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The Russian Federation's Policies Toward the Korean Security Crisis: Moscow's Pivot Toward China

*Anthony V. Rinna**

Abstract: Amidst the fluctuation in the state of diplomacy over Korean security between the threat of “fire and fury” in 2017 and the period of summitry between 2018-2019, the Russian Federation has demonstrated an unprecedented level of cooperation with the People's Republic of China over the North Korean security crisis. Factors that have led to Moscow's increasing alignment with Beijing, in spite of potential Russian strategic anxieties over the rise of Chinese power in East Asia, include Russia's own lack of clout on the Korean Peninsula as well as stark differences in Russian and American views over how to achieve the denuclearization of the DPRK and peace in Korea. Trends toward Beijing-Moscow policy coordination presenting an alternative vision to American policies over Korean security means that while Russia's own role as an independent actor in Korean security continues to remain negligible, it is appropriate to speak of Moscow's role as comprising an element of a Sino-Russian bloc in Korean security dynamics and diplomacy.

Keywords: East Asia, Korea, Russia, nuclear program, foreign policy, security.

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Introduction

In spite of Moscow's historic legacy on the Korean Peninsula, the Russian Federation has long been one of the least influential states engaged in multilateral diplomacy over the Korean security crisis. Nevertheless, Russia has maintained a presence in the multi-party dynamics of Korean security, in large part because of its status as a great power, not least as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and to a lesser extent because of its geographic proximity to the DPRK. In the period between North Korea's sixth nuclear test and the successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017 and the flagging of summit diplomacy toward the end of 2019, Moscow has become an increasingly intimate associate of China in the diplomatic interplay over North Korean security.

In and of itself, Russia's leverage over the DPRK remains negligible, especially when compared with China's influence. The deepening of Beijing-Moscow policy coordination over Korean security, however means that what was previously regarded as primarily China's leverage over the DPRK, as exemplified by the “China responsibility theory” which remains widespread in US policy circles, will increasingly become Sino-Russian

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in nature. Joint proposals such as the Sino-Russian roadmap of 2017 and the action plan proposed in late 2019 indicate that stakeholders in Korean security such as the ROK and the United States will be forced to coordinate diplomacy with both Beijing and Moscow, meaning that dismissing the latter's role in Korean security dynamics will no longer be as feasible as in the past.

East Asia in Russia's foreign policy

Geographically speaking, the post-Soviet space remains the priority area for the Russian Federation's foreign policy, as underscored in the Russian government's most recent foreign policy concept.¹ Although the Kremlin has highlighted the importance of the Korean Peninsula in the overall scheme of Russian foreign policy, in reality it occupies a relatively low rung on the overall hierarchy of Moscow's foreign policy priorities,² particularly as the Russian Federation lost a significant amount of influence in East Asia - and on the Korean Peninsula in particular - following the Cold War. In recent years however, the Kremlin has been placing more emphasis on its relations with countries across the Asia-Pacific, a development that has come to be known as the "turn to the East." The post-Cold War basis for relating to the Russian Federation, namely Russia's comparatively non-threatening position in East Asia, has partially helped pave the way for the Kremlin's outreach to East Asian states.³

The Russian Federation's "turn to the East" resulted in part from the realization of relative post-Cold War stability in Moscow's relations with Europe and the United States as well as the Russian Federation's need to sustain an export-driven economic relationship with the rising East Asian economies.⁴ Contrary to common misperception, the "turn to the East" did not fundamentally begin as a response to souring ties with the West from 2014. Rather the roots of Russia's Asiatic pivot began several years prior, although even as contentions with the West may not have specifically prompted Russia to focus on Asia, Russia has nevertheless fallen into an old habit of seeing Asia as an alternative to the West.⁵ Specific characteristics of the Kremlin's eastward pivot include implementing legislation and policies aimed at economically integrating the Russian Federation with other states

1 Vladimir V. Putin, "Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 30.11.2016 g. no 640 Ob utverzhdenii Kontseptsii vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii [A Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from November 30, 2016. No. 640 On the approval of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation]," accessed July 16, 2019, <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451/page/1>.

2 Motohide Saito, "Russian North Korea Policy: current status and future outlook," in *The Kim Jong Un Regime and the Future Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula* (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), 163.

3 Elena Litsareva, "Sistema bezopasnosti v Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom regione na rubezhe vekov i pervoye desyatiletie 21 v. Pozitsiya Rossii [The system of security in the Asia-Pacific at the turn of the century and the first decade of the 21st century: Russia's position]," *Natsional'nyye priority Rossii* 2, no. 12 (2014): 106.

4 Shinji Hyodo, "Russia's security policy towards East Asia," in *Russia and East Asia: Informal and Gradual Integration*, eds. Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, (Routledge, 2014): 46.

5 Jeffrey Mankoff, "Russia's Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation?" *Asia Policy* 19 (2015): 67.

in East Asia, hosting initiatives such as the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok and even creating an entire ministry aimed at economically developing the Russian Far East.⁶

Today, the issue of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula constitutes a top priority *within the context* of the East Asia aspect of Russian foreign policy⁷. The Korean Peninsula plays an important role in Putin-era Russian foreign policy toward East Asia, particularly given the Korean Peninsula's position on the Russian periphery. Indeed, despite the post-Soviet space's place on the highest rungs of Moscow's foreign policy priorities, Russia's pursuit of influence on the Korean Peninsula can also be understood not simply as a part of its "turn to the East", but also in light of Russia's bid to re-establish itself as a veritable Eurasian power.⁸ Thus, it is natural for the Kremlin to take an interest in issues related to the Korean Peninsula.⁹

Moscow's post-Cold War Korea strategy

Since the mid-1990's Moscow has pursued a policy of balancing its relations between the two Koreas, in part as a way to restore Russian influence on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁰ Part of Moscow's original aim was to position itself as an intermediary between the two Koreas,¹¹ based on the belief that it could help strengthen Russia's geopolitical position in light of the post-Cold War shift in the balance of power between China and the United States.¹² In 2001, Putin set out a series of goals for Russia's Korea policy, including a peaceful solution to the Korean security crisis and inter-Korean reconciliation (with eventual unification) as well as a formal non-nuclear status for the Korean Peninsula, with an eye on reversing the Yeltsin-era malaise of Russia's policies toward Korea.¹³ Under Putin, Russia's interests toward the Korean Peninsula can be said to be three-pronged in nature: *security* interests based on preventing armed conflict and maintaining a balance of military power, *political* interests aimed at ensuring Moscow's position as an intermediary for the two Koreas, and *economic* goals oriented toward enhancing the Korean Peninsula's commercial connectivity with the Russian Federation.¹⁴

6 Anthony V. Rinna, "Moscow's 'turn to the East' and challenges to Russia-South Korea economic collaboration under the New Northern Policy," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 10, no. 2 (2019): 4.

7 Yongchool Ha, and Beomshik Shin, "Non-proliferation and Political Interests: Russia's Policy Dilemmas in the Six-party Talks," *US-Russia: Regional Security Issues and Interests* (Washington, DC: 2006), 178-179.

8 Pavel Cherkashin, "Rossiysko-severokoreyskiye otnosheniya na sovremennom etape i perspektivy ikh razvitiya [Russia-North Korea relations at the current stage and perspectives on their development]," *Izvestiya Vostochnogo instituta* 2, no. 26 (2015): 31.

9 Ingon Yeo et al., "Reosiaui dae hanguk tongil tonggong oegyosiltae [The state of Russian public diplomacy toward Korean unification]" (Korean Institute of National Unification, 2012), 59.

10 Ibid, 60.

11 Ibid, 61.

12 Ha and Shin, "Non-proliferation and Political Interests," 181.

13 Andrey Davydov, "Pekin, Moskva i Vashington: poiski vykhoda iz 'Koreyskogo tupika' [Beijing, Moscow and Washington: the search for an exit from the 'Korean stalemate']," *Kitay v mirovoy i regional'noy politike. Istoriya i sovremennost'* 23 (2018): 145.

14 Yongchool Ha, and Beom-Shik Shin, *Russian nonproliferation policy and the Korean Peninsula*

Indeed, to this day there is some overlap between economics and security in the Russian Federation's Korea policy, seeing as the realization of Russia's security interests vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula are crucial to the fulfillment of the Kremlin's economic ambitions for the development of the Russian Far East, for which the Korean Peninsula plays a crucial role.¹⁵ The Russian Far East, with its vast natural resources, has the potential to be a nexus of cooperation between Northeast Asian states. The potential benefits to be had from integrating the Russian Far East into the Northeast Asian economic network, however underscores the imperative to ensure stability on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁶ Russia is greatly interested in preventing the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, particularly for economic reasons. Unlike China, which will have to contend with a wave of refugees, the primary blowback of an armed conflict in Korea Russia would suffer would be economic. Not only would war negatively affect the Russian Far East, but large-scale violence in Northeast Asia - one of the main engines of the global economy - would, in turn, affect Russia as a whole, not just in its Pacific regions.¹⁷

Insofar as the success of the Kremlin's attempt at pursuing balanced relations with the Koreans is concerned, ROK-Russia ties have been somewhat stagnant. Indeed, although Russia and South Korea officially designated their relationship as a "strategic partnership" in 2008, even at that time the two countries had not realized a level of cooperation befitting this type of relationship,¹⁸ a reality that largely holds true today. Nevertheless, although ties between Russia and South Korea have not reached any significant depth correlative to their designated strategic partnership, both sides nevertheless place a certain value on their bilateral relationship. Moscow-Seoul relations have remained unscathed by challenges such as the US's deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, and Russia is a top priority for the ROK's "New Northern Policy", a policy track launched in 2017 aimed at connecting the entire Korean Peninsula to Russia in a way that fosters both economic prosperity as well as security through trade.¹⁹

DPRK-Russia relations, for their part have witnessed a consistent upward trajectory since Vladimir Putin's visit to Pyongyang in 2000, a development that truly marked the beginning of a positive post-Cold War shift in the Kremlin's relations with the DPRK.²⁰ In

(Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 14.

15 Tony Rinna, "Sanctions, Security and Regional Development in Russia's Policies Toward North Korea," *Asian International Studies Review* 20, no. 1 (2019): 26-27.

16 Tamara Troyakova, "Rol' rossiyskogo Dal'nego Vostoka v razvitií otnosheniy s KNDR [The role of the Russian Far East in developing relations with the DPRK]," *Izvestiya Vostochnogo instituta* 3, no. 31 (2016): 46.

17 Artem Lukin, "Uregulirovaniye raketno-yadernogo krizisa na Koreyskom poluostrove: interesy Rossii i perspektivy mnogostoronnegó formata," *Izvestiya Vostochnogo instituta* 2, no. 38 (2018): 33.

18 Yeo et al., "Reosiaui anbo-gunsajeollyak byeonhwawa hanbandojeongchaek," 235.

19 Rinna, "Moscow's "turn to the East" and challenges to Russia-South Korea economic collaboration under the New Northern Policy," 159-168.

20 Nikolay Klovok, "Pozitsiya i rol' Rossii na shestistoronnikh peregovorakh po 'Severo-koreyskoy yadernoy probleme' [Russia's position and role in the Six Party Talks on the 'North Korean nuclear

2000 the two countries also signed a friendship treaty, yet conspicuous by its absence were any Russian security guarantees for Pyongyang, a departure from the North Korea-USSR mutual defense treaty in effect from 1961-1995. In 2001 Kim Jong Il made a reciprocal journey to Moscow, culminating in the 2001 “Moscow Declaration”, in which the two sides agreed to cooperate on issues related to military security and other relevant problems on the Korean Peninsula.²¹ North Korea and Russia for their part share a common position in being subjected to Western sanctions, and thus have aligned interests in seeing the West’s reach undermined.²² The 2015 purging of Hyon Yong-chol, a former North Korean defense minister who had helped facilitate Moscow-Pyongyang ties, caused unease in the Kremlin’s North Korea policy.²³ Nevertheless, DPRK-Russia ties have continued to experience an upward trajectory in recent years, as underscored by the frequent high-level visits between North Korean and government officials, including Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin in 2019.

Russia and North Korean denuclearization

In the case of nuclear non-proliferation, Russia is unwilling to recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear state, even though Moscow doesn’t consider the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities to be aimed at the Russian Federation.²⁴ One of Moscow’s key short-term interests in Korean security is for the DPRK to return to its former status as an adherent to the NPT.²⁵ Indeed, as contemporary Russia has faced increasing challenges from preventing the spread of nuclear proliferation among smaller, weaker states on and in relative proximity to the Russian periphery,²⁶ Moscow is concerned that advances in Pyongyang’s WMD capabilities would lead to counter-measures from other states, thus escalating tensions in a way that jeopardizes Russian interests.²⁷

Although the Russian Federation is among the least influential actors in Korean security, Russia would prefer to be involved in multi-party negotiations aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction.²⁸ Nevertheless, ever since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, neither North Korea

problem’],” *Territoriya novykh vozmozhnostey. Vestnik Vladivostokskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta ekonomiki i servisa* 2, no. 2 (2009): 84.

21 Yeo et al., “Reosiaui dae hanguk tongil tonggong oegyosiltae,” 60.

22 Ibid, 31.

23 Yoko Hirose, “Russia’s North Korea Policy: The Logic and Dilemma of Assisting North Korea.” *The Asan Forum*, last modified December 8, 2017, <http://www.theasanforum.org/russias-north-korea-policy-the-logic-and-dilemma-of-assisting-north-korea/>.

24 Lukin, “Uregulirovaniye raketno-yadernogo krizisa na Koreyskom poluostrove,” 33

25 Klokov. “Pozitsiya i rol’ Rossii na shestistoronnikh peregovorakh po ‘Severo-koreyskoy yadernoy probleme,’” 90.

26 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and global security norms.” *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (2004): 64-65.

27 Georgy Toloraya, “The Security Crisis in Korea and its International Context: Sources and Lessons from a Russian Perspective,” *The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis* 23, no. 3 (2011): 346.

28 Yeo Ingon, “Reosiaui anbo-gunsajeollyak byeonhwawa hanbandojeongchaek [Changes to Russia’s security-military strategy and Putin’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula]” (Korean Institute of National Unification, 2001), 120.

nor the US has viewed the Russian Federation as a viable independent actor in light of their respective interests toward the Korean security crisis. In 2003 for example, just after the DPRK's second withdrawal from the NPT, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a proposal that included the following measures: recognizing the DPRK's non-nuclear status; strict adherence to the principles of the NPT; adherence to the 1994 Agreed Framework; implementing multilateral dialogue while simultaneously providing the DPRK with security guarantees, and; the resumption of economic and humanitarian programs on the Korean Peninsula. Neither Pyongyang nor Washington, however demonstrated any interest in implementing Moscow's proposal.²⁹

From Pyongyang's point of view, factors such as the Russian Federation's consistent condemnations of North Korean nuclear tests, Moscow's adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and Russian participation in sanctions laid against Pyongyang by the UN Security Council have undermined North Korea's ability to view Moscow's role in resolving the Korean security crisis in a positive light.³⁰ Furthermore, the lack of a mutual defense treaty - or other legal security assurances from Moscow - means that Russia will have a harder time ensuring the DPRK's security to the point the later may feel comfortable sacrificing its nuclear deterrent. Even a return to the Six Party Talks, in their original form, would be inadequate for such purposes, given that their main goal was to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, not necessarily ensure security as a whole.³¹

As far as the US's views of Russia's role in North Korean denuclearization are concerned, Russia and the US in principle share the same goals for Korean denuclearization. The Kremlin had initially been keen to cooperate with the Washington in order to achieve North Korean disarmament. In the earliest days of the DPRK's nuclear outbreak, when North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993, Russia joined the US in calling for Pyongyang to allow IAEA inspectors into the country.³² Furthermore, paragraph 18 of "The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy to 2020" (implemented in 2009) outlined Moscow's desire to build a "strategic partnership" with the United States to cooperate on stemming the proliferation of WMD as well as managing regional conflict.³³ Nevertheless, in addition to Washington's disinterest in the aforementioned Russian proposal made during the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the US

29 Klovov, "Pozitsiya i rol' Rossii na shestistoronnikh peregovorakh po 'Severo-koreyskoy yadernoy probleme,'" 86-87.

30 Valeriy Denisov, "Pozitsiya Rossii v voprose o mirnom dogovore po Koreye [Russia's position on the question of a Korean peace agreement]," *Vestnik MGIMO Universiteta* 3, no. 30 (2013): 47.

31 Valeriy Mishin and Vitaliy Boldyrev, "Koreyskiy poluostrov: problemy yadernoy bezopasnosti i ikh vliyaniye na ekonomicheskuyu integratsiyu [The Korean Peninsula: problems of nuclear security and their influence on economic integration]," *Oykumena. Regionovedcheskiye issledovaniya* 2, no. 33 (2015): 125.

32 Shinji Hyodo, "Russia's security policy towards East Asia," 66-76.

33 Vladimir V. Putin, "Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 12 maya 2009 g. no. 537 [National security strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation from May 12, 2009, No. 537]," accessed March 21, 2019, <https://base.garant.ru/195521/#friends>.

displayed a somewhat cool reception to the Kremlin's participation in the Six Party Talks, which was ensured at Pyongyang's insistence.³⁴ From the vantage point of achieving North Korean denuclearization, the United States has relatively little reason to believe that Russian Federation has the ability to execute a positive role in inducing change to North Korea's behavior. Potential cooperation between North Korea and Russia in energy and rail infrastructure have traditionally constituted one of the few levers of economic influence Russia has over the DPRK, although they are not sufficiently strong areas of collaboration to allow Moscow to claim any substantial leverage over the DPRK.³⁵

Whereas the United States has traditionally viewed the Russian Federation as lacking substantial levers to apply pressure against the DPRK, officials in Moscow have tended to disagree with their American counterparts over the nature of the threat a nuclear-armed North Korea poses. Within Russia's expert class, many assert that the DPRK's nuclear deterrent is more for psychological purposes, rather than genuine military application.³⁶ Additionally, Russia does not share the US's concerns over the possibility of North Korea enacting nuclear blackmail or other actions detrimental to national security, as evidenced by Russian intelligence agencies' assessments of the North Korean WMD threat, which tend to be more relaxed than those produced by the US intelligence community. Indeed, countries such as North Korea, as previous Soviet client states, maintain disputes with the United States that emerged in the context of Soviet-US tensions during the Cold War.³⁷

As Trenin argues:

“Russia's response to an apparently nuclearizing state is guided less by theological rejection of nuclear proliferation and more by a strategic assessment of how the prospect of a particular state's proliferation might threaten Russian interests per se.”³⁸

Based on the extensive history of high-level contacts between North Korean and Soviet/Russian officials and analysts, the commonly-held view among Russia's expert class is that the US's track of applying economic and political pressure on the DPRK government is a miscalculation, and that the US's current method of inducing political change in Pyongyang will backfire - rather than facilitating the collapse of the Kim family regime, pressure will, in the view of many in Russia's foreign policy elite, simply solidify domestic support for Kim and increase the risk of armed conflict.³⁹

34 Ha and Shin, “Russian nonproliferation policy and the Korean Peninsula,” 19-22.

35 Stephen Blank, “Russia's ‘Pivot to Asia’: The Multilateral Dimension,” *National Bureau of Asian Research*, (June 2017): 21-22.

36 Davydov, “Pekin, Moskva i Vashington,” 148.

37 Trenin, “Russia and global security norms,” 65.

38 Ibid, 65.

39 Alexander Vorontsov, “The Russian Perspective on Korean Unification,” *Peace and Unification* 5, no. 1 (2013): 226.

The Growing Sino-Russian Concert Over North Korean Security

Against the backdrop in the divergent American and Russian views of North Korean denuclearization, the Russian Federation has, in the pursuit of its interests, found a willing collaborator in the People's Republic of China. In the early decades of the standoff over the DPRK's nuclear program, Moscow's views on how to best achieve North Korean denuclearization were not overtly aligned with either Beijing or Washington. At that time, as Ha and Shin argue, China had largely favored the so-called Ukrainian model of denuclearization, while the US appeared more disposed toward the Libyan model. Russia, however was skeptical of both methods.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Moscow's views of China's role in the Korean Peninsula have traditionally been overcast by anxieties regarding the rise of Chinese influence in East Asia overall to the detriment of Russian interests. In the Kremlin's strategic views of Northeast Asia, there is also a tacit understanding that Korea is much more important for China than it is for Russia, and thus exists an implicit arrangement that while Beijing and Moscow cooperate on Korean security, Russia will recognize China as having a higher standing in Korea than Russia, while hoping that China will recognize Russia's superior position in places such as Central Asia and Ukraine.⁴¹ This implicit arrangement notwithstanding, Russia would ultimately prefer the establishment of a multilateral system of managing security in Northeast Asia as opposed to exchanging American dominance for Chinese hegemony.⁴² For Russia, the idea would be for Moscow to have the role as one of the key stakeholders in a multi-polar Northeast Asian sub-region.⁴³

In spite of potential strategic anxieties regarding the rise of Chinese power, the Russian Federation appears to have shifted its own strategy toward Korean security away from attempting to position itself as an independent actor in Korean affairs, encapsulated by Vladimir Putin's aforementioned outline of Moscow's interests on the Korean Peninsula which included positioning Moscow as an inter-Korean intermediary, toward closer alignment with China, culminating in the formation of a Sino-Russian bloc offering an alternative to the American vision of how to achieve lasting security on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing, like Moscow is interested in both the preservation of the political status quo in North Korea for the sake of stability as well as the DPRK's denuclearization.⁴⁴ Furthermore, in line with Russian interests, Beijing prefers a strictly diplomatic solution to the standoff over the North Korean nuclear weapons program, preferably done through

40 John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (2005): 84–85. Cited in Ha and Shin, "Non-proliferation and Political Interests," 176.

41 Artem Lukin, "Uregulirovaniye raketno-yadernogo krizisa na Koreyskom poluostrove," 34.

42 Ibid, 35.

43 Lukin, "Rossiya i severokoreyskiy yadernyy krizis. (2017): 65.

44 Hongseo Park, "Pukhanüi ch'a haeksirhöm ihu chunggugüi taeüng - 'wangi inisyöt'ibü'üi paegyönggwa hamüi [China's Response to North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test: Implications of the Wang Yi Initiative]" *Chunggukhak yön'gu che chip [Research in Chinese Studies]*, no. 77 (2016): 253.

a multilateral format⁴⁵. Beijing does not view denuclearization as a standalone issue, but rather considers denuclearization as well as the implementation of a peace agreement between North and South Korea to be interconnected and mutually-reinforcing goals,⁴⁶ a goal that is not incompatible with the Russian Federation's interest in creating a Northeast Asian sub-regional multilateral security format.

Providing a firm basis for China-Russia cooperation over Korean security is the broader Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Sino-Russian relations have evolved with considerable speed to the level of strategic partnership over the past two decades, particularly in response to American hegemony in Northeast Asia. Beijing and Moscow's shared desire to balance against the US has prompted the PRC and Russia to emphasize issues of mutual concern as vehicles of cooperation while avoiding potential areas of contention.⁴⁷ In spite of perceptions that China has been a more responsible actor than the adventurist Russian Federation – raising questions as to what benefits a rising PRC would garner from cooperating with an aggressive yet declining Russia – Beijing and Moscow have recently shown a track record of cooperation on various hard security issues, particularly at the UN Security Council.⁴⁸

Particularly from 2017, the North Korean security has proven to be an area of cooperation between China and Russia. Both China and Russia share a common opposition to the US-led campaign of “maximum pressure”, despite both Beijing and Moscow having consistently voted in favor of sanctions against Pyongyang. China and Russia's shared skepticism over the efficacy of sanctions has emerged in part because the US-led sanctions regime against the DPRK has had a negative effect not only on North Korea itself, but possibly also on the Chinese and Russian regions geographically proximate to the Korean Peninsula,⁴⁹ providing an impetus for Beijing and Moscow to jointly present an alternative to the US approach. One exemplar of Beijing-Moscow coordination over Korean security is the so-called “roadmap” to Korean peace unveiled in 2017. The Sino-Russian “roadmap” breaks down into three stages: first is the agreement whereby the DPRK halts its missile provocations in exchange for the US ceasing large-scale military exercises. The second is fostering direct dialogue between the DPRK and the US. The third

45 Jong-ho Shin, “Si Jinp'ing sigi chunggugüi taeye jöllyak pyönhwawa hanbando chöngch'aege taehan yönghyang” [Changes to China's foreign policy strategy in the Xi Jinping era and its effects on policy toward the Korean Peninsula] *T'ongil jöngch'aek yön'gu chekwön ho* [Unification Policy Research] 25, no. 2 (2016): 147.

46 Park, “China's Response to North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test,” 258.

47 Alexander Korolev, “Systemic balancing and regional hedging: China–Russia relations,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 4 (2016): 386.

48 Michael Cox, “Not just ‘convenient’ China and Russia's new strategic partnership in the age of geopolitics,” *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1, no. 4 (2016): 317-334.

49 Cin Dun, “Rossiysko-kitayskoye voyenno-politicheskoye sotrudnichestvo v Severo-Vostochnoy Azii kak sostavlyayushchaya strategicheskogo partnërstva [Russo-Chinese political-military cooperation in Northeast Asia as a component of strategic partnership],” *Vestnik Zabaykal'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* [Baikal State University Herald] 25, no. 6 (2019): 95.

is initiating multilateral dialogue to establish a security mechanism in Northeast Asia.⁵⁰ The DPRK's moratorium on long-range and nuclear missile testing as combined with reductions in joint ROK-US military exercises as well as the repeated summits between the North Korean and US top leadership indicated that the Sino-Russian roadmap was to all intents and purposes being fulfilled.

Toward the end of 2019, following nearly two years of summit diplomacy between Kim Jong Un and various heads of state, Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Beijing and Moscow would continue to engage in diplomacy over Korean security in a multilateral format.⁵¹ Around that time, the Russian government unveiled a joint Sino-Russia action plan to North Korea's First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son Hui during an official visit to Moscow for strategic dialogue with the Russian government. Although the details of the action plan were not made public, according to Sergei Lavrov, the action plan would focus on defense, economics, humanitarian and political affairs.⁵² Shortly after the Kremlin unveiled the Beijing-Moscow action plan to the North Korean government, China and Russia jointly proposed a program for sanctions relief at the United Nations Security Council, which the United States immediately rejected.⁵³

Policy implications of Sino-Russian cooperation over North Korean denuclearization

Considering the development of Sino-Russian ties over Korean security, it appears that Beijing and Moscow will continue to form a more-or-less coherent block in favor of an approach toward North Korean security that contrasts with the US's maximum pressure campaign. Korean security remains an important facet of the Russian Federation's East Asia policy, although in and of itself, Moscow has not gained any notable degree of influence in Korean affairs. Yet due to Moscow's increasing alignment with China, the United States will likely be forced to consider the implications of the Russian Federation's interests on the Korean Peninsula to a greater extent than in the past. Given the breakdown of direct North Korea-US dialogue in late 2019, in the coming years the United States may attempt to engage in increased multilateral diplomacy with China and Russia. In this case, Washington will find itself dealing with two separate states that comprise what is to all intents and purposes a unified bloc that poses a vision for Korean security in

50 Anastasiya Fedorova, "Rol' problemy KNDR dlya regiona Vostochnoy Azii i eye vliyaniye na Rossiyskuyu Federatsiyu [The role of the DPRK problem for the East Asian region and its influence on the Russian Federation]" (Honors thesis, *Zarubezhnoye regionovedeniye*, 2018), 61.

51 Anthony Rinna, "At Moscow conference, slim progress on North Korea's 'window of opportunity,'" *NK News*, November 10, 2019, <https://www.nknews.org/2019/11/at-moscow-conference-slim-progress-on-north-koreas-window-of-opportunity/>.

52 Anthony Rinna, "Choe Son Hui in Moscow: Russia tries to resuscitate flagging DPRK-U.S. diplomacy," *NK News*, November 24, 2019, <https://www.nknews.org/2019/11/choe-son-hui-in-moscow-russia-tries-to-resuscitate-flagging-dprk-u-s-diplomacy/>.

53 Edith Lederer, "US opposes lifting key sanctions against North Korea," *AP*, December 18, 2019, <https://apnews.com/8692b877d6c22548622056e263f25ec7>.

fundamental opposition to the US's gambit. Unlike in the past, when North Korea and its nuclear program factored into Sino-Soviet geopolitical competition,⁵⁴ there are no signs of immediate geopolitical contention between Beijing and Moscow over the Korean Peninsula, despite the fact that in the long term the Russian Federation's strategic interests may be best served by the unification of Korea so as to remove the need for Sino-Russian cooperation in this particular area.⁵⁵

Russia's *de facto* role as the junior partner in the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as a whole, and in the Korean theater in particular, may tempt outside actors to continue to simply dismiss Moscow's role in Korean security outright, viewing Russia as little more than an appendage of China. This, however would be short-sighted. Aside from the increasing overlap of Chinese and Russian policy interests, North Korea and the Russian Federation have experienced their own bilateral rapprochement, particularly since 2019. Following the summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin in April of that year, Sergei Lavrov described Choe Son Hui's visit to Moscow in late 2019 for North Korea-Russia strategic dialogue as marking a "golden age" in DPRK-Russia ties. Thus, the other stakeholders of Korean security, namely Japan, South Korea and the US, will find themselves having to deal with a Russian Federation whose policy interests are largely in lockstep with China, while maintaining its own deepening bilateral relations with Pyongyang.

54 Balázs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, "North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives," working paper no. 53 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006), 29.

55 Davydov, "Pekin, Moskva i Vashington," 151.

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Xi Jinping and His New Zhijiang Army: A Perspective from Social Network Analysis

*Simin Li**

Abstract: Authoritarian regimes' internal and external behavior are characterized by their leaders' traits and behaviours. Building upon the achievements of elite studies in recent years, this paper analyzes the relationships among cadres who hold high posts within the Chinese Communist Party in the Xi Jinping era. The term "New Zhijiang Army" refers to the people who Xi trusts and are closely associated with. The paper first chooses four cadre-selected congresses from 2007 to 2018, through which Xi rose to power from a member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau to his investiture as president without term limits. The paper analyses the figures of the party, government, and military in these four congresses and indicates the characteristics of officials who emerged alongside Xi Jinping. Finally, the paper sheds light on the relationships between Xi and his "army", and offers a new perspective on future developments in China.

Keywords: China, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party, elite studies, network analysis.

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Introduction

The decline of leaders' powers since the 1990s has led to a process of institutionalization in China's leadership. Institutionalization refers to a set of mechanisms that are created to regulate leaders' policy-making and power transition.¹ Retirement age and term limits are main examples of institutionalization.² In an authoritarian state, dictators cannot govern effectively alone. Thus, institutionalization helps to facilitate the power-sharing between a dictator and his allies to extend the regime's duration.³ Nevertheless, institutionalization is not permanent and static because power-sharing depends on a dictator's desire and opportunity.⁴ Kou and Zang⁵ argue that top leaders with high personal authority can prevent institutionalization. Similarly, Boix and Svulik⁶ argue

1 Chien-wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang, "Informal Politics Embedded in Institutional Contexts: Elite Politics in Contemporary China," in *Choosing China's Leaders*, ed. Chien-wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang (London: Routledge, 2013), 4.

2 Milan W. Svulik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 92.

3 Carles Boix and Milan, W. Svulik, "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships," *The Journal of Politics*, 75, no.2 (2013): 300–316.

4 Svulik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 54.

5 Chien-wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang, "Informal Politics Embedded in Institutional Contexts: Elite Politics," in *Contemporary China*.

6 Carles Boix and Milan, W. Svulik, "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government"

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that imbalance of power within the ruling coalition breaks institutionalization.

Therefore, a question is raised as to whether formal institutions can counteract informal factions since Xi Jinping took the reins of power in 2012.⁷ In other words, the question is whether institutionalization is challenged under Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping, “the chairman of everything,”⁸ was regarded as the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. He has collected power rapidly and has broken many formal and informal rules and norms within the Communist Party. For instance, he has launched a purge of former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, and he has enshrined his thought in the party’s constitution and canceled term limits for presidency in 2018. Moreover, he has taken several titles in small groups and Security Council in addition to his existing institutional roles, namely General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the President of the PRC. All these institutional roles surpass even those of Mao Zedong’s.⁹

At this point, the role of Xi Jinping’s personality and experience in governance are highlighted. Xi Jinping and his followers in the process of decision-making are this paper’s research objectives. Li summarizes four types of people, Shaanxi Gang, friends, political protégés, and personal assistants in Xi Jinping’s inner circle.¹⁰ These people compose a loose group who has connections with Xi Jinping in the ruling coalition, although the number is dynamic and implicit. The prominent component of the group is the ‘New Zhijiang Army.’ The term ‘Zhijiang’ was sourced from a column written by Xi Jinping on Zhejiang Daily when he worked in Zhejiang province from 2002 to 2007.¹¹ New Zhijiang Army refers to the members who share some common attributes and have strong connections with Xi Jinping. They consist of Xi Jinping’s old friends (classmates, roommates), subordinates, and townsmen.¹² Compared with old friends and townsmen, subordinates who have worked with Xi Jinping in the same province make up most of the New Zhijiang Army.

Given the above, it is interesting to explore the pattern and characteristics of senior officials alongside the rise of Xi Jinping. Several questions are asked. Does the New Zhijiang Army exist in the ruling coalition? Do the promoted officials share similar

7 Victor, C. Shih, “Contentious Elites in China: New Evidence and Approaches,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 16 (2016):1.

8 “Chairman of Everything,” *The Economist*, April 2, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/china/2016/04/02/chairman-of-everything>.

9 Ming Xia, “Xi Jinping’s Constitutional Coup,” December 18, 2013, http://2newcenturynet.blogspot.com/2013/12/blog-post_18.html.

10 Cheng Li, “Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle,” *China Leadership Monitor*. 43 <https://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/spring-2014>.

11 Ying J. Chou, “An Estimate of Xi Jinping’s Personnel Allocation in the 19th CPCNC Based on the Rise of ‘New Zhijiang Army,’” *Prospect & Exploration* 14, no.9. (2016):104-116.

12 Guang, Yang, “Xi Jinping’s Way to Select Officials,” *Human Rights in China*, October 14, 2016, <https://www.hrichina.org/en/node/17388>.

characteristics? Do their connections with Xi Jinping play a role in promotions? And what are the implications for China elite studies? This paper neither identifies every member of Xi Jinping's inner circle nor predicts the potential successors. Instead, it hopes to examine senior officials from a new perspective and contribute to the field of elite studies.

The paper first proceeds by reviewing the main tenets of studies on China's elites and the technique of social network analysis. In subsequent sections, it elaborates the rationale of research methods, namely document analysis, social network analysis, and logistic regression and the analytical data. Results with graphs and tables are explained in detail. Finally, the paper highlights implications and conclusions.

Literature Review

Studies on China's Elites

Elite refers to a group of powerful people whose political decisions influence society. Elite studies hence research the characteristics of politicians and leaders in public institutions and private organizations. Their research fields include elites' social backgrounds, careers, activities, and interactions. When elites are identified, published sources and surveys are employed to collect data.¹³ Feminism, network analysis, ethnography, comparative analysis, and interviews are also used in analytical approaches or methods.¹⁴ Besides that, personality profiling, which consists of psychobiography and personality study,¹⁵ and biographical analysis¹⁶ are new analytical methods for leadership studies.

In the case of China, a variety of theories and models have been developed to look at the nature of political leadership from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping era. Four themes are summarized by Kou and Zang,¹⁷ with the first one being factional politics. Before power transfer and leadership succession were institutionalized within the CCP, dichotomies were used to divide groups according to elites' attitudes, interests, class background, and stances on policies. Subsequently, more detailed categories were set up at the national level and the provincial level.¹⁸ Nevertheless, these studies can be generally classified into factional analysis, the most important theory at the early phase. Factionalism as an informal explanation of elites' similarities and connections is very popular in elite studies. Factions were mainly formed in the Jiang Zemin's era from 1989 to 2002.¹⁹ The well-

13 Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, "Methods of Elite Research," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 910-927.

14 Joseph A. Conti and Moira O'Neil, "Studying Power: Qualitative Methods and the Global Elite," *Qualitative Research* 7, no. 1 (2007): 63-82; Matias López, "Elite theory," *Sociopedia.isa* (2013): 1-12.

15 Jerrold, M. Post, "Personality Profiling Analysis," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 328-344.

16 James Walter, "Biographical Analysis," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership* Edited by R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 314-327.

17 Kou and Zang, "Informal Politics Embedded in Institutional Contexts"

18 Monte R. Bullard, "People's Republic of China Elite Studies: A Review of the Literature," *Asian Survey*, 19, no.8 (1979): 789-800.

19 Kerry Brown, "The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China," (New York: I.B. Tauris,

known factions include the Shanghai faction, Youth League faction, princeling faction, and Qinghua University faction. However, the limitations of factionalism are apparent: the boundaries between factions are not clear and one elite can belong to more than one faction.²⁰

Meanwhile, international relations theories such as the bandwagoning effect and balance-of-power polity were adopted to analyze actors during the Mao era.²¹ The second theory, generational politics, appeared in late 1970s and the mid-1990s. This theory is about the conflicts between the older revolutionary generation and the younger one. Technocracy, the third theory, stands for the significant contrast between the young and well-educated officials and the revolutionary cadres.²² When institutionalization was strengthened in the Post-Mao era, rules within the party had been built up and factional analysis was questioned.²³ Hence, the fourth theory is institutionalization.

However, the concentrated power of Xi Jinping has resulted in a new situation. The disputes between factionalism and institutionalization continue, but a new argument has been put forward by recent works. By comparing Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong in the Five-Factor model (extraversion, conscientiousness, openness to experience, agreeableness and neuroticism), Lee²⁴ argues that even though both have similarities in charisma, Xi Jinping has higher levels of political tolerance and need for achievement. In other words, Xi Jinping is less likely to repeat creating a personality cult and endure political struggle as Mao did, but would not yield to core issues. Likewise, Gueorguiev²⁵ argues that existing norms and institutions within the party have allowed Xi Jinping to expand power, with ambiguous and malleable rules supporting his intentions in succession and promotion. The ambiguous and malleable rules used by Xi Jinping to secure his position include succession norms, the incumbent's semblance of balance, and the retirement age. Thus, informality and formality coexist in China's leadership.

In practice, the past studies on China's elites rely on archives, intelligence sources, interviews, news reports, and researcher's observations.²⁶ Constrained by a lack of transparent and systematic data, earlier studies mainly employ qualitative methods. Gradually, case studies in individual leaders and political campaigns, group studies in demographic information, and statistical methods are the main approaches to analyze

2014):15.

20 Brown, *The New Emperors*, 18-19.

21 Zhi, Y. Bo, "Political Leadership in China," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 613

22 Kou and Zang, "Informal Politics Embedded in Institutional Contexts", 4.

23 Zheng, X. Wang and Anasta Vangeli, "The Rules and Norms of Leadership Succession in China: From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping and Beyond," *The China Journal* 76 (2016): 1324-9347.

24 Tony, C. Lee, "Can Xi Jinping be the Next Mao Zedong? Using the Big Five Model to Study Political Leadership," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 23 (2018):473-497.

25 Dimitar, D. Gueorguiev, "Dictator's Shadow: Chinese Elite Politics Under Xi Jinping," *China Perspectives*, 1-2, (2018): 17-26.

26 Chien, W. Kou, "Chinese Elite Politics and Qualitative Analyses: Primary Data Sources and Analytical Methods," *The Taiwanese Political Science Review*, 9, no.2 (2005): 236.

Chinese leadership.²⁷ Moreover, new data and new techniques were introduced in elite studies. Benefiting from the internet, short biographies of higher-level elites with data on careers and their backgrounds are becoming available. Therefore, graphs are becoming increasingly more useful to depict relationships among members of an elite.²⁸ As a consequence, political scientists have started to focus their attention on social network analysis to study the Chinese leadership.²⁹

Social Network Analysis in Elite Studies

Social network theory explores interpersonal relations and the relational structure within a group of people.³⁰ In a network, actors (or nodes) can be individuals, firms, states, and so on.³¹ In political science, the interactions between states or individuals may be the perfect topic for network theory. The usefulness of this theory is especially evident at the micro-level. Information and resources flow through networks, and the position within the overall network, determine the priority to access information and resources. Meanwhile, actors' behaviors in the network are regulated by the structure, so different positions have different controls.³²

As an analytical technique, social network analysis is applied to two special formats of data. One is describing the characteristics of actors, and the other is describing the actors' relationships.³³ The principle of network theory implies that the power and influence of an actor within the network are measurable, so several core indexes need to be introduced. Centrality is one of the most important measurable concepts; the actor who reflects greater centrality is the more "powerful" and occupies the more central position in the network. Centrality can be measured by degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality.³⁴ This paper uses degree centrality and betweenness centrality in its analysis. The former is counted through the number of edges of a node. The higher the degree, the more central the node is. The actor who has the most degrees is the most important in the network. The latter is a measure of the extent to which a node is connected to other nodes that are not connected to each other. It's a measure of the degree

27 Bo, "Political Leadership in China."

28 Franziska, B. Keller, "Moving Beyond Factions: Using Social Network Analysis to Uncover Patronage Networks Among Chinese Elites," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 16, no.1 (2016): 21.

29 Guang, X. Wang, "The Application of Social Network Analysis to Public Administration Research," *Survey Research — Method and Application*, 34, (2014): 67-132; Chan, H. Wang, "Social Network Analysis and China Studies: Measurement and Analysis of Relational Network," *Mainland China Studies*, 58, no.2 (2015): 23-59.

30 Yuh J. Tsai, "Social Networks: A New Approach of Sociological Research," *Thought and Words: Journal of the Humanities and Social Science*, 46, no. 1 (2008): 1-34.

31 John Patty and Maggie Penn, "Network Theory and Political Science," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Networks*, ed. Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H. Montgomery, and Mark Lubell (Oxford University Press, 2016): 1-32.

32 David Lazer, "Networks in Political Science: Back to the Future," *Political Science & Politics*, 44, no.1 (2011): 61-68.

33 Franziska, B. Keller, "Analyses of Elite Networks," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, ed. Heinrich Best and John Higley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018): 136.

34 Patty and Penn, "Network Theory and Political Science."

where a node serves as a bridge.

In the case of social network analysis applied in China studies, social capital and employment are the main fields. Public policy is also another emergent issue. Wang³⁵ proposes three available fields, namely elite studies, enterprise studies, and collective action. For elite studies, the past research experience and theories of qualitative research have paved the way for social network analysis.

Research Design and Methods

To analyze the New Zhijiang Army in a comprehensive way, the paper employs three methods, namely document analysis, social network analysis, and logistics regression to analyze data. Document analysis is a qualitative procedure that reviews printed and electronic documents to gain meaning, knowledge, and understanding.³⁶ Documents in the paper include news reports, officials' digital profiles, and related analytical literature on China's elite studies. This paper will use social network analysis and logistic regression to analyze the relationship between multiple independent variables and a categorical dependent variable, and the probability of occurrence.³⁷ Binary logistic regression where the dependent variable is dichotomous will be used in this paper.

Officials' data in this paper is collected from the online database³⁸ built by the CCP. It records the national and municipal officials' profiles including name, age, gender, place of origin, title, career, ethnicity, and educational background. Moreover, the paper also refers the political elite database³⁹ built and updated by National Cheng Chi University. Data collection and analysis consist of two procedures. The analytical groups and measurable variables are identified in advance. The first procedure is social network analysis for 138 senior officials from March 2013 to March 2018, and the second is logistic regression for 190 senior officials from March 2008 to March 2018.

The first procedure's purpose is to find the characteristics of the new or promoted officials with the rise of Xi Jinping since March 2013. Since subordinates under Xi Jinping are the majority, officials' working provinces are presented with social network analysis.

Table 1 shows the dataset at the national level for social network analysis from March 2013, when Xi Jinping became the head of state, to March 2018. The higher ranking means higher positions, while the same ranking means the same level of position. The ranking of positions is in a fixed order in China's leadership. The highest position is the party's decision-making core, the Politburo Standing Committee, whose members are currently seven. The second position, the Political Bureau, is composed of 25 members

35 Wang, "Social Network Analysis and China Studies."

36 Glenn Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9, no.2 (2009): 27-40.

37 Hyeoun A. Park, "An Introduction to Logistic Regression: From Basic Concepts to Interpretation with Particular Attention to Nursing Domain," *Korean Society of Nursing Science*, 43, no.2. (2013): 154-164.

38 The database can be found at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/394696/index.html>.

39 The database can be found at <https://cped.nccu.edu.tw/>.

from the Party, state, and military. From ranking 6 to rank 4, these positions belong to party and state leaders⁴⁰ even though the power distribution is unbalanced. The lowest position is the functional office of state council.

The analytical unit here is the head of each position despite the fact that one position may have two leaders. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the minister Wang Yi and the party chief Qi Yu. The analytical unit in the paper hence is Wang Yi and not Qi Yu. In addition, it is possible that one person has more than one identity or title. For example, Wang Yi is not only the minister of Foreign Affairs but also the state councilor. State councilor which ranks 4 in Table 1 is higher than minister, therefore, Wang Yi's principal identity is state councilor.

Table 1. The Dataset of Analytical Groups.

Position	Ranking	Example
The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau	6	Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang
The Political Bureau	5	Fan Changlong, Li Xi
Secretariat of the Central Committee	4	Yang Jing, Huang Kunming
Vice-chairman of National People's Congress	4	Wang Shengjun, Wang Chen
State Councillor	4	Wang Yi
President of Supreme People's Court	4	Zhou Qiang
Procurator-general of Supreme People's Procuratorate	4	Zhang Jun
Vice-chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	4	Chen Yuan, He Lifeng
Central Military Commission of CCP	3	Zhang Youxia
Ministries and Commissions under the State Council	2	Yuan Guiren, Chen Baosheng
Units under CCP Central Committee	2	Song Tao
Functional Offices of CCP Central Committee	1	Wang Jiarui,
Organizations directly under the State Council	1	Cai Fuchao, Ning Jizhe
Functional Offices of the State Council	1	Wang Guangya, Zhang Xiaoming
Agencies under the Central Military Commission	1	Zhong Shaojun, Li Zuocheng


Once the analytical unit is identified and collected, a red point (see from Figure 1 in social network analysis) is a node that refers to an official, and an edge refers to the link between two nodes who have connections.

According to Xi Jinping's official profile,⁴¹ he has worked in Shaanxi, Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. Fujian province and Zhejiang province are places where he spent the most years. Since subordinate is the main relationship, the edge here refers to the same province in officials' careers. If actor A and actor B have worked as administrative officials in the same province, an edge will be tied between them.

40 Zhi Z. Zheng, "How to Rank leaders of Party and State," Accessed on April 10, 2019. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1270347.

41 Xi Jinping's profile can be found at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1025/c414940-29608803.html>.

Figure 1. Examples of Nodes and Edges.



The second procedure's purpose is to test whether the connections with Xi Jinping influence officials' promotion. Thus, combining with previous empirical works and the focus of the paper, the paper defines different variables. Table 2 shows the independent variables, dependent variables, and controlled variables. Data is collected from March 2008 to March 2018 to measure potential changes in positions in that time frame. Promotion can mean two things here: firstly, literal promotion, and secondly, through a new identity or title for the same position during the term. For example, Liu He, the classmate of Xi Jinping in middle school, is a member of the Political Bureau since October 2017, and the vice-premier of the State Council since March 2018, but he was assigned a new title as the vice director of the National Science and Technology Education Leading Group in August 2018. That means he got promoted.

Table 2. Variables for Logistic Regression.

Name	Independent Variables		Controlled Variables	Dependent Variables
Actor	Relations with Xi	Working Province	age, gender, ethnicity, education	Promoted
	same place of origin; classmate; subordinate	Shaanxi, Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai		Non- promoted
		none of the above		

Two categories are classified in the independent variables. Relations with Xi Jinping include townsmen whose places of origin is Shaanxi province, classmates who studied in the same class with Xi Jinping, and subordinates who have worked under Xi in the same local government. The information can be found in officials' profiles and news reports. The second category is working province in accordance with Xi Jinping's path to promotion. If an official has worked in one of the five places, he or she will be marked.

The controlled variables include age, gender, ethnicity, and education which are often tested by previous empirical studies.⁴² Therefore, the paper will mark these controlled

42 Lu H. Chen, Te S. Chen, and Yi, L. Chen, "Who Are the Rising Stars in the 18th CCP National Congress? A Study of Political Potential of Central Committee Alternate Members," *Mainland China Studies*, 55, no.1 (2012): 1-21; Ruixue Jia, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim, "Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13, no.4 (2015): 631-668; Z Wu, J Luo, and X Zhang, "Uncovering Political Promotion in China: A Network Analysis of Patronage Relationship in Autocracy," accessed on May 2, 2019, <https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.00625>.

variables out based on previous research.

Results

In the first procedure, 138 officials' data of working provinces are collected and presented in Figure 2. Red points mean cadres, and blue squares mean their working places. When several cadres have worked in the same province, the blue square links these red points together. The isolated red points on the left side mean those cadres have no working experience in provinces. Examples include Liu He, the vice-premier of the State Council, who stayed in the state council after graduating from Renmin University in 1986, and Wan Exiang, who became the deputy president of the Municipal Court and the Supreme Court without administration experience. For military cadres, if military regions are marked in their official profiles, the regions are their working places. For example, the Nanjing Military Region which governs six provinces locates in Nanjing City, Jiangsu province.

Figure 2. Two-mode Graph of Cadres and Provinces From 2013 to 2018.




Figure 3 shows the index of degree centrality among 138 officials. Beijing's size is the biggest in the figure. It means the number of cadres who have worked in Beijing is the largest and that working in Beijing is the most important within the network. The sizes of Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai are also big, illustrating their importance.

Figure 4 shows the index of betweenness centrality among cadres. It turns out that Guangdong's size is the largest (Beijing's is smaller). That means Guangdong is the most suitable province as a bridge for cadres. If one cadre wants to know another cadre, he or she had better ask someone who has Guangdong experience for help.

Figure 3. Two-mode Graph of Cadres and Provinces with Degree Centrality.




Figure 4. Two-mode Graph of Cadres and Provinces with Betweenness Centrality.





Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 expose two terms of Xi Jinping. When it came to the second term, situation has changed. Figure 5 shows the network of the cadres who were promoted in March 2018. In the isolated group, no officials have worked in Jilin, Hainan, and Jiangxi. Fujian province where Xi Jinping worked for 17 years becomes the most important in the network. The new and promoted officials who worked in Fujian province make up the majority of cadres. Shanghai, Liaoning, and Zhejiang’s positions are also highlighted.

and Hebei-Tibet have the most shared officials.

Figure 7. One-mode Graph of Provinces From 2013 to 2018.



The following figures are the networks of cadres themselves. Red rectangles in Figure 8 mean cadres who were not sent-down youths (Zhi Qing) were promoted in March 2013. Green triangles mean cadres who were sent-down youths were promoted in March 2018. If two cadres have worked in the same province, they will be tied together. Likewise, if cadres did not have province experiences, they are listed on the left side of the figure.

Figure 8. One-mode Graph of Cadres From 2013 to 2018.




Figure 9 and Figure 10 show indexes of degree centrality and betweenness centrality among cadres. Red rectangles mean cadres who were promoted in March 2013 without sent-down youth experiences, and green diamonds mean cadres who were sent-down youths were promoted in March 2018. Both figures show Li Xi, a member of the Political

Bureau and the Party Secretary of Guangdong province, is the most important person within the network.

Li Xi not only shares the most working provinces with other cadres but also is the best person to connect with other cadres. The provinces he worked in include Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanghai, Liaoning, and Guangdong.⁴³ Even though he was not the subordinate under Xi Jinping, he was usually regarded as a member of Xi’s group. Another outstanding person within the network is Guo Jinlong, who was a member of the Political Bureau and the Party Secretary of Beijing. But his position was replaced by Caiqi, Xi Jinping’s subordinate in Fujian province, in 2017 (Xinhua, 2017).

Figure 9. One-mode Graph of Cadres with Degree Centrality from 2013 to 2018.





Figure 10. One-mode Graph of Cadres with Betweenness Centrality from 2013 to 2018.



43 Li Xi’s profile can be found at www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/25/c_1121856438.htm.

In the second procedure, 190 cadres' data from March 2008 to March 2018 are collected by excluding the ones who have entered the Politburo or retired before Xi Jinping was promoted to a member of the Standing Committee in 2007. Also, two cadres lacking complete data are excluded. Table 3 shows the result of the dependent variable with SPSS.

By controlling four variables, the relations with Xi Jinping, including classmates, subordinates, and townsmen, do have an influence on officials' promotions ($p=0.018$). Working in Shaanxi, Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang, or Shanghai has no significant impact on officials' promotions. Therefore, the relation with Xi Jinping is more important than the working places. In other words, the New Zhijiang Army is more like a group of people who have connections with Xi Jinping, not based on the places they worked in—Xi Jinping just happened to work in the above five provinces. Furthermore, if officials who don't have relations with Xi Jinping want to get a promotion, the rate of success is the ones who have relations with Xi Jinping's 0.156 times. The officials who have relations with Xi Jinping are likely to be promoted.

Table 3. The Logistic Regression of 190 Cadres.

Variables in the Equation		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	relation(1)	-1.857	.785	5.595	1	.018	.156	.033	.727
	place(1)	-.870	.526	2.731	1	.098	.419	.149	1.176
	gender	-.688	.918	.562	1	.454	.503	.083	3.039
	education	.164	.260	.396	1	.529	1.178	.708	1.960
	nation	-1.801	1.042	2.989	1	.084	.165	.021	1.272
	age	-3.605	.568	40.280	1	.000	.027	.009	.083
	Constant	5.519	1.780	9.616	1	.002	249.342		
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: gender, education, nation, age.									

Conclusion and Limitations

Elite governance is a special and significant issue in Chinese studies. With the power concentration of Xi Jinping, new leadership developments need to be observed and studied. To explore the pattern and characteristics of senior officials with the rise of Xi Jinping, the paper used document analysis, social network analysis and logistics regression to examine the phenomenon of New Zhijiang Army in the ruling group. Departing from previous research on the members of the central committee of the Party, this paper has analyzed the Party and state leaders and the affiliated organizations of the Party, government, and military. It argued that a group of people who have strong connections with Xi Jinping was formed with the rise of Xi. The majority were Xi Jinping's subordinates in Fujian province until March 2018. Li Xi was the most important person within the officials' network from 2013 to 2018 if we're only considering the working province. The results also find that the relationship with Xi Jinping influences officials' promotions, while the

working places are not important.

The problem of decision-making within a closed circle is apparent. Xi Jinping is surrounded by party members whose political career is tied to his own success. Among political cadres, loyalty to Xi Jinping is valued more than competence. Until this skewed value system remains, no one will provide critical information and oppose Xi Jinping's opinion. Lack of accurate information can be a problem for the Party, as shown by the recent case of COVID-19 in Hubei. After the virus outbreak, Hubei's party secretary has been replaced by the mayor of Shanghai, Ying Yong, who has held a high post in Zhejiang province from 2003 to 2007, when Xi Jinping was the party chief.⁴⁴

Until now, the network of "Zhijiang Army" among main cities of China has been constructed by Xi Jinping. From the north to the south, the party secretaries of Heilongjiang, Beijing, Shanghai, Hubei, Chongqing, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council are, respectively, Zhangqingwei, Caiqi, Liqiang, Chenminer, Yingyong, Lixi, and Xiabaolong. All of them are thought to be close to Xi Jinping.

The main limitation of this paper is that the analytical units in the study are principals at the national level. They exclude the deputy positions except for the vice-chairmen of the National People's Congress and the vice-chairmen of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the lowest levels of the party, state, and army are functional offices of CCP Central Committee, functional offices of the State Council, and agencies under the Central Military Commission. Hence, it is possible that when the scope of research units extends to the provincial level, the result is different. Moreover, the tested variables merely consider the relations with Xi Jinping and officials' working provinces and ignore officials' family backgrounds, for example, princeling or the "fuerdai"—the rich second generation, because their data lacks transparency. Changes may also still occur due to Xi Jinping's now unlimited term. People's relations are dynamic, and nothing is guaranteed. One example is that military cadres' news and information can disappear, or stop being updated without explanations. This represents a major challenge for future research.

Given the above, the paper argues that key persons exist within the ruling clique in the Xi Jinping era. They get in charge of substantial affairs and affect Xi Jinping. Thus, developing innovative and comprehensive techniques to measure and analyze these key persons is necessary in elite studies. Further studies can turn to long term tracking of officials since 2013. Conversely, key persons' influences on Xi Jinping can also be researched.

44 Zheng, William Zhang, "Coronavirus: Beijing Purges Communist Party Heads in Hubei over 'Botched' Outbreak Response in Provincial Capital of Wuhan," Accessed on February 28, 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050372/coronavirus-beijings-purge-over-virus-takes-down-top-communist>

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Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic. By Emily Conroy-Krutz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018. Pp. 264. Hardcover, \$48.00. ISBN: 0801453534

*Book Review by Curtis Keltner**

Abstract: Christian Imperialism, by Emily Conroy-Krutz, knits together a captivating story of the men and women who passionately obeyed the words once spoken by Jesus, who said, “go ye into the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.” In her first book Conroy-Krutz argues that “American missionaries sought to determine how the American foreign mission movement should relate to empire and political institutions.” From 1810 and throughout the nineteenth century brave men and women left everything behind to preach the Gospel to those they called heathens. These missionaries were exceedingly in support of empires in theory, but critical of many imperial principles in practice. Evangelical missionaries imagined communities beyond the shores of the nascent American republic, as they traveled mostly to Asia by the hundreds, then thousands, to spread their faith. They suffered numerous setbacks, but their faith and determination kept them going strong throughout the nineteenth century.

Keywords: Christian, imperialism, American, Evangelical, missionary, history.

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In her first book *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* Emily Conroy-Krutz knits together a captivating story of the men and women who passionately obeyed the words once spoken by Jesus, who said, “go ye into the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.” Two years before the United States declared war on England in 1812, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) convened for the first time to discuss how American Evangelical missionaries could spread Christianity to the far reaches of the globe.¹ Conroy-Krutz argues that “American missionaries sought to determine how the American foreign mission movement should relate to empire and political institutions.”² The men and women who were willing to leave everything behind to preach the Gospel to those they called heathens, exceedingly supported empires in theory, yet were critical of many

1 Emily Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), xv, <https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501725098/christian-imperialism/>.

2 Conroy-Krutz, 17.

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imperial principles in practice.³ Evangelical missionaries imagined communities beyond the shores of the nascent American republic, as they traveled mostly to Asia by the hundreds, then thousands, to spread their faith. They suffered many setbacks, but their faith and determination kept them going strong.

Christian Imperialism is thematic and, as Conroy-Krutz points out, looks at different types of missions and their relation to various types of British and American imperialism.⁴ The structure of the book helps compartmentalize how the ABCFM viewed the various missions they had set up throughout the world, aiding the reader in a greater understanding of how the board viewed their professed role in making the world a better place. Despite a prodigious number of topics discussed, the book flows well and is easy to read; nonetheless, the constant comparison of overseas missions to American Indian missions is distracting and convolutes the overall premise of the book, which is to discuss imperialism. The scope of *Christian Imperialism* is broad, Conroy-Krutz jumps between overseas missions in India, Liberia, Hawaii, Singapore, and then she comes back to the Cherokee Nation. Conroy-Krutz demonstrates how Americans viewed themselves on the world stage after the American Revolution, and she shines new light on a topic that is often not given much thought in secular literature.

In the Early Republic era, while most Americans looked westward and thought about the vastness of the North American continent, some Evangelical Protestants looked East, and by 1860, the ABCFM had sent out around thirteen hundred missionaries worldwide.⁵ With the assistance of the British Empire, American missionaries were able to gain a foothold in India and branch out to different locations in Asia and beyond. Conroy-Krutz points out the difficulty in converting some cultures to Christianity and how the ABCFM created a “hierarchy of heathenism” to determine which locations were best suited for missions.⁶ *Christian Imperialism* is useful in demonstrating how the hierarchy of heathenism worked, stating that “in the early period, the civilized status of a location, or its potential for eventual civilization, was central to missionary decision making.”⁷ Conroy-Krutz continues, saying, “civilization, they believed, could lead to Christianization.”⁸ Using mostly secondary sources, letters, correspondence, and the ABCFM annual report, *Christian Imperialism* offers a well-rounded view of how nineteenth-century evangelical missionaries viewed themselves and the world they sought to civilize.

Leaving their homes, potentially never to see them again, hundreds of men and women set out by ship to remote areas of the world. Some of these people certainly kept diaries or maintained other relics that could fill the gaps in Conroy-Krutz’s research. The notable

3 Conroy-Krutz, 7.

4 Conroy-Krutz, 16.

5 Conroy-Krutz, xvii.

6 Conroy-Krutz, 16.

7 Conroy-Krutz, 29.

8 Conroy-Krutz, 30.

lack of first-person accounts, save for letters and reports, is a missed opportunity by the author to add more depth to her argument. Moreover, in a country ripe with slavery, the author misses another opportunity to speak about the evangelization of slaves; although she mentions missionaries in Liberia, there is minimal mention of them working in the United States. It is odd that the author mentions evangelizing Native Americans, but not African Americans. Conroy-Krutz could have expanded the scope of *Christian Imperialism* slightly to include diary entries from missionaries and accounts of Protestant evangelization efforts towards African American slaves. Despite the lack of diary entries, the book is well researched and written. Some aspects were overlooked; nevertheless, it is understandable for a first-time author. The thesis for this book works because Conroy-Krutz adheres to how the ABCFM viewed its mission as it relates to imperialism on a geopolitical scale. The success of their overseas missions is another story altogether.

At the beginning of the book, Conroy-Krutz asks the question, “how did Evangelical Americans envision their role in the world?”⁹ She spends the rest of the book answering this straightforward yet overwhelmingly complex question. Invariably the role of empires and imperialism was uppermost in the minds of missionaries as they thought about where they would go to accomplish their high commission. The period between America’s colonial era and 1898 is where *Christian Imperialism*’s historical focus lies.¹⁰ It is this stage that lays the groundwork for American imperialism, which started on the work of British imperialism, by way of Protestant missionaries. The book is short, just over two hundred pages, which makes it excellent for an undergraduate or graduate-level class. *Christian Imperialism* is multifaceted, which, in a classroom setting, could be used to talk about religion, early America, empires, and to an extent, interaction with Native Americans. Determining the proper equilibrium between doing God’s work and dealing with imperial powers is where the missionaries often found themselves. In *Christian Imperialism*, the reader will come to understand and appreciate the men and women who went out into the world to spread the Gospel message. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in American, religious, or imperial history.

9 Conroy-Krutz, 7.

10 Conroy-Krutz, 6.

Challenges and Prospects in the Counter Terrorism Approach to Boko Haram: 2009 – 2018

*Wazeer Murtala**

Abstract: This work is an attempt to look at the many efforts that have been adopted to combat Boko Haram. It looks at the challenges faced in the counter-terrorist campaign and how the strategies have failed or succeeded so far. Attempts are made to take a broad look at the general theories of counter-terrorism and how the federal government of Nigeria has fared so far in the practical application of counter-terrorist strategies against the Boko Haram group. What are the specific counter-terrorism measures adopted by Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram – how is Nigeria combating Boko Haram? What are the challenges in the efforts? What are the possible ways to combat Boko Haram and similar insurgencies in the future?

Keywords: Boko Haram, Nigeria, terrorism, counter-terrorism, insurgency, security.

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Introduction

To a very big extent, insecurity in the form of terrorism has turned out to be one of the leading contemporary challenges facing the modern state with records showing that terrorism has become a truly global phenomenon over the past two decades. The actual impacts of terrorism on each region or country vary, albeit, no country is immune to terrorism due to globalization, porous borders, the proliferation of light weapons and the many other technological innovations that have been adopted or could possibly be adopted by terrorist organizations across the globe to create their networks of terror, thereby making them more sophisticated or even elusive. As a result, Boko Haram has remained a thorn in the flesh of Nigeria as the primary target for more than a decade. It has evolved to seize the headlines among the ranks and files of global terrorist groups. A discussion of terrorist groups in 21st century Africa, and indeed, the world, will not be complete without a mention of the group.

Theoretical Framework

This work is situated within the thrust of *political realism*. It holds that the two actors (a

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state actor and a non-state actor) are fighting for the control of sovereignty within a given territorial boundary. This implies that the said definite territory can only be controlled by one government or a single entity which is superior and sovereign at a given time. In this interaction, there can only be one dominant sovereign player in the long run, or two players in different states depending on the outcomes. Power, as consideration for realism, is crucial as an instrument of dominance for each player.

Power, as an important element of realism, belongs to the state as the sovereign body that organizes the affairs of the territory. Accordingly, if the state, or by extension a political regime is to exist, the hierarchical sovereign power must remain inalienable. Explicitly, this implies that the very existence of a state has to do with its ability to coerce its citizens when they act in a way that threatens the existence of the state. Without power, or legitimate force, a state cannot exist. Contrarily, the non-state actor (Boko Haram) intends to wrestle for this sacrosanct instrument of statehood from the successive governments of the federal republic of Nigeria. As a result, the state must take all the necessary means to assert itself or emerge victorious in the contest.

Major State Actors	Major Non-State Actors
Nigeria	Boko Haram - Jamā"atu Ahli as-Sunnah lid-Da"wah wa"l-Jihād - Society of the People of Prophetic Traditions for Preaching and Jihad (داهجلاو قوعدلل فنسلا لهأ ةعامج):
Cameroun	
Chad	
Niger	
Benin Republic	

This theoretical framework has given us one broad way to understand the Boko Haram insurgency; it explains Boko Haram as constituting a threat to the existence of Nigeria as a state or at the very least, a parallel competitor and rival for the instrument of statehood – power and sovereignty. This has been taken to a new level by the attempt to create a distinct sovereign state or *Khilaafat*¹ by the group within the sovereign geographical boundary of Nigeria.

Conceptualizing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

There has been no single definition of terrorism as a concept. For this paper, terrorism is defined as the systemic use of violence by non-state actors against civilians to achieve political objectives from state actors.² On the other hand, counter-terrorism is explained

1 Abdulgafar Fahm, "Boko Haram's Claim to an Islamic Caliphate: Is It Creditable?" *Islam and Civilisational Renewal*, 2017.
 2 J. Jeremy Wisnewski, *Torture, Terrorism, and the Use of Violence* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008).

here as the totality of all activities and strategies adopted by governments or any group to combat terrorism or all acts of terrorism. Counter-terrorism has been defined by Philip Wilcox as:

the policies and methods used to deter and defeat terrorism which involves the use of information gathering, law enforcement, diplomacy, military force, and other all-inclusive protective security.³

Theories of Counter-terrorism

Broadly put, counter-terrorism can be explained from two simple approaches (but not limited to these two), which can be classified as (i) Military Approach and (ii) Soft Non-Military Approach. According to Wilkinson⁴ existing research on counterterrorism tends to structure debates around two major approaches which are: (i) Stick or military approach and (ii) the carrot non-military approach. Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah⁵ have divided these two approaches using different, but similar words which are “coercion and reconciliation.” The third approach to counter-terrorism has been identified as the Hybrid Doctrine.⁶

The military approach to counter-terrorism focuses on the actual deployment of military assets to fight terrorist organizations. Contrarily, the non-military approach focuses on non-violent engagement of terrorists by adopting non-overly military measures that appeal to them and seek to persuade terrorist groups to avoid continuous violence as well address the underlying motivation for terrorism through steps like dialogues, negotiations or other forms of concession. The third approach to combating terrorism and indeed Boko Haram has been referred to as the Hybrid Doctrine as put forward by Adewumi Falode⁷ in his recommendations on how Nigeria should fight Boko Haram. The Hybrid Doctrine is an aggregate of other approaches, it recommends a “harmonisation of all state capacities and resources by blending the carrot and sticks approaches into one single strategy and deployed concurrently.” According to him, the Hybrid Doctrine is a strategic initiative that “means the deployment of assets and resources in the Contested Zones, both in the battlefield and non-combat areas to achieve synergistic effects.”⁸ The key to an effective Hybrid Doctrine as expounded by Falode rests in his “Four Ds” which are: to defang,

3 Philip C. Wilcox, “Counterterrorism,” 2009.

4 Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, 2 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

5 Aghedo, Iro & Osumah, Oarhe. “The Boko Haram Uprising: How should Nigeria respond?”. *Third World Quarterly - Third World Q.* (2012) 33. 853-869.

6 Falode Adewumi, “Countering the Boko Haram Group in Nigeria: The Relevance of Hybrid Doctrine by Adewunmi James Falode: SSRN,” 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893262.

7 Falode Adewunmi “The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* (2016) Volume 10, Issue 1.

8 Falode James, 2016.

depower, degrade and to detox the group through a concerted effort. The Hybrid approach would end with socio-political and economic reforms.

Boko Haram

Loosely known among the people as “Boko Haram,” a phrase in Hausa language, which means “western education is forbidden.” “Boko” simply means “book” to imply western education, model and lifestyle, while “haram,” properly pronounced as “haraam”⁹ is used as nomenclature for things, events or actions that are deemed unlawful or forbidden. Conversely, Paul Newman¹⁰ stresses that “Boko” does not come from English and never meant “book”; it refers rather to a sham or a fraud. Essentially, the proper rendering of the meaning of Boko Haram implies that Western norms and system of government is corrupt, but not necessarily that they are against learning and study. The group has been given this appellation because of its stance against western orientation which they deem as hopelessly and helplessly corrupt as a system of justice and governance in Nigeria.

The group considers itself more formerly as *Jamā’atAhl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wahwa’l-Jihād* which means “the group of the people of prophetic tradition for the propagation of Islam and struggle.” Recently, a faction of the group changed its name to *Wilāyat el islaamiyyat fii Gharbi I frīqīyyah*¹¹ (Islamic State of West Africa) to create a direct link with ISIL as a global force.

The exact date for the creation of the group would be difficult to ascertain because the group did not start out as a violent organization that was soon to become a terrorist one, but as a movement. However, some analysts have traced the solidification of the group to 2002. Various accounts, often conflicting, and at times, complementary exist about the emergence and formation of the group. According to Aghedo and Osumah,¹² its existence can be traced to the mid-1990s when it existed under the name *ahlusunnah waljamaa hijrah* also referred to popularly in later years as “the Nigerian Taliban. However, this position does not seem coherent because the said *ahlusunnah waljamaa hijrah* exhibited a lot of differences in terms of thought and ideology compared to Boko Haram. There are many groups that continue to use the appellation *ahlu sunnahwa l jamaa*” but remain strict critics of Boko Haram and denounce¹³ the group as anti-Islam and lunatic during sermons and speeches among Muslim scholars. The difficulty in tracing the establishment

9 Pronounced Ha-raa-m ‘حرام is originally an Arabic word which means unlawful or forbidden. This is a literary explanation of the word. It is in no way a depiction of the legal technical meaning in the Islamic jurisprudence texts.

10 Paul Newman, “The Etymology of Hausa Boko,” *Mega-Chad Miscellaneous Publications*, 2013, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/20965>.

11 Glenn Kessler, “Boko Haram: Inside the State Department debate over the ‘terrorist’ label,” *The Washington Post*. 2014, May 19 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/19/boko-haram-inside-the-state-department-debate-over-the-terrorist-label/>.

12 Aghedo and Osumah, 2012, The Boko Haram Uprising: How should Nigeria respond?

13 Ogunlesi Tolu, “Opinion | Nigeria’s Internal Struggles,” *The New York Times*, 23 March 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/opinion/nigerias-internal-struggles.html>.

of the group in a formal way arises largely because of its existence as a movement for social and religious cause prior to emerging as a violent group. The evidence of this can be seen in the multiple clips where the known founder Yusuf, was seen answering questions about religious clarifications.¹⁴ Thus, we can establish the development of the group through stages such as the era of evangelism which was peaceful and the era of confrontation with the Nigerian security agencies which was reportedly triggered by their frustration against the Nigerian security operatives¹⁵ and led to more attacks by the group after members were killed extra-judicially.

A more detailed systemic account has been given by Andrew Walker¹⁶ and Muhammad Kyari,¹⁷ the former traced the group's evolution to its moment of hijrah¹⁸ from the urban areas to remote places along the borders of Nigeria and Chad, while the latter identified three stages in the development of the group as "the era of calling," the "Kanama or retreat phase" and "the "active combat era." The major flashpoint was the brutal crackdown on the members of the group and the killing of Muhammad Yusuf who was the leader of the group. Yusuf Muhammad was arrested and extra-judicially killed¹⁹ after a series of clashes with the state authority leading to the "Kanama period" or retreat. Afterward, they re-grouped more effectively under Mallam Shekau. The Shekau Era is also known as the active combat era. In 2016, following what seems to be a series of intra-group disagreements a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS' leader, Abubakar Al-Baghdadi. The leader of the new faction has been identified as Abu Musa Al-barnawi.²⁰

Atrocities of the group

The transitioning of the group has been an unusual phenomenon in terrorism. The confrontation by Boko Haram started first, against the government – a stage that may not necessarily fit their actions into the broader definitions of terrorism. The group, after being repressed militarily regrouped to become more powerful. They sought to attract members

14 *Tafsirin Tauba 1-1 Mallam Muhammad Yusuf Maiduguri*, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y33rL_D_6pw.

15 In one of the earlier interviews I had with an eye witness, it was revealed that the confrontation by the group started originally as a demonstration against assaults by the members of the Nigerian police force on citizens and innocent motorcycle riders. It is not uncommon in Nigeria for members of the police force to harass innocent citizens or even kill them extra-judicially. This spark led to degeneration and further escalation against the government and symbols of the authority. The group existed as a non-violent movement prior to the eventual extra-judicial killing of its leader.

16 Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram" *United States Institute of Peace* (2012) <https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/05/what-boko-haram>.

17 Mohammed, Kyari. "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram," *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*. Ed. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos. African Studies Centre: Leiden, Netherlands, 2014.

18 Hijrah is an Arabic word that means "migration." It is used here to denote the initial movement of the group.

19 Cameron Duodu, "Mohammed Yusuf's Final Days," *The Guardian*, 6 August 2009, sec. Opinion, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/aug/06/mohammed-yusuf-boko-haram-nigeria>.

20 Shideler, Kyle "FRANK GAFFNEY: Boko Haram discusses Baga massacre, ideology in new video," *Washington Times*. 29 January 2015.

to join them by force, the promise of financial reward²¹ or by a sense of common goal against the government. Those who declined to join the group were targeted as enemies.²² Like other terrorist groups, they sought to use indiscriminate violence against the citizens to get concessions from the government or to intimidate the local population.

Boko Haram has murdered more than 18,000²³ people up till September 2019 after it began its offensive campaigns. The years 2014 and 2015 represent the peak period for the group in terms of casualties and transition into a rebel-insurgent group after it seized a swathe of territories in northeast Nigeria. Churches, mosques, markets and several places have been targeted in the attacks. In terms of Internally Displaced Persons, about 2.4 million individuals had fled the conflict zone by September 2019.²⁴

Highlights of their attacks include several attacks on schools, the bombing of UN building in Abuja²⁵ and the kidnapping of the Chibok girls from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State.

Combating Boko Haram; the Stick Approach

Having established the broad approaches to counter-terrorism as well as a modest account of the group, I shall turn my attention to the practical attempts by Nigeria to combat Boko Haram.

Stricto sensu, the *modus operandi* in the Federal Government counter-terrorism campaign as it relates to Boko Haram has been largely military or kinetic in nature, which involves the deployment of military assets to confront the group. Starting from 2009, when Yusuf was killed, the security agents have continued to respond to Boko Haram by force. As observed by Felix, Ekanem and Angela,²⁶ the military approach to combating Boko Haram can be highlighted thus:

- Continuous military reinforcement
- The International Joint Task Force (IJTF)
- Declaration of state of emergency
- Imposition of Curfew
- Establishment of Civilian JTFs

21 Alfred Charlotte, "Why People Join Nigeria's Boko Haram" *HuffPost*, 16 March 2016.

22 I had discussions with individuals who fled from the North-East to the South Western part of Nigeria. I met with individuals who declined to join the group. They made it clear that they have been declared as targets by members of the group for turning them down.

23 John Campbell, "Nigeria Security Tracker," *Council on Foreign Relations*, August 1, 2019.

24 UNHCR, "Nigeria emergency."

25 Mshelizza Ibrahim, "Islamist Sect Boko Haram Claims Nigerian U.N. Bombing", *Reuters*, 29 August 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829>.

26 Akpan, Felix; Ekanem, Okonette; Olofu-Adeoye, Angela "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria" *Canadian Social Science*, March 1, 2014, <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-3330435321/boko-haram-insurgency-and-the-counter-terrorism-policy>.

In 2012, the government introduced ‘state-of-emergency’ in the most affected states of the region.²⁷ The state-of-emergency implied that, a designated military chief would run the affairs and day-to-day activities in the affected areas and as such, empowered to declare curfews and take other precautionary measures as deemed fit. In May 2013, the government extended the declared state-of-emergency in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The shifting of the military command headquarters as ordered by the federal government, further alludes to the total dependency of the government on the use of stick approach to overcoming the Boko Haram menace.

Consequently, the government increased its military expenditure on security as a response to the crises and to crack down heavily on members of the group, with a report by Premium Times showing that a total N4.62trillion has been allocated to the federal security sector in the past five years.²⁸ For instance, in the 2015 budget, N934billion was allocated for the security sector, the highest for the year. The figures for 2011 and 2012 were N920billion and N924billion respectively while N923billion each was thrown at the sector in 2013 and 2014. In the 2018 budget, 123 billion naira was voted for the office of the National Security Adviser.²⁹ An estimated sum of Six trillion naira has been spent on security between 2008 till the year 2018.³⁰ For the year 2019,³¹ there is a projected 436 billion naira for the Ministry of Defence.

Multi-National Joint Task Force: As part of the direct approach to combat Boko Haram, the Nigerian government has adopted a multi-national approach to the war on the group by working jointly with neighboring countries such as Cameroun, Niger, Chad and, the Republic of Benin. The Multi-National Joint Task Force was initially made up of about 8,700 troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin which has since been expanded. It is imperative to underline here that a multi-national joint force became imperative due to at least two conditions. The first is the cross-border and guerilla tactics that have been embraced by Boko Haram without any respect for international border demarcation, such as attacks and the seeking of haven across Cameroon and other countries across the sub-region. The second reason for deploying the IJTF was due to the positioning of the conflict as part of the global campaigns against international terrorism and the sensitivity of the insecurity it brings.

27 Jack Moore “Nigerian Military Enter ‘Final Stages’ of Boko Haram Offensive,” *Newsweek*, 23 April 2015. Retrieved 2 May 2015.

28 Joshua Omufemi , “Nigeria spends N4.62 trillion on National Security in 5 years, yet widespread insecurity remains,” *Premium Times* June 18, 2015, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/185285-nigeria-spends-n4-62-trillion-on-national-security-in-5-years-yet-widespread-insecurity-remains.html>.

29 Wale Odunsi, “2018 Budget: Buhari Govt Gives Breakdown of Allocations,” *Daily Post Nigeria*, 21 June 2018, <https://dailypost.ng/2018/06/21/2018-budget-buhari-govt-gives-breakdown-allocations/>.

30 Ndujihe Clifford, “Security: FG Spends N6trn on Defence in 11 Years,” *Vanguard Nigeria*, 29 July 2018, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/security-fg-spends-n6trn-on-defence-in-11-years/>.

31 Udo Udoma Udoma, “Breakdown of 2019 FGN Budget Proposal,” Budget Office of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, accessed 2 November 2019, <https://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/breakdown-of-2019-fgn-budget-proposal?task=document.viewdoc&id=697>.

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF): The CJTF is a paramilitary group made up of hunters and vigilantes³² who have helped the Nigerian military in its fight against the Boko Haram group. They are usually armed with basic Dane guns for hunting and amulets. They are particularly useful for intelligence gathering and combats in places where military deployment is not readily available. Their knowledge of the local terrain and their ability to track members of the group using basic footprints learned from their years of hunting and tracking animals have significant advantages.

Successes and Criticisms of the Stick Approach

In terms of success, the strong military approach and coordinated assault launched by the state actors have drastically led to the reclamation of territories that were held by the group. At its apogee, the group held a vast territory that was almost the size of Belgium,³³ where they erected an almost parallel government as a traditional rebel group. The coordinated attacks by the Nigerian military resulted in a steady recovery of almost all territories under the group thereby forcing them to return to their early guerrilla tactics that are typical of non-state violent groups.

Tactical Challenges: Policing terrorism and containing it requires a different approach when compared to conventional warfare where parties involved can identify one another, fight within a given territory and follow the rules of military engagement. In the military approach to Boko Haram, the line of action or even theatres of war are usually not clear-cut, and the enemies are not usually identifiable – a daunting task that usually proves herculean. The continuous shift in the approach by Boko Haram has forced the government to re-adjust inconveniently. The group had lost most of the territories it once held due to the direct assault and superior military organization from the federal government. However, the group has returned to its initial adoption of hit-and-run tactics which has made it difficult for them to be contained.

A new set of challenges emerged when other tactics, such as suicide bombing were adopted by the group, most especially the use of underage children who are forced to wear suicide vests. In conventional military ethics, these tool-children cannot be shot at as suspects, but a slight misjudgment could lead to irreversible loss of lives and damage on the side of the troops or other citizens.

The use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) has proved particularly difficult to contain by the Nigerian military who were mostly trained in conventional warfare. Roadside bombings have resulted in the deaths of Nigerian soldiers. At the tactical level, suicide bombings and the use of IEDs represent a different and cumbersome layer of

32 Cropley Ed, “On Boko Haram Front Line, Nigerian Vigilantes Amass Victories and Power,” *Reuters*, 15 June 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-vigilantes-idUSKBN1960FK>.

33 Ola Lanre, “About 20 Nigerian soldiers missing after Boko Haram clash: sources,” *Reuters* July 16, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/about-20-nigerian-soldiers-missing-after-boko-haram-clash-sources-idUSKBN1K628N>.

challenge for any military as we can see in the experience of the USA-led coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Additionally, reports from videos obtained by media outlets have shown that Boko Haram has adopted the use of Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs) which was efficiently used by the *Daesh* terrorist group in their campaigns. Based on several assessments, it remains unclear whether the Nigerian military is fully equipped to contain the use of SVBIEDs by the group due to depleted resources and tactical problems. There are also fears that the group might adopt the use of drones alongside other difficult-to-track offensive weapons.

The capacity of the group has improved from crude methods to more a more sophisticated type with RPGs, anti-aircraft guns and other weapons seized from the Nigerian Defence Forces or smuggled through the porous borders. In 2014, a Nigerian pilot, Wing Commander Chimda Hedima was decapitated by Boko Haram members when he could no longer hold on to the control of his fighter jet after he came under heavy fire while providing air support for the Nigerian Army. Attacks like this show a significant improvement in the ability of the group.

Inadequate Weapons and Corruption: Another visible challenge that Nigeria has faced in the fight against Boko Haram is in the areas of procuring weapons. This problem is exacerbated by two major factors, namely corruption on the part of Nigerian officials and international delay. There have been allegations of diversion of funds meant for military equipment by the top brass in the military especially under the administration of President Jonathan. About 2 billion dollars earmarked for acquiring weapons in the fight against Boko Haram was said to have been diverted or difficult to account for. In 2015, Sambo Dasuki, the National Security Adviser was charged for fraudulent practices in connection with about 68 million dollars meant for the military.³⁴ Nigerian soldiers have posted clips from the frontline which showed that soldiers were under-fed almost throughout the period leading to the 2015 general elections. Soldiers have lamented their ordeals by stressing that they have been forced to out-stay their routines on the frontline and sometimes cover the costs of personal needs while on national duties.³⁵

The Nigerian military has suffered from international delay or outright cancellation of military equipment/armaments contracts. For example, in July 2015, the United States of America refused to sell advanced weapons to Nigeria as a result of the Leahy Law³⁶ which prohibits the sale of US military weapons to countries whose militaries are accused of gross human rights violations. Practically, this implies that the country's air force,

34 BBC Africa, "Nigeria's Sambo Dasuki charged over '\$68m fraud'" *BBC*, December 14, 2015 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35093785>.

35 Malik Samuel, "Nigeria: Soldiers Forced To Buy Their Own Uniforms," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, accessed 4 October 2019, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/nigeria-soldiers-forced-buy-their-own-uniforms>.

36 Joe Picard, "Nigeria Calls for a Re-Think of the Leahy Law," *The Hill*, 5 February 2015, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/231778-nigeria-calls-for-a-re-think-of-the-leahy-law>.

like other sister agencies, was unable to purchase new attack helicopters such as the Cobra attack helicopters which are significantly needed across the theatres of operation to provide on-the-spot air cover and attack for the Nigerian army. Hence, the country has tilted towards Pakistan,³⁷ South Africa and Russia³⁸ in a bid to fill the supply vacuum left by the USA.

Boko Haram members are armed with RPGs, anti-aircraft guns and an enormous number of foot soldiers with booties from looting, kidnapping for ransom and a supply of weapons from the black markets.³⁹ All these problems are the consequences of long-term systemic decay and fraud which has eaten deep into the system in the country.

Criticisms of the Military Approach

The highhandedness and the overly brutal tactics that were allegedly adopted by men of the Nigerian security service at the initial stage of the crisis which included shooting-at-sight⁴⁰ and random execution has hampered real-time intelligence service because of the fear of being detained by the authority. The military approach to security issues, most especially to civilian affairs and riots has become normalcy in Nigeria. In simple cases; where students protest the policies of school authorities or even during widespread protests, the government calls on the military to arrest the situations. This over-reliance on the military approach to civilian issues has come with unintended negative consequences such as loss of civilian lives. This is probably because soldiers are not extensively trained to handle civilian matters coupled with long-standing negative images of the army in the eyes of the public. This break down in the army-civilian relationship stems from the repressive eras of military government where soldiers could harass civilians on the street with no consequences. Political and social uprisings are always tamed by the deployment of soldiers. This is usually preceded by poor intelligence gatherings and lack of good strategic analysis of the situations. The first response to security challenges is guns and tanks as deterrence. For example, during the fuel subsidy protests in Nigeria, about seven civilians were shot dead or rough-handled by war-trained soldiers or members of the

37 "Nigeria Turns to Pakistan, China for War Planes, Helicopters, Others - Premium Times Nigeria," 4 December 2016, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/217061-nigeria-turns-pakistan-china-war-planes-helicopters-others.html>.

38 "Russia & Nigeria Ink Deal for Delivery of MI-35 Combat Helicopters," *RT International*, accessed 2 November 2019, <https://www.rt.com/business/471604-russia-niger-helicopters-contract/>; Reuters, "Russia Signs Deal to Supply Nigeria With 12 Attack Helicopters: RIA," *The New York Times*, 25 October 2019, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/10/25/world/africa/25reuters-russia-africa-niger-helicopters.html>.

39 Open Briefing, "Reducing the Supply of Weapons to Boko Haram," 12 March 2015, <https://www.openbriefing.org/docs/Reducing-the-supply-of-weapons-to-Boko-Haram.pdf>.

40 Eye witness accounts I obtained directly shows that Nigerian soldiers were ordered to shoot at sight during the beginning of the crisis. An inter-state trailer driver explained how they were instructed to shave their beards to avoid suspicion by the police. This tactics would have been counter-productive because it pushes non-Boko Haram individuals towards the group due to be targeted based on their appearances.

police force.⁴¹

This continuous use of overhanded military tactics to diffuse all situations whether appropriate or inappropriate took a negative turn when it was used against members of Boko Haram – an organised group that had become popular through expressive criticism of the government that is deemed corrupt and helpless. The initial controversial and extra-judicial killing of a one-time leader of the group, Muhammad Yusuf in the hands of the security operatives of Nigeria highlights the lacuna in military approach to the issue in its formative years. The situation spiraled out of control despite the assurance by the government that the extrajudicial killing would be investigated. Five officers linked to the incident were arrested for Yusuf’s murder, but it bore no positive impact on the level of unrest and his followers swore to avenge the killing of their members as well as free those who were detained without any court trial.

The overly military approach has resulted in gross human rights abuse and summary executions by Nigerian troops. According to a research by Amnesty International, “One of those executions, captured in footage, shows people who appear to be members of the Nigerian military and the Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF) using a blade to slit the throats of five detainees, before dumping them in an open mass grave. Nine people were killed this way and, according to witnesses, other detainees seen in the video were shot.”⁴²

Other criticism against the Nigerian army, in particular, includes allegations of war crimes, the use of torture against suspects and raping of women.⁴³ All these anomalies, from tactical and financial problems, are important obstacles in the war against Boko Haram.

Failures of the Non-Military Approach

The non-military approach to combating Boko Haram can be highlighted as containing negotiation, the promise of amnesty and return to normalcy. Two important impediments can be identified here. The first is that the strategic objective of the group to establish a sovereign state in the region cannot be reconciled by negotiation except if the group abandons its goal of creating a sovereign state altogether. The second impediment is the unwillingness of the group’s leadership to reach out for serious negotiations and in fact, the negotiation process came a bit late as it was done when the government realised that a total military solution had become difficult. Limited attempts have been made by the Federal Government to adopt this as a counter-Boko Haram method. The lateness in

41 Gillian Parker, “Nigeria Paralyzed by ‘Occupy’ Strike over Gas Prices,” *Time*, 9 January 2012, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2104053,00.html>.

42 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Threats from the Military Won’t Deter Us from Defending Human Rights”, 7 June 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/nigeria-threats-from-the-military-wont-deter-us-from-defending-human-rights/>.

43 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Starving Women Raped by Soldiers and Militia Who Claim to Be Rescuing Them”, accessed 4 October 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/nigeria-starving-women-raped-by-soldiers-and-militia-who-claim-to-be-rescuing-them/>.

the effort for dialogue is well corroborated by a revelation through one of the respected negotiators with the group Barrister Aisha⁴⁴ who posits that the group was willing to have a reasonable dialogue with the federal government, but the abuses and extrajudicial killings against its members were a stumbling block. The leader of the group was recorded to have said “you were here when they shot and killed my followers and as we were carrying the deceased, they shot us again. My hands are tied, but if we’re able to meet governor Ali Sheriff [former governor of Borno state] and talk things over, the war will not happen”.⁴⁵ The reasons for the current failure in the attempt at peaceful resolution range from perceived lack of a defined leadership representation of the group to the group’s unwillingness to sit with the government. It is very dicey to see how effective and productive a possible negotiation with the group could be held because of the lack of clear-cut leadership and representatives for the group. There are in-group division⁴⁶ and disagreement over whether to negotiate with the government or not. There have been reports of willingness to negotiate in the past, but these attempts have failed because of counter-claim and refusals by other members of the group that the faction that called for negotiation does not represent the whole group⁴⁷. In an embarrassing scenario that unraveled in 2014, the federal government allegedly negotiated with some “top members of the group” only for it to eventually turn out as a controversial fraud⁴⁸ in which the said splinter group was later denounced by the supreme commander, Shekau. In 2011, former president of the country, Olusegun Obasanjo visited Maiduguri to reach out to members of the family of the group’s former leader, Yusuf Muhammad, but the host⁴⁹ was killed in the aftermath of the visit⁵⁰.

In April 2013, President Jonathan inaugurated a Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges⁵¹ in the affected areas, but this dialogue was futile. The possibility for the success would have been higher if the initial extra-judicial killing of

44 Ashionye Ogene, “‘Mama Boko Haram’ Grasps for Peace in Nigeria,” accessed 4 October 2019, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/boko-haram-grasps-peace-nigeria-2014615113232422214.html.

45 Ibid.

46 Zenn Jacob, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, Africa Special Issue (February 2014), <https://ctc.usma.edu/leadership-analysis-of-boko-haram-and-ansaru-in-nigeria/>.

47 Dionne Searcey and Chris Stein, “Nigeria Describes 3 Failed Negotiations With Boko Haram on Kidnapped Girls,” *The New York Times*, 16 September 2016, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-chibok.html>.

48 Gaffey Conor, “Goodluck Jonathan Lost ‘Millions’ to Fake Boko Haram Leaders: Buhari Adviser,” 1 December 2016, <https://www.newsweek.com/goodluck-jonathan-lost-millions-fake-boko-haram-leaders-buhari-adviser-414426>.

49 The name of the host has been given as Babakura Fugu, a relative of Yusuf Muhammad who has been described as one of the founders of the group during its formative years.

50 Ajani Jide, “Boko Haram Visit: Obasanjo’s Host Shot Dead”, *Vanguard Nigeria* (blog), 17 September 2011, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/boko-haram-visit-obasanjos-host-shot-dead/>.

51 Campbell John, “Nigeria’s President Launches Amnesty Committee for Boko Haram”, *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), accessed 4 October 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerias-president-launches-amnesty-committee-boko-haram>.

the former leader of the group was not carried out. For Boko Haram, there was no turning back, most especially, when they appeared to have recorded quick victories over the government and even seized some territories to create their own system of government.

One of the prominent actors in the bid to negotiate with Boko Haram for various dialogues, including for the release of hostages is Barrister Aisha Wakil, also known, as Mama Boko Haram. She has been named as Boko Haram as one of the necessary participants for any meaningful discussion and dialogue with the group. However, all these efforts have been moribund in finding a lasting solution to the insurgency. Negotiations for ceasefire and the release of the kidnapped Chibok Girls was one of the options explored by the federal government in its fight against Boko Haram. Consequently, Boko Haram demanded the release of detained terrorists in exchange for the Chibok girls, and several other civilians held hostage by the group.

Falode⁵² recommends a blend between the carrot and stick approaches against Boko Haram, this approach is somewhat limited in terms of practicalities and successes. A careful analysis reveals that there have been elements of this approach in one way or the other, but the crisis still thrives and has been on for a decade already. Broadly, the combination of carrot and stick approaches is expected to force them to abandon the thought that they stand a chance against the organized army of the state actors, while the carrot arm would give them the assurance that they will be welcomed into the system as law-abiding citizens.

De-radicalization: De-radicalisation can be explained as a process through which potential terrorists or recruited members of any terrorists group are made to go through psychological and social re-engagement to address their extremist views and by extension, the potential danger they pose to the society with the aim of re-integrating them back into the society. In the words of Alex Schmidt,⁵³ deradicalization refers to “a cognitive or mental denunciation of certain attitudes and views.” The process of de-radicalization in Nigeria is relatively new, but a very important one nonetheless. As part of the efforts to combat Boko Haram, certain achievements have been recorded in this area including re-training of former Boko Haram and others who pleaded for forgiveness after undergoing various capacity-building training and professional workshops.⁵⁴ The de-radicalization efforts have continued to blossom with members of the group learning different vocations through the federal government’s re-integration programs. The challenges of de-radicalization and the potential for recidivism has been discussed by various authors, but

52 Adewumi, “Countering the Boko Haram Group in Nigeria: The Relevance of Hybrid Doctrine by Adewunmi James Falode: SSRN.”

53 Alex Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies* 4 (1 March 2013), <https://doi.org/10.19165/2013.1.02>.

54 NAN, “ICYMI: Deradicalised Ex-Boko Haram Members Beg for Forgiveness,” *Punch Newspapers*, accessed 4 October 2019, <https://punchng.com/deradicalised-ex-boko-haram-members-beg-for-forgiveness/>.

the successes and failures in this regard require a different study.

Anti-Terror Acts: Prior to Boko Haram, Nigeria had no elaborate counter-terrorism measures in the constitution due to the novelty of the phenomenon. The constitutional and legal framework for anti-terrorism was built on the existing legal provisions covered under the standard Violence and Criminal Acts. The delay in the enactment of counter-terrorism acts can be attributed to the newness of the phenomenon to Nigeria. The Anti-Terrorism Acts remains the most comprehensive single legal document in the history of Nigeria to deal with terrorism. As specified in the final memorandum of the Act, it “provides for measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria and its effective implementation”⁵⁵ The provision of the document ranges from identifying terrorist groups and individuals to specifying the necessary punishment for the acts and everything related to it.

Counter-Ideological Narrative: Security experts have urged the government to adopt non-kinetic measures against the group such as the spiritual warfare strategy discussed by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai.⁵⁶ Accordingly, “the need to defeat the ideologies of Boko Haram and ISWAP is based on the awareness that it is the ideologies that enhance their resources and help to recruit new fighters to their fold and as such; kill their ideology and the terrorist movement withers and dies.”⁵⁷ Social aspects of this includes the series of talks and discourse by Muslim leaders against the group in the mosques or other public forums where the violent views of Boko Haram were criticised as *unislamic*. The adoption of counter-ideological methods and narratives against Boko Haram is not a new phenomenon. Several top scholars of Islam have openly criticised the ideas of Boko Haram as abhorrent in what has been an ideological polarity between mainstream Salafi groups and Boko Haram⁵⁸. Popular clerics have stood up to counter the extreme narratives of Boko Haram in mosques and fora across the country. In 2011, Mallam Ibrahim Birkuti was killed⁵⁹ by members of Boko Haram for criticising them in open talks. In 2014, another prominent, Adam Albani⁶⁰ was killed alongside members of his family.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Nigeria failed in at least two broad ways. First; the government largely showed a sheer

55 Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011.

56 Olaleye Aluko, “spiritual Efforts Needed to Defeat Boko Haram —Buratai,” *Punch Newspapers*, 30 September 2019, <https://punchng.com/spiritual-efforts-needed-to-defeat-boko-haram-buratai/>.

57 Ibid.

58 Alex Thurston, “Nigeria’s Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State”, *Islamic Africa* 6, no. 1–2 (2015): 109–34.

59 “Muslim Cleric Killed in Nigeria”, *BBC News*, 7 June 2011, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13679234>.

60 “Nigerian Muslim Cleric Opposed to Boko Haram Shot Dead”, *Reuters*, 3 February 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSBREA120CK20140203>.

inability to recognize the possible localization of the global terror threat as well as work towards the renewed threats posed by the proliferation of weapons. Boko Haram did not start as a global threat but did take great inspiration from other established groups such as ISIS. They perfected their models so much that it took them a few years to even surpass ISIS in terms of the number of casualties. Following this, it is important that other countries in the ECOWAS sub-regional zone, most especially Ghana, Senegal and Mauritania among others develop broad and comprehensive pre-emptive measures to counter the threat of terrorism pre-emptively.

Nigeria needs to channel more funds into the military industry of the country to save the country from over-reliance on imported military hardware which has hampered the operation and may continue to hamper similar military operations elsewhere. Today, there are countries in West Africa that do not possess enough military power to contain potential insurgencies without reaching out to the countries of the global north.

Adequate moral support and welfare should also be made available to officers and men of the Nigerian military, most especially those who are at the forefront of the operation against Boko Haram. Leaked videos and audios from the frontlines reveal widespread dissatisfaction among Nigerian soldiers due to neglect, corruption and diversion of fund meant for their welfare.

The usual use of brutal tactics and crackdown by officers of the Nigerian Police and other security agencies is a well-known trend in the country which further aided the impetus and resolve of the group. Disregard for the rule of law, continuous human rights abuses and systemic failure are some of the many problems that led to the emergence of Boko Haram as a terrorist group. These factors have also continued to hinder Nigeria's efforts to combat the group. The potential for similar conflicts is widespread in the country due to institutional failures. For example, one of the potentially similar cases is the re-current Shia-Army standoff facing the country with the army killing hundreds of members of the group.⁶¹

Finally, Boko Haram as a group gives an interesting insight into the evolution of terrorist groups for any theoretical consideration. The patterns in its evolution are different and it offers a fertile ground for a serious academic discourse that would be separate from this paper.

61 Murtala Wazeer, "In Search of Justice and Tolerance among Muslim Groups in Nigeria - The Muslim Vibe", accessed 4 October 2019, <https://themuslimvibe.com/muslim-current-affairs-news/analysis/in-search-of-justice-and-tolerance-among-muslim-groups-in-nigeria>.

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Russia as a Great Power? A Case Study of Southeast Asia

*Joshua Espeña & Don McLain Gill**

Abstract: The great power concept has been widely used in the study of International Relations. However, its usage has often occurred in foreign policy analyses of a more rhetorical than empirical nature. Several scholars have tried to contribute to defining what a great power is. For the purpose of this study, Andrew Heywood's great power framework provides a critical understanding of the concept of great powers and touches on the contributions made by other scholars as well. Russia has been usually labeled as a great power based on a common nostalgia of the former Soviet Union and the charisma seen from President Putin; however, before attributing the status of great power to Russia, it is important to look into empirical data, not merely rhetoric. Considering that a great power is global in reach, this paper employs Southeast Asia as a case study in analyzing Russia's influence in the sub-region. This study claims that despite common perceptions, Russia has not yet achieved great power status based on the empirical data provided against the backdrop of Heywood's conceptual framework.

Keywords: Great power, Russia, Southeast Asia, Andrew Heywood, international relations, Asia-Pacific.

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Defining a Great Power

International Relations has long been concerned with defining the concept of *great power*. Several scholars have contributed towards providing a detailed understanding or measurement of what a great power is and should be. In this study, we have utilized the great power framework introduced by Andrew Heywood in his 2011 book titled *Global Politics*. We believe that Heywood's explanation encompasses the efforts put in by other scholars in defining the scope of a Great Power. Accordingly, Heywood defines a great power as a "state deemed to rank amongst the most powerful in a hierarchical-state-system."¹

Furthermore, Heywood provides certain criteria for a state to qualify as a great power: (1) it must be in the first rank of military prowess, having the capacity to maintain its own security and, potentially, to influence other powers, (2) it must be an economically powerful state, (3) it must have a global, and not merely regional spheres of interests, and (4) it must adopt a "forward" foreign policy and have an actual, and not merely a potential, impact on international affairs.²

1 Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 7.

2 Ibid., 7

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Several studies and news reports have carelessly labeled Russia as a great power today; however, based on empirical data, this paper argues that Russia has not yet achieved great power status. It is one thing to say that Russia has a global agenda; however, it is another to claim that Russia has achieved great power status by means of that global agenda. Considering how a great power must have global influence, this paper will use Southeast Asia as a case study to test if Russia has indeed an actual impact beyond its immediate geographic neighborhood based on the framework provided by Heywood. It is also in the interest of this paper to provide conceptual clarity on ongoing debates among scholars and practitioners vis-a-vis the usage and application of the term great power.

Gurganus and Rumer explain how Russia may qualify as a great power by arguing that its grand strategy has been to seek recognition of its great power status in the international system so that it could legitimize both its military conquests and geopolitical ambitions in the near abroad.³ However, looking beyond its military prowess, a self-sustained economy, and geopolitical ambitions, questions still lie on the nature of Russia's forward foreign policy, as well as its actual impact on international affairs.

This paper will investigate the case of Southeast Asia to evaluate Russia's global impact. The next section will explore Russia's involvement and engagement in the sub-region. This section will be followed by an in-depth analysis of Russia's impact on Southeast Asia based on several empirical observations. This will help gauge whether Russia is indeed a great power based on the conceptual framework provided by Heywood.

Russia in Southeast Asia: A Great Power?

At the end of the Cold War, Russia needed to broaden its legitimacy and offset losses by expanding its foreign relations, particularly in Southeast Asia. Russia began its interaction with Southeast Asian states at the regional level through the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Russia became a consultative partner in 1991 and was elevated to a full-fledged partner in 1996 by becoming a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2004, Russia acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, followed by the first ASEAN-Russia partnership dialogue in 2005 where both parties agreed to expand their ties in the security and economic realms through a 10-year plan. In 2011, Russia became a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS). However, it is important to point out that despite these advancements, Russia has not yet been able to effectively maximize its relations with ASEAN.

Russia has been trying to make its presence felt on the global level in accordance with its great power ambitions. In Southeast Asia, Russia has been increasing its presence, particularly through arms sales in countries like Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand, Laos,

3 Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, "Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 20, 2019, accessed February 2, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067>.

Myanmar, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Through this initiative, Russia is trying to deepen its defense cooperation with these states. In 2016, Russia hosted the commemorative ASEAN-Russia summit in Sochi, where a declaration was established to deepen the strategic relationship between them.⁴ This signaled Russia's intention to invest itself in Southeast Asia. Russia has also embarked on other projects that involve energy, infrastructure, and transportation to make inroads into Southeast Asia's growing export markets. The next section will identify Russia's activities in the sub-region and evaluate whether it truly has the potential to become a global power based on the concept and framework provided by Heywood.

Evaluating Russia's Great Power Ambitions in Southeast Asia

Military Capability

Russia may possess a capable and lethal army; however, it is important not to over-estimate the extent of its military capacity to be recognized as a great power. Russia's military potential to influence Southeast Asian affairs has significantly diminished from that of the Soviet days, which can be seen through its limited power projection capabilities; in fact, much of its Pacific Fleet is rusting in port.⁵ According to the 2019 Asia Power Index, Russia lags third behind the US and China in the overall military capability in Asia.⁶

Despite the size of Russia's military and the strength of its strategic nuclear forces, Russia is at most still a regional power with only the capacity to coerce its closest neighbors in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In terms of its military and defense capabilities, Russia can hardly be considered a formidable great power. In fact, it may not even be considered a great power at all if we rigidly apply the framework presented by Heywood. Furthermore, it is important for a state to have a global reach in terms of military and defense capabilities. However, using the case of Southeast Asia, it is evident that Russia does not have the capability to coerce the states of Southeast Asia the way it can do in its own geographical neighborhood. Additionally, Russia does not possess the capacity to challenge other rising great powers in the sub-region, such as China, in terms of military capability. The expensive weapons and platforms aired during Russia's military parades may seem to be inconsistent with what it employs in its near abroad.

The Russian armed forces seem to be in a deadlock between improving overall capacity and expanding overall capacity.⁷ Much of this is due to Russia's enduring problem with

4 "Sochi Declaration of the ASEAN-Russian Federation Commemorative Summit to Mark the 20th Anniversary of ASEAN-Russian Federation Dialogue Partnership 'Moving Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit' - ASEAN: One Vision One Identity One Community," ASEAN, May 21, 2016, <https://asean.org/sochi-declaration-of-the-asean-russian-federation-commemorative-summit-to-mark-the-20th-anniversary-of-asean-russian-federation-dialogue-partnership-moving-towards-a-strategic-partnership-for/>.

5 Charles Ziegler, "Russia in the Asia-Pacific: A Major Power or Minor Participant," *Asian Survey* 34, no.6 (1994): 534, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645339>.

6 Hervé Lemahieu and Bonnie Bley, *Asia Power Index 2019*, (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2019), 20.

7 Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, and Brian Nichiporuk, *Trends in Russia's Armed Forces*, (California: RAND

sufficiently funding its armed forces. Currently, the Russian weapons systems are mostly invested in defending itself against air attacks from its Western flank in Eastern Europe to protect the Russian Heartland.⁸ According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2017, Russian military expenditures fell by 17% over the previous year to 3.9 trillion rubles (USD 61 billion); the defense budget declined an additional 5.5% in 2018. Given its immediate interest in defending its military presence in Eastern Europe and the Russian Heartland in addition to its corresponding limited budget, Russia will not be able to effectively project military power in Southeast Asia as a great power.

Economic Capacity

In 2010, Russia under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin announced that the country would “turn to the East.” Russia was steadfast to bolster its economic, military, and political engagements with countries in Asia. There are two main factors that can be pointed out that served as a catalyst for Russia’s decision to redirect its attention to the East. First, Russia has shown its acceptance of the notion that power is globally shifting to the East; it has shown its willingness to enhance cooperation with rising Asian powers such as China and India. Second, Russia also aims to maximize its engagements and influence, particularly in Southeast Asia.⁹

However, in terms of economic engagement with Southeast Asia, Russia is still a minor player. Russia’s main exports to the sub-region consist mainly of natural resources such as oil and gas.¹⁰ Moreover, Russia has been trying to boost its exports in the sub-region, particularly in areas in which it excels, such as arms and nuclear technology. In 2012 Russia’s state-owned Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation won a contract to supply Vietnam with two nuclear power plants — the country’s first — to be completed in 2023-24.¹¹ Russia has also offered to provide Myanmar, Indonesia, and even Cambodia with advanced civilian nuclear technology.¹² However, aside from arms trade and energy resources, Russia-Southeast Asian trade has little room for a significant amount of expansion.

Russia’s economic presence in Southeast Asia is rather fragmented. Economic relations between Russia and the sub-region are built on a relatively weak foundation. While Russia was still preparing to “turn to the East,” other major players—primarily China and the United States—were already able to gain a strong foothold in Southeast Asia. In a tight

Corporation,2019), xiii.

8 Ibid., xiii.

9 Ian Storey, “What Russia’s “Turn to the East” Means for Southeast Asia,” December 3, 2015, 3, accessed February 15,2020, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_67.pdf.

10 Ibid., 4.

11 AP, “Russian president visits Vietnam to boost ties,” *USA Today*, November 11, 2013, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/11/putin-hanoi-visit/3502857/>.

12 DVB, “Russia and Burma discuss ‘favourable conditions’ for nuclear technology,” *Democratic Voice of Burma*, April 14,2015, <http://images.dvb.no/news/russia-and-burma-discuss-favourable-conditions-for-nuclear-technology-burma-myanmar/49982>.

competition between two formidable players, Russia has no choice but to play catch-up.¹³

Moreover, Russian investments in the ASEAN markets are not significant. In 2012–2014, the economies of Southeast Asian countries received USD 698 million in Russian investments, or 0.2 percent of the total. Out of this sum, USD 420 million went to Vietnam in a single year.¹⁴ As mentioned above, aside from the insufficient size of its economy, Russia's economic engagements have also been stalled due to the lack of diversification of its economy.¹⁵

Spheres of Interests

Russia's great power ambitions would require bolstering its presence in other parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. This involves light military intervention in the Syrian Civil War,¹⁶ diplomatic leverage between competing regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, and renewing relations with Turkey and Israel.¹⁷ These actions were interpreted (sometimes with too much rhetoric) as Russia acting as a great power; however, it is critical to note that Russia has been careful not to overcommit and not to exert an active diplomatic strategy.¹⁸ In this sense, the sphere of influence may be limited contrary to what many might suspect.

In Eastern Europe, greater insecurity appeared when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine. For the Baltic states, diplomacy remains short of Russia's influence while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to debate on the member-states' commitment in their defense contributions. NATO's collective security policy remains an effective deterrent against Russia. As a result, part of Russian strategy has been to employ *gray zone* tactics which include supporting pro-Russian political parties, wedging U.S.-led alliances, propaganda and narrative efforts, energy deals, cyber warfare, and unconventional warfare¹⁹ in order to avoid triggering an interstate conflict leading to a possible full-scale war. However, these gray zone tactics have their limits as they destroy Russia's image as a responsible stakeholder in key regional and global issues. In the grander scale of things, Russia's Middle Eastern and Eastern European policies, though legitimate national interests, will likely remain to be regional in nature.

Despite Russia's commitment to securing its influence in ASEAN, the organization

13 Anton Tsvetov, "Russia still seeking a role in ASEAN," *Carnegie*, May 19, 2016, accessed February 1, 2020, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/63628>.

14 Ibid.

15 Nivedita Kapoor, "Russia and its engagement with Southeast Asia", *Observer Research Foundation*, October 22, 2019, accessed February 1, 2020, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russia-and-its-engagement-with-southeast-asia-56902/>.

16 Cesare M. Scartozzi, "Assads Strategic Narrative: The Role of Communication in the Syrian Civil War," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 2, no. 4 (2015): 313–327.

17 Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, "A Brief Guide to Russia's Return to the Middle East", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October 24, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/24/brief-guide-to-russia-s-return-to-middle-east-pub-80134>.

18 Ibid.

19 Michael Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict*, (Pennsylvania: U.S Army War College Press, 2015), 93–94.

remains a relatively low priority as Russia prefers to engage with Southeast Asian states bilaterally. One explanation for this strategy is to avoid a straining Russia's strategic partnership with China. For a relatively new player in Southeast Asia like Russia, an image of a "third player" amidst US-China power competition in the sub-region would trigger China to isolate Russia. In order not to offend China, Russia's engagement would likely remain limited. But as the West pushes Russia towards China, Southeast Asian states would likely be on alert for a Beijing-dependent Moscow.²⁰

Furthermore, some Southeast Asian states find an increasing interest to bandwagon with Beijing in aspects that include arms sales and defense networks. This has serious implications regarding Russia's competitive edge.²¹ Regardless of Russia's desire to maximize its strategic potential, sensitive geopolitical impediments can occur, such as the possibility of straining relations with China and Southeast Asian states in addition to depleting needed resources to defend its interests in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Foreign Policy

President Putin's foreign policy rests on seeking recognition from the international community to view Russia once more as a "great power." Russia's current posture is to sustain its presence in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East; however, its military and diplomatic instruments have been quite limited there. This limitation has serious implications for its foreign policy aspirations in Southeast Asia. According to the 2019 Asia Power Index, Russia is categorized as an underachiever, which means that its resources exceed influence²². In other words, Moscow's performance is seen to be mediocre when it comes to using its resources, particularly weapons and military hardware to influence Southeast Asian affairs.

The 2019 Asia Power Index reported that Russia ranked top three out of twenty-five nation-states to demonstrate its strategic ambition in the Asia-Pacific. This can partly be attributed to President Putin's charismatic endeavors. But projecting personal charisma is not enough to explain Russia's great power status, especially in Southeast Asia. In fact, Russian political leadership in foreign policy only ranked nine out of twenty-five despite being in the top five of overall diplomatic influence based on the said Index. One reason can be attributed to Moscow's failure to follow through on its commitments with ASEAN concerning the 10-year action plan which only yielded minimal results. As a response, Russia recommitted to form a five-year plan which contains a roadmap to increase both economic and security ties from 2016 to 2020.²³ As President Putin ends his term on 2024, the future is uncertain with Russian foreign policy.

While ASEAN has yet to provide positive returns for Russia, its propensity for

20 Nivedita Kapoor, "Russia and its engagement".

21 Ibid.

22 Hervé Lemahieu and Bonnie Bley, *Asia Power Index 2019*, 66-67.

23 "Putin, ASEAN leaders to adopt summit declaration, partnership action plan", *TASS News Agency*, May 20, 2016.

bilateral relations seems promising, particularly in security where Russia is viewed to be a force of stability²⁴ amidst the U.S-China competition. While that projection exists, Russian foreign policy perceives that arms sales can provide the greatest economic returns.²⁵ In 2019, Russia gained USD 12 billion for its arms transfer deliveries with four consultation pacts in Southeast Asia as of 2018.²⁶

Despite milestones in increasing arms transfers and sales, Moscow is yet to establish a comprehensive defense network in the Asia-Pacific in general, having been ranked top eleven out of twenty-five.²⁷ This provides problematic implications for its arms sale in Southeast Asia. If Russia sells weapons, it should at least be committed to help the buyer state integrate the weapons, platforms, and materiel to the force configuration of its armed forces. This could help build the prestige of Russia as a responsible defense partner. However, Russia has not yet provided a figure on its foreign deployment in Southeast Asia per the 2019 Asia Power Index.²⁸ Furthermore, the current force employment is oriented towards strategic deterrence in Eastern Europe and the defense of the Russian Heartland, which likely explains the deemed absence of foreign deployment in Southeast Asia. Given this case, it is agreed that the sub-region is simply not a high priority for Russia due to its preoccupation in its near abroad.²⁹

Conclusion

The concept of a great power has been used time and time again in international relations scholarship. However, its usage has often been used based on rhetoric rather than on empirical evidence. Russia has been frequently labeled as a great power in the international system. This attribution may be a product of what many speculators see as an active Russia trying to play a bigger role in world affairs under the active charismatic leadership of President Putin compounded by a common near-distant nostalgia of the former Soviet Union. However, the concept of a great power goes beyond these mere speculations.

This essay has utilized Andrew Heywood's framework to evaluate whether Russia can be defined as a great power. Considering how a great power must have a global reach, Southeast Asia has been used as a case study to test if Russia has an actual impact outside its neighboring countries. With the empirical observations provided in the study, it can be said that Russia may have certain strengths as a key player in the international scene; however, it has not yet qualified as a great power. On the military level, Russia may possess a remarkable military capability; but it is important not to overestimate its wherewithal

24 Dimitry Gorenburg and Paul Schwartz, "Russia's Strategy in Southeast Asia," *PONARS Eurasia*, 5, March 2019, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm578_Gorenburg-Shwartz_March2019.pdf.

25 Ibid.

26 Hervé Lemahieu and Bonnie Bley, "Asia Power Index 2019", 87.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Gorenburg and Schwartz, "Russia's strategy".

given its force employment towards Eastern Europe and the Russian Heartland. On the economic level, Russia is seen to be staggering due to its internal structural problems and the sanctions imposed by the West.

In Southeast Asia, Russia's economic activity is quite limited and considerably dwarfed by the presence of the United States and China. On its spheres of interest, Russia's involvement in the sub-region will remain limited because of the geopolitical implications it may entail. There are more minuses than pluses for projecting itself as a third player in Southeast Asia given the U.S-China competition there and the risk perception among Southeast Asian states. Also, Russia's propensity to deal bilaterally with Southeast Asian states rather than on the ASEAN level implies its limited influence in the sub-region.

In terms of foreign policy, Russia has not yet maximized its relations with ASEAN given its preoccupation in influencing Eastern Europe and defending the Russian Heartland. Furthermore, its actual impact on the sub-region is considered relatively insignificant compared to that of China and the United States. From the evidence provided, Russia seems only highly capable and influential in its strategic backyard, but beyond that, its impact is significantly marginal.

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Is Democracy a Prerequisite for Economic Growth? A Sectoral Analysis of Authoritarian Capitalism in Rwanda's Coffee Sector

*Alessandra Costagliola**

Abstract: The question of whether democracy is needed as a prerequisite for growth is highly debated within the development field. The rapid growth of the East Asian “miracle” economies has questioned the necessity of democracy in producing growth outcomes, with growing literature supporting the notion of authoritarian-led growth. This paper will analyze the evidence behind the widening acceptance of authoritarian capitalism and its application in Rwanda's coffee sector. The findings will indicate that although democracy is indeed not a prerequisite for growth, long term economic sustainability is reliant on continued liberalization of markets and improved personal freedoms, ultimately leading to a transition to democracy.

Keywords: Rwanda, democracy, economic growth, authoritarian capitalism, coffee.

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Introduction

The debate concerning democracy and economic growth is much like that of the chicken and the egg: which comes first? In her 2018 book, *The Edge of Chaos*, Dambisa Moyo proposes that “economic growth is a prerequisite for democracy and not the other way around.”¹ Indeed, the question of democracy as a prerequisite for growth is highly contested, particularly given the success of the East Asian “miracle” countries whose growth is largely credited to authoritarian regimes. Rwanda has modelled this approach, coined “Africa's Singapore,”² having grown its economy significantly since Paul Kagame took power in 2000. GDP has risen from \$1.8 billion USD in 2000 to \$9.5 billion in 2018. This growth is largely attributed to Rwanda's fixation on Singapore's growth model, a model that combines authoritarian political ideology with liberalized market capitalism.

This essay will explore Moyo's claim for the need of a benevolent dictator to promote economic development through an analysis of authoritarian capitalism in Rwanda's coffee sector. Rwanda's coffee sector experienced a significant overhaul under the autocratic

1 Dambisa Moyo, *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth - and How to Fix It*. (New York: Basic Books, 2018).

2 Julian Hatter, “Kagame Seems Set to Win Again in Rwanda. But Is He a ‘miracle Man’ or a Nascent Dictator?” *The Washington Post*, 2017.

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leadership of President Paul Kagame, that aimed to innovate the sector and promote incentive for growth. Although this overhaul was government led, liberalized policies enabled the sector to experience growth. Today, however, continued government control over the sector has proved consequential and without further liberalization and response to demands for enhanced freedoms, the sector could continue to stifle.

The first section of this essay will explore the notion of economic growth as a prerequisite to democracy, noting the historical trends of countries that have followed this method to facilitate economic growth, namely the East Asian “miracle” economies. The second section will explore the arguments against this method of growth, instead prioritizing democratic stability ahead of capitalist economic measures. The third section will explore these arguments through a case study of Rwanda’s coffee sector, which has seen significant growth under authoritarian capitalism. The fourth section analyzes the long-term implications of this economic growth model and how democracy will need to be integrated to ensure the sector’s stability and continued development over time.

Economic Growth as a Prerequisite to Democracy

Among the Western world, democracy is heralded as a solution to the problems of underdevelopment. Democracy has been argued to be the “economic salvation” for developing countries, a catalyst for battling “corruption, economic cronyism, and anticompetitive and inefficient practices.”³ However, evidence illustrates that democracy can sustain itself longer as per capita income increases⁴ and this notion calls into question whether democracy is needed at all to induce economic growth. The East Asian “miracle” economies represent a widely used example as to why democracy is not a prerequisite to economic growth. Examples including Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore demonstrate that, as Moyo notes, a ‘decisive benevolent dictator’ is what poorer countries need to get the economy moving.⁵ The ‘benevolent dictators’ credited to promulgating economic growth in these countries, including Suharto in Indonesia, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Park Chung Hee in South Korea aimed to “ensure some semblance of property rights, functioning institutions, growth-promoting economic policies and an investment climate that buttressed growth.”⁶ Selective interventionism in specific sectors, including electronic components in South Korea⁷ and communications and information technology in Taiwan⁸ for example, combined with large-scale investment and prioritization in

3 Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa*. (London: Penguin, 2010),41.

4 Dambisa Moyo, *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth - and How to Fix It*. (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 42.

5 Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid : Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa*. (London: Penguin, 2010), 42.

6 Ibid, 42-43.

7 Luis Suarez-Villa and Han Pyo-Hwan, “The Rise of Korea’s Electronics Industry: Technological Change, Growth, and Territorial Distribution.” *Economic Geography* 66, no. 3 (1990): 273-92.

8 Eunice Hsiao-Hui Wang, “ICT and Economic Development in Taiwan: Analysis of the

education led to increased productive growth in these economies.⁹ These measures are significant, not only because they lifted millions out of poverty, but also because these measures were enacted while still limiting social and political freedom. From suppressing freedom of expression in South Korea¹⁰ to banning chewing gum in Singapore,¹¹ these governments prioritized the growth of the economy while undermining basic freedoms.

Economist Dambisa Moyo, at the forefront of the anti-democracy growth theory, challenges the viability of democracy when economic growth levels are low.¹² She suggests that the West's insistence on political rights as a precursor for economic growth is misguided.¹³ Moyo argues that for those in dire poverty, essential needs like food and water take priority over social desires like freedom and democracy.¹⁴ Further Moyo argues that not even the West implemented full democratic rights for all its citizens during its economic development and that those who are considered democratic "have become so illiberal that they're indistinguishable from authoritarian regimes."¹⁵

Indeed, Moyo posits a compelling case against democracy as a prerequisite for growth, and as Alamdari notes economies have the ability to grow under any political system, be it democratic or authoritarian, so long as well-defined social and legal systems are present.¹⁶ Consistent with Moyo, Alamdari argues in favor of economic development as a precursor for a stable democracy, preceding social advancement.¹⁷ Despite the well-known evidence of the "Asian Tiger" economies that scholars often point to argue against democracy as a prerequisite for growth, there is still much resistance to this proposal. The next section will explore critiques of this position, as well as analyze what evidence the data reveals about democracy and its correlation with growth.

Democracy as a Prerequisite to Economic Growth

Easterly analyzes the anti-democracy growth theory by leveraging Polity data to correlate positive-growth relationships with long term democracy.¹⁸ He notes that those countries that did grow under authoritarianism are not adequately representative of disasters that

Evidence." *Telecommunications Policy* 23, no. 3 (1999).

9 The World Bank, 1993. *East Asian Miracle*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

10 Isabella Steger, "The Legacy Park Geun-Hye Leaves behind in Korea's 30-Year Democracy Is a More Authoritarian State." *Quartz*. Quartz, March 15, 2017.

11 Elle Metz, "Why Singapore Banned Chewing Gum." *BBC News*. BBC, March 28, 2015.

12 Alice Hu, "A Look at Global Economic Growth: An Interview with Dambisa Moyo." *Harvard International Review* 37, no. 1 (2015): 43.

13 Dambisa Moyo, *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth - and How to Fix It*. (New York: Basic Books, 2018).

14 *Ibid*, 112.

15 *Ibid*, 120.

16 Kazem Alamdari. "Is Democracy A Prerequisite of Economic Growth?" *Michigan Sociological Review*, no. 8 (1994): 20.

17 *Ibid*, 21.

18 William Russell Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 44.

have occurred under dictatorships.¹⁹ Indeed, the authoritarian regimes of Kim Jong-Il's North Korea, Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, and Omar Hassan Al-Bashir's Sudan not only disintegrated any resemblance of an economy, but also precipitated grave human rights abuses throughout the duration of their regimes. Certainly, such practices are not conducive to economic growth. Easterly argues that the success of autocrats "does not imply that autocracy delivers rapid growth," but rather, indicates that "these growth episodes happened in spite of autocrats, not because of them."²⁰ However, Easterly acknowledges that this analysis does not assume the benevolence of autocratic leaders²¹ although this point is key in distinguishing whether economic growth can be successful under autocrats. As noted by The World Bank, the regimes of the East Asian miracle economies, although autocratic, were "willing to grant a voice and genuine authority to a technocratic elite and key leaders of the private sector. Unlike authoritarian leaders in many other economies, leaders in the HPAEs [high performing East Asian economies] realized that economic development was impossible without cooperation."²²

Indeed, as noted by Behuria, insecurity in their position as leaders necessitates that ruling elites maintain their economic goals.²³ As argued by Behuria, this vulnerability forces elites to commit to delivering economic development. The approach towards recognizing this vulnerability indicates whether a government will define its rule with benevolence or malevolence. Oftentimes, a government's stability is dependent on its response to the economic needs of its people, meaning that a disciplined approach is required for sustainable rule. For authoritarian capitalism, an approach that combines authoritarian political ideology with a liberalized market economy, to be effective and for productivity to be achieved in sectors "governments must build alliances with capitalists,"²⁴ This counterpoise between governments defining sectoral planning for economic growth and capitalists executing those plans leads the type of growth that has occurred in the East Asian miracle economies.

The data demonstrates that economies that utilized the authoritarian capitalism model, namely the East Asian miracle economies, demonstrate a transition to democracy over time as the country develops. Using Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia as examples, since their rapid development under autocratic rulers, these countries have widely improved on the EIU's Democracy Index²⁵ and within the Human

19 William Easterly, *The Tyranny of Experts : Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*. (New York: Basic Books, a Member of the Perseus Book Group, 2013), 308.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid, 309.

22 The World Bank, 1993. *East Asian Miracle*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press).

23 British Behuria, "Between Party Capitalism and Market Reforms – Understanding Sector Differences in Rwanda". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 53 (3): 418.

24 Ibid.

25 "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index", The Economist Newspaper, Accessed February 16, 2020, <https://infographics.economist.com/2019/DemocracyIndex/>.

Freedom Index,²⁶ ranking higher than many Western countries in terms of economic freedom. Related to economic freedom, Singapore (ranked 8.84/10) ranks higher than a number of Western countries including the UK (8.0), Switzerland (8.39), Netherlands (7.71), Denmark (7.77), Ireland (8.07), Finland (7.65), Norway (7.60), Germany (7.69), and the United States (8.03). All five countries have demonstrated increased standing in personal freedoms as well since the 2015 report.²⁷ In 2018, the Human Freedom Index indicated a personal freedom ranking for Taiwan at 9.04 when compared to Western countries like Ireland (8.94) and the United States (8.75) who ranked lower on personal freedom.²⁸ Singapore and South Korea are on par with Western countries on the personal freedom scale, ranking at 7.48 and 8.77, respectively.²⁹ Although Indonesia and Malaysia trail further behind on the personal freedom scale (6.38 and 5.90) and the economic freedom scale (7.16 and 6.92), they have still made marked improvements over the last several years.³⁰ Moreover, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index indicates that all four of these countries have transitioned to either a flawed democracy or a full democracy since their economies first began growth under authoritarian regimes.³¹ This indicates that indeed, as Moyo posits, the model of authoritarian capitalism, led by a benevolent dictator, not only precipitates economic growth, but in the long run, as noted by Alamdari³² and Moyo,³³ enables democracy to flourish and sustain.

Given the growing literature that supports the notion that democracy is not necessary for economic growth, but in fact, that economic growth acts as a facilitator to achieving democracy, many developing countries have used the East Asian miracle economies as an example for developing their own economies. China, as an example, under authoritarian capitalism, has achieved rapid economic growth since the 1980's, with GDP reaching \$13.6 trillion in 2018, the second largest in the world next to the US.³⁴ Rwanda has also begun to model this approach in its quest to grow its economy. The next section will explore how Rwanda's application of authoritarian capitalism in its coffee sector has precipitated significant growth and demonstrate how, as the sector becomes well-established, a response to demands of increasing freedoms and liberalization within the

26 "Human Freedom Index, 2019" Cato Institute, accessed December 31, 2019, <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/cato-human-freedom-index-update-3.pdf>.

27 "Human Freedom Index 2015," Cato Institute, accessed December 31, 2019, <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/human-freedom-index-2015.pdf>

28 "Human Freedom Index, 2019" Cato Institute, accessed December 31, 2019, <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/cato-human-freedom-index-update-3.pdf>.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index", The Economist Newspaper, Accessed February 16, 2020, <https://infographics.economist.com/2019/DemocracyIndex/>.

32 Kazem Alamdari. "Is Democracy a Prerequisite of Economic Growth?" *Michigan Sociological Review*, no. 8 (1994).

33 Dambisa Moyo, *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth - and How to Fix It*. (New York: Basic Books, 2018).

34 "GDP (current US \$)", World Bank Data, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.

sector could ensure its sustainability in the long term.

Authoritarian Capitalism in Rwanda's Coffee Sector

Since Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, took power in the early 2000s, following the devastating genocide that took place in the mid 1990s, his presidency has marked both significant social improvements between the Hutu and Tutsi communities, as well as notable levels of economic growth in the country. Dubbed "Africa's Singapore,"³⁵ Rwanda has grown from GDP of \$1.8 billion in 2000 to \$9.5 billion in 2019.³⁶ Rwanda's leading sectors, including energy, agriculture, trade, hospitality, and financial services accounted for \$995.7 million of exports in 2018, increasing 5.5 per cent year-on-year.³⁷ Rwanda's investment in the agricultural sector accounted for nearly 10 per cent of its annual budget in 2012, demonstrating its prioritization to improve productivity in the sector.³⁸

Rwanda's National Coffee Strategy

The coffee sector is one of the leading sectors in Rwanda's economy accounting for \$68.7 million of exports in 2018, up 7.2 from the previous year.³⁹ This growth has largely been driven by the government's 1993-2003 National Coffee Strategy, which transformed Rwanda as producer of mediocre coffee to being recognized for producing high quality, premium priced coffee.⁴⁰ With the coffee sector on the verge of collapse in the late 1990s, Rwanda's National Coffee Strategy aimed to resolve some of the primary issues facing the sector, including "low skills, minimal technology adoption and a lack of coordination among actors along the value chain."⁴¹ To solve these challenges, the government of Rwanda liberalized the sector, collaborating with international donors and the private sector to improve the branding and quality of the coffee by modifying the framework of production, supporting the development of cooperatives, and facilitating international buyer relations.⁴² To do this, the Strategy prioritized the improvement in agriculture technology and increased production.⁴³ More specifically, the government provided the sector with "material and technical support to growers and processors, distributing

35 Julian Hatttem, "Kagame Seems Set to Win Again in Rwanda. But Is He a 'miracle Man' or a Nascent Dictator?" *The Washington Post*, 2017.

36 "GDP (Current US\$).", Data, Accessed April 13, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.

37 International Trade Administration, 2019. *export.gov*. U.S. Department of Commerce.

38 Ngabitsinze Jean Chrysostome, 2012. "The Rwandan Coffee Sector: out of the Ordinary." *Paris, L'Harmattan*.

39 International Trade Administration, 2019. *export.gov*. U.S. Department of Commerce.

40 Karol C Boudreaux, "A Better Brew for Success: Economic Liberalization in Rwanda's Coffee Sector" *Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from a Dynamic Continent/World Bank* (2010): 185; Ngabitsinze Jean Chrysostome, 2012. "The Rwandan Coffee Sector: out of the Ordinary." *Paris, L'Harmattan*.

41 The World Bank, 2016. World Economic Forum, *Case 14: Rwanda Coffee Sector*, World Bank Group.

42 Karol C Boudreaux, "A Better Brew for Success: Economic Liberalization in Rwanda's Coffee Sector" *Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from a Dynamic Continent/World Bank* (2010): 185.

43 The World Bank, 2016. World Economic Forum, *Case 14: Rwanda Coffee Sector*, World Bank Group.

fertilizer, as well as promulgating and enforcing regulations.”⁴⁴ The government also introduced coffee competitions to develop the palettes and standards of coffee farmers to improve quality.⁴⁵ Additionally, workforce development programs provided training within the sector to improve the installation and operation of coffee-washing stations, refine the cherry sorting and selection process, and establish administrative and financial management.⁴⁶

Rwanda’s National Coffee Strategy not only aimed to liberalize the sector to increase sectoral growth and competition, but it also demonstrates how the government’s intervention in defining and facilitating a plan for the sector promulgated its growth. As noted by Guariso, Ngabitsinze, and Verpoorten, at the time of the writing, there were over 200 washing stations in the country, demonstrating significant competition.⁴⁷ Entrepreneurship has flourished as a result of Rwanda’s industry liberalizations,⁴⁸ demonstrating the Rwandan government’s response to providing opportunities that enhance economic freedom. This indicates the success of the government’s intervention in the targeted allocation of resources for the sector that facilitated the resulting growth and subsequent entrepreneurship.

Although Rwanda’s National Coffee Strategy has demonstrated success in contributing to the economic growth that Rwanda has experienced over the last twenty years, it has not been without major hurdles. In the next section, I will explore the challenges faced by the coffee sector in Rwanda, and take a look at how further reforms and liberalization, components that demonstrate a slow transition to instilling democratic values, could enable further growth in the sector.

Is Democracy Next?

As explored above, the implementation of Rwanda’s National Coffee Sector made significant strides of improvements in the sector, ultimately leading to the sector contributing to the economy as a major source of exports. The enhancement of this sector has provided income for over 355,000 farming households in the country and Rwanda has become recognized globally as a major producer of specialty coffee.⁴⁹ However, while growth in this sector, largely facilitated by programs implemented by the government alongside the support of international donors, the private sector, and foreign buyers, as

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ngabitsinze Jean Chrysostome, 2012. “The Rwandan Coffee Sector: out of the Ordinary.” *Paris, L’Harmattan*.

48 Jutta M Tobias, Johanna Mair, and Celestina Barbosa-Leiker. “Toward a Theory of Transformative Entrepreneurship: Poverty Reduction and Conflict Resolution in Rwanda’s Entrepreneurial Coffee Sector.” *Journal of Business Venturing* 28, no. 6 (2013): 729.

49 Daniel C. Clay, Aniseh S. Bro, Ruth Ann Church, David L. Ortega, and Alfred R. Bizoza, “Farmer Incentives and Value Chain Governance: Critical Elements to Sustainable Growth in Rwanda’s Coffee Sector.” *Journal of Rural Studies* 63 (2018): 200.

Clay notes, much of the country's coffee producers have failed to become recipients of this newfound prosperity, largely due to their inability to enact influence over the supply chain.⁵⁰ With little ability to affect positive change or voice their dissatisfaction within the sector, many farmers are allowing their production to falter, leading to low productivity and stagnated production or are choosing to exit the sector altogether.⁵¹ The sector has failed to provide incentives to farmers largely due to the Rwandan government's control over the cherry floor price.⁵² As noted by Clay this regulatory process not only eliminates cherry competition, but also limits the incentives that drive quality and productivity improvements.⁵³ Zoning policies also negatively impact competition in the region,⁵⁴ again, de-incentivizing producers and resulting in poor levels of productivity and quality.

Rwanda's economic growth at large, but particularly in the coffee sector, was catapulted by the sectoral reforms implemented by the government. This demonstration of authoritarian capitalism allowed the government to allocate resources effectively and focus their attention on sectors where the country could demonstrate competitive advantage, ultimately leading to Rwanda becoming a compelling trade partner in quality coffee. Given that the sector is now well-established, relative to its beginning twenty years ago, the government's transition to a more democratic allocation of freedoms within the sector is essential for the continuity of its growth. Lifting on the control over the price floor on cherry could provide the incentives needed by farmers to induce competition and continued growth in the sector. As the sector continues to develop, the Rwandan government will need to accede to the growing demands of economic and personal freedoms that will encourage growth in the well-defined sectors originally initiated by the government.

Other countries' economic growth has demonstrated how enhanced market liberalizations embedded in shifts towards democratization can sustain long-term growth. As an example, South Korea's growth, as previously highlighted, was dependent initially upon authoritarian measures to facilitate production in manufacturing sectors, namely in textiles, plywood, electronics, synthetics, and chemical industries.⁵⁵ Since the country's economic transformation began 50 years ago, South Korea has transitioned into a stable liberal democracy with sustained long term economic growth. GDP has grown 40,000 per cent since 1960.⁵⁶ As Alamdari notes, as economic growth is facilitated under authoritarian regimes, social advancement promulgates increasing economic demands and increased

50 Ibid, 201.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid, 202.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Kazem Alamdari, "Is Democracy a Prerequisite of Economic Growth?" *Michigan Sociological Review*, no. 8 (1994):20.

56 "GDP (Current US\$) - Korea, Rep." Data. Accessed April 9, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=KR>.

participation rights in decision making.⁵⁷ Alternatively, Ghana represents an example where the autocrat government's refusal to liberalize cocoa markets resulted in decreased growth rates across the country. In this case, because the government refused to lift the control on cocoa pricing, farmers, facing lower producer prices, were not incentivized to plant as much of the crop or opted to sell on the black market.⁵⁸ When Jerry Rawlings, then dictator, finally agreed to allow producers to control the coca price, Ghana's production recovered leading them to once again become a leading cocoa producer.⁵⁹ These examples highlight the necessity for autocratic governments to respond to increasing demands for liberalizing markets in order to sustain long-term economic growth. Such response will eventually support a transition to democratization as economic growth increases.

As demonstrated throughout this paper, although democracy is not necessary for inducing economic growth, continued liberalization of well-established sectors over time and a slow transition to democracy are necessary to sustain economic growth over time. As indicated by Moyo, "democracy can sustain longer as per capita income increases."⁶⁰

Conclusion

The analysis of Rwanda's interventionist market reforms in the coffee sector demonstrates how authoritarian capitalism can induce growth in the economy. This example highlights that while democracy is not a prerequisite for growth, the long-term sustainability of economic growth patterns requires increasing liberalization and freedoms within economic sectors, and ultimately, a transition to democracy. This pattern of growth, from authoritarian interventionism to democratic liberalization, as a method of economic growth, has been proven through the examples of the East Asian miracle economies, and further modelled by countries including China and Rwanda. Although Rwanda will need to respond to demands for increasing personal and economic freedoms across the country in order to sustain its growth, the method of inducing this growth has been largely reliant on autocratic market-led reforms.

57 Kazem Alamdari, "Is Democracy a Prerequisite of Economic Growth?" *Michigan Sociological Review*, no. 8 (1994):20.

58 William Easterly, *The Tyranny of Experts : Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*. (New York: Basic Books, a Member of the Perseus Book Group, 2013):319.

59 Ibid.

60 Dambisa Moyo, *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth - and How to Fix It*. (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 118-119.

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In Defense of Vital Interests: United Nations and Anglo-American Diplomacy in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970

*Onianwa Oluchukwu Ignatus**

Abstract: This article examines the Anglo-American attitude towards the clamour for the debate of the Nigerian Civil War at the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. To achieve this objective, the study adopts a historical narrative approach and bases its analysis on primary sources, namely, archival materials obtained from the British National Archives Kew London. The author argued that mounting pressure from the international public opinion prompted the campaign to debate the Nigerian conflict at the UN. The strong opposition from Nigeria, United Kingdom, and some Member-States of the Organization of African Unity inhibited a UN diplomatic action in the war with the perception that Western-inspired UN involvement would be viewed by African countries as neo-colonialism which posed a serious problem to the OAU peace efforts. The Anglo-American position on the matter was that the war was an internal affair under the control of the OAU. Hence, a UN initiative implied receipt of the global disposition of the conflict that strengthens the Biafran cause and weakens settlement on the basis of Nigerian unity. The urge for an official debate of the civil war proved futile because of the great power's diplomatic manoeuvrings within the Security Council and General Assembly premised on the calculation that there existed a tendency of discussions over-flowing on to the political aspects of the dispute, thus, endanger Anglo-American interests in Nigeria. The UN exhibited strong apathy to the Nigerian-Biafran situation having adopted the approach of soft condemnations and passionate speeches to the conflict rather than inestimable patience to sought formulas useful for the resolution of the war.

Keywords: United Nations, Anglo-American, Diplomacy, Nigerian Civil War

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Introduction

The 1960s was the period of decolonization that marked a watershed in the politics, leadership and development of Africa. However, a few years after gaining independence, African countries were besieged with internal leadership crises caused by party politics, struggle for power and resource control, ethnic and tribal scourge.¹

In the case of Nigeria, there emerged powerful secessionist movement in the Eastern Region that canvassed for a total separation from the country and eventually declared the

1 Meredith Martin, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (Great Britain: The Free Press, 2005), 13; George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?: The Coming Struggle for Africa* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1956); Hatch John, *A History of Postwar Africa* (London: Deutsch, 1965); Ali A. Mazrui & Wondji C, *General History of Africa*. Volume VIII (California United States: UNESCO & University of Cambridge Press, 1993).

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Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967.²

On 6 July 1967 there was an outbreak of civil war between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, led by Major-General Yakubu Gowon and the Republic of Biafra under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.³

One significant incident that occurred during the conflict was the campaign for the United Nations' (UN) diplomatic and political intervention in the form of an official debate of the civil war at the Security Council and General Assembly. This epoch-making diplomatic event designated the fighting as a vital component of the international politics of the twentieth century.⁴

The essence of this study is to discuss the clamour for the official raising of the Nigerian Civil War at the UN Security Council and General Assembly. However, it implements a specific focus on Anglo-American attitude towards the UN diplomatic initiative in the civil war. Despite all that has been written on the Nigerian Civil War, not much is known about the Anglo-American reactions towards the need for a UN debate of the Nigerian conflict and that makes the subject matter worth interrogating.

The study adopted a historical narrative approach and based its analysis on primary sources namely archival materials employed from the British National Archives Kew London. Similarly, other secondary sources related to the subject matter were obtained from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN) in Enugu State, Nigeria. This helped to ensure an acceptable level of accuracy of facts and an in-depth analysis of the issues discussed. The significance of this study lies in how the perception that the Nigerian Civil War was an internal affair thwarted the diplomatic efforts of debating the conflict at the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

The author argued that mounting pressure from the international public opinion prompted the campaign to debate the Nigerian conflict at the UN. Anglo-American position on the matter was that the war was an internal affair under the control of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Hence, a UN initiative implied receipt of the global disposition of the conflict that strengthens the Biafran cause and weakens settlement based on

2 File No. JM 1/19/6C/1049/West and General African Dept. / Title: Commonwealth Africa: Nigeria, Political Affairs, Secession of Eastern Region, 10 March 1967-20 November 1968, Foreign and Commonwealth Office papers, 38/265, the National Archives, Kew London.

3 Brian McNeil, "The Nigerian Civil War in History and Historiography" in *Africa, Empire and Globalization: Essays in Honour of A.G. Hopkins*, edited by Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell, 539-551 (Durham, North Carolina: North Carolina Academic Press, 2014); Warren G.B, "Petroleum and the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970". *The Fletcher Forum* 3 no.2, 66 (2000); Michael, Gould. 2013. *The Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War, 1967-1970* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co); Nwankwo A Arthur, *Nigeria: The Challenge of Biafra* Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publisher, 1972). Okpaku J, *Nigeria: Dilemma of nationhood: an African analysis of the Biafra Crisis* (New York: Third Press, 1970). Stremalu J. John, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977); Waugh, Auberon and Cronje Suzanne, *Biafra: The British Shame* (London: Michael Joseph Limited, 1969); Kirk-Green, A.H.M. 1971. *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Source Book, 1966-1969, Volume I* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Achebe Chinua, *There was a country: a personal history of Biafra* (London: Penguin Book, 2012).

4 Warren 2000, "Petroleum and the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970," 66.

Nigerian unity. The urge for an official debate of the civil war proved futile because of the diplomatic manoeuvrings within the Security Council and General Assembly premised on the calculation that there existed a tendency of discussions over-flowing on to the political aspects of the dispute. Britain and United States were reluctant to act on the UN issue because of the danger it posed to their economic and political interests in Nigeria, which they vowed to protect from the beginning of the war. They wielded too much control on the UN and took a firm stance against allowing the civil war issue to be officially debated, as a means of protecting vital interests that fortify their mutual diplomatic relations with Nigeria. The UN exhibited strong apathy to the Nigerian-Biafran situation having adopted the approach of soft condemnations and passionate speeches to the conflict rather than inestimable patience to sought formulas useful for peaceful resolution of the war.

United Nations and Diplomacy of the Nigerian Civil War

Since its commencement on 6 July 1967 there was a limited need for the United Nations intervention in the Nigerian Civil War. In short, it took the UN Secretary-General, U-Thant, a year before making his first statement on the civil war for he regarded the conflict as an internal affair of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria which had to be settled exclusively within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that had already established a Consultative Committee led by the Ethiopian Emperor, Hailé Selassíé, saddled with the responsibility of initiating peace process geared towards settling the fighting. At this time also, the Commonwealth Secretariat in London had got involved in facilitating peace mediation between Nigeria and Biafra.⁵

Meanwhile, the drive to have the civil war debated at the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly was first presented on 25 September 1967 when the Vice-Chairman of the National Liberation Council (NLC) and the Chairman of Ghanaian Delegate at the UN, Harley and the Gambian Foreign Minister and delegate to the UN, A. B. N’jie made references to the Nigerian crisis in their respective policy statements delivered before the 22nd Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The two African diplomats had called for international intervention in the conflict through the UN because the Federal Military Government of Nigeria insisted that neither the OAU Consultative Committee nor anyone else should “mediate” in the civil war.⁶ In his statement, Mr. Harley said:

5 Confidential: Minute on Nigeria and OAU from British High Commission in Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 13th August, 1967, File No. TX 2/4/Part A/ 6C/1066/ West and General African Dept./ Nigeria: Political Affairs, External-Multilateral, Nigerian Civil War and OAU, 25 July 1967-31 December 1968, FCO, 38/232, TNA.

6 Confidential: Minute on Conversation between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Michael Stewart and General Ankrah on the Nigerian Civil War and OAU Peace Mission to Lagos, from D.C. Tebbit E.G. Norris, 3 October 1967, FCO, 38/22, TNA. See, Armstrong, R.A, *The Issues at Stake: Nigeria 1967*(Ibadan: University Press, 1967). Azikiwe Nnamdi, *Peace Proposals for ending The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*(London: Colusco Ltd, 1969). Ezeani, E, *In Biafra Africa died: The diplomatic plot*. 2nd eds. (London: Veritas Lumen publishers, 2013).

I know that there were several urgent matters which are at present exercising our minds in Africa and which some of our well-wishers would like to see tackled and solved by the Organization of African Unity. Prominent among them is the situation in Nigeria which is indeed a source of anguish and grief to all of us. I should like to assure this Assembly that everything possible will be done by us in Africa to assist our brothers in Nigeria to end this most regrettable fratricidal war and to restore the country to peace and harmony.⁷

In the afternoon of the same day, the Gambian delegate, A. B. N'jie said in his speech to the General Assembly that the situation in Nigeria, threatened by secession and disintegration, needed to be mediated by the world body. According to him, "there were lessons in these; I am sure, for all of us. As regards Nigeria, although the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federation must be respected, and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states recognized, my Government feels that the situation had reached a stage where the possibility of some form of international mediation should be explored."⁸

On 28 September 1967 the Nigerian Permanent Representative at the UN, Simeon Adebo, protested against the reference of the Nigerian-Biafran dispute by the Gambian and Ghanaian delegates at the General Assembly session. On behalf of the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, Okoi Arikpo, Simeon Adebo, told the General Assembly that since the two countries in question were represented at the conference of African Heads of State and Government in Congo-Kinshasa, their introduction of the civil war into the general debate of the august Assembly came as a surprise to the Nigerian delegation.⁹ The Nigerian Representative submitted:

Raising the internal affairs of Nigeria in the UN was incompatible with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. The Nigerian delegation did not doubt about the bona fides of the two distinguished African leaders whose statements they had hereby protested. They were sure that they meant well for Nigeria. Their countries have stood firmly by the Federal Government of Nigeria and they knew that they would continue to do so. He, therefore, trusted that they would understand the purpose of the Nigerian government's friendly protest.¹⁰

The stern reaction of the Nigerian representative at the UN over Ghanaian and Gambian diplomatic action did not deter other nations across the globe particularly from North America and Europe from agitating on the need to raise the conflict at the UN especially in

7 Confidential: Record of Speeches by Ghanaian Representative at the UN General Assembly from D.C. Tebbit of Commonwealth Office to the British High Commissioner in Lagos, 10 October 1967, FCO, 38/232, TNA.

8 From D.C. Tebbit to British High Commission in Lagos, 10 October 1967, FCO, 38/232, TNA.

9 Press Release: Adebo's Protest on Reference to Nigeria at UN. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information No. F.2205, 28 September 1967, FCO, 38/232, TNA.

10 Press Release: Adebo's Protest on Reference to Nigeria at UN. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information No. F.2205, 28 September, 1967, FCO, 38/232, TNA.

the wake of the breakdown of peace talks conveyed by the OAU Consultative Committee, intensification of military confrontation by both sides of the conflict and upsurge of human rights violations.

According to Philipé Ben, “in these circumstances it was not surprising that indignation mounted among the representatives of many countries. These representatives pointed out that in this war which had already lasted for twenty-one months, the UN had not made the slightest efforts to facilitate a political solution which would put an end to the fighting and had not even contributed to humanitarian action”.¹¹ Thus, an official discussion of at least the humanitarian aspect of the war by the UN was considered necessary because of the tragic nature of the war.

On 17 September 1968 the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, issued a historic declaration in the House of Parliament that Canada should refer to the humanitarian aspect of the civil war to the UN. According to him, “if the Member-States of the OAU refused to take the initiative of resolving the civil war Canada would not hesitate to bring the conflict before the UN.”¹²

Consequently, an official statement was issued to all the Canadian Diplomatic Missions abroad by the External Affairs Ministry on 18 September 1968 notifying them about the intended diplomatic move by Ottawa. According to the bulletin released for the Canadian Diplomatic Missions, the Minister argued: “Canadian interest was humanitarian. It did not want to intervene in the political dispute between Nigeria and Biafra. Canada was under heavy pressure from the opposition parties to explore the best means to bring the full weight of world opinion to bear on Nigeria and Biafra. The Government considered how we can act most effectively...”¹³

The activities of pro-Biafran sympathizers in Canada prompted the decision of the External Affairs Minister to initiate the diplomatic action in the UN. After making his intention known the Minister said that “daily he was spending more time on the Biafran issue than any other subject, and spending even more as time goes by”.¹⁴

The emergence of strong public criticisms over the way the civil war issue was being handled in Western European countries forced governments to call for the UN debate of the conflict as the price of holding aloof from political involvement with one side or the other. Furthermore, the growing dependence of both sides of the conflict on some European nations such as Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and Portugal for arms supply

11 Philipé Ben. The War in Nigeria: Growing Criticism of Mr. Thant’s Inaction. *Le-Monde*. 2nd -3rd, 1969.

12 Confidential: Minute on Canadian Attitude to the Nigerian Civil War from P.D. McEntee to P.H. Moberly, 19 September 1968, File No. TX 2/1/6C/1066/Part B/Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, General and Multilateral, the Nigerian Civil War and the United Nations, 14 February 1967-31 December 1969, FCO, 38/230, TNA.

13 Bulletin for Canadian Diplomatic Mission. 1968. External Affairs Minister Said the Canada will raise the Nigerian-Biafra Question in the UN if the OAU Does Not. Ottawa: Canadian Press from Rogers to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 September 1968, FCO, 38/230, TNA.

14 From Rogers to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 September 1968, FCO, 38/230, TNA.

further ignited the call on the UN to look into the matter. They were persuaded that the activities of these great powers posed a serious threat to the security of the West African region thus decided to develop diplomatic contacts at the UN concerning the matter.

France supported a UN debate of the Nigerian conflict. On 18 September 1968 ahead of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, an official of the British Embassy in Paris, A.H. Campbell, asked a French official, Lacharrière, whether the Biafran War would be raised as an item at the UN Security Council, Lacharrière gave the impression that the French were determined to consider favourably some UN diplomatic move of a humanitarian character in the war.¹⁵

Then, on 2 October 1968 in a foreign policy speech to the French National Assembly, delivered on the eve of his departure for the UN General Assembly meeting in New York the French Foreign Minister, Michael Debré, called on the UN action in the civil war. He argued that:

Whether it is a question of Czechoslovakia, of Vietnams, of the Middle East, or Biafra, we see the same lack of recognition of the necessary cooperation between states and peoples. In other words, the same lack of recognition of the rules in the absence of which there exists only tension, intolerance, confrontation and conflict. the essential point in the declaration which I hope shortly to make in the name of the French government at the UN would be the necessity to respect these rules and I shall remind the United Nations that there is no more serious threat to peace than the maintenance of the state of affairs in which violence pays... There should be the cessation of arms supplies and worldwide recognition of the right of the Biafrans to self-determination.¹⁶

The campaign for UN intervention in the civil war received an unprecedented boost in the United States Congress following the famous speech of Senator Edward Kennedy on the floor of the house on 23 September 1968 where he called for strong international action to meet the humanitarian needs in the conflict.¹⁷ He specifically recommended that the UN General Assembly should consider and pass a resolution recognizing the international humanitarian obligations in the Nigerian situation; Second, that the resolution, employing the mandatory power of the United Nations Charter, direct the Secretary-General to use

15 Confidential: Minute on French Attitude towards the United Nations Affairs from A.H. Campbell of British Embassy in Paris to Miss A.M. Warburton C.V.C. of Foreign Office, 20 September 1968, File No. TX 8/27/Part A/ 6C/ 1068/ West and General African Dept/ Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Bilateral, French Policy towards Nigeria, 1 January 1967-31 December 1969, FCO, 38/247, TNA.

16 Confidential: Text of Speech on the Nigerian Civil War and United Nations to the French National Assembly by French Foreign Minister Michael Debré, 2 October 1968, FCO, 38/244, TNA. See, Nnoli, O. "The Nigerian-Biafra Conflict: a Political Analysis" in Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood ed. (Okpaku, J. New York: The Third Press, 1972).

17 Confidential: The Speech of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on the Urgent Need for International Action to Meet Humanitarian Needs In the Nigerian Civil War 23 September 1968. United States Congressional and Senate Record/S11227, File No. TX 3/3/6C/1066/West African Dept./ Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Bilateral, Relations with the United States, 1 January 1968-31 December 1969, FCO, 38/237, TNA.

his good office and all the resources available to him, to expedite the conclusion of a “mercy agreement” with the parties to the Nigerian conflict.¹⁸

Senator Kennedy’s speech received massive support from numerous US Congressmen. For instance, Senator Mansfield said that the United Nations takes the position that this war was an internal affair and therefore decided to stay out. It did not take that position concerning the Congo crisis and Rhodesian situation having declared them as matters of global concern. But the Biafrans were deliberately being starved and they died in their hundreds.¹⁹ According to Senator Mansfield:

How can the United Nations say that genocide perpetrated primarily through starvation and other means was not a matter of world concern? The United Nations and the US government should speak up more clearly about ways and means of solving this problem. The argument that the Nigerian situation was strictly an internal matter had to fall by the wayside. We know, for example, that the United Nations General Assembly had put on the agenda the whole question of apartheid in South Africa. Certainly, the problems which were suggested by the mass starvation in Biafra, and its genocidal consequences not only call for, but demanded more expeditious action than they have seen, and realized the significance of any further delay at this time; namely a mounting, but the needless loss of human life.²⁰

At the 354th meeting of the Ministerial Council of Western European Union (WEU) held on 21 and 22 October 1968 in Rome, the Italian Second Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (*Sous-secrétaire d’Etat aux affaires étrangères*) S.E. M. F. Malfatti said that the Italian government had been under intense pressure to act directly and raise the matter in the UN, having regarded the conflict as an internal affair and accepted the UN resolutions. Moreover, the question of arms supplies to both sides of the conflict was a fundamental issue that got the Italian government upset.²¹

Malfatti noted that “the Italian foreign policy towards the newly independent countries particularly in Africa had always been to suspend arms supplies in areas of tension. One wondered whether friendly countries which had continued to supply arms to Nigeria and Biafra, directly or indirectly, under special agreements might be able to bring the two

18 The Speech of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on the Urgent Need for International Action to Meet Humanitarian Needs In the Nigerian Civil War 23 September 1968. United States Congressional and Senate Record/S11227, FCO, 38/237, TNA.

19 The Speech of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on the Urgent Need for International Action to Meet Humanitarian Needs In the Nigerian Civil War 23 September 1968. United States Congressional and Senate Record/S11227, FCO, 38/237, TNA.

20 The Speech of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on the Urgent Need for International Action to Meet Humanitarian Needs In the Nigerian Civil War 23 September 1968. United States Congressional and Senate Record/S11227, FCO, 38/237, TNA.

21 Secret: Draft Minute of the 354th Meeting of the Council of Western European Union Held at the Ministerial Level on 21 and 22 October 1968 in Rome, No. CR (68)19 Part 1, 26 October 1968. Nigerian-Biafran Question, 56-67, File No. JWN 2/2/Part A/ 5A/368/West African Dept./ Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Bilateral, WEU Attitude towards the Nigerian Civil War, 1 January 1968-31 December 1969., FCO, 65/240, TNA.

sides to the negotiating table if arms supplies were halted.”²²

Similarly, the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 28 January 1969 adopted a motion that called on the Italian government to take an initiative of urging the UN to have the Biafran issue inscribed as an official item on the agenda of the Security Council and General Assembly.²³

The prevalent public reaction in Italy just like in other Western European nations led to the decision of the Italian government to have the civil war referred to the UN. Most Italians saw the situation as a humanitarian problem and wished that their government could make meaningful contribution in the war through the UN.

During his speech at the hearings of the subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the Nigerian Civil War Relief Problems, July 15 1969, Senator Charles E. Goodwell said that the UN and its Secretary-General bear responsibility in the Biafran conflict. Despite the 1968 UN Study Reports that two million Biafrans perished by hunger and starvation, the UN had done nothing of real significance regarding the famine conditions in Biafra. The Secretary-General, U-Thant had dismissed as an internal problem a conflict that had been encouraged, financed and supported by three of the major world powers, Britain, the Soviet Union, and France. While recommending that the United States should make full use not only of its contacts with the two sides of the conflict but also its influence with other individual African States, the great powers, the UN and the OAU in resolving the conflict, Senator Charles argued that:

Is the United Nations so weak that it can do nothing to avert a famine in which millions may die? Is our influence in this great international body so small that we cannot move it to action? I cannot believe this is so and what of our policies? The United States, at least, has never involved itself in supplying armaments for the Nigerian Civil War. The fact that we, alone of the great powers, have not had direct arms involvements gives us a unique opportunity to expedite relief.²⁴

In the Netherlands, the House of Commons urged the United Kingdom government to take steps with the UN in conjunction with other friendly governments to seek ways of bringing the civil war to an end. Mr. Berkhouwer of Liberal Party asked the Netherland Foreign Minister whether it was justified to make an effort whether or not within the scope indicated above, to apply the UN Convention of 9 December 1948 regarding genocide to

22 Secret: Draft Minute of the 354th Meeting of the Council of Western European Union Held at the Ministerial Level on 21 and 22 October 1968 in Rome, No. CR (68)19 Part 1, 26 October 1968. Nigerian-Biafran Question, 56-67, FCO, 65/240, TNA.

23 Confidential: Additional Note on Proposed Italian Initiative in the United Nations Prepared for the Western European Union Ministerial Meeting Luxembourg 6 -7 February 1969, FCO, 65/240, TNA.

24 Speech by Senator Charles E. Goodwell For the Hearings of the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Regarding Nigerian Civil War Relief Problems, July 15 1969, File No. JWN 3/304/1/Part C/ 368/Part C/ West African Dept/Nigeria: Political Affairs, Bilateral, External, United States Activities in the Nigerian Civil War, 1 January 1968-31 December 1969, FCO, 65/258, TNA.

appeal to competent UN bodies to put a stop to acts of genocide going on in Biafra.²⁵ According to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs J.M. A.H. Luns "public opinion in the Netherlands was deeply disturbed about the situation in Nigeria and especially its humanitarian aspects."²⁶

Ahead of a Foreign Affairs debate in the British House of Commons on 8 and 9 December 1969 a substantial number of British Parliamentarians signed an early day motion urging Her Majesty's Government to press through the UN Security Council for an immediate and total arms embargo on arms supply to Nigeria and Biafra.²⁷

Gabon and Ivory Coast being among the two major countries in Africa that recognized Biafra strongly clamoured for a UN initiative in the civil war. In their respective speeches delivered at the UN General Assembly session held in December 1969, the delegates of the two nations disagreed with the UN approach to the problems of decolonization and conflicts in Africa particularly the Nigerian-Biafran War. The UN had adopted in the conflict, wrong approaches of soft condemnations and passionate speeches, instead of patience to sought peaceful formulas acceptable to both sides of the conflict.²⁸

Both countries were highly critical of the UN general apathy to the Nigerian-Biafran situation. According to the Ivorian Foreign Minister and delegate to the UN, Arsene Usher, "to protest against this attitude which was unworthy of African humanism, the Ivory Coast had decided to abstain in any resolution dealing with these problems until an end was put to this shameful internecine war."²⁹

By calling for a new strategy to bring about change which would make it easier for other Member-States of the UN reach an understanding with them the Gabonese Foreign Minister and delegate to the UN, Ayune, said, "thus, until we mobilize our minds to put together this new strategy, Gabon would not participate in any vote on resolutions presented during the session of the General Assembly concerning these problems." Ivory Coast and Gabon had intended to use their votes as a protest against the refusal of the UN to deal with the Nigerian-Biafran problem.³⁰ The statement by the pro-Biafran African

25 Questions Asked by Mr. Berkhouwer of Liberal Party Concerning the Civil War in Nigeria Submitted on 14 July 1969 from the British Embassy in The Hague to the West African Department of Foreign Office, 13 August 196 File No. JWN 3/340/1/Part A/5A/368/ Nigeria: Netherlands Attitude towards the Nigerian Civil War, 1 January 1968-31 December 1969, FCO, 65/279, TNA.

26 Secret: Draft Minutes of the 361st Meeting of the Council of WEU at Ministerial Level on 6 and 7 February 1969 in Luxemburg, CR (69) 3, FCO, 65/241, TNA.

27 Confidential: Minute on Foreign Affairs debate in the British House of Commons from Foreign Office to Lagos, 8 and 9 December 1969, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

28 Confidential: Minute on Gabonese and Ivory Coast Speech at the UN General Assembly Session in December 1969 from A.S. Papadopoulos of the UN Department in the Foreign Office to John Wilson the Head of West African Department, 10 December 1969, File No. PRG 447/1/Information Research Dept./Nigeria: Information, British Information Research Department Work on Gabonese Attitude towards the Nigerian Civil War, 1 January 1968-31 December 1969, FCO, 95/617, TNA.

29 From A.S. Papadopoulos of the UN Department in the Foreign Office to John Wilson the Head of West African Department, 10 December 1969, FCO, 95/617, TNA.

30 From A.S. Papadopoulos of the UN Department in the Foreign Office to John Wilson the Head of West African Department, 10 December 1969, FCO, 95/617, TNA.

countries showed their readiness to flex diplomatic muscle by ensuring that the Nigerian-Biafran question was inscribed as an official item on the agenda of the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Anglo-American Diplomacy and United Nations Initiative

The possibility of raising the Nigerian-Biafran question at the United Nations intensified following the report that the Biafrans were gaining greatly in terms of global public opinion and that much sympathy for the Biafran cause was expressed in Western Europe and Britain, particularly in the House of Parliament and in church circles.³¹

At a meeting with the Danish Ambassador, Munk, in February 1968, the British High Commissioner, Sir David Hunt, said that he was very uncertain about the idea of an appeal in the United Nations General Assembly over the civil war issue. Moreover, the Nigerians had tended to be more enraged about the matter than during the remarks on the need for international mediation in the conflict made at the UN General Assembly meeting by Ghanaian and Gambian delegates in 1967.³²

On 6 August 1968 a meeting at the British Foreign Office was organized to look at the implications of the Nigerian Civil War being taken to the UN. It was considered that if the OAU mediatory effort in the conflict broke down, the matter could be raised in the Security Council. This might be done by a European country or an African nation that recognized Biafra.³³

Evidence suggested that Zambia had thought of doing so, much sooner than later. However, items to be presented could either be the request for a meeting or draft resolution specifically calling for a ceasefire and the use of the good offices of the UN Secretary-General for diplomatic action, the cutting off of arms supplies, international relief measures and possible appointment of a UN Observer Force. A call for a referendum in the minority areas of Biafra might follow later.³⁴

The British officials stated the importance of Britain's unalloyed support for the Nigerian government who they perceived would be deeply offended if her dispute with Biafra had to be brought before the UN Security Council. While Britain did not officially recognize the independence of the Republic of Biafra, it regarded the civil war as an internal affair and opposed its official inscription on the agenda of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. However, if there was a simple call for a ceasefire and peaceful settlement at the UN which also included humanitarian issues it would be difficult for Britain to resist support of such diplomatic move. Hence, the appropriate thing to do in such a scenario

31 Confidential: Note of Record between the British High Commissioner in Lagos Sir David Hunt and Danish Ambassador Munk from the British High Commission to Foreign Office, 23 February 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

32 From the British High Commission to Foreign Office, 23 February 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

33 Confidential: Note of a Meeting of British Officials at the Foreign Office on the Inscription and Discussion of the Nigerian Civil War at the UN, 6 August 1969, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

34 From Foreign Office to Lagos, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

was to advise the Nigerian government to accept the discussion of the conflict at the UN as a way of reducing public criticisms against them.³⁵

Meanwhile, there were public debates in the United States on why the Nigerian conflict could not be submitted to the UN and why the US should not support such a diplomatic initiative. It was discovered that, the US officials discussed the problem with the UN Secretary-General who exhorted parties to the conflict to negotiate their differences. According to the US official view:

Although, the referral of the Nigerian problem to the UN was superficially attractive, there exist very serious problems in attempting to engage the UN in the war. More direct involvement required a Security Council or General Assembly action. As noted by US Under-Secretary Richardson before Edward Kennedy Sub-Committee on 15th July 1969 the UN had been unable to take up this problem because strong African opposition had precluded its introduction before the Security Council or General Assembly.³⁶

Earlier consultations with the small number of key UN member-states convinced the US that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain nine votes necessary to inscribe the Nigerian item on the Security Council agenda. The diplomatic resistance of the Federal Government of Nigeria, United Kingdom, and the OAU had inhibited most other UN members from urging UN diplomatic action in the war. Many felt that Western-inspired UN involvement would be viewed by African countries as neo-colonialism.³⁷

A UN debate of the issue had the potential to be uncooperative and divisive; it could aggravate tensions and hinder progress towards a peaceful reconciliation of the conflict. A further problem was the Soviet Union's attempt to exploit the situation by posing as Nigeria's champion and supporter of preponderant African opinion against "neocolonialists" including Portugal and South Africa.³⁸

However, the US through its Mission at the UN broached the idea of allowing only the humanitarian aspects of the war to be inscribed as an official item on the agenda of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The idea was to send a letter to the Secretary-General asking that should in case no agreement on Biafra relief was reached in Addis Ababa the US would implement the diplomatic initiative at the UN without waiting for the outcome of further discussion at the OAU meeting in Algiers. The move towards the

35 Confidential: Note of a Meeting of British Officials at the Foreign Office on the Inscription and Discussion of the Nigerian Civil War at the UN, 6 August 1969, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

36 Confidential: US Telegram on UN and the Nigerian Problem from the American Embassy in Lagos to British High Commission in Lagos and all American Diplomatic Posts in Africa and Europe/DE: RUENC/1334582210703/ZNY/CCCC/ZZH/POL1/11482/9 August 1969, FCO, 65/244, TNA.

37 Confidential: US Telegram on UN and the Nigerian Problem from the American Embassy in Lagos to British High Commission in Lagos and all American Diplomatic Posts in Africa and Europe/DE: RUENC/1334582210703/ZNY/CCCC/ZZH/POL1/11482/9 August 1969, FCO, 65/244, TNA.

38 Confidential: US Telegram on UN and the Nigerian Problem from the American Embassy in Lagos to British High Commission in Lagos and all American Diplomatic Posts in Africa and Europe/DE: RUENC/1334582210703/ZNY/CCCC/ZZH/POL1/11482/9 August 1969, FCO, 65/244, TNA.

inscription of a new item on the UN agenda by the US administration was only intended to counteract its critics who complained about the US slow response to the war.³⁹

In a message to the British Foreign Office on 8 September 1968 the UK Mission in New York warned that if the Biafran issue was raised at all on the platform of the UN it might be difficult or impossible to exclude political issues altogether. It suggested the need for Britain to concentrate only on the humanitarian aspect of the conflict and favour reference to the General Assembly rather than the Security Council. The US with a good deal of support from Europeans particularly the Scandinavians and Austria had made some form of diplomatic moves to take an initiative of the kind.⁴⁰

The British Ambassador to the US, Sir Patrick Dean, reminded the Foreign Office that although the US States Department informed him that the decision of the US Mission in New York was not based on specific instructions from Washington, it only reflected the concern of the State Department. One of the questions frequently asked by the critics of the US administration was “why is the US government not doing anything about the civil war at the UN?” The State Department thought that a debate in the General Assembly, with attendant publicity, might help to educate the US public about the issues involved in the civil war and thereby make them more resistant to Biafra’s propaganda.⁴¹

The official response of the British Foreign Office was that the General Assembly could hardly be dissuaded from discussing the political component of the conflict once it began talking about the problem of relief. It doubted whether a UN debate on relief would lead to more effective action than the one being undertaken under the aegis of the International Committee of Red Cross with the attendant support of the UN agencies as arranged by U-Thant.⁴²

Western-backed UN initiative at a time when the Africans were actively discussing the Nigerian problem was an affront to the OAU peace efforts. Thus, it was a mistake to take a separate initiative before it was clear what more the Africans could achieve themselves. If the dangers of inscription were to be accepted, London should at least have a clear idea of what Americans wanted and expected to achieve either in the General Assembly or the Security Council.⁴³ According to the British Foreign Office:

There exist common ground between Britain and the US that the internationalization of the Nigerian Civil War could only work out to the Biafrans’ advantage and thereby defer a settlement based on Nigerian unity which they had always supported. Indeed,

39 Confidential: Minute on the Conversation between the UK Representative at the UN Lord Caradon and US Representative at the UN George Ball and Danish Representative at the UN Borch from UK Mission in New York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 September 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

40 From UK Mission in New York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 September 1968, FCO, 38.229, TNA.

41 From UK Mission in New York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 September 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

42 From Foreign Office to UK Mission in New York, 10 September 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

43 From Foreign Office to UK Mission in New York, 10 September 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

British policy in Nigeria would be put under severe strain by public discussion of the political issues of the war at the UN. The only beneficiary would be the Soviet Union for they have no public opinion to worry about in their support to Nigerian territorial integrity whilst Western powers had incurred strong Nigerian resentment for interfering in the internal affairs of the country. Based on the above reasons, the British government earnestly hoped that the US would not pursue the proposed diplomatic action.⁴⁴

British diplomats believed that a UN action in the civil war were very remote. Reference to the General Assembly could be counter-productive unless it was handled very carefully. Both as to timing and a substance they would be seriously perturbed if Britain and Americans got out of step over an initiative. Even if the action in the UN could be limited to relief measures, they were not clear what objective would be achieved⁴⁵. Despite appeals and protests addressed to the world body, it jettisoned the political component of the civil war and limited its role strictly on humanitarianism.⁴⁶

Giving the great powers' influence on its affairs during the 1960s, the UN was powerless to take appropriate diplomatic action in the fighting. Hence, it chose to maintain the status quo to the dictate of the external actors that had huge political and economic interests in Nigeria.

Conclusion

Mounting pressure from the international public opinion prompted the campaign to debate the Nigerian-Biafran conflict at the UN. The strong opposition of Nigeria, United Kingdom and some African nations inhibited a UN diplomatic action in the war with the perception that Western-inspired UN involvement would be viewed by African countries as neo-colonialism which posed a serious problem to the OAU peace efforts. The Anglo-American position on the matter was that the war was an internal affair under the control of the OAU. The OAU through its Consultative Committee was already actively engaged in seeking a solution to the civil war. Hence, a UN initiative implied receipt of the global disposition of the conflict that strengthens the Biafran cause and weakens settlement on the basis of Nigerian unity. It was the Anglo-American desire that the settlement of the dispute should be left in the hands of African hands, but to make this argument more convincing it was necessary to demonstrate that the OAU was actively engaged in peace negotiations.

The urge for an official debate of the civil war proved futile because of the diplomatic manoeuvrings within the Security Council and General Assembly premised on the calculation that there existed tendency of discussions over-flowing on to the political aspects of the dispute, thus, endanger Anglo-American interests. Majority of the Members

44 From Foreign Office to UK Mission in New York, 10 September 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

45 From Foreign Office to UK Mission in New York, 10 September 1968, FCO, 38/229, TNA.

46 Note for the Secretary-General from René de Branché, RideB/ksn/CR. 13/11/64, 3rd June, 1969, United Nations Archives New York.

of the Security Council and the General Assembly were against raising the matter unless the Nigerian government itself agreed-which was seen as most unlikely. An attempt to force the issue on the UN had tended to create confrontational attitudes and caused further divisions without producing tangible results. The UN exhibited strong apathy to the Nigerian-Biafran situation having adopted the approach of soft condemnations and passionate speeches to the conflict rather than inestimable patience to sought formulas useful for effective resolution of the war. The complexity of the conflict led to the incapacitation of the UN just like the OAU to act politically and diplomatically in the war. The diplomatic siege laid against the call for official UN debate of the fighting was equally part of the strategy towards exasperating the efforts of many Western countries that indicated interests to recognize the Republic of Biafra. Some of these nations wanted to take the high ground over the discussion of the war to voice their official support and recognition for Biafra. But that never happened because of Anglo-American influence within the UN Security Council and General Assembly. They wielded too much control on the UN and took a firm stance against allowing the civil war issue to be officially discussed, as a means of protecting their economic and political interests in Nigeria.

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Approaching East Asia: the EU's Foreign Policy towards China and Japan

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Abstract: Why is the East Asia region so important for the European Union? What are its interests and what challenges does it face? How it approaches its main strategic partners in the region, the People's Republic of China and Japan? The current paper is trying to answer these questions providing an analysis of the foreign policy of the EU in the region as it has formed throughout the last decade. It focuses mainly on a brief review of the literature and the research progress which has been accomplished so far with the purpose of identifying new challenges, weaknesses and factors that need to be included in future research. In the first part, there will be an effort to describe the interests, priorities and challenges of the Union. In the second part, there will be an analysis and description of the EU foreign policy towards its two major partners in East Asia, highlighting the main elements of their bilateral relationships. Lastly, there will be an effort to provide the future trends and possible actions to be taken by the EU, in order to further consolidate its presence in the area via a multifaceted strategy as presented at the EU Global Strategy of 2016.

Keywords: European Union, China, Japan, International Relations, Diplomacy, Foreign Policy.

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Introduction

The engagement in East Asia is undoubtedly of paramount importance for the European prosperity and interests. It is also true that the Asia-Pacific region was not always a priority area for the external relations of the EU.¹ The Union was mainly focusing on their bilateral relationship with the US, Russia and its neighbors in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the majority of its strategic partnerships are formed with countries located in the Asia/Asia Pacific region, including two of the world's biggest economies, the People's Republic of China and Japan.²

The EU Global Strategy, adopted in June 2016, seems to fully acknowledge the importance of it. It declares the need for a "direct connection between EU and Asia" and especially with major players in East and South East Asia which "expect the European Union to play a major role, including as a global security provider" other than being a simple economic actor.³ Nonetheless, the EU began to take action towards cooperation in

1 Takako Ueta, "EU Policy toward Asia and the Pacific: A View from Japan," Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 15, (March 2013): 1, <https://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications>.

2 Ibid, 1-2.

3 "A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", European Union External

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East Asia long before the adoption of the Global Strategy. Since 1994, when the ASEAN Regional Forum was established with the Union as a founding member, more agreements took place in order to consolidate the European Union's presence in East and South East Asia. These include among others, the adoption of the "Europe-Asia Strategy" in 2001 and more importantly, regarding the sub region under discussion on this paper, the adoption of an EU policy in East Asia in 2012.⁴

It is also beyond question that the EU has significant interests in the region and numerous challenges to confront as well. As a result, the top priority of the EU was always to preserve and protect its economic interests through a soft, preventive and mainly economic diplomacy, with the main objectives to be the economic expansion and development of the Union, the maintenance of freedom of navigation, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), conflict resolution and dealing with security threats such as piracy and terrorism.⁵ However, in order for the Union to pursue its interests in the region, current policies are not enough. At the very moment, the perception of the EU by numerous countries in the Asia Pacific, including its strategic partners, is of an EU incapable of demonstrating "hard" power in the region. The geographic limitations, the unwillingness of the EU member states to acquire a common stance towards the EU's foreign policy goals and the absence of military presence in East Asia are some of the reasons the Union is only perceived as a huge economic actor but as a negligible political one. This is also the main reason that the EU is still not participating in the East Asia Summits, the primary strategic and security forum in the region. Asian countries are not relying to the EU for their security and they seem to have different approaches towards international relations. The EU is advocating "soft power" approaches where countries in the region are holding a more realistic "hard power" approach especially regarding the expansionism of China in recent years. The EU, as mentioned in the Global Strategy of 2016, need to demonstrate a new strategic profile and be considered a strong, considerable, political and security actor in the area, shifting its priorities towards East Asia and the Indo Pacific.⁶

Deepening security and economic cooperation with its partners in East Asia is a strong prerequisite for the above objectives to be accomplished. In order for this accomplishment to take place, the way EU approaches and engages with China and Japan, the two biggest economies of the region and strategic partners of the Union, is pivotal. The purpose of the current paper is to highlight these objectives, interests and challenges the EU faces, trying to implement its foreign policy in East Asia. More specifically, the current paper will focus on the bilateral relationship of the EU with China and Japan. It will be an effort by

Action Service, last modified June 28, 2016, 3, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

4 Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and the World: Players and Policies post-Lisbon," *EU Institute for Security Studies* 1, no. 1, (2016): 140.

5 Ueta, "EU policy," 6-7.

6 European Union External Action Service, "A Global Strategy," 8-9.

the author to demonstrate the current strengths and weaknesses of these two relationships, responding to the questions of why are so important for the EU, how the latter approaches them and what are the challenges that need to be surmounted. In the conclusion part, the findings of the research will be briefly demonstrated, along with possible trends and actions the Union should follow in the future so as to further consolidate its presence in the region.

EU Interests and Priorities

The East Asia region is of paramount importance to the EU's core interests. This has been highlighted during both the "Guidelines on the EU's foreign and security policy in East Asia" of 2012, as also at the EU Global Strategy of 2016. All the previous years there have been numerous policy papers issued by the EU Commission and the Council regarding the EU Strategy in Asia, giving extreme importance at the sub region under discussion as the "home of some of the world's largest and fastest growing economies."⁷

Thus, the EU is highly dependent on Asia due to its importance in the global trade. The whole region accounts for 35% of EU exports (618 billion Euros) and 45% of EU imports (774 billion Euros) according to the Commission's Joint Communication of September 2018. More specifically on the East Asia region, the EU is maintaining four out of its ten Strategic Partnerships with China, Japan, South Korea and India. In economic terms and regarding the amount of bilateral trade conducted each year, China is the 2nd largest trading partner after the US; the ASEAN members collectively constitute the 3rd one; while Japan and South Korea are among its top 10 larger trading partners worldwide.⁸

EU is in the mean time a major provider of foreign direct investment (FDIs) in respective countries of the region, such as China and South Korea, accompanying the investments with a strong advancement in interpersonal contacts and especially the tourist sector. For instance, more than 4 million Chinese tourists in 2011 have visited the European Union with their numbers augmenting each year contributing vastly to the overall European budget.⁹ Strong financial links between East Asia and the EU market and businesses are also created through the free trade agreements (FTAs) that are being negotiated or are in place. Significant commercial opportunities have been advanced through them with the examples of the FTAs with Japan and Singapore being in place since 2019 and South Korea in 2015, being also the largest investor of the latter since 1962.¹⁰

7 "Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia", Council of the European Union, accessed April 12, 2020, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf.

8 David Kang, "China, Hegemony, and Leadership in East Asia," in *Responding to China's Rise: US and EU Strategies*, ed. Vinod Aggarwal and Sara Newland (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 28.

9 Ibid, 30.

10 Maria Garcia, "Fears and Strategies: The European Union, China and their Free Trade Agreements in East Asia," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 6, no. 4 (2010): 498.

The East Asia region is conjointly a large market of military technology and arms sales for the EU states. Throughout the last decade the military expenditures of the countries located in the Asia Pacific have augmented by 5% and during the period of 2007 to 2017 the numbers have risen by 47% regarding the Southeast Asian countries.¹¹ The region has become a central market for the EU arms producers, exporting vast amounts of military hardware including transfer of technology agreements as well. Such examples of the EU involvement in the region are the technological transfers to China; the military equipment provided to all domains to South Korea since 1980 by implementing the EU-South Korea Framework Partnership Agreement; new arms trade with Japan after the alteration of its respective policies since 2014.¹²

In addition to the above, the South and East China Seas are of huge geopolitical importance as they constitute international transport corridors and important Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Approximately 60% of global shipping by volume takes place in the area including more than the ¼ of the EU international trade especially crossing through significant “choke points” such as the Straits of Malacca and Taiwan.¹³ As a result, protecting these transport corridors equals the protection of the EU trade, the European Markets and provides safety of investments in the area. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of the SLOCs and the possibility of a conflict in the aforementioned maritime areas, due to the expansion of the Chinese claims, have raised security concerns between the EU member States. A possible Chinese militarization and interruption of the freedom of navigation in the area under could provoke heavy damages to the European markets as well as huge trade deficits jeopardizing the EU investments in the region.¹⁴

Of course, the economic interests of the EU as briefly presented above, are in strong alignment with its ambitions of becoming a strong security and political actor in the region and subsequently a global one. Fostering and enhancing the security cooperation with its partners in East Asia have been highlighted thoroughly in the EU Global Strategy of the 2016. In practice, the EU political engagement includes the conduction of dialogues with its regional counterpartners, both formally and informally and in bilateral and multilateral fora.¹⁵ These include several actions taken such as the bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreements which have been signed with several countries of interest as mentioned before; a stronger engagement at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in which the EU was a founded member in 1994; the further commitment in the Europe- Asia Meeting (ASEM) processes, a formal forum assembling the ASEAN members along with China,

11 Felix Heiduk, “European arms exports and the South China Sea conflict,” in *Guns, Engines and Turbines: the EU’s Hard Power in Asia*, ed. Eva Pejsova (Belgium: Bietlot Press, 2018), 15-23.

12 Heiduk, “European arms,” 22.

13 Missiroli, “The EU and the World,” 140.

14 Nicola Casarini, “Visions of North-East Asia: China, Japan, Korea and the EU,” EU Institute for Security Studies, June 20, 2014, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/visions-north-east-asia-%E2%80%93-china-japan-korea-and-eu>.

15 Missiroli, “The EU and the World,” 142.

Japan, South Korea and its European counterparts. More specifically, the EU has expanded its engagement in the ARF, the only formal security forum including 27 states, by providing the region with its expertise in crisis management, humanitarian relief and other agendas including cyber and maritime security.¹⁶

The EU also participates in the multilateral security dialogues and activities of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, as well as in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012, aiming at promoting peace and cooperation in South East and North East Asia. These actions were an effort of the EU to counterbalance its absence of military presence in the region.¹⁷ The latter has always been a severe disadvantage of the EU in order to establish its presence as a security actor in the region. Specifically, the only EU member with operational military presence in the region is France, a fact that cannot be perceived as a collective EU engagement in military and strategic terms.¹⁸ At the same rational, the most recent EU involvement was in the South Korea's framework of the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), aiming at cooperation at the fields of energy, environment, disaster management and trust building.¹⁹

All the above measures can be considered EU efforts in order to actively be involved in regional security issues and safeguard its interests especially in East Asia. With the above engagement in multilateral security fora, the main objective is to counter traditional and nontraditional security threats, such as piracy, terrorism and radicalization, illegal human and drugs trafficking and other disasters. Its foreign policy also focuses on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the North Korean security threat as well as the maritime challenges and territorial disputes in East and South East China Seas in order to achieve stability, development and stable markets and investments in the region.²⁰

The EU approach towards China

The EU-China bilateral relationship is continuously growing through the years and since their official establishment in 1975. As stated at the Joint Communication of 2019 regarding the strategic outlook of China, the two partners are “linked by an enduring relationship” being “two of the three largest economies and traders in the world.”²¹ China

16 Ibid, 146.

17 Nicola Casarini, “Security developments in East Asia: what implications for the EU,” EU Institute for Security Studies, February 15, 2011, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/security-developments-east-asia-what-implications-eu>.

18 Ibid.

19 Michael Reiterer, “The European Union in the Asia-Pacific: strategic reflections,” in the *The European Union in the Asia-Pacific: Rethinking Europe's Strategies and Policies*, ed. Weiqing Song and Jianwei Wang (Manchester: University Press, 2019), 15-56.

20 Mercy Kuo, “What the EU Thinks of the US ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy,” *The Diplomat*, January 31, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/what-the-eu-thinks-of-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy>.

21 “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook,” Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, last modified March 12, 2019, 2, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf>.

is also referred to the document as a “key global actor” and a “strategic partner.”²² The cornerstone of the relationship can be considered to be the EU Strategy on China of 2016 which clears the objectives and challenges towards the latter, and develops a strategic concept for the future. As it is declared within it, the EU shall focus on strengthening its relationship with China, “involve in its reform process,” promote “fair conditions of competition” and “respect for the rule of law and human rights.”²³ As it is obvious, the EU is trying to conceptualize the relationship with its East Asian partner through a multifaceted approach.

Nevertheless, the above framework is not the only one addressing the EU-Chinese relationship. Since the EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 1985, many initiatives have taken place fostering the latter. These include for instance: the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership announced in 2003, aiming at addressing pressing security and economic issues, political affairs and people to people exchanges; the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (2013); the EU’s China Strategy Paper in 2016; and the Bilateral Investment Agreement of 2013 along with the initiation of the High Level People to People Dialogue (in 2012).²⁴ The purpose of the above initiatives was mainly the further engagement of the two partners in the areas of economic cooperation (including bilateral trade, direct investments, technological innovation and connectivity) as well as political and security issues, including the non proliferation of Nuclear weapons in North Korea, “effective multilateralism”, human rights and “upholding the rules based international order.”²⁵ Even if the cooperation and certain goals have been achieved and the economic relations have grown rapidly, challenges still exist both in economic and political aspect.

Regarding the economic relationship, the interdependence between the two partners is rather obvious. As presented by the quantitative analysis of their trade relations by Jitaru and Popescu (2017), there appears to be a very strong link between EU-China imports, exports, trade and investment and the total EU GDP.²⁶ As it is also stated together they are accountable for the one third of the World GDP, more than the one fourth of the world’s population, being also accountable for “more than two fifths of the global exports and imports.”²⁷ Thus, the EU-China agreements on pivotal economic sectors have created a large volume of trade and interdependence between the two partners. Providing the latest

22 Ibid, 1.

23 “Elements for a new EU Strategy on China,” Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, last modified June 22, 2016, 3, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf.

24 Ueta, “EU policy,” 10.

25 Joint Communication, “A Strategic Outlook,” 3.

26 Loredana Jitaru and Lorenta Florentina Popescu, “Economic relations EU-China - the mechanism that the European Union outlines the position of the economic actor,” *Centre for European Studies* 9, no. 3 (October 2017): 263, <https://ideas.repec.org/a/jes/wpaper/y2017v9i3p255-271.html>.

27 Ibid, 257.

figures, China is currently the EU's second largest trading partner, ranking 1st as an EU partner regarding the volume of imports, with a total trade value of 560 billion Euros in 2019.²⁸

In addition to the above, since 2013, the EU and China have launched negotiations regarding a bilateral investment agreement, which ideally will enhance and rebalance their relationship by lifting market access barriers to EU, clarifying a set of unified investment rules extending the cooperation to new areas. These include green economy, knowledge transfer, advanced technologies as well as standards, innovation and connectivity mainly via the Investment Plan for Europe and the EU-China Connectivity Platform.²⁹ To further pinpoint the importance of the economic relationship, since 2012 the EU has been the number one destination for Chinese foreign direct investment (FDIs), leading to more mutual investments that are vastly growing.³⁰

Meanwhile, the EU faces some severe challenges as also mentioned before. In the economic section of the relationship, there appears to be severe burdens regarding several issues. First of all, there is a vastly unbalanced trade. There is a growing trade deficit with the latest figures showing a difference of 163, 5 billion Euros in 2019 between the respective imports and exports.³¹ Secondly, the Chinese investment practices are accused of not being transparent, including "financial dumping practices and violations of the WTO's regulations."³² Other impediments to the business opportunities in China that damage the mutual economic development are bureaucratic constraints and different existing regulations between the EU and China regarding mainly the intellectual property rights and cash subsidies to the Chinese companies.³³

In addition to the above, the political and security challenges arose as China became a global actor. Even if they do not perceive each other as a security threat and the EU follows the "One China Policy" aligning with Beijing, it also calls on the latter to respect the rule of law and the international rules. The accusations of human rights abuses, environmental issues and territorial disputes are of great concern for the EU and they constitute severe impediments at their relationship, creating limitations at expanding the cooperation between them. As a result, the two partners seem to be divided over political values, perceptions of the International Law and the aggressive behavior of China towards its neighbors.³⁴ The EU arms embargo that is maintained since the Tiananmen violent repression of 1989 is also a burden until now.

Regarding the territorial disputes, the EU is more than worried regarding their evolution

28 "European Union, trade in goods with China," European Commission, accessed April 22, 2020, 1, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_china_en.pdf.

29 Missiroli, "The EU and the World," 162.

30 Jitaru and Popescul, "Economic Relations," 261.

31 European Commission, "Trade in goods with China," 3.

32 Jitaru and Popescul, "Economic Relations," 257.

33 Ibid, 262.

34 Missiroli, "The EU and the World," 162.

in the future. Possessing significant shipping/trade and investment interests in the South and East China Sea, where territorial disputes take place between China and Southeast Asian states in the first one and Japan in the latter, the EU is mainly dealing with China through declarations in order to ensure freedom of navigation in the maritime area. In addition, the constant conflict between PRC and Taiwan, endanger the economic interests of the EU in the Asia Pacific, where the latter represents also one of the largest trading partners of the EU with significant ties established.³⁵ As a result, high tensions in the disputed areas triggered by the Chinese claims, could lead to financial losses of the EU industries and markets. The militarization of the South China Sea, the artificial islands building, the denial of the ICJ's arbitration regarding the case against Philippines are some of the security and political issues that the EU needs to take into consideration when approaching China.³⁶

Lastly, it must be noted that creating a common EU Strategy towards China is also a problem by itself. There is no doubt that there is a lack of unity in the way EU member states approach China. Each one of them has its own individual policy and bilateral agreements with the latter according to their countries' interests.³⁷ Therefore, the approach towards Beijing and its political values differ as well between member states. In general, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU members shall promote its core values in its external relations: democracy, rule of law and human rights. Nevertheless, member states approach the political ideology or human right violations of Beijing differently. In some countries such as Hungaria, Romania, Portugal or Greece, where Chinese investments in sensitive economic sectors have taken place, their overall stance towards the different political values of China remain passive or sometimes even counteractive. Other countries on the other hand, such as Germany or Sweden, have vocally expressed their concerns and they are creating cooperative projects in China in order to promote and strengthen western values.³⁸

Because of the above fragmentation the EU Commission's Joint Communication regarding China is highlighting the need for the EU members to "ensure consistency with EU law and policies" when dealing with China and that "neither the EU nor any of its Member States can effectively achieve their aims with China without full unity."³⁹ The European Commission's approach of course is correct and the matter is crucial. Beijing, even without any conscious effort, can proceed to "divide and rule" tactics thanks to the

35 Alex Berkofsky, "The EU's Relations with China, Japan and North Korea: Implications for the EU's Role and Engagement in Asian Security," in the *Perspectives for a European Security Strategy towards Asia*, ed. Gustaaf Geeraerts and Eva Gross (Brussels: VUB Press, 2011), 130.

36 Kang, "China, Hegemony, and Leadership in East Asia," 32.

37 Jitaru and Popescu, "Economic Relations," 262.

38 Björn Jerdén and Tim Rühlig, "Europe's Divided Approach to China and Human Rights," *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/europes-divided-approach-to-china-and-human-rights/>

39 Joint Communication, "A Strategic Outlook," 2.

huge range of the bilateral agreements between it and the member states, undermining the EU's negotiation efforts and its position as a global actor.⁴⁰

The EU-Japan relationship

The bilateral relationship between the two actors is becoming more profound through the years as Japan is historically the most reliable partner of the EU. Both parties perceive each other as advocates of democracy and human rights, using diplomacy and soft power in order to settle their differences.⁴¹ In general, the bilateral relationship is well established in both political and economic terms. Since the establishment of the EU delegation in Tokyo in 1974, the first ministerial meeting in 1984 and the Hague Declaration of 1991 which initiated the official cooperation in the areas of economy, security and political issues, the relationship is advancing rapidly.⁴² The "Action Plan for the EU-Japan Cooperation" took place almost a decade after the Hague Declaration in order to further promote collaboration in peace and security and cultural exchange, as well as the Economic and Trade Partnership and the announcement of Japan as a strategic partner of the EU.⁴³

Besides the Treaties signed since then, with the most important recent signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2018, the two partners are extremely important to each other in economic terms. For the EU, Japan was ranked 6th (in 2019) as a trade partner with a total trade volume worth 123,9 billion Euros with a relatively fair balance between imports (62,8 billion) and exports (61,1 billion).⁴⁴ For Japan the trade relationship is also of paramount importance since the EU is Japan's third largest destination of its exports after US and China, mainly in machinery and transport equipment.⁴⁵ The most recent trade agreement between the two partners which entered into force in February 2019, known as the Economic Partnership Agreement, advanced the economic relationship even further. The aforementioned Agreement removed "tariffs and other trade barriers...in order to prevent obstacles to trade", "saving European companies 1 billion euro in duties every year."⁴⁶ It is true that this advancement in the trade relationship is crucial for the future of both partners as it removes tariff barriers and custom duties allowing the bilateral trade to get boosted by approximately 36 billion euro the following years.⁴⁷ Lastly, the two

40 Michael Smith, "EU-China relations and the limits of economic diplomacy," *Asia European Journal* 12, no.1 (January 2014): 41, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-014-0374-x>.

41 Jérôme Legrand, "EU-Japan cooperation on global and regional security - a litmus test for the EU's role as a global player?" *European Parliament*, (June 2018): 5, <https://doi:10.2861/86451>.

42 Ueta, "EU policy," 8-9.

43 Ibid, 9.

44 "European Union, Trade in goods with Japan," European Commission, accessed April 22, 2020, 2, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_japan_en.pdf.

45 "Japan exports to European Union," Trading Economics, accessed April 22, 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/exports-to-european-union>.

46 "EU-Japan trade agreement enters into force," Press Release, European Commission, last modified January 31, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_785.

47 Ibid.

partners have advanced their cooperation in providing Official Development Assistance (ODA). Together as official donors, they accounted for about 60% of the total assistance in 2016.⁴⁸

In political and security terms the bilateral relationship is also advancing. Aligning with Japan, the EU is against the proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction and maintains pressure in the North Korea through the UN Security Council's sanctions including assets freezes and entry denials of individuals.⁴⁹ They also complement each other in the security challenges towards China and Russia. The EU holds a more soften approach towards China trying to mitigate the tensions with Japan when in need and the latter does the same regarding Russia with which the EU holds a tougher stance.⁵⁰ This strategic cooperation has of course expanded in other areas as well. For example, the Japanese Self Defence Forces have engaged with the EU in the anti-piracy operation *Atalanta* in 2014 in the Gulf of Aden. They have also engaged together in peacekeeping/building missions under UN mandates, in economic and political projects in Africa, as well as in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵¹ It is also worth noting that the two partners are heavily dependent on their biggest ally, the US, regarding security issues and Japan is also the longest standing partner of NATO, cooperating through formal agreements in the areas of information gathering/sharing, anti-piracy missions, cyber security and disaster relief.⁵²

The EU-Japan political dialogues also include their common challenges and interests in the Asia Pacific. These include the importance of maintaining open and safe the Sea lanes of Communications in East and South China Seas, as they are pivotal for the wealth of both partners; dealing with traditional security threats internationally and regionally, such as terrorism in the Asia Pacific region; advancing cooperation through the economic agreements on energy and food security.⁵³ Similar challenges that characterize both partners such as a rapidly ageing population, natural disasters and cybercrimes have been included as mutual areas of interests in the Strategic Partnership Agreement.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, even if the bilateral relationship seems ideal, challenges exist. It is also true that these challenges are potentially more eager to be resolved or mitigated in contrast with the challenges in the EU-China relationship as mentioned above. The common perception of sharing the same values and the advanced political cooperation,

48 "Aid spending by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in 2016," Factsheet, Development Initiatives, last modified April 12, 2017, <https://devinit.org/publications/aid-spending-by-development-assistance-committee-dac-donors-in-2016>.

49 Legrand, "EU Japan Cooperation," 6.

50 Ibid, 11.

51 Missiroli, "The EU and the World," 165-7; Ibid, 10.

52 Enrico D' Ambrogio, "The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement," European Parliamentary Research Service, *European Parliament*, last modified January 22, 2019, 2, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630323/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)630323_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630323/EPRS_BRI(2018)630323_EN.pdf).

53 Missiroli, "The EU and the World," 166.

54 D' Ambrogio, "The EU-Japan," 2.

elements that the EU has not yet acquired with China, can facilitate any processes to find solutions. The first main challenge though is rather inherent and it is a matter of perception. Japan is not considering the EU a strong political actor that can contribute in security and political issues in the East Asian region. In the dialogues concerning the North Korea's missile program for example, Japan considers the EU more as a facilitator of the process providing venues and logistical support, rather than a true mediator.⁵⁵ This perception and willingness of accepting the EU only as an external economic actor is generally spread in the region and it characterized the Japanese approach as well.⁵⁶

Another challenge to the relationship is the neutrality policy which EU follows regarding territorial disputes in the region.⁵⁷ As a general rule, the EU is calling for respect of the International Law and the UNCLOS since, as mentioned before, safe and open Sea lanes are of paramount importance for the Union. Nevertheless, in an effort to find a balance between its two major economic and strategic partners, China and Japan, the EU has not taken sides in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between the two.⁵⁸ Tokyo has applied pressure to the EU in order to achieve its support in the maritime dispute, nevertheless, the latter stays reluctant and discrete.⁵⁹

In conclusion, the EU policy towards Japan faces some challenges but the bilateral interests are a priority. As mentioned before, EU approaches Japan as an equal developed country, with same values and interests which can lead to a common understanding of the global challenges and opportunities. The economic part of the relationship is more advanced than ever and the political dialogue continues with strong bases. Though, the perception of Japan and other Asian countries towards the EU as a strong economic but anemic strategic and political one is difficult to change. In addition, the discreet and careful diplomacy of the Union in order to maintain a balanced approach towards Japan and China, provoke inherently side effects such as the discomfort of its Japanese partner, nonetheless, they can be overwhelmed.

Conclusion

The EU interests in East Asia, as described in the first part of the paper, are such that an economic interdependence with its partners prevails. The main core interests and strategies the Union must follow for the years to come, have very concretely described, for the first time in such extent, in the EU Global Strategy of 2016. The EU is seeking to protect and maintain its interests through stable and transparent markets and investments, mainly with the two economic giants and Union's Strategic Partners in the Asia Pacific,

55 Legrand, "EU Japan Cooperation," 6.

56 Guy Banim and Eva Pejsova, "Prevention better than cure: the EU's quiet diplomacy in Asia," *EU Institute for Security Studies* 33, no. 1 (May 2017): 4, <https://doi.org/10.2815/288488>.

57 Legrand, "EU Japan Cooperation," 8.

58 Ibid, 8.

59 Missiroli, "The EU and the World," 166-7.

China and Japan. This protection of interests includes cooperation in more aspects other than the economic one as it has been acknowledged by the Union's leadership. Traditional and modern security threats must be addressed as well as challenges of political nature with its two aforementioned partners. Besides the above, the current changes in the global political landscape need to be further researched in order for the EU to participate more effectively in the East Asian affairs. For example, the UK's withdrawal and the effect of Trump administration in the US-China relationship shall be further examined regarding their long term consequences, in order for the EU to better safeguard its interests in the region.

Regarding the People's Republic of China, there is indeed a lot room for improvement. The main challenges are both of economic and political nature as mentioned before. Based at the profound economic cooperation and the excessive dependence of China to foreign investments, including the Belt and Road Initiative that engage EU member states, there is enough space to deal with the problems of the EU-China relationship. However, this would be impossible to happen without unity of the member states. A common strong stance must be achieved in every aspect on the ways to deal with China. In order for that to take place member states must agree to form a clear, common foreign policy as a Union towards China with a common approach towards the political issues of the latter and not holding a divided and diverse stance. This is not the case today but it does not mean that it will never will.

Regarding the bilateral relationship with Japan, even if there no such challenges of political nature as exist with China, such as human rights violations or excessive maritime claims which could halt the improvement of the relationship, still there is the issue of perception. As explained above, Japan do perceive the EU as an economic superpower but far less as a strong political and security actor that could have any influence in the East Asian region. It is true that the EU lacks political and military engagement in the area since the only EU member state with presence in the Asia Pacific is France. Nevertheless, the EU still can utilize its diplomatic leverages, pressure various actors in case of crises, advance cooperation in the defense sector (e.g. in cyber security) and take advantage of the US isolation policy in order to be a more active player in the region.

To sum up, the EU needs to become a stronger power in the East Asia region. Perceptions of the Union being just an economic/trade actor and less of a security/political one need to change in order to be more effective and proactive on safeguarding its interests. It is possible that trends in the near future are that the trade policy and preventive/soft diplomacy will be the main foreign policy tools of the EU in order to deal with the challenges in the region. Nonetheless, the issues regarding the effectiveness and cohesion of its foreign policy and its weakness to be perceived as a multifaceted actor will still exist unless further integration and cooperation between the member states take place. Being a more of a "soft" power at the time being is not of course equal to inactiveness and

ineffectiveness regarding the protections of the Union's interests. But it does appear to have certain limitations in its potential choices and actions that could possibly jeopardize the perseverance of its interests in the future, if a further multifaceted engagement fails to arise.

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Asphatronics: On the Way to the Global Security Theory

*Book Review by Eugene A. Vertlieb**

Book: Igor Fedorovich Kefeli. *Asphatronics: On the Way to the Global Security Theory*. St. Petersburg: The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 2020. 228. ISBN 978-5-89781-676-7.

Abstract: The coronavirus pandemic has thrown the world into chaos and has revealed the unmanageability of the world order. The very existence of humanity itself is threatened. To resolve the deepest systemic crises, new tools, methods, theories, and methodologies are needed — the creation of a new scientific paradigm — to ensure the peaceful coexistence of peoples in the ecosystem of the planet. While security has traditionally been addressed mainly along separate, narrow disciplines, Professor Igor F. Kefeli, in his *Asphatronics: On the Way to the Global Security Theory*, summarizes the challenges and threats to the global security system of the sixth technological order, and, most importantly, provides a theoretical basis for achieving security in the face of *any* manifestation of global danger to humanity. As such, global risks (geopolitical, environmental, economic, social, technological) are countered by applying a kind of “restraining bridle” - a method that reduces them to an acceptable risk level by making use of NBICS (Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno-Socio) convergence, the concrete expression of which are critical technologies. This “taming of the recalcitrant electron” — constrained use of technology applied to global security — is a clear advance in systems science and security, and a step forward from cybernetics to asphatronics.

Keywords: Asphatronics, coronavirus, Igor F. Kefeli, global risks, NBICS, cybernetics.

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Professor Igor Fedorovich Kefeli, in his most recent book, *Asphatronics: On the Way to the Global Security Theory*,¹ deftly summarizes the challenges and threats to the global security system of the sixth technological order, and, most importantly, provides a theoretical basis for achieving security in the face of any manifestation of global danger to humanity.

As the world moves in the direction of a new technological order, there is a critical need to re-examine traditional approaches to global security problems. Dr. Kefeli’s “Asphatronics” calls for moving away from the traditional heavy reliance on international relations and other stove-piped approaches as tools for managing global risks, and asks

1 Kefeli, I. F. *Asphatronics: On the Way to the Global Security Theory* (St. Petersburg: North-Western Institute of Management, Russian Academy of National Economy and State Service under the President of the Russian Federation, 2020). Also rendered in English as *Asphatronics: Toward a Global Security Theory*. (In Russian): Кефели, И. ф. Асфатроники: На пути к теории глобальной безопасности (СПб.: Северо-Западный институт управления РАНХиГС, 2020).

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that we apply the very newest technologies to manage living, social, and technical systems. Cybernetics, viewed broadly, is the study of systems whether they are electrical, social, physical, mechanical, biological, or even psychological. Asphatronics, as an offshoot of cybernetics, aims to make use of NBICS (Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno-Socio) technologies to identify risk patterns in various systems, and to respond by using those technologies to counter the risks. Kefeli defines this generalized summation of global threats and the means for countering them as “asphatronics” — a term formed from Greek ασφάλεια - “security” and ηλεκτρόνιο - “electron” — whereby “electron” refers broadly to “technology.” The “security gene”² — a term also used by Dr. Kefeli in “Asphatronics” — then, might be viewed as a sort of blueprint for the mechanisms that would activate to detect and challenge global threats.

It is a well-known fact that the balance of power among the main geopolitical players is a core criterion both for assessing global security risks and for building practices of international relations. True, strategic parity does assure security, but it is one where parties must look over their shoulder for the inevitable retribution that will follow. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world model narrowed to a monocentric *Pax Americana* model. Now, the coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated the trend of global disorder. The planet is overrun by chaos, and the very existence of humanity itself is under threat. Resolution of this profoundly systemic crisis requires new means, methods, theories and methodologies. It calls for the creation of a new scientific paradigm to ensure peaceful coexistence of peoples within the planet’s ecosystem.

In January 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres compared the threats to the livelihood of Earth’s inhabitants with the Biblical-and-Durean “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse,” the four threats now being geostrategic tensions, climate crisis, global mistrust, and the abuse of technologies (“the dark side of the digital world”). For Professor Kefeli, this “quartered quaternary”³ of the main threats to humanity serves as a semantic counterpoint in his reflections on the creation of a sixth technological order within the global security system. Broadly speaking, asphatronics refers to the comprehensive scientific domain that studies the application of critical technologies as tools for ensuring global security. It can be viewed as an offshoot of cybernetics — the science of communication and control in living organisms as well as social and technical systems of the Anthropocene. “We have reached the point where we need to create a theoretical framework that can underpin security in any and all of its manifestations,”

2 Kefeli, *Asphatronics*, 165. “Security gene” (in Russian, “ген безопасности”) refers to a set of regulatory mechanisms that would activate in response to risk situations just as genes are a set of instructions that determine what the organism is like, its appearance, how it survives, and how it behaves in its environment. (Translation of the original Russian text of this book review was done by D. T. Faleris.)

3 This proprietary term of Dr. Eugene Vertlieb’s is used to express bitter irony over “dismembered” divine design of human realization. The Quaternary is a subdivision of geological time which covers the last 2.6 million years up to the present day.

said the scientist at the presentation of his “Asphatronics” monograph at the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration on June 30, 2020.

Professor Kefeli’s comprehensive work addressing the challenges and counteraction to global threats also summarizes his prior writings that have been published in his journal *Geopolitics and Security*⁴ as well as in other research and academic resources. Global risks (geopolitical, environmental, economic, social, and technological) are, figuratively speaking, functionally “bridled” using methods aimed at reducing them to admissible risk levels. These methods are based on NBICS technology convergence as explicitly expressed in critical technologies. This “Kefeli-ism” of “taming a shrew of an electron” represents progress made by science and security system engineers along the path from cybernetics to asphatronics. It requires making use of converged technologies to manage global risks, all the while containing those technologies to prevent the adverse effects that could arise if they were applied unchecked.

The Eurasian perspective it offers informationally captures the Russian deep cosmism with its humanistic idea at the core: The author advocates anthropocentrism rather than a chip-and-machine-based and artificial intelligence-driven conscience, and promotes cognitive technologies for human beings rather than having humanoids replace them. Cyberneticist Norbert Wiener anticipated the threat of a rapidly rising “psychological level” of machine consciousness, and clearly in Professor Kefeli’s view, this is exactly where it is all going: The human genome structure and the neural depths of the human brain are being assaulted by NBICS technologies. An impending digital dictatorship is rapidly taking shape — one which “hacks” humans, and in so doing, undermines the very essence of their freedom. As futurologist historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Harari suggests, technologies can destroy not only human economy, politics, and philosophy, but human biology — our physical make-up and behavior — as well.⁵

The coming decades, then, will see artificial intelligence and biotechnology providing us with seemingly “divine” abilities to reengineer or even create entirely new forms of life. After four billion years of organic life based on natural selection, we are entering a new era of non-organic life — one which is not created by God’s design. In this new paradigm, decision-making will gradually — and with self-generated, suspect justification — be delegated by humans to algorithms. Professor Kefeli, the scientist, humanist, and the founder of asphatronics, is clearly and loudly sounding the alarm: Steps must be taken to avoid the transformation of human beings into technological artifacts, and mathematics

4 The journal *Geopolitics and Security* was published by the Baltic State Technical University ‘Voenmekh’ Publishing House, St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, the journal was “optimized” to its demise in 2017.

5 Tovah Lazaroff, “The human mind is in danger of being hacked, warns Israeli author Harari,” *The Jerusalem Post*, January 22, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/jpost-tech/how-will-a-technological-arms-race-shape-our-future-614785>.

into predominantly a weapon of mass destruction.

As a follower of Russian philosopher V. S. Stepin, Kefeli is convinced of the practical necessity of “being aware of the bans on some interaction strategies potentially implying catastrophic consequences.”⁶ Our security theorist insists on the necessity of humanistic measurement of the “human dimensionality” of any objects of natural or social being (as encouraged by Stepin), thus re-interpreting Protagoras’ famous thesis: “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.”⁷ “The things that are not” are exactly those explicit and yet unidentified threats, risks, and dangers that require humanistic reflection and “measurement.” Moreover, the very knowledge of the phenomenology of security has been torn into pieces of narrowly-defined, “self-contained independences” and scattered across the theories of international relations (national security or international security, which is often interpreted as global security), life security (personal safety, security of society and state), information security, and the like.

Professor Kefeli’s unique asphatronics system of “electron-based security” reduces all the various fragments of knowledge relating to a global security to a common denominator. It would be quite interesting, in fact, to see the newly discovered Kefeli “security gene” incorporated into the National Security Strategy of Russia, which is now regularly updated,⁸ or into that of the United States, or any other state, for that matter. As cybernetics correlates with the theory of power (“politics in its own sense is the very art of managing and choosing in each case what can and should be done, the science of statesmen”), so does asphatronics with the system of sciences on managing global security processes.

In his book “Asphatronics,” Kefeli weighs the risks associated with the sixth technological era, the industrial revolution 4.0, and natural disasters, the latter being brought about by the depleted potential of positive interconnectedness between humans and the Earth. The planet’s ecosystem responds to this asymmetrically with, for example, a global pestilence in the form of the coronavirus pandemic. Since everything in nature is interconnected, a comprehensive, holistic risk assessment should be organic and exhaustive. To this end, Professor Kefeli addresses the entire range of global security systems in his book. Just as Norbert Wiener generated an impulse for the creation of cybernetics having sensed an analogy between missile guidance systems and motion control processes in the nervous system, Kefeli’s asphatronics encourages the improvement of the alpha and omega of the Russian state’s sovereignty — its national security system. The “hybrid war” claimed by

6 Kefeli, *Asphatronics*, 11.

7 Plato’s dialogue “Protagoras” involves a fictional, yet realistic, conversation between the sophist and Socrates. Another Plato dialogue is named after a young boy named Theaetetus and involves a discussion between him, Socrates, and Theodorus, who was a friend of Protagoras.

8 In fact, it would then be quite fitting to award the author of the idea, Professor Kefeli, for his significant contribution to strengthening the security of the Russian Federation by reinstating him as Editor of the journal *Geopolitics and Security*.

some to be going on between the United States and Russia⁹ is one being further whipped up by fear-mongering the hopelessness of the coronavirus. Extremely alarming is the simultaneous proliferation of conspiracy theories playing upon this hopelessness. For example, one popular — and ungrounded — theory ties the alleged emerging need for total anti-coronavirus control over the population to prevent the spread of the disease with the purported immediate patenting of a chip designed exactly for this purpose by Bill Gates of the “The Good Club.”¹⁰

It is a curious coincidence. At the same time, then, that Gates is purportedly advocating for a questionable application of chip technology and that society is now being controlled by government requirements to wear a mask or alter behavior in other ways, an irreconcilable opposing side — Russia — is relentlessly ranting about “color revolutions”¹¹ and the “rancorous whirlwinds” that are being stirred up everywhere around the world. So then for the Russian state to be secure in the face of these threats, there is, it is claimed, a real need to implement regulatory methods to managing a “stirred-up” society — methods that employ more sophisticated technologies — a symbiosis of cybernetics (“general theory of communication and control in technologies, living organisms and societies”) and synergy (“theory of self-organization”). There is, of course, always a danger that such an approach could be taken too far.

On balance, as concerns the application of newer technologies, without a toolkit synthesized from these “human measurement systems” it would be impossible to model reflective processes, learn the algorithmic essence of a human being, create metamodels, or perform a comprehensive system-integrated wide analysis of “computational algorithms” for controlling the human masses and managing the state. Multi-domain security analytics is in high demand: In October 2020, for example, the Scientific Society of Young Researchers of the National Security Department of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration is slated to hold a meeting titled “Analytical Prototyping of Noospheric Geopolitics: From the Philosophy of A. E. Snesarev to the Ontology of N. F. Fedorov.”

There is no doubt: Professor Kefeli’s research work is current and relevant. It fits extremely well into the entire range of key 21st century security concepts. The book is

9 The crisis over Ukraine has resulted in a hybrid war essentially between Russia and the United States over the issue of the world order. Hybrid warfare refers to the use of unconventional methods as part of a multi-domain warfighting approach aimed at disrupting and disabling an opponent’s actions without engaging in open hostilities.

10 The “Club of Good People” refers to a small global elite of billionaire philanthropists who, in May 2009, met in response to the global economic downturn and numerous health and environmental crises that are plaguing the globe. The meeting was convened by Bill Gates, among others.

11 “Color Revolution” is a term that has been used to describe movements that developed in several countries of the former Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, and the Balkans during the early 2000s. For further information, see, for example, Cordesman, Anthony H., Russia and the “Color Revolution: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, May 28, 2014, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-color-revolution>.”

a useful reference for anyone interested in an updated look at global security. It is well organized, with the first half devoted to a full range of both expected and unforeseen global risks, and the second half exploring an array of global security issues. Interestingly, one chapter is devoted to a discussion of geopolitical concerns surrounding Russia’s “Eurasia Project” — an initiative to create a Greater Eurasia as the framework for promoting various cooperation projects in the region.¹² For these and other reasons, the book deserves to be translated into the major languages of the world, and is worthy of a global response. Security is the only undeniable prerequisite of life for each and every one of us.

12 For further information, see David Lewis, “Strategic Culture and Russia’s ‘Pivot to the East:’ Russia, China, and ‘Greater Eurasia,’” *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*, July 2019 Number 034, <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/strategic-culture-and-russias-pivot-east-russia-china-and-greater-eurasia-0>.

The New Government of Zimbabwe: A Distant Relationship with China?

*Diana Ninoshka Castillo Morales**

Abstract: Given the sanctions imposed by Western countries, the government of Robert Mugabe characterized Zimbabwe's foreign policy as an explicit rejection of the political conditions of the West and searched to establish economic and political relationships with other countries, such as China. However, by contrast with Mugabe's government, the presidency of Emmerson Mnangagwa has been promoting an active foreign policy intending to reengage with the West, particularly with the European Union and the United States. Is it because the economic relationship with China has failed to provide benefits to the Zimbabwean society? Does the change of administration represent a shift in Zimbabwe's foreign policy and its relationship with China? Or does the current presidency of Zimbabwe see the Western and China as two complementary and strategic partners? This article argues that even if the current government will try to reengage with the West as part of its national strategy of economic development, that does not mean that Zimbabwe intends to distance itself from the People's Republic of China because it has proved to be a strategic political and economic partner for more than fifty years now.

Keywords: China, Zimbabwe, United States, foreign policy, sanctions, foreign direct investment.

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Introduction

The initial approach between the PRC and Zimbabwe occurred in the colonial era when the PRC provided arms, military strategies, and training for freedom fighters of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, while also providing ruling elites with revolutionary ideas and scholarships throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. As soon as Zimbabwe became an independent country on April 18, 1980, Robert Mugabe visited Beijing, intending to express his gratitude and interest to continue strengthening the bilateral relationship.¹

Even though during the 1980s, the newly formed Zimbabwean government continued to receive Chinese financial loans, it also received development and military aid from Western countries, which were eager to support the government of Robert Mugabe as he promised to avoid the influence of the Soviet Union and Cuba.² With the end of the Cold

1 Victor Ojajorotu and Rumbidzai Kamidza, "Look East Policy: The Case of Zimbabwe–China Political and Economic Relations Since 2000," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 74, no. 1 (2018): 17-41.

2 Timothy Scarnecchia, "Intransigent Diplomat: Robert Mugabe and His Western Diplomacy, 1963–

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War, the Western governments and global financial institutions, such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became the primary mechanism to support social and economic development in developing countries, including Zimbabwe.³

Nevertheless, since 2001, the Western countries, namely the United States (U.S.), the European Union (EU), and Australia, imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe since they considered that the country needed to reinforce its democratic mechanisms and institutions.⁴ The U.S. passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act⁵, opposing voting in favor of new grants, extensions of loans, or any debt cancellations from multilateral organizations, such as the WB and the IMF.⁶ In the same tenor, the EU introduced restrictive sanctions to specific individuals and companies from traveling and having business with Europe, freezing funds, and imposing an embargo on arms and other related materials.⁷ Furthermore, in 2003 Zimbabwe stopped being part of the Commonwealth.

It is widely believed that given these restrictions, Mugabe's government decided to intensify its economic and political relations with Asian countries, especially with China, through the 'Look East' policy⁸, announced in 2003. Since then, the exports from Zimbabwe to China have increased at an annual average rate of 17 percent, while the imports from Zimbabwe to China have been increased by an annual average of 32 percent.⁹ This trend has resulted in the PRC becoming the third largest exporter partner of Zimbabwe, right after South Africa and Singapore.¹⁰

At the same time, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China has become relevant to the economy of this African country. While the United Kingdom and the United States were the countries with the most FDI flows in Zimbabwe's economy during the period from 2001 to 2006, this was reversed when China took first place since 2007, and it has been the largest foreign investor since then.¹¹ Moreover, the financial aid for development

1983" in *Mugabeism? African Histories and Modernities*, ed. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Sabelo J. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 77-91.

3 Ojakorotu and "Kamidza, "East Policy," 17-41.

4 For thorough analysis about the nature and perceptions of the sanctions imposed, refer to the article of Heather Chingono, "Zimbabwe sanctions: An analysis of the "Lingo" guiding the perceptions of the sanctioners and the sanctionees," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 4, no. 2 (2010): 66-074.

5 U.S. Congress, *Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001*, 2001, Washington D.C., <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ99/PLAW-107publ99.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2019).

6 U.S. Embassy in Zimbabwe, *U.S. Sanctions Policy: Facts and Myths*, 2019, Harare, <https://zw.usembassy.gov/u-s-sanctions-policy-facts-myths/> (accessed December 21, 2019).

7 European Union Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, *European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force (Regulations based on Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, July 7, 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (accessed December 18, 2019).

8 Although there is no official document on this regard, it appears constantly on the statements and declarations of the Government of Zimbabwe.

9 For details, see United Nations, *UN Comtrade Database, 1992-2018*, 2020, <https://comtrade.un.org/data/> (accessed December 18, 2019).

10 World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution. *Zimbabwe Trade*, 2019, <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/ZWE> (accessed December 19, 2019).

11 United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, *Bilateral FDI Statistics*, 2014, <https://unctad>.

received from China has been an essential income for the Zimbabwean economy. It is estimated that during the period 2000-2019, the total amount of aid received has been USD 2,188,632,701.00,¹² whereas the concessional loans represent 84.5 percent of the total Chinese aid.

On the political side, it is remarkable that in 2008, the United Nations' Security Council decided to adopt an initiative to intensify the sanctions on President Mugabe's government. However, China and the Russian Federation voted against it.¹³ In that way, the PRC proved not only to be a strong economic partner but also a strategic political one for the government of Mugabe.

However, in contrast with the government of Robert Mugabe, the presidency of Emmerson Mnangagwa, which was established in November 2017, has been promoting an active foreign policy intending to reengage with the West, in particular with the European Union and the United States. For instance, in Mnangagwa's inaugural speech, he asked for the consideration of "those who have punished us in the past to consider their economic and political sanctions against us. [...] We will take definite steps to reengage those nations who have had issues with us in the past."¹⁴ In June 2018, the EU resumed talks with Zimbabwe's government, as it committed political and economic reforms to the country. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the EU have insisted on the reforms that need to be immediately applied in order to revoke the restrictions and sanctions from this African country.

Reflecting on the exposed above, why does Zimbabwe's current government orient its foreign policy to reengage with the West despite the previous sanctions and having a longstanding political and economic relationship with China? Is it because the economic relationship with China has failed to provide benefits to the Zimbabwean society? Does the change of administration represent a shift in Zimbabwe's foreign policy and its relationship with China? Or does the current presidency of Zimbabwe see the Western and China as two complementary and strategic partners?

Literature Review

Terrence Musanga was one of the first authors to write about the Zimbabwean people's

org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx (accessed December 18, 2019).

- 12 Since there is no an integral official document about the Chinese aid given to Zimbabwe, this amount has been calculated using different sources, such as the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Zimbabwe, the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and some articles published in newspapers of China and Zimbabwe, respectively.
- 13 United Nations, Security Council, *Security Council Fails to Adopt Sanctions against Zimbabwe Leadership as Two Permanent Members Cast Negative Votes*, 2008, SC/9396, New York, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9396.doc.htm> (accessed December 18, 2019).
- 14 Emmerson Mnangagwa, "President Mnangagwa's inauguration speech in full," *Chronicle*, November 25, 2017, <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/president-mnangagwas-inauguration-speech-in-full/> (accessed December 18, 2019).

vision to the engagement with China. He states that the ordinary people consider that the 'Look East' policy has been an imposition, as they perceive the Chinese products are of poor quality and the benefits to the national economy have been scattered.¹⁵ However, this argument does not explain that a rapprochement to the European Union and the United States would be the logical solution to disengage away from China since Musanga contends that Zimbabwean people also perceive the presence of Western capitalism as the reflection of "discontinuities and continuities of colonialism in post-colonial Zimbabwe."¹⁶

According to Lucky E. Asuelime, the relationship with China has been unfruitful to improve the country's economic and social conditions. Moreover, the current government is aware of the danger of having undiversified partners since it could harm the economy as it did in the financial crisis of 2008.¹⁷ In the year 2009, the exports from China were reduced, which did not impact the overall trade with Zimbabwe because the decrease in imports was only 5.04 percent compared to the previous year.¹⁸ However, the factor that could have brought more harm to Zimbabwe's economy could have been FDI, which in 2008 suffered a decrease of 92.3 percent compared to 2007. Contrarily to expectations, in 2009, FDI volume once again boomed insofar as one thousand percent, almost reaching similar investment levels as in years preceding the financial crisis.¹⁹ Therefore, the financial crisis did not severely impact the long-term economic relationship between Zimbabwe and China.

On the other hand, Victor Ojakorotu and Rumbidzai Kamidza consider that Zimbabwe's government has continuously signed opaque business and investment contracts with China that mainly benefit the ruling elites by rooting them in power.²⁰ However, the authors fail to enumerate and provide specific examples about the opaque investment contracts signed between the ruling elite with China, while there is ample evidence that most part of the PRC's aid has been destined to the sectors of health and education.

Furthermore, they argue that there is a widespread belief among Zimbabweans that the relationship with the PRC has caused many domestic industries to be affected by Chinese companies' entrance into the country.²¹ Nevertheless, according to the Afrobarometer organization survey in 2016, 48 percent of Zimbabweans consider that China has had a very positive influence on their domestic economy, whereas 31 percent believe it has been

15 Terrence Musanga, "Perspectives of Zimbabwe-China Relations in Wallace Chirumiko's 'Made in China' (2012) and No Violet Bulawayo's We Need New Names (2013)," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 29, no. 1 (2016): 81-95.

16 Musanga, "Perspectives of Zimbabwe," 81-95.

17 Lucky E. Asuelime, "Mnangagwa's Foreign Policy Direction : Old Wine in New Skin?" *Journal of African Foreign Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2018): 9-21.

18 United Nations, *UN Comtrade Database, 1992-2018*, 2020, <https://comtrade.un.org/data/> (accessed December 19, 2019).

19 United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, *Bilateral FDI Statistics, 2020*, <https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx> (accessed December 18, 2019).

20 Ojakorotu and Kamidza, "Look East Policy," 17-41.

21 Ibid.

negative. Simultaneously, 46 percent of Zimbabweans consider that China's economic development assistance has been beneficial, while 30 percent think it has done an awful job.²²

Moreover, 41 percent of the population consider that the Chinese investment in infrastructure and business contributes the most to a positive image of China, 31 percent of them consider that the most influencing factor is the cost of products, while only 5 percent of Zimbabwean believe it has been the support in international affairs and 4 percent claimed it is the non-interference in internal affairs.²³ By contrast, only 9 percent of Zimbabweans consider that China is taking jobs or business from locals.²⁴ For these reasons, it seems improbable that the people of Zimbabwe are pushing the new government to get a rapprochement to the West as a strategy to disengage with China.

Since the explanations described above remain insufficient to explain the significance and the approach to China planned by the government of Emmerson Mnangagwa as it also looks for a re-engagement with the West, in the following section, I provide a different analysis with the aim of elucidating the importance of the cooperation with the PRC for the current administration of Zimbabwe.

The New Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe

In order to understand the foreign policy of the current Zimbabwean administration, it is essential to say that after internal disputes in the government of Robert Mugabe and his ex-vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa, on November 14, 2017, a military takeover and mass demonstrations made Robert Mugabe resign to the presidency of Zimbabwe.

This paved the way for Mnangagwa to be sworn as state-in-waiting president of this African country on November 24 2017. Then, after the general elections were held in 2018, he was sworn as chief of state with 50.8 percent of the popular vote. These elections were remarkable because this is the first time in 16 years that the government allowed the EU, U.S. and the Commonwealth to monitor the election events in the country,²⁵ which could be interpreted as an initial sign of the new administration to reopen talks with the Western countries with regard to the restrictions imposed in the early 2000s.

In the inaugural speech of President Mnangagwa in 2017, he stressed that his administration's main driver would be the country's economic development. On the agenda of the foreign policy, he put emphasis on the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment, exports, the establishment of Special Economic Zones, the creation of a re-engagement

22 Mogopodi Lekorwe, et al., *China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews*, Report of Afrobarometer Round 6, Dispatch no. 122, October 24 (2016), 1-31, https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno122_perceptions_of_china_in_africa1.pdf.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 European Union Election Observation Mission, *Zimbabwe 2018*, October 11, 2018, Zimbabwe, https://eeas.europa.eu/election-observation-missions/eom-zimbabwe-2018_en.

program with all the nations of the world, commitment to honoring the debts, and active interest to settle new relationships.²⁶

This is important because, in the following months, President Mnangagwa would start a series of activities related to the expansion of the foreign relationships of Zimbabwe. Remarkably, the first trip he did outside of Africa as chief of state took place in April 2018, when he paid a state visit to Beijing, intending to meet with President Xi Jinping in order to express his gratitude for all the support given in the aftermath of the Western sanctions. Besides, he expressed his interest in reinforcing the economic ties and investment with China, including participating in the Belt Road Initiative.²⁷

Under the framework of this trip, the Chinese and the Zimbabwean governments agreed upon the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership cooperation between their countries in areas of trade, investment, technology, telecommunication, infrastructure, and people-to-people exchanges. Likewise, President Xi Jinping called on “Western countries and organizations to improve relations with Zimbabwe at an early date.”²⁸

Therefore, under the current government, the relationship between the PRC and Zimbabwe shows signs of being promoted and strengthened even more than the previous years despite Harare’s interest in reengaging with the West. Moreover, it is worth saying that the Chinese administration seems not to consider the re-engagement policy as an actual competition with the United States or the European Union.

During Mnangagwa’s inaugural speech as elected chief of state in August 2018,²⁹ he mentioned that the strategic sectors to improve the national economy are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, infrastructure, and tourism. Concomitantly, health, education, water and sanitation infrastructure are priorities in the social services sector.

Thus, despite the shift of government in Zimbabwe, China remains a strategic partner to Harare since many of the direct investments, loans, and financial aid have been largely destined to the most relevant sectors established by the current administration. For instance, most of the grants aim to develop infrastructure for energy generation and supply, while water supply and sanitation have received the most considerable amount of concessional loans.

Concerning Chinese commercial loans, the most considerable amount of money, which is estimated at USD 341,300,000.00, has been provided to social infrastructures, such

26 Emmerson Mnangagwa, “President Mnangagwa’s inauguration speech in full,” *Chronicle*, November 25, 2017, <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/president-mnangagwas-inauguration-speech-in-full/>.

27 Yuliang Zhang and Gretinah Machingura, “Interview: Zimbabwe seeks deeper economic ties with China to boost economy, says President Mnangagwa,” *Xinhua Net*, April 01, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/01/c_137080600.htm.

28 Mengjie, “China, Zimbabwe agree to establish comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation,” *Xinhua Net*, April 02, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/03/c_137086164.htm.

29 Emmerson Mnangagwa, *Inauguration Speech by the Incoming President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrade Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa*, August 26, 2018, Harare, <https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/ff7b7050/files/uploaded/HE%20INAUGURATION%20SPEECH.pdf>.

as the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's aging water treatment and distribution, the upgrade and expansion of the Victoria Falls airport and the expansion of the state-owned mobile network NetOne. Agriculture and Health are the second and third sectors to receive the most considerable amount of loans, respectively.³⁰

Moreover, the principal sectors with the presence of Chinese foreign direct investment are energy generation and supply, which mainly refers to the construction of hydropower infrastructure, mining, industry, and agriculture.³¹ This makes it likely that the current administration of Zimbabwe will continue to seek deeper collaborations with the government of the PRC, since the infrastructure projects are directly related to the development of its national economy.

In fact, during the period 2017-2019, there have been new Chinese aid grants, loans, and investments in Zimbabwe that account for strengthening this bilateral relationship. For example, in terms of grants, China contributed USD 47,058,000.00 to the sectors of health, agriculture, government, and emergency response, and it provided concessional loans for transport with a total amount of USD 153 million.³²

Regarding FDI, there is a large Chinese manufacturing company that, since 2018 was established in Zimbabwe to produce ceramic. It intends to employ 1,600 to 1,700 local workers, including supervisors and general workers and the total estimated amount of investment is USD 120 million.³³

Furthermore, in 2019 there have been new and large direct investments in the construction of hydropower plants that intend to expand the sewage treatment plants, to upgrade and rehabilitate distribution networks, especially in eleven high-density suburbs, and to construct new water pumping in reservoirs, as well as the implementation of water and wastewater projects.³⁴

Therefore, this evidence is consistent with the official speeches of both Chinese and Zimbabwean governments about the interest of both countries to continue with the bilateral economic engagement in areas of shared benefits and it also means that the relationship between the PRC and the administration of Robert Mugabe was not focused on the benefit of the Zimbabwean ruling elite, but in the needs and priority sectors of national development.

30 Since there is not an integral official document about the Chinese loans given to Zimbabwe, this amount has been calculated using different sources, such as the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Zimbabwe, the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and some articles published in newspapers of China and Zimbabwe, respectively.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Tonderayi Mukeredzi, "Chinese investors establish ceramic tile manufacturing company in Zimbabwe," *China Daily*, October 23, 2018, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/15/WS5da52c23a310cf3e3557086a.html>.

34 Tonderayi Mukeredzi, "Chinese enterprises to help end Zimbabwe's chronic water problems," *China Daily*, October 15, 2019, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/15/WS5da52c23a310cf3e3557086a.html>.

On these matters, it is essential to say that they have consistently provided large amounts of aid to Zimbabwe in the past years despite the European Union and the American governments' sanctions. According to the National Budget Statements published by the Zimbabwean's government in 2018³⁵ and 2019,³⁶ the most extensive aid funding for development came from the United States. Although there have been recent debates about China's exact amount, it is considered that nowadays is the second-largest funder of aid for development of Zimbabwe.³⁷

In the case of the aid provided by the U.S., it is mainly focused on the health sector, management of programs (operation costs) and democracy, human rights, and governance. Other grants are devoted to humanitarian assistance, economic development, education, peace and security, and the environment. However, there are no grants directly related to infrastructure.³⁸ This is worth noting because that means that the aid provided by the Chinese government is different from the one that comes from the U.S., which reinforces the idea that despite the current intentions of re-engagement to the West, the aid provided by China remains strategic for the development of this African country.

Final Remarks

The bilateral relationship between China and Zimbabwe is of great relevance to the national economy of the latter because the financial aid provided by the PRC is targeted to strategic sectors that the current government wants to develop in order to reach its national economic goals, such as infrastructure, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, health, education, water, and sanitation.

Moreover, since China remains the prominent foreign direct investor in Zimbabwe, the administration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa will likely continue to pursue a stronger relationship with the PRC in order to attract more Chinese direct investment into the country. Therefore, even if the current government tries to reengage with the West as part of its national strategy of economic development, that does not mean that Harare would intend to distance itself from the PRC, which has proved to be a strategic political

35 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Zimbabwe, *The 2019 National Budget Statement 'Austerity for Prosperity' Presented to the Parliament of Zimbabwe*, November 22, 2018, Harare, http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=54&Itemid=787.

36 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Zimbabwe, *The 2020 National Budget Statement 'Gearing for Higher Productivity, Growth and Job Creation' Presented to the Parliament of Zimbabwe*, November 14, 2019, Harare, http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=54&Itemid=787 (accessed December 21, 2019)

37 The debates emerged because the Zimbabwean government published in the 2020 National Budget Statement that the aid funding received from China in 2019 accounted for USD 3,881,500.00. Nevertheless, the Chinese Embassy in Zimbabwe argued that the actual amount provided were USD 136.8 million. In the end, the Zimbabwean government acknowledged the mistake, which makes China the second largest aid donor in 2019.

38 U.S. Foreign Assistance, *Zimbabwe: Foreign Assistance*, 2019, <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Zimbabwe>.

and economic partner for more than fifty years now.

There are signs that the relationship between the PRC and Zimbabwe is being promoted and strengthened even more than the previous years under the administration of Robert Mugabe. At the same time, the evidence shows that the Chinese government does not consider Zimbabwe's re-engagement policy as an actual competition with the United States or the European Union because China and the West's economic presence in Harare have been focused on different fields.

For instance, the U.S.'s aid has been mainly focused on the health sector, management of programs (operation costs) and democracy, human rights and governance, and other grants provided to humanitarian assistance, economic development, education, peace and security and the environment. By contrast, the Chinese grants are allocated to develop infrastructure for energy generation and supply, while water supply and sanitation have received an extremely substantial amount of concessional loans. Further, Chinese FDI is invested in energy generation and supply, mainly referring to the construction of hydropower infrastructure, mining, industry and agriculture.

Besides, it is essential to note that despite the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the American government, they have consistently provided large amounts of aid to Zimbabwe in the past years, where the most extensive aid funding for development comes from the United States. Moreover, although there have been recent debates about China's exact amount, it is considered that nowadays is the second-largest funder of aid for the development of Zimbabwe.

However, the current administration of Zimbabwe nowadays faces the challenge of providing attractiveness and certainty to foreign investors in order to increase its exports, as well as the presence of Chinese companies and from other countries in its territory. The end of the government of Robert Mugabe may be appealing for investors -particularly from those that come from Western countries- but Mnangagwa will have to take decisive actions in order to implement a proactive foreign policy that promotes a renewed image of Zimbabwe to the world.

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