Influencing the EU’s Foreign Policy on Asylum and Migration: Populist Political Dynamics and Cooperation with (Un)safe Third Countries

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ABSTRACT: The rise of populism and its effect on the erosion of liberal values in the EU is a current prime focus in international politics. This paradigm shift also brings with it another important question related to the EU’s foreign policy priorities. Such an angle is of particular importance in the current international environment, where a multitude of exogenous factors are resulting in responses which appear to be rooted in political realism. The EU’s external policy towards the current asylum and migration crisis is one such example. The EU has opted for an increasingly inward looking foreign policy that prioritizes cooperation with third countries as an exclusionary tool. Outsourcing the issue may appease the rising populist sentiments in the short term. In the long term, however, it raises questions about safeguarding the EU’s liberal values vis-à-vis using leverage to achieve cooperation with potentially unsafe third countries of origin and transit. This essay recognizes that populism at the central and national level in the EU is pulling the center further right and influencing public opinion. In turn, this is resulting in an increasingly closed and intolerant foreign policy. This essay acknowledges that international politics cannot be solely based on normative judgements. Going forward, however, the EU should balance a pragmatic migration strategy with the founding values of an open and liberal Europe.

Keywords: EU, Foreign Policy, Asylum, Migration, Liberalism, Populism.

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Influencing EU’s foreign policy on asylum and migration

Rising right-wing populist influence within the EU brings with it questions related to its effect on the EU’s foreign policy. Populist parties now hold an important decision-making power in the European Parliament and have increased their significance across more than half of the EU member states. Given that anti-immigration is a central component of right-wing populism, the rise of populist parties at both the EU and national level is contributing to the normalization of populist rhetoric and the implementation of illiberal practices as the political center gets pulled further right. The outcome is a foreign policy response which ranks the protection of national sovereignty

1 Whilst populism exists in both the political left and right, this essay focuses on right-wing populism.

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and external borders vis-à-vis shared values related to the protection of human rights; the very principles on which the EU is founded on.

At the central level, the European Parliament is a co-legislator in asylum related legislation and therefore plays a critical role in the EU’s foreign policy. Right-wing populist parties “increased their vote share from around 15% in 2009 to 20% in 2014.”\(^3\) Coalitions such as the Europe of Nations and Freedom, European Conservatives and Reformists Group and the European Freedom and Direct Democracy group are increasingly at the forefront of criticizing the EU’s migration response. This is exemplified through the push for tougher anti-migration policies.

At the member state level, populist parties such as the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and the French National Front are challenging the status quo. They have made anti-immigration and xenophobia a central component of their political platform and have gained support from a wide voter base who are dissatisfied with traditional political parties and feel let down by the EU. This has led mainstream political parties such as the Dutch liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy to adopt a similar mindset. Indeed, in a climate characterized by increased political (and social) cleavages, a unifying factor has appeared out of a consensus to develop a stronger external EU immigration policy.

The question is: how are populist political dynamics influencing the EU’s foreign policy choices on asylum and migration as the political center is being pulled further right? This essay looks at the relationship between the normalization of populist rhetoric and the evolving partnerships with potentially unsafe third countries to answer this question. It argues that such partnerships are harmful to the EU’s liberal safeguards and contradict the principle of non-refoulement. This is not only detrimental to the effective protection of refugees and asylum seekers, but pragmatically speaking may also lead to the loss of the EU’s future influence in the neighborhood. Rather than buying into overtly simplistic populist rhetoric and focusing on short term solutions, the political center should retain its position and ensure that the EU acts as an interlocutor, entrenching the normative values of the EU in its foreign policy agenda on migration and asylum.

**Rising right-wing populism and migration in the EU**

Literature does not prescribe a uniform definition of right-wing populism. Looking at commonalities between different parties, however, demonstrates that right-wing populism is “essentially illiberal and prescribes a nativist ideology that syndicates xenophobia and nationalism.”\(^4\) According to Betz, right-wing populism entails the rejection of “social

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integration of marginalized groups, and [an] appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism.”

Wodak et al. identify issues of “race, immigration, national identity, welfare and social inequality” as central components of this ideology. At the supranational level, such parties share a “distrust of all EU institutions, a desire to return power to national institutions, opposition to further EU enlargement and calls for reduced immigration.”

With regards to the latter, there is a common exploiting of the fear of the “other.” This is coupled with the rejection of the EU’s response to the refugee crisis since the 2014 watershed moment when the migration crisis peaked in Europe. The EU has increasingly found itself under pressure to develop large-scale solutions to the rising number of people trying to enter the EU. The proximate response agreed on in 2015 focused on emergency measures to manage the physical influx of refugees and asylum seekers. However, ineffective central policy responses did not prevent the continued high number of people attempting to make the dangerous journey. Public criticism of the EU’s refugee response coupled with rising terror attacks in member states allowed populist parties at the central and national level to use their position to heavily criticize the EU’s seeming inability to protect its own borders and keep out people who pose a threat.

In an increasingly fragmented and disgruntled union, consensus has transpired on the issue of pursuing tougher anti-migration policies. Consequently, the center is being pulled further right as populist sentiment is getting stronger and gaining widespread public support. This is causing the EU’s normative foreign policy to be shaped by self-interest vis-à-vis the effective protection of fundamental rights of refugees. Indeed, the evolving relationship between the EU and third countries of origin and transit demonstrates this claim.

The evolving relationship with third countries in the EU’s migration policy

Cooperation with third countries first appeared on the EU’s agenda in 1994 when the Commission registered the need for cooperation with non-EU states on migration rooted

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in mutually beneficial partnerships.\textsuperscript{10} This followed with the Seville European Council conclusions of 2002 that called for a targeted approach to migration through “closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention.”\textsuperscript{11} The aim of the approach was to promote prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reduce the underlying causes of migration flows.

In 2008, the Commission re-expressed cooperation as a priority because “effective management of migration flows requires genuine partnership and cooperation with third countries […]. The EU should work in close tandem with partner countries on opportunities for legal mobility, capacities for migration management, identification of migratory push factors, protecting fundamental rights, fighting illegal flows and enhancing possibilities to let migration work in service of development.”\textsuperscript{12} The approach highlighted the notion of \textit{genuine partnership and cooperation} which indicated the EU’s recognition that effective migration management cannot be rooted only in immigration control. It must also entail the development of reciprocal partnerships that reflected the interest of all parties concerned.\textsuperscript{13}

This is especially interesting given the shift in the EU’s migration policy in the aftermath of the 2014 mass influx of refugees. Examining the current principles for cooperating with third countries shows that the EU’s reciprocal focus has shifted towards increasingly draconian measures. The 2016 Migration Partnership Framework, which seeks to establish a more coordinated systematic and structured cooperation with third countries such as Mali and Niger, for example, “raise awareness of partner countries on the consequences – the sticks – that may arise if they do not fully cooperate on readmission and return.”\textsuperscript{14}

It could be argued that many factors outside of rising populism can explain the shift away from reciprocity towards the carrot and stick approach with third countries. However, never before in the history of the union have the EU’s core values been under such forceful threat from right-wing ideology. In this current political climate, it is even more critical that European external policies combine a pragmatic approach with respect to human rights. Instead, an examination of the EU’s current partnership approach demonstrates

\bibitem{Geddes2017a} Geddes, “Migration as Foreign Policy? The External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum,” 12.
that priority is placed on the effective administration of repatriation and return rather than on the protection of those fleeing instability and conflict.

**The EU and third countries: carrot and stick**

A shift from reciprocity towards a realpolitik response could be in part facilitated from growing populist influence on the political center of the EU. This shift is detrimental to the EU’s liberal values of the protection of human rights and especially the principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement is the cornerstone for the protection of refugees under international refugee law. It is enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Related to the Status of Refugees which states “no Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

The principle is also a central component of the EU’s fundamental rights regime, reflected in Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Charter and is also further specialized in secondary EU law. The EU *acquis communautaire* further prohibits the return of a person to real risk of serious harm deriving from indiscriminative violence in a situation of armed conflict. Non-refoulement not only prohibits the removal, expulsion or extradition to a country where a person may be at risk of persecution or serious harm, but also to “countries where individuals would be exposed to a serious risk of onward removal to such a country (indirect refoulement).” Both countries may bear responsibility in cases of indirect refoulement of returning an asylum-seeker to an alleged ‘safe’ third country. An examination of the EU’s foreign policy within the scope of readmission agreements and ‘safe’ third countries calls into question the EU’s full and effective protection of this principle.

**Readmission agreements**

EU readmission agreements are a foreign policy tool designed to increase the third country cooperation to facilitate higher return numbers of rejected asylum seekers. In the 2017 renewed Action Plan on a more Effective Return Policy in the European Union, the EU details that readmission agreements should focus on using EU assistance as an incentive to stimulate third countries to negotiate new readmission agreements. Presented as mutual engagements, these agreements favor the EU by imposing readmission clauses in all forms of development aid and economic and commercial cooperation. The current plan prioritizes Nigeria, Tunisia and Jordan as target countries and strives towards engaging

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16 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Guidance on how to reduce the risk of refoulement in external border management when working in or together with third countries,” 2016, Vienna.
further with Algeria and Morocco.\textsuperscript{17}

For the EU, these readmission agreements derive their legitimacy from the fact that they are designed to facilitate the return of rejected asylum seekers to their country of origin based on the principle of state sovereignty. Whilst such agreements are not inherently bad per se, Giuiffre details two concerns. The first is related to when asylum-seekers are apprehended while illegally crossing the border, especially in situations of emergency with massive arrivals of mixed influxes.\textsuperscript{18} This leaves questions about whether the individual has gone through a fair identification procedure on a case-by-case basis as required in an effective asylum procedure.

The second concern is related to situations when asylum procedures are denied to those asylum-seekers who have transited through a ‘safe’ third country before soliciting protection within the borders of an EU member state.\textsuperscript{19} The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe confirms that “if the state of return is not the state of origin, the removal (readmission) order should only be issued if the authorities of the host state are satisfied, as far as can reasonably be expected, that the state to which the person is returned will not expel him or her to a third state where he or she would be exposed to a real risk.”\textsuperscript{20} However, readmission through the ‘safe’ third country clause opens the way for a situation in which a person may be returned to a transit state with the risk of being deported back to the country of origin. This dangerous legal vacuum can occur when transit states enter into similar agreements with other countries of origin to continue the process. For example, Turkey and the EU signed a readmission agreement in 2011. Since then, Turkey has sought to establish bilateral agreements that are similar in nature to the EU’s readmission agreement with other third countries. Consequently, persons currently returned to Turkey under the EU-Turkey agreement may be subjected to deportation back to the country they fled from.

\textit{Recognition of safe third countries}

Whilst readmission agreements are not a novel foreign policy instrument in the EU’s engagement with third countries, they have proven difficult and time-consuming to negotiate, with an average negotiation period of three years.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, it is difficult to issue an accelerated decision procedure due to complex legal requirements. And


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.


even if a forced return decision has been made, returnees then have the right to appeal a return decision thereby prolonging the procedure further. To circumvent this, the EU is developing more flexible and quicker types of agreements. One such approach is the development of a common list of safe third countries. The aim of this is to support the swift processing of asylum applications originating from countries designated as ‘safe.’

The European Agenda on Migration developed in 2015 includes a proposal of having an EU-wide common list of safe countries previously determined at the national level. In the period of 2015-2018, member states will be able to suggest to the EU Commission which other safe third countries should be added to the list. The aim of developing a common list of safe third countries is to enable asylum seekers to be sent back to the countries through which they transited before their arrival to the EU. According to the EU Asylum Procedures Directive:

A country is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in [the recast Qualification Directive], no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.

Akin to the concerns raised above, this concept has serious detrimental consequences to the right to seek asylum. For example, it may facilitate the expedited examination of an application at the border or transit zone and possible return to the country from which the person transited. When migrants are sent back to a country of which they are not nationals, the transit country becomes de facto country of destination where a foreign national is at risk of being stranded there without a legal status or indeed being sent back to the country of origin from which they fled.

Using Turkey as an example again, the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement aims to halt the large-scale irregular movement of refugees and migrants from Turkey to Greece. Under the agreement, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece are to be sent back to Turkey and in exchange for each Syrian returned, another Syrian refugee will be resettled in the EU. As of June 2017, 1,798 people have been returned from Greece to Turkey; a figure which the EU views as a success. In his speech to the European Commission on June 13, 2017, Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner of Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, stated that “despite sometimes challenging circumstances [the deal] continues to deliver steady results.”

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22 Currently the EU’s list of safe countries of origin comprise of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.


At minimum, the EU’s recognition of Turkey as a ‘safe’ third country can be considered an obfuscation of international and European law protecting refugees and asylum seekers. First, Turkey has traditionally been a country of origin and consequently has little experience in being a country of transit or destination. This is reflected in its legal migration structure, which puts a geographical limitation on asylum seekers not originating from Europe. Instead, Turkey grants Syrians a special status of temporary protection, which is indefinite and prevents access to the full asylum procedure. Therefore, there is a need for Turkey to re-evaluate the limits imposed on the Geneva Convention. Second, there are concerns about the “speed of the procedure in Greece and whether a full individual assessment of a person’s claims can be completed in such a short timeframe.” Third, it is questionable whether there is sufficient connection between the asylum seeker and Turkey, a requirement under the Asylum Procedures Directive Article 37 (2a). Fourth, the deal carries the risk of indirect refoulement from Turkey on account of rejected asylum seekers being sent back to their country of origin as explained above. Fifth, there are also concerns about Turkey’s treatment of refugees and its ability to guarantee protection to asylum seekers. This includes a lack of infrastructure to accommodate returnees, a lack of capacity to process individual status determination and a lack of judicial capacity to review asylum cases.

Despite these concerns, the EU is looking to reach similar agreements with third countries, with a current focus on Egypt and Tunisia and potentially Libya, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In France and Germany’s “A crisis-resistant Common European Asylum System” recommendation note dated February 2017, it is stated that the EU-Turkey agreement is “a blueprint for future European asylum policy, also vis-à-vis other neighboring states.” The note mentions that the EU’s current Common European Asylum

30 Jenny Poon, “EU-Turkey Deal: Violation of, or consistency with, international law?” European Papers 1, no. 3 (2016).
System (CEAS) does not allow for concluding such agreements due to high requirements which must be met in order to implement the forced return of asylum seekers. The note recommends that “in case of a crisis, a State may also be considered as a safe third country if it respects the non-refoulement principle and […] provides to returned or transferred asylum seekers safe and humane living conditions […]. Both a transit state and a third state ready for reception could qualify as a safe third country.”

In sum, readmission and safe third country agreements are focused on facilitating a robust migration policy of repatriation and forced return, thereby shifting the burden from the EU towards the third country of origin or transit. The conclusions of the European Council meeting of June 22-23, 2017 state that “further efforts shall also be made to achieve real progress in return and readmission policy […]. Well-functioning readmission agreements and pragmatic arrangements with third countries shall be put in place at EU level without any further delay by using all possible levers, including by reassessing visa policy towards third countries, as needed.” Reassessing visa policy here refers to making the visa procedure for regular migration tougher for uncooperative countries.

First, negative leverage is a clear dismemberment from the reciprocal cooperation approach previously prioritized by the EU. Second, by making return the cornerstone of migration, the EU’s approach disproportionately focuses on preventing irregular migrants arriving in Europe and facilitating quick forced return. This risks undermining fair and effective asylum. Third, the EU is looking to use the EU-Turkey agreement as a blueprint to circumvent the hefty and time-consuming obligations mandated under readmission agreements. This will mean reaching quick agreements with several priority countries that lack the necessary mechanisms and safeguards to protect the returned (non) national refugees and asylum seekers. Such concerns raise the question of whether these agreements result in the de facto breach of the principle of non-refoulement. Regardless of the influence of populist rhetoric, the EU has a legal obligation to protect refugees. It is therefore imperative that cooperation with third countries does not endanger the fundamental right to seek asylum and international protection.

Implications of the EU’s foreign policy on asylum and migration

In sum, the EU is facing diverging pressure from political actors and the wider public to manage the migration crisis. Anti-immigrant and xenophobic standpoints have risen in popularity as a result of a loss of trust in traditional political parties to deliver adequate policy response to complex challenges vis-à-vis the increased influence of right-wing populist parties. Mounk and Foa (2017) describe this as a trend where “citizens […] have less faith in the democratic system […]. And they vote for anti-establishment parties and
candidates that disregard long-standing democratic norms in ever greater numbers.”36

Populist parties have leveraged this discontent and are making use of political volatility and widespread distrust to pressure the political spectrum further right. This is resulting in the redefinition of a stark anti-immigration policy. Indeed, a unifying factor among political (and to a certain extent social) cleavages has appeared out of a consensus regarding safeguarding the EU’s borders and reducing the number of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in the EU. In response to this, it is clear that the EU has found it difficult to balance an increasingly fragmented union with adequate protection of asylum seekers.

What poses a greater danger to the EU than the influx of mass migration, however, might very well be the EU’s external migration policy itself. By pursuing such a foreign policy with third countries, the EU faces the danger of a more regressive and illiberal Europe in which key principles are rooted in increasingly protectionist, nationalistic and intolerant measures. Such a shift is especially relevant for a union that has traditionally relied on soft-power tactics in its foreign policy relations. Consequently, this essay advocates that in addressing the migration crisis, the EU should not only seek populist measures of protectionism and nativist ideology, but should also keep in mind its historical values and not compromise these for short-term gains. Whilst it would be naïve to believe that international politics can be based solely on normative judgements, foreign policy should strike a balance between values and interests. Going forward, the EU should ensure that any agreements reached with third countries adheres to the principle of non-refoulement and the full protection of asylum seekers—as should be expected from a union founded on the liberal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and respect for human rights.

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