneous options and possible outcomes. Anti-establishment policies and new, inexperienced foreign policy elites can lead to decreased clarity, capacity to calculate, and crisis response in foreign policy.

A specific form of populism characterized by nativist and anti-establishment appeals is

\textsuperscript{45} In-person interview conducted on June 26th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #36-4100. McCulloch (2017) data.
\textsuperscript{47} In-person interview conducted on June 24th, 2017, in Tbilisi, Georgia, interview #34-4925. McCulloch (2017) data.
on the rise in the global system, with major implications for foreign policy. The legitimation of populist nativism in mainstream politics charges divisions within the electorate across issues of import to foreign policy. These hardened divisions among voters in turn depress the possibility of compromise among policy makers on issues ranging from immigration to intervention. Meanwhile, the anti-establishment’s demands for populism have the effect of putting less experienced leaders in charge of decisions they are not fully able to handle. Drawing from public opinion surveys in the U.S. and elite interviews in Georgia, we argue that these consequences are already apparent and apply to countries beyond those discussed in this essay. The nativist and anti-establishment components of contemporary populism will likely further popular divisions over foreign policy issues, stall the development of foreign policy reform and action, and produce more confused and ineffective foreign policy.
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The Rise of Populism and the Future of NATO

Phillip Gary Schrank

ABSTRACT: The rise of populism in the last five years in both the United States and Europe has led some to question the power of NATO. Even though populism has a long and varied history in America and Europe, the common theme has withstood the test of time: people were sick of the so-called ruling elite and demanded change; a head of state and government that will speak for the common people. This paper sees NATO in its current form inimical to the rising era of populism. In order for NATO to survive, it must re-invent itself by combating the problems that have brought on the rise of populism; by retrenching back to its borders and by engaging Russia. If NATO is able to re-invent itself again, it will continue to play a key role in international peace and security.

Keywords: Populism, NATO, Foreign Policy, European Security, Retrenching, Russia.

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Introduction

Populism in Europe has surged since the early 2000s. According to some scholars, populism was widespread in Europe. At that time, entrepreneurs like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Simeon II in Bulgaria took advantage of large reserves of cash and innovative marketing schemes. At that time, no one speculated that the rise of populism would call the basic tenets of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to question.

The rise of populism in the last five years in both the United States and Europe has led some to question the power of NATO. During his campaign, President Trump stated, “We will no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state remains the true foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down.” Since he has made that statement, Trump has also called NATO irrelevant and called on US’s Asian allies to pay more for US support. In the short period he has been president, Trump has scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), criticized NATO, NAFTA, the WTO, and most bilateral relationships the US has fostered since the end of World War II. In Europe, Marine Le Pen, former French presidential candidate associated with the National Front, has praised

Trump for calling NATO ‘obsolete’ and criticized him for his subsequent backtracking on that statement. Similar to Trump being skeptical to international organizations, Geert Wilders, former presidential candidate in the Netherlands wanted to “liberate” the Netherlands and pull the country out of the EU and NATO. This essay is meant to further the discussion of what the rise of populism might mean for NATO. Suggestions are given that can help secure the purpose of NATO in what has been called the “Age of Populism.”

The Rise of Populism

The rise of populism in the United States and Europe is so pronounced that *Foreign Affairs* decided to dedicate almost the entire November/December 2016 publication to the subject. *Foreign Affairs’* next two issues stay on the general theme of populism and what it means for the future of the liberal order. The amount of attention this rise of populism is getting should not make us think this is something new. Both Europe and the United States have a long history of populist movements.

Populism in Europe goes back to Roman times when the Roman senators had “populist agendas.” Populism again flared up with peasants’ revolts during and after the Reformation. The French Revolution at the end of the 18th century could be considered a populist revolt. In America, it can be debated whether the Declaration of Independence and subsequent Revolutionary War could be considered populist uprisings. Populism was a force in national politics twice in the 19th century in the US. In his first inaugural address, Andrew Jackson dedicated a single sentence to foreign policy: “With foreign nations,” Jackson declared, “it will be my study to preserve peace and to cultivate friendship on fair and honorable terms, and in adjustment of any differences that may exist or arise to exhibit the forebearance [sic] becoming a powerful nation rather than the sensibility belonging to a gallant people.”

Populism again rose at the end of the 19th century with the rise of the “People’s Party.” In 1892, that party looked on the verge of staging a fight in the coming elections, but it seemed to fizzle out before it had a chance to evoke real change. The Democratic nominee in 1896, William Jennings Bryan, carried many of the ideals of the People’s Party, but he failed to win the presidency.

Even though populism has come and gone and come back again in America and Europe, the common theme has withstood the test of time: people were sick of the so-

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called ‘ruling elite’ and wanted change; a president and government that will speak for the common people. The present class of populists (from Trump in America to Le Pen, Wilders, the Alternative for Germany, SYRIZA in Greece, and many others in Europe) look to survive longer than their historical predecessors.

The Foreign Policy of Populism

The foreign policy of populists is rooted in the idea that the United States cannot continue supporting the liberal order it created. Populists tend to be Lockian on the domestic front in that they believe the government exists because of them and solely for them. Any military action or any international interaction must be to protect or enhance the rights of citizens, or preserve the homeland. On the international front, populists tend to push Hobbesian realism where they see each nation as a sovereign entity that should not be infringed upon, unless said nation violates their international responsibilities.6

In Europe, the foreign policy of radical right populism was cultivated because of three elements: “the perception of the economic and social effects of globalization in the mid-1990s; the increased rate of European integration in the late 1990s; and, the launch of the US-led ‘war on terror’ after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001.”7 These facts most decidedly took attention away from home led to those left to rise up and demand more attention.

The rise of populism has led some to question the viability of the liberal world order as we now know it. Joseph Nye argues that the propagation of “public goods” has been spread too broadly; that citizens of countries like the Unites States believe the goods that the government provides should be for them and them alone.8 No longer should governments provide for developing countries and secure far off lands. Boyle argues that “historically the institutions of global order have mirrored the domestic structures of the most powerful states in the system.”9 That is to say liberal democracies have built international structures that have modeled its domestic structures. As liberal democracies have become more populist in nature, one can expect the international institutions to change along with their domestic counterparts. Specifically, in Europe, Jones argues that populism cannot dismantle Europe: “The countries of Europe are too interdependent both economically through integrated markets and politically via the institutions of the European Union for any one country to be immune from shocks emanating from the rest.”10 The world will soon see if his prediction is true as we watch the negotiations and

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10 Jones, “Populism in Europe,” 42.
finally the culmination of Brexit closely.

**Populism and the Future of NATO**

There are some who believe that NATO must transform itself in order to stay relevant. This would not be the first time NATO has been reinvented. After the end of the Cold War, many called for NATO to be dissolved. The West had won. The old nemesis Soviet Union had ceased to exist. What purpose did NATO have if they didn’t have an enemy to fight against? A quick scan of the NATO website will present how NATO has transformed since the Cold War. It has expanded to as far east as Turkey and even has strategic partners such as South Korea and Japan far from its physical base. NATO’s missions have moved from border states to completely outside of Europe. It can be argued that NATO has over-extended itself and expanded its role to areas outside its sphere of influence. This has diluted its core mission of securing North Atlantic countries.

The rise of populism in Europe and the United States has led some to question the role of NATO in Europe. Marine Le Pen pushed for “French independence.” She feels the previous ruling parties have failed to put France first and instead have put Europe first. In the interview conducted by *Foreign Affairs* she questioned the assumption that the EU has helped bring peace to Europe. Instead she argued that peace brought on the EU. When talking about potential French isolation, Le Pen talks about French history of withdrawing from NATO; Le Pen recounts how General de Gaulle pulled France from NATO and she feels the debate now is similar to what it was in 1966.11

Donald Trump had campaigned on questioning the US role in NATO. The heart of the issue was countries paying their fair share into NATO operations. He implied that US involvement in protecting NATO countries would be conditional on those countries paying their obligations.12 However, Trump recently declared that the US would honor Article Five of NATO and unequivocally protect fellow member states. It is this ambiguous policy position that has Europe worried about the resolve of the US in times of trouble.

One of the major issues in this era of populism is that each country is more likely to focus on its own security issues. In Europe, Southern European countries along the Mediterranean will see the threat coming from North Africa and the Middle East whereas Eastern European countries view Russia as a threat.13 According to Galeotti, many citizens of Europe view security threats as a country specific problem.

Recommendations

During the first transformation of NATO after the Cold War, Asmus and Holbrooke argued that three things happened that cemented NATO’s role for the future: 1) It stopped ethnic cleansing in the Balkans; 2) It brought former Warsaw Pact countries under its influence through expansion; and 3) It engaged Russia. This reinvention and subsequent “re-reinvention” after the 9/11 attacks led to a more globalized NATO. A simple glance at the NATO interactive map will show that NATO’s security challenges are clustered in member countries and border countries while “NATO in Action” is spread from Europe to East Africa and Central Asia. Perhaps a new reinvention of NATO is needed in order to make it more palatable to member nations and their citizens which are increasingly questioning their roles in international institutions.

To that end, this paper recommends three suggestions to secure the relevancy of NATO in the face of rising populism: 1) Instead of fighting populism, fight the problems that had led to the rise of populism; 2) With the view that nations are turning inward and focusing on domestic issues, NATO should retrench to within its borders and extricate itself from areas far from its immediate sphere of influence; and, 3) NATO needs to engage Russia, not recreate it as the needed enemy.

Fixing the Problems that Caused Populism’s Rise

The rise of populism in Europe has been at least a 10 year journey. For an outsider, it seems as if this sudden populist surge has come out of nowhere, but it has been simmering just beneath the surface; waiting for the leaders that will listen to the people’s demands and lead populism to political prominence. Economic issues that many in the Euro zone are either experiencing or helping to alleviate have helped bring on the populist surge. But it is not the only factor in the current rise of populism. Muddle has described the situation in Europe thusly:

“The threat of terrorism and anxiety about a massive wave of immigrants from the Muslim world, coupled with the widespread belief that the EU hinders rather than helps when it comes to such problems, have created a perfect storm for populists, especially enhancing the standing of right-wing populists in many countries.”

Traditionally, the rise of populism has coincided with economic struggles of the lower classes. While economics still play an important role in the distrust of the ruling elite, Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin found another important issue to American populists. In a study of Massachusetts Tea-Partiers, the authors found that 78% of those that responded to the survey found immigration and border issues to be “very important.” That is

15 This map can be found at http://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-map/.
compared to 87% that found “Deficits and Spending” to be their top issue.17

The rise of populism in both Europe and the United States has similar undertones: economic instability and fear of immigrants. The reasons behind the rise of populism are much more complex, but the driving force seems to be a combination of economic uncertainty and immigration. The Democrats in America and the opposition parties in Europe need to work with the people and find solutions to their problems. Having citizens engaged in politics and interested in the issues of the day can only lead to better governance. What needs attention are the issues that drove people to political activism. Those opposition politicians need to figure out how to combat economic instability and make policies regarding immigration that will still be humanitarian and yet not disenfranchising to its own citizens.

Retrenching NATO
The increased role of NATO in Middle Eastern and North African crises has played a direct role in the rise of populism. Some have said the very people who are terrorizing Western countries and cities had been radicalized because of US and NATO action.18 This radicalization has been happening since the Soviet-Afghanistan war in the 1980s and continues with the latest example of ISIS gaining power in Libya after the NATO operation concluded in 2011. There is no empirical evidence to date that links NATO operations with terrorist recruitment, but circumstantial evidence is there.

NATO’s stated purpose is “to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.”19 The general purpose is rather abstract and allows for much interpretation. Conducting military operations around the globe can be rationalized as guaranteeing the security of NATO members. NATO has been re-invented numerous times in the past. Asmus and Holbrooke recount how NATO reinvented itself at the end of the Cold War; and called for NATO to re-reinvent itself after September 11, 2001 to consider challenges far from NATO’s borders.20

At the same conference, Krastev surmised that the “real threat to NATO’s future role... [was] the lack of transatlantic consensus on the political nature of the world.”21 He was talking about the rise of populism and the movement’s disdain for the ‘global war on terrorism.’ Considering the rise of populism has continued unabated, it would be wise for NATO to follow the advice of Krastev and not Asmus and Holbrooke.

Taking into account the rhetoric regarding NATO by populist politicians would be

wise. Trump has called NATO obsolete and European populists have promised to pull their countries out if elected. If NATO can show the people of America and Europe that its efforts directly benefit them, NATO can survive the potential populist purge. Getting back to roots of collective security can help show populists that NATO works for them and their security. Major argued that re-emphasizing collective security was not necessarily going back to the roots because the environment in which it is happening has changed dramatically. I disagree as getting back to collective security is going back to the root objective of NATO during the Cold War era. The fact that the environment has changed does not change the idea that collective security at home had been an original intent of NATO.

Retrenching to its borders can also show citizens of member countries that NATO is working for them. Another core objective of NATO is crisis management. Too often NATO has managed crises outside of its borders yet the biggest threats on its borders are not getting the focus they need. The exception is NATO’s work with the migration crisis. Even here, NATO needs to take a leading role and publicize their efforts to show citizens the work they are doing. Because there are ongoing crises at home such as an influx of migrants and terrorist attacks, NATO would be best served to retrench and focus on the home-front.

Another issue NATO needs to be concerned about is the rise and influence of Russia. After Russia annexed Crimea, NATO and Russia ceased “dialogue and cooperation structures.” In order to solidify NATO and appease populists, it would be wise to engage and not alienate Russia.

**Engaging Russia**

Major argues that NATO must engage Russia, but it “must wait until Russia has made substantial progress in implementing Minsk II.” If NATO would engage before implementation of Minsk II, then it would appear weak and acquiescing to Russia’s aggression. So far, it seems as if Russia is not willing to implement the agreement because Russia does not want peace. Thus, it would be difficult to engage if Russia does not comply.

There are those who believe engagement is the wrong policy. Ringsmose and Rynning argue that NATO must strengthen its deterrence posture against Russia, but they concede that doing so may be difficult with the rise of populist leaders. Kroenig argues that

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23 Ibid, 14.
24 Ibid.
NATO must be prepared to respond to Russian aggression against a member, but cautions that building up NATO’s nuclear capabilities in Eastern Europe may lead to nuclear war.\textsuperscript{27} While the concerns these authors raise are to be heeded, engagement is the best policy for strengthening NATO and appeasing populists.

If Russia were to implement the Minsk II agreement, Major gave three recommendations on how to engage Russia: 1) Communication and dialogue; 2) Confidence Building and Rules; and 3) Practical Cooperation.\textsuperscript{28} Dialogue can begin once NATO sees progress on Minsk II. In the meantime, NATO and Russia need to assure each other that any military exercises do not inadvertently spark confrontation. Simple cooperation in practical matters can also form a basis for further cooperation. Major suggests looking to Scandinavia for examples of practical cooperation avenues that can be pursued.

\section*{Conclusion}

In the end, the most significant issue of 2017 is the rise of populism and how people, countries and international organizations will effectively deal with the change in political climate. For its part, NATO must re-invent itself again in order to make sure its purpose is focused on the citizens of member countries. This does not mean it has no place in operations outside of its borders; it means that it must be judicious in choosing which operations to pursue. The last thing it needs is wavering members whose politicians must pay heed to its citizens who may question why its soldiers are fighting in far off lands.

NATO needs to play a role in fixing the problems that have led to the rise in populism. It must fight terrorism at home, and work toward an agreeable solution to the migrant problems. If NATO is able to re-invent itself again, it will again prove to be an international organization vital to world peace and stability.

Finally, NATO must be at the forefront of engaging Russia. Of course, Russia must first comply with the Minsk II agreement. Once it does work toward implementation, NATO must be first in line to actively engage Russia to help secure peace and stability in Europe in this time of political climate change.

\textsuperscript{28} Major, “NATO and European Security,” 15.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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