

ISSN 2464-9929

Association for Research, Innovation and Social Science

GLOBAL
POLITICS
REVIEW
Journal of International Studies

Global Politics Review

Journal of International Studies

Volume 2, Issue 1, April 2016

ISSN 2464-9929

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Published by the Associazione per la Ricerca, Innovazione e Scienze Sociali
[Association for Research, Innovation and Social Science]

Tax Code (CF): 97748700016

Address: Via Cernaia 14, 10122, Turin, Italy.

E-mail: staff@globalpoliticsreview.com

Fax: (+39) 011 0371950

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Letter from the Editor

The second issue of the *Global Politics Review* already represents a milestone in the history of this young journal. Here, the number 2, albeit a small unit, is proof of the continuing success story of GPR which began a little over a year ago through the academic enthusiasm and formidable cooperation of graduate students at the University of Torino and Yonsei University. In less than a year, GPR has published two issues and fifteen articles among papers, essays, reviews, and interviews. Today, the journal also counts an editorial team of eight, an advisory board of seven, and three institutional partners. GPR has grown a lot, and its success is entirely attributable to the constant effort of its editorial board, which has developed a routine of well-organized processes and workflows among editors, advisors, and partners. Yet, while the established routine is a pleasant guarantor for consistency and continued academic rigor, GPR is constantly evolving.

For instance, in the recent past, the journal has established new partnerships in order to improve its online presence and increase its dissemination. To date, GPR can be found on several third party repositories and databases, which are listed on our website. The journal has also been active in organizing events that go beyond academic publishing. The International Conference on North Korean Studies is one such example, which GPR cohosted in cooperation with the *North Korean Review* and the Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies on October 14, 2015, at the President Hotel in Seoul.

The conference, organized with the support of professors Lonnie Edge and John Delury, proved to be an excellent opportunity for GPR to foster debate among the academic community. The event succeeded in drawing a numerous audience and provided the opportunity for North Korea experts from all over the world to come together and exchange ideas and research results. Some of the results are reported in this issue in the form of two peer-reviewed papers written by Justin Kim-Hummel and Jacco Zwetsloot.

Kim-Hummel provides in his article “Diplomatic Relations with the DPRK: India as a Global Case Study” insight into one part of interstate relations that has often been overlooked in a body of literature, which otherwise stresses the isolation of North Korea from the international community. India, as Kim-Hummel points out, did often function as a mediator between North Korea and the world. Hence a strong case can be made that the Indian model of cooperation with the DPRK could serve as an example to end the isolation and marginalization of North Korea.

Zwetsloot presents the paper “Visual Metaphors in North Korean Graphic Novels for Children.” In this empirical research of North Korean comic books, the author examines how the anthropomorphized animal characters in one graphic novel represent stylized characters of the North Korean anti-imperialist narrative. Special focus lies on how young readers appear to be trained to internalize a stereotypical dichotomy of good Koreans vs.

bad Americans (and South Korean traitors) through these seemingly innocent children stories.

The rest of the papers presented in this issue have been collected under the theme of “Interdisciplinary International Relations.” This theme was chosen to express what the editors of GPR believe to be one of the strengths and at the same time challenges of the broad field of International Studies. Virtually all research in this field goes beyond pure political science, as it touches upon international economics and finance, diplomatic history, sociology, international law, anthropology, and many more. This instance is well represented in this issue, and we are happy to publish three papers and one more essay that reflect the rich and colorful field of International Studies.

David Tibor Teszár combines the domains of international security and immunology in his paper “War as the Autoimmune Disease of Humanity: Perspectives on a Theoretical Proposal.” This piece provides an analogy between the individual and collective human body (the second being all of humanity). The author, in this truly innovative and fresh approach of biopolitics, attempts no less than to find a cure to humanity’s most deadly disease.

John Perry, in his paper “Shifting Sands: The United States, Great Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1945-1954” traces the origins of the hostilities between the United States and the Egyptian non-state actor. In this historical analysis, Perry looks closely at British and American Middle East policies and sheds light on the development of early anti-US sentiment in the region.

Elisa Gambino also touches upon a topic of contemporary history that has repercussions into current world affairs. The paper “The People’s Republic of China’s Pro Status Quo Approach in Cross-Strait Relations” argues that China is, despite her clear commitment to national unification, taking a non-assertive position with regard to the timely fulfillment of the unification project, and examines the reasons behind this position.

In the essay “The Manipulation of History in South Korea seen through the Lens of Francis Bacon’s Four Idols,” David Andrew Tizzard presents a truly multidisciplinary approach to the problem of how history is perceived within one nation. He applies the Four Idols of Francis Bacon to structurally exemplify historic distortions of history in the Korean context.

Finally, this issue contains one book review by Christoph Sorg on Neil Wilcock and Corina Scholz’s book “Hartmut Elsenhans and a Critique of Capitalism, Conversations on Theory and Policy Implications,” as well as an interview with the Ukrainian Ambassador to Seoul, H.E. Vasyl Marmazov, by GPR’s affiliate editor Rachel Leng.

We would like to express our deepest gratitude and sincere appreciation, on behalf of the Editorial Board, to the authors who have, with their outstanding writings, made this milestone in the history of GPR possible. The quality of a journal, after all, depends on

the quality of its publications.

Our thanks therefore extends equally to our academic advisors for their generous support and guidance throughout the last year for both the conference and this second issue. Last but not least we want to thank our formidable group of editors, who are the backbone of the meticulous work at GPR and function as quality guarantor to ensure the high goals which we at GPR all have.

We wish all readers of this issue to find its contents enlightening and entertaining, gaining from it a deeper understanding of everything international.

Maximilian Ernst & Cesare Scartozzi

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About the Journal

Global Politics Review (GPR) is a peer-reviewed journal of international studies published twice a year by the Association for Research, Innovation and Social Science (ARISS). The Journal was founded in 2015 by the Association through a sponsorship of the University of Turin. GPR publishes high quality research papers, interviews and essays that survey new contributions to the field on international studies, with a focus on alternative and non-western theories of international relations.

The Journal aspires to achieve a two-pronged goal: to provide the opportunity for distinguished scholars and graduate students to publish unconventional and innovative researches, and to be a vehicle for introducing new ideas while encouraging debate among the academic community. Global Politics Review aims to make a distinctive contribution to the field of international studies and serve the academic community as a whole.

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Website: www.globalpoliticsreview.com

Website: www.ariss.it

Address: Via Cernaia 14, 10122, Torino , Italy.

E-mail: staff@globalpoliticsreview.com

Fax: (+39) 011 0371950

PAPERS



War as the Autoimmune Disease of Humanity: Perspectives on a Theoretical Proposal

David Tibor Teszár

Abstract: In this essay two seemingly distant domains are linked together: a particular issue in international security (warfare) and a group of diseases that are related to the abnormal functioning of the human immune system (autoimmune disorders). First an analogy is introduced between the individual and the collective human body (i.e. humanity) by elaborating basic definitions in both fields of study (war – peace, health – disease) through etymological research, and correspondences are drawn between particular forms of warfare and specific autoimmune diseases. The second half of the paper touches upon existing theories on the causes of war within the two bodies and aims to offer a potential cure for the autoimmune disease of humanity.

Keywords: *International Security, War, Theory of War, Immunology, Autoimmune diseases.*

“Our fate is shaped from within ourselves outward,
never from without inward.”
(Jacques Lusseyran)

Introduction

This brief essay aims to elaborate my definition of war based on the analogy between the individual and the collective body of human beings. This definition is the following: *war is the autoimmune disease of humanity*. Drawing a correlation between the state and the human body is not a new phenomenon: the so-called body politics was a popular metaphor in the medieval era. Thomas Hobbes, one of the most influential political theorists of the seventeenth century, used connections between the political and medical thought in his magnum opus, *Leviathan*. Political diseases described by Hobbes included epilepsy (a conflict between the spiritual and civil authority) and pleurisy (a great concentration of the state resources in the hands of just a few individuals) among other afflictions.¹

1 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 220.

David Tibor Teszár received his Master’s degree from the Graduate School of International Studies of Yonsei University where he majored in International Cooperation with a concentration in International Security and Foreign Policy. Previously he studied law at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. He spent three years in South Korea as a grantee of the Korean Government Scholarship Program (KGSP).

E-mail: namhanman@gmail.com

ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, Global Politics Review, <http://www.globalpoliticsreview.com>

The idea of such correspondences dates back to the legendary Hermes Trismegistus (“Thrice Greatest Hermes”) who postulated a divine analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm in his cryptic work entitled Emerald Tablet: “What is above is like what is below. What is below is like what is above.”² While followers of the Hermetic tradition explored the mystical analogies in domains such as alchemy and astrology³, Hobbes used this all-encompassing paradigm to analyze the relationship between the human political construct and the human body.

Definitions – War and Peace in the Two Bodies

Firstly, I argue that in analogy with the normal state (i.e. health) of the individual human body, the normal condition of the collective body of humans (i.e. humanity) is peace. This is a controversial statement, because notable thinkers had diametrically opposed opinions. For example, the aforementioned Hobbes’ position was that

the *status naturalis* of mankind was a *status hostilis* resulting in a ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ (war of all against all). As the reasons for this state of affairs he [Hobbes] identified competition as well as the universal human motives of diffidence, glory and power (‘I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death’). Most philosophers (Spinoza, Locke, Kant) and the founders of international law (such as Grotius) did not envisage peace as the natural state of mankind.⁴

However, certain anthropologists share my view. According to Margaret Mead, the institution of war is a cultural invention that can be abolished, so it is not a biological necessity to kill one another on a grand scale. Harry Holbert Turney-High wrote that “cold-blooded slaughter has really never been approved by the bulk of mankind. All have understood the amenities of peace to a greater or less degree. Peace, then, seems to be the normal situation in the minds of even warlike peoples.”⁵ R. Brian Ferguson also supports this idea by stating that:

Even if we focus on societies where warfare is an undisputed occurrence, periods of active warfare involving a given group usually are relatively brief. The vast majority of humans, living or dead, have spent most of their lives at peace. So one can agree with Hobbes that politically autonomous groups have the potential for war, but this tells us nothing about why

2 Idries Shah, *The Sufis* (London: Octagon, 1977), 198.

3 For an accurate and detailed definition of terms such as Hermeticism, alchemy and astrology, consult the standard academic reference edited by Wouter J. Hanegraaff, *Dictionary of Gnosis & Western Esotericism* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

4 Johan M. G. van der Dennen, *The Origin of War* (Groeningen: Origin Press, 1995), 60.

5 Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), quoted in van der Dennen, *The Origin of War*, 508.

real war occurs. Contrary to the Hobbesian image, peace is the normal human condition⁶

I emphasize that peace is the balanced state of humanity. The meaning of the Anglo-French word *pes*, (derived from the Latin *pax*) is freedom from disorder. This word replaced the Old English *frið* which also meant happiness.⁷ Correspondingly, health, derived from the Old English *hælp* referred to “wholeness” that encompassed not only physical well-being, but also happiness and prosperity.⁸ In contrast, disease means the lack of ease: discomfort, distress and inconvenience. It is an abnormal condition, an impairment of the normal state of a living being. Disease indicates the disruption of the default equilibrium of the body and suggests that the ease by which life is generally lived becomes blocked.

Although modern Western medicine does not consider balance an important concept of health due to its mechanistic views, both the ancient Indian and traditional Chinese medical systems agree on the centrality of harmony within the body. In his seminal text on Ayurveda, Todd Caldecott describes that “from an Ayurvedic perspective health is defined as the equilibrium between the *dosas* [three elemental substances or bodily humours], *dhatu*s [seven basic tissues or principles of structure] and *malas* [waste products of the body].”⁹ According to Jerry Alan Johnson, traditional Chinese medicine stipulates that “through exposure to either adverse environmental conditions, stress and emotional tension, or poor nutrition, an imbalance is created in the physiological matrix resulting in illness.”¹⁰ Another renowned authority, Giovanni Maciocia also emphasizes that “Chinese medicine stresses balance as a key to health: between rest and exercise, in diet, in sexual activity, and in climate. Any long-term imbalance can become a cause of disease.”¹¹

According to Levy & Thompson, war can be defined as “sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations.”¹² It is especially fruitful to compare the original meaning of war with the definition and the cause of autoimmune diseases. The late Old English *werre* (large-scale military conflict) originates from the Frankish *werra* that has a Proto-Indo-European verb stem (*wers-*).¹³ *Wers-* means to mix up or confuse.¹⁴

6 R. Brian Ferguson, “Anthropology and War: Theory, Politics, Ethics,” in *The Anthropology of War and Peace: Perspectives on the Nuclear Age*, eds. David Pitt and Paul R. Turner (London: Greenwood Press, 1989), 152, quoted in van der Dennen, *The Origin of War*, 508.

7 “Online Etymology Dictionary,” accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=peace&allowed_in_frame=0

8 Ibid.

9 Todd Caldecott, *Ayurveda: The Divine Science of Life* (Philadelphia: Elsevier, 2006), 93.

10 Jerry Alan Johnson, *Chinese Medical Qigong Therapy Volume 3: Differential Diagnosis, Clinical Foundations, Treatment Principles and Clinical Protocols* (Pacific Grove: The International Institute of Medical Qigong, 2002), 3.

11 Giovanni Maciocia, *The Foundations of Chinese Medicine: A Comprehensive Text for Acupuncturists and Herbalists* (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 2005), 237.

12 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 5.

13 “Online Etymology Dictionary,” accessed April 21, 2015, <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=war>

14 For example, the current German verb “verwirren” (to confuse, perplex) derives from this ancient stem.

The Encyclopedia of Autoimmune Diseases defines autoimmune disease as the following:

The basic definition of an autoimmune disease is a disorder caused by an autoimmune response, i.e. an immune response directed against something in the body of the patient. The word auto is the Greek word for self. The immune system is a complicated network of cells and cell components that normally work to defend the body and eliminate infections caused by bacteria, viruses, and other invading microbes. If a person has an autoimmune disease, the immune system mistakenly attacks the self, targeting the cells, tissues, and organs of a person's own body.¹⁵

When the human immune system turns into a self-destructive mode, in this confused state it mixes up the healthy cells with harmful bacteria or viruses, and wages war against the self in the absence of any detectable microbial assault. This *tragic misidentification*, just like the ancient verb stem *wers-* suggests, is not only the cause of autoimmune diseases in the individual body but also constitutes the very root of war that happens in the collective body. Failing to recognize other humans as fellow cells within the living organism we call humanity is the source of all violence and warfare. Politician and author Norman Angell, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933, had this insight in mind when he wrote that:

Mankind as a whole represents the organism and the planet the environment, to which he is more and more adapting himself, is the only conclusion that consorts with the facts. [...] The completer the co-operation, the greater the vitality; the more imperfect the cooperation, the less the vitality. Now a body, the various parts of which are so interdependent that without co-ordination vitality is reduced or death ensues, must be regarded, in so far as those functions are concerned, *not as a collection of rival organisms, but as one* [my emphasis]. This is in accord with what we know of the character of living organisms in their conflict with environment. The higher the organism, the greater the elaboration and interdependence of its parts, the greater the need for co-ordination.¹⁶

If we consider cells as citizens, tissues as cities, organs as countries and the human body as humanity itself, various correspondences may be discovered with the nearly one hundred different autoimmune diseases. These diseases can affect the body in different ways. If the autoimmune reaction is directed against a certain organ (like intestines in the case of Crohn's disease or the brain in multiple sclerosis), we may call it an interstate war. Type 1 diabetes mellitus destroys only the insulin-producing cells of the pancreas – this is comparable to an ethnic war. Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE)

15 Dana K. Cassell and Noel R. Rose, *The Encyclopedia of Autoimmune Diseases* (New York: Facts on File, 2003), 30.

16 Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion – A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), 162-163.

is analogous to a world war given that the immune system carries out attacks against many tissues and organs at the same time such as the heart, liver, kidneys, lungs, skin and/or joints. Ultimately, using this theoretical framework, autoimmune diseases and all wars may be considered civil wars where fellow cells within the individual body/fellow citizens within the collective body physically liquidate each other on a large scale.

Causes of War in the Two Bodies

Neither researchers of autoimmune diseases nor scholars of war could come to a universal consensus as to the causes of internal/external warfare. Of course, many theories exist in both areas. Cassel and Rose mention genetic predisposition and an environmental trigger that may lead to the development of an autoimmune disease.¹⁷ Top medical experts in the field of immunology extend the potential variables with “a large portion of chance. Mechanisms that could result in chance events include environmental influences, somatic mutations, and random receptor mutations.”¹⁸

Philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, historians, anthropologists, political scientists, biologists and economists have produced a wide range of theories, but they “debate not only what the causes of war are, but also what theoretical approaches and methodologies are best suited to identifying those causes.”¹⁹ According to Greg Cashman, several theories have been validated by real events and therefore can be considered worthy of closer attention. Such theories include those that “emphasize changes in dyadic or systemic balances of capabilities, theories that focus on the effects of various kinds of political unrest and the political vulnerability of political elites, theories that address state-to-nation imbalances, and the steps-to-war theory that incorporates the critical factors of territorial disputes, dyadic rivalries, and conflict spirals.”²⁰

Following the example of autoimmune diseases, the main cause of warfare is a misidentification, i.e. perceiving a fellow cell within humanity as the Other. Although the actors of war are political organizations (following Levy & Thompson’s definition of war), individuals are the ones who do the actual fighting to advance the interests of the leadership of a particular political organization. In the case of warfare, the interest of the leadership and the fighting individuals rarely correlate. Consequently, the political elite must convince the public that liquidating fellow cells within the collective body is the only option left to resolve an ongoing conflict.

Here ideology plays the most crucial role. State ideology is disseminated to the people via various propaganda organs. The false framework of “us vs. them” is established by magnifying the differences between human beings (race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, political opinion, membership of a particular social group etc.) while willfully ignoring

17 Cassel and Rose, *The Encyclopedia of Autoimmune Diseases*, 31.

18 Ian R. Mackay and Noel R. Rose, *The Autoimmune Diseases* (St. Louis: Elsevier, 2006), xxiii.

19 Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, 2.

20 Greg Cashman, *What Causes War?* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 477.

the fact that we are equally important and valuable cells within humanity. *Divide et impera* (“divide and conquer”) is an ancient Latin maxim that was widely used in every historical era. In the twentieth and twenty-first century we witnessed narratives based on binary opposites such as Aryan vs. Jew (World War II), communist vs. capitalist (Cold War) and terrorist vs. peace-loving citizen (War on Terror). Creating an image of the enemy (the Other) and instilling fear in the public are classic examples of the propaganda machine specifically designed to manufacture an ideology based on division. Dutch psychologist Joost A. M. Meerloo elaborates that

fear and catastrophe fortify the need to identify with a strong leader. They lead to herding together of people, who shy away from wanting to be individual cells any longer; they prefer to be part of a huge mystic social organization that protects against threat and distress, in oneness with the leader. This protection-seeking instinctual reaction is also directed against dissent and individualism, against the individual ego.²¹

The “father of public relations”, Edward Bernays, whose work was carefully studied by Joseph Goebbels, wrote the following lines about propaganda in 1928:

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. In almost every act of our lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons [...] who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires that control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.²²

A Potential Cure for the Autoimmune Disease of Humanity

As I stated before, the healthy state of humanity is peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Although the increasing destructiveness of military technology reduced the incentives of major powers to fight large-scale wars, we still see significant amount of warfare in the world. These developments suggest that the general quality of consciousness of humanity is rather low. Identifying a fellow cell as an enemy because it lives in another organ (cf. nationality), looks like a red blood cell instead of a white one (cf. race), believes in the heart instead of the brain (cf. religion), and follows the kidney instead of the gall bladder (cf. political affiliation), is not the characteristic of an efficient, well-organized, low-entropy system.

I suggest that the top-down approach toward peaceful coexistence does not work as the

21 Joost A. M. Meerloo, *The Rape of the Mind – The Psychology of Thought Control, Menticide, and Brainwashing* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1956), 127.

22 Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York: IG Publishing, 2004), 37-38.

failure of the Kellogg-Briand pact (1928) demonstrated.²³ The potentially more effective bottom-up design (eradicating ignorance one person at a time by identifying the Other as an equal unit within the collective body) may lead to a quantum leap in the consciousness of humanity that will result in – among others – the total absence of warfare based on the realization of our interconnectedness and essential oneness. The reason why the so-called Golden Rule of every major world religion stipulates to treat others the way we would like to be treated is because every individuated unit is part of the whole (i.e. humanity, and ultimately, the Self). Given that the Self (the Absolute that is commonly referred to as Tao in Taoism, Brahman in Hinduism, God in Christianity, Yahweh in Judaism and Allah in Islam) consists of everything and everybody (the four elements, the mineral kingdom, the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom and the human kingdom), harming the Other is literally harming the Self – myself. The only possible explanation behind damaging the Other is the lack of recognition that there is no Other: everything and everybody is part of the Self.

I have already cited the traditional, holistic medical wisdom of India and China, and in conclusion, I describe their ideal, healthy version of humanity that is found in their ancient sacred scriptures. The Chinese people call this peaceful state of being *tianxia datong* (“grand harmony all under Heaven”). Tan Chung writes that

in the classic of Liji (Book of Rites) there is the famous passage generally called *datongpian* (Essay on Grand Harmony) which is one of the hallmarks of Chinese civilization. The Essay depicts the utopia of the ancients which is a society governed by the most virtuous and capable people. There is no unrest, robbery, theft, machination, and people do not need to close their doors when they sleep at night.²⁴

The Indian wisdom tradition refers to the ideal state of the collective body as *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* (“the world is one family”). This concept originates from the classic Vedic text *Maha Upanishad*: “Only small men discriminate saying: One is a relative; the other is a stranger. For those who live magnanimously the entire world constitutes but a family.”²⁵

Immense financial, natural and human resources are directed at warfare, even though one trivial realization on a mass scale would result in the total cessation of all hostilities. This realization is that every Other (the so-called “enemy”) is in actuality a fellow cell, because regardless of the superficial differences these very units comprise the living organism we call humanity. The healthy, peaceful, cooperative state of humanity needs to

23 This international pact renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Eventually it proved to be an inefficient multilateral treaty that did not make any tangible contribution to international peace. See the full text here: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm>

24 Tan Chung, *Himalaya Calling – The Origins of China and India* (Hackensack: World Century Publishing, 2015), 73-74.

25 “Maha Upanishad VI:71-73(a),” accessed 23 April, 2015, http://www.celexel.org/upanishads/sama_veda/maha.html

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Shifting Sands: The United States, Great Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1945 – 1954

John Perry

Abstract: Anti-US sentiments in Egypt began in the late 1940s and 1950s. This development is traced by examining the Muslim Brotherhood, a non-state actor, and its relationship with the United States. Non-state actors are crucial to understanding both the history of the United States in the Middle East and contemporary US/Middle East relations. Large segments of the region's population did not, and still do not, view their governments with legitimacy. This is largely due to the role of colonial powers both in determining the national borders of the area after WWI and the influence those powers wielded over many of the regimes that governed Middle East nations. But from 1945 to 1954, US actions moved non-state groups like the Muslim Brotherhood from focusing on Great Britain to focusing on the United States as the primary foreign threat in the Middle East. US officials' support of Britain's military occupation of Egypt, the US government's backing of an Israeli state carved from the Palestinian homeland, US policymakers' continued pursuit to secure the region's economic resources, and Washington's assistance, or perceived assistance, to Gamal Abdel Nasser from 1952 to 1956 laid the foundations to anti-US attitudes in Egypt. This period is one of the genealogical origins of contemporary beliefs that place a hostile emphasis on the United States.

Keywords: *United States, Middle East, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Cold War, Decolonization.*

Introduction

In the 2000s, the United States' relationship with the Middle East took on new significance. The attacks on September 11, 2001, the War on Terror, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the rise of ISIS, and the continued threat of attacks both in the United States and around the world has made US/Middle East relations an important topic of continued debate. But to properly understand ISIS, or similar groups, the historical evolution of their being must be considered.

Historians have examined the United States' early relations with the Middle East through various models. Many, like Peter Hahn or Christopher D. O'Sullivan, have examined the US role in the Middle East by focusing on the upper echelons of policy-making. Hahn traces the complicated interactions that took place between the US, British, and Egyptian governments from 1945 – 1956. His study focuses on the top level of government officials

John Perry is a PhD student at the History Department of the University of Kentucky.

E-mail: jpe256@g.uky.edu

ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, *Global Politics Review*, <http://www.globalpoliticsreview.com>

to explain the Suez Crisis.¹ O’Sullivan, on the other hand, explores the New Deal style programs implemented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration during WWII. O’Sullivan emphasizes Roosevelt’s aid programs and his attempts to modernize the Middle East through progressive reform packages.² Other historians like Douglas Little have pointed to the role of oil and business in the US government’s early relations with the region.³ But historians of US foreign relations have paid less attention to the role of non-state actors.

Non-state actors are particularly important when examining the United States in the Middle East in the 1940s and 1950s. Large segments of the region’s populace did not acknowledge the validity of their governments due to colonial influence over the state. After WWI, the British and the French decreed many of the national borders in the Middle East. Rarely, if ever, were native peoples considered in these decisions. Moreover, many regimes in the Middle East during the interwar years became puppets of British or French authority. As a result, native individuals and groups often turned to institutions, other than the state, for social aid, communal fraternity, or platforms for political change. One such institution was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that continued to play a fundamental role in Egyptian politics up to the present.

Many aspects of the ideologies of contemporary groups’, like ISIS, or Al Qaeda before it, can be traced back to the immediate post-WWII period. In particular, anti-US sentiments can be traced back to this time. Although different conditions framed the United States’ relationship with the Middle East in different ways across time, following WWII is when significant numbers of anti-colonial nationalists first began to move their focus from Great Britain to the United States. There are many strands of thought within political Islam and each of these strands has its own hereditary history but regarding the United States, this is the historical starting point. From 1945 onwards, the US government focused on a campaign of security and stability in the Middle East. This strategy revolved around the protection of the region’s oil reserves and the prevention of Soviet influence in the area.⁴ However, in carrying out this strategy, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations also authorized illegal coups, regime overthrows, and secret military and intelligence operations. While some of these actions resulted in short-term gains for Washington, the long-term effects of these actions have been catastrophic for populations in the Middle East and have given credence to the belief that the United States is simply a violent, imperial power. Developments like the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and US

1 Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945 – 1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

2 Christopher D. O’Sullivan, *FDR and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

3 Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

4 Little, *American Orientalism*, chap. 2 and 4; Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt*, introduction, chap. 3 and 4.

support for it, the CIA led coup in Syria in 1949, the overthrow of the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Moseddegh in 1953, US officials' continued quest to secure the region's oil fields, and the US government's support to colonial powers like the British all helped create the perception that the United States was simply a new imperial power. In the 1940s and 1950s, anti-colonial groups in the Middle East were greatly affected by these developments.

Anti-US sentiments in Egypt began before the Eisenhower Administration took office. Both the circumstances and actors involved are vital to understanding the contemporary relations the United States shares with the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood, a non-state organization of the period, played a fundamental role in Egyptian politics. By 1945, the organization had a membership of roughly 500,000 branches throughout the Middle East, and a sophisticated hierarchy and organizational structure that enabled it to efficiently engage the masses.⁵ As such, the Muslim Brotherhood is crucial to the history of Egypt and, therefore, is crucial to understanding US/Egyptian relations. Nevertheless, Washington's support of London after WWII, particularly for the British troop presence around the Suez Canal, US officials' endorsement of the Israeli state in 1948, and the US government's accommodation of Gamal Abdel Nasser from 1952-1956 all contributed to the brotherhood's shift in focus from Great Britain to the United States as the primary foreign threat.

Backdrop: The US, Great Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood

A major US presence in the Middle East began at the turn of the twentieth century. In the early 1900s, vast reserves of oil were discovered in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. These resources played a vital role in US officials' Middle East policies. With the outbreak of WWII, US and British policymakers formed a wartime union but continued challenging each other economically. The British had long held a presence in the area and considered the Middle East their sphere of influence. However, the Muslim Brotherhood challenged this assertion. It emerged amidst the turmoil of the Paris Peace and worked to undermine both the Egyptian state and its British backers.⁶

After WWI, anti-colonial nationalists regarded Europeans as their primary hindrance to independence. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, secretly made during WWI, divided control of the Middle East largely between the British and the French. News of it, as well as European and US officials' refusal to consider self-determination for populations outside of Europe, helped lead to protests throughout Egypt.⁷ The US government lost an

5 Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1969), chap. 2, 6, and 7.

6 Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn, 2001).

7 Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 3.

important opportunity to strengthen ties with colonial populations in these years.

Instead, US leaders pursued policies revolving largely around the economic concessions of oil. While the US government was content to let the British police the Middle East, at least for the time being, US businesses wasted no time in developing commercial footholds. By 1941, five major firms had become invested in Middle East oil – Jersey Standard, Socony, Socal, Texaco, and Gulf. These companies created an informal network of diplomacy between themselves and the countries they operated in.⁸ However, Washington’s attention to the area grew as it became apparent that the region’s resources and strategic location made it vital to US interests.⁹

When war erupted again in 1939, US officials moved to strengthen ties with both the business community and governments of the Middle East. Washington hoped to strengthen its economic position in the Middle East, largely at the expense of the British. But it did not want to jeopardize its strategic relationship with London. The hope was to make clear that although they were wartime allies, the US government did not support British imperialism. This was a fine line to walk, as US officials deemed British troops in the Middle East, particularly around Egypt’s Suez Canal, a vital resource in the protection of the region. In the early Cold War, US policymakers viewed the Middle East as one of the most strategically important regions in the world.¹⁰ But as its attention to the area grew, so too did Washington’s conflict with London.

The US government found its growing presence in the Middle East almost always framed by the British. Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria were all footholds of the British Empire by the outbreak of WWII. But in 1942, Roosevelt made it clear to Churchill that although British influence had preeminence in the region, the United States had control over the monetary concessions of Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Egypt, the British had a protracted and complicated history that was characterized largely by military rule and political coercion.

Due to the unrest caused by the Paris Peace Conference after WWI, the British imposed martial law on Egypt in December 1921 and in February 1922 the British unilaterally declared Egyptian independence. A constitutional monarchy was created but the British pulled the strings from behind the scenes. The system of government divided power between the King, and his cabinet, Parliament, and, unofficially, London. From 1922 onwards, each body, including London, struggled for power and influence over the others. The Egyptian King, Farouk I, wanted total control of his country, like his forefathers, and hoped to both free himself from British influence and suppress the democratic aspirations of the opposition parties. On the other hand, the various opposition groups – liberals,

8 Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918 – 1967*, (University of North Carolina Press, 2011) and Little, *American Orientalism*.

9 Little, *American Orientalism*, chap. 2 and 4; Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt*, introduction, chap. 3 and 4.

10 Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt*, chap. 3 and 4.

nationalists, socialists, and religious groups – each moved to implement their individual interpretations of society. London, conversely, looked to reassert its political authority and strengthen its presence militarily.

The Muslim Brotherhood, in stark contrast to most of the other political parties in Egypt, relied on indigenous beliefs and supported the creation of a state that revolved around the Islamic faith. While most of Egypt's political parties had existed since the late nineteenth century, the Muslim Brotherhood was a relative newcomer to the political scene. In 1928, Hassan al Banna began teaching in the town of Ismailia, located nearby the Suez Canal. Al-Banna's societal beliefs quickly grew in popularity. His principles regarding the role of Islam, in relation to the state, presented a culturally authentic, non-western social formula that was in stark contrast to the country's current political situation. These threads of thought led al-Banna to found the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), initially a small, local club for discussing important social and religious matters. In the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood functioned as a spiritual organization that provided social aid, cultural and religious fraternity, and a space to voice public concerns. However, from the 1930s onwards, the Brotherhood rapidly grew in popularity and sophistication.¹¹ It developed strong representation in various public institutions like labor parties, student groups, the police, and the army as well as in large private establishments, like advertising firms, transportation businesses, publishing and printing companies, and textile mills. This gave the Ikhwan a powerful influence in Egyptian politics.

The Muslim Brotherhood arose largely as a result of the instability of the Egyptian state. By 1945, the Brotherhood viewed the Egyptian government as one of the primary hindrances to social reform. However, it was Great Britain who pulled the strings from behind the scenes. As a result, the Ikhwan directed most of its anger at Egyptian and British authorities.

The Beginning: The US, Great Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1945 – 1947

In 1945, Truman and his advisors favored Egyptian independence, over support of the British, as the best means to secure the areas' resources. Both the Middle East's oil production and its geographic location were deemed vital to US interests in the early Cold War.¹² However, although they continued to contest each other's economic influence, from 1946 onwards the quest for security began to outweigh the desire for commercial supremacy for both the United States and Great Britain. After WWII, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to focus its public protest on British and Egyptian authorities,

¹¹ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1969), chap. 2 – 5.

¹² Little, *American Orientalism*, chap. 2 and 4; Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt*, introduction, chap. 3 and 4.

however the first hints of anti-US sentiments emerged in this period.

Although most Egyptians desired independence, as the United States claimed to support, the US government's backing of an Israeli state carved from the Palestinian homeland left many doubtful of its sincerity. For example, in early November 1945, riots erupted around the US Consulate in Egypt. "Gangs of hoodlums and street urchins" attacked the buildings surrounding the American Embassy with stones and sticks to protest the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration – one of the first public pronouncements of an Israeli state made in 1917. The police were called in and they fired on the mob leaving ten dead, 300 wounded, and 1,000 arrested.¹³ For the Egyptian people and the Muslim Brotherhood, freedom from colonial powers was by far the most pressing post-war issue. Riots in protest of the national government and its relationship with the British had broken out regularly throughout 1945. Moreover, in the same year, three major assassination attempts were made against top officials in the Egyptian government.¹⁴ This instability had a strong influence on US policy.

By 1946, the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union had deteriorated. Soviet activity in Turkey and Iran distressed Washington and London. In Egypt, both moved to strengthen ties with the other as a result. The fear was that Moscow might exploit the country's instability in attempts to move it towards the Soviet Union. Alarm of socialist influence often framed US policy, even when those fears were imagined. US officials deemed British positions in the Middle East, particularly its military bases in Egypt, as crucial to the protection of US interests.

However, on January 6, 1946 Amin Osmin Pasha, a high-ranking Egyptian minister, was shot and killed. According to the US Embassy in Egypt, this was undoubtedly a result of the deep-seated resentment of British rule one saw apparent everywhere and many suspected the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁵ With the end of WWII, the 1936 lease agreement to station British troops by the Suez Canal became a focal point for many Egyptians.¹⁶ In early February 1946, students clashed with police on Abbas Bridge while attempting to cross into Cairo to protest the British. 150 were wounded and 80 were estimated hospitalized. In the following days, demonstrations took place at universities across Egypt, the authorities, in attempts to keep order, killed twelve students. Protests, demonstrations, riots, and looting continued throughout the next few weeks.¹⁷ Washington chose to re-strengthen ties with London as anti-British sentiment in Egypt was reaching a pinnacle. US officials assumed, incorrectly, that the unrest was due to Soviet agitators. Therefore,

13 US Department of State, US Legation in Egypt to Washington, *Confidential US State Department Central Files, Egypt, 1945 – 1949, Internal Affairs Decimal Number 883 and Foreign Affairs Decimal Numbers 783 and 711.83*, microfilm collection, telegram from the 10th of November, 1945.

14 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, telegram from the 7th of January, 1946.

15 Ibid.

16 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, telegram from the 23rd of February, 1946.

17 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, telegram from the 11th of February, 1946.

they moved to support the continuation of Britain's 1936 lease to station troops by the Suez but this further alienated Egypt's anti-colonial groups.

On February 26, 1946 the US Legation received a report from the Cairo Division of the Office of Strategic Service, which concluded that "beyond question" the Ikhwan was responsible for the rioting in November 1945 and the student demonstrations that occurred in the previous weeks. The report was the first major effort to understand the Muslim Brotherhood's organizational structure, ideology, and membership. US officials made clear that the Brotherhood had a complex hierarchy and administrative composition, as well as broad support from the populace that was growing daily.¹⁸

Despite the report, Washington's reasoning held that although the Kremlin may not have initiated the most recent series of protests, it might use similar circumstances to their advantage in the future. In May 1946, US officials intervened on behalf of the British in the talks to renegotiate the 1936 treaty. Moreover, through synchronized pressure, US and British officials were able to force the Soviets to withdraw from Iran the same month. However, this public intervention on behalf of the British had significant consequences for US policymakers.

May 1945 was the first time the United States officially and publicly supported the colonial interests of London in Egypt. Soon after the two largest political groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd, briefly resolved their differences to create a united front. For these groups, US support made the British threat now appear even more pressing and the need to unify seemed to outweigh their differences. Furthermore, six months later the brotherhood and the state began open attacks on one another. In October the Egyptian government arrested 56 members of the Ikhwan.¹⁹ In response, the Brotherhood bombed six police stations. The following day, the government arrested the organization's leadership, confiscated its property, and shut down its newspapers.²⁰ Although most of the brothers were released and their property returned, these events helped initiate the Muslim Brotherhood's shift in focus towards the United States. From this point, the organization slowly began moving towards viewing the United States as the primary foreign threat. US public endorsement of Britain's colonial policies helped start this process.

The end of WWII was a high point in US and British economic competition. The Cold War moved the US and British governments to increase collaboration in the Middle East. Although they continued to challenge each other in financial spheres, both Washington and London placed the prevention of Soviet influence above commercial hegemony. The Muslim Brotherhood abhorred US support to the British but continued directing most of its energy towards challenging the Egyptian state and its backer, London.

18 US Legation in Egypt from the Office of Strategic Service, Cairo, memo titled, *'Office of Strategic Services' analysis of protests received by the Legation at the time of the November Riots*, from the 27th of February, 1946.

19 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, telegram from the 23rd of November, 1946.

20 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, telegram from the 3rd of December, 1946.

Sowing Seeds: The US, Great Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1947 – 1952

From 1947 to 1952, US officials continued to swing back and forth between policies of security and stability, and continued to safeguard US economic interests in the region. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, however, moved Washington and London to reaffirm the need for troops in the area. Throughout the war, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state waged open combat against one another on the streets of Cairo. Ultimately, this led to the assassination of Hasan al-Banna in 1949, the Ikhwan's spiritual guide and leader. The Brotherhood interpreted continued US support to the British, as well as to the newly created state of Israel, as an attack on both the rights of the Arab people and on the sovereignty of the Egyptian state.

By the late 1940s, US oil companies had greatly expanded in the Middle East. For the Truman Administration, these firms played a vital role not only in Cold War security but also in the US domestic economy. Oil was a fundamental resource in fueling the US military and, increasingly, US transportation needs. In 1948, construction of a massive pipeline stretching from the Gulf to the Mediterranean began. Washington assisted immensely in its construction, it provided financial relief to oil companies through various economic packages but its primary help came from the CIA. In March of 1949, the CIA assisted a faction within the Syrian army in the overthrow of Syria's democratically elected government. The primary motivation for this action was the Syrian government's refusal to sanction construction of the pipeline through its territory. Securing the region's resources for both strategic and economic purposes were central to the Truman Administration.

In 1947, when American congressmen refused to lift import restrictions on Egyptian cotton, however, Cairo threatened to seek Moscow's help. Despite evidence that Egypt was not vulnerable to communism,²¹ US and British officials extended the policy of containment to the country. Fear of socialism's spread continued to lead the two powers to favor policies of security over stability. When war broke out between Egypt and the newly created state of Israel in May of 1948, these fears were further exacerbated. The US endorsement of the Israeli state infuriated populations throughout the Middle East. The effect on British and US policymakers was the reaffirmation of the need for British military bases.²² The Muslim Brotherhood interpreted the creation of Israel in 1948 as violent, colonial expansionism and the Egyptian state, by ending hostilities and not waging total war, was viewed as complicit with America.

Within Egypt, the government and the Muslim Brotherhood waged daily battles against one another throughout the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.²³ In January, the state announced that

21 Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt*, chap. 4.

22 Ibid, chap. 5.

23 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, telegrams from January to December 1948 make clear that throughout the year the Egyptian state faced disorder and confusion. This coincides with Mitchell's

after a clash with Ikhwan members, it had discovered 165 bombs and pieces of arms. In March, the Brotherhood assassinated a respected judge, Ahmad al-Khazindar. Numerous attempts were also made to take the life of Nahhas Pasha, who served as Egypt's Prime Minister on and off from the late-1920s to the early-1950s. In May, two days before the Egyptian offensive against Israel was launched, the Egyptian government declared martial law. A month later, some houses were blown up in the Jewish quarter of Cairo. In October, the government discovered a cache of arms and munitions on the estate of a prominent brother and then, in November, the police seized a jeep filled with documents that referenced the Brotherhood's "secret apparatus." This wing of the organization was reserved for the most devout and loyal members. It was established sometime between 1939 and 1942 with the purpose of carrying out paramilitary operations, arms build-ups, and intelligence gathering.²⁴

With the discovery of the "secret apparatus," the state felt it had sufficient strength to rid itself of the Ikhwan. On December 8, 1948, the Egyptian government announced a public ban on the Muslim Brotherhood – police surrounded its headquarters, arrested everyone inside, confiscated its property, and shutdown its newsletters. In response, the Ikhwan assassinated the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha. Two months later, on February 12, 1949, the police retaliated by murdering Hasan al-Banna, the Ikhwan's supreme leader and spiritual guide.²⁵

At this point, hostilities between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian government subsided substantially. The Muslim Brotherhood had to deal with the leadership crisis that arose in the wake of al-Banna's murder, as well as strategize how best to deal with its outlawing. For the latter, the Ikhwan moved to strengthen its alliance with the Wafd, at some point after the brothers' ban, an agreement was made between the two. The Wafd promised to re-establish the Brotherhood if voted into power in return for electoral support in the upcoming elections for the Egyptian Parliament. No other group in Egypt enjoyed the popular support like that of the Muslim Brotherhood, even with its official proscription. In January 1950, the Wafd won 225 of 319 seats in Egypt's House of Representatives. However, the real issue for the Ikhwan was dealing with the death of al-Banna.

When the "secret apparatus" was established in the late 1930s or early 1940s, a subtle split began in the organization's ranks. However, by the time of al-Banna's murder, the two factions were in full view. The minority faction was composed largely of members who worked in the "secret apparatus." They advocated a much stronger and proactive approach – guerilla actions aimed at the Egyptian state and implicitly Great Britain and the United States. These individuals were deeply involved with the Ikhwan's operations in

account in *The Society of Muslim Brothers*.

24 Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question, 1928 – 1947*, Tauris Academic Studies, 1998; Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*.

25 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, numerous telegrams from December of 1948 to February of 1949 describe these events, as does Mitchell in *The Society of Muslim Brothers*.

Palestine during the 1948 war, as well as its paramilitary actions in Egypt.²⁶ The majority faction advocated a more conservative approach and looked to use official channels to attain the organization's goals. This split in the Ikhwan's ranks never fully healed and played a crucial role in the unfolding of events up to 1954.

The Muslim Brotherhood was becoming more and more aware of the United State's role in the region. Support to Great Britain and Israel, as well as the US pursuit to secure the region's economic resources, led to increasing resentment and mounting perceptions of the United States as a greedy, violent, colonial power. But despite the growing anger, US policy-makers remained fixed on Moscow as the potential source of Egypt's unrest, not their coordination and support of imperial policies.

The US still considered policing the Middle East a British responsibility but Egyptian nationals were now threatening to completely terminate the 1936 troop lease. In May 1950, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly issued the Tripartite Declaration. It guaranteed the territorial status quo of the Arab-Israeli armistice and pledged each country's intention to uphold peace and stability in the area. This was the first US commitment to the region and, although largely a token gesture, was a portent of the United States' future role in the area.

From 1950 on, US officials worked to enlist Egypt in the creation of a Middle East security network like that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Truman Administration aimed to use this network to appease both the Egyptian and British governments. Bringing the important countries of the Middle East, like Egypt, together in an officially organized defense apparatus would help negate the need for British influence in the area and appease Egyptian nationals, while also maintaining counter-measures to Soviet encroachment. The Middle East Command (MEC) was a program created by the British to coordinate resources in the region. The United States joined MEC during WWII and by the 1950s had largely taken command of the program. MEC, later changed to the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), attempted to bring together the United States, Europe, and Middle Eastern nations into a security structure to defend against Soviet threats.

Washington and London, however, refused to treat Egypt as a full partner in the creation of MEDO. As a result, the talks failed and helped further alienate much of the Egyptian populace. First and foremost, Egyptians wanted the British military presence removed from their country. No agreement could be made without exploring their removal as a primary dimension to the treaty but American and British officials refused to do this.

Protests, riots, and rallies occurred throughout the talks. In early April 1950, the Muslim Brotherhood held demonstrations in the Sayida Zeinab section of Cairo. Although largely in protest of foreign influence in Egypt, the organization now also began to protest the

26 El-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question*.

Wafd government.²⁷ The relationship between the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood had deteriorated by spring 1950. The Ikhwan's popularity made it a danger to the state regardless of the political faction that held the reins of power. The Wafd was fully aware of this and hoped to delay the Brotherhood's readmission into the mainstream. But by May 1951, the brothers had pressured the government to the point where it was forced to lift the public injunction on them.

In July and August 1951, a "highly confidential" source informed the US Legation in Egypt that he had attended a meeting between the opposition groups – the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nationalists, the Socialists, and the Communists.²⁸ According to the source, these groups met to affirm their opposition to the current government.²⁹ In October, violence erupted in the Canal Zone in protest of the continued Western influence in the country. This tension continued into 1952 and set the stage for Nasser's takeover in July.

The United States continued to pursue a strategy of security and stability in the Middle East, even when these policies contradicted each other. However, their efforts to create a regional defense organization failed. Moreover, Washington's continued support to the British and the newly created state of Israel, as well as its growing coordination with the major oil firms in the region, further enflamed the Muslim Brotherhood.

Pivot-Point: The US, Great Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1952 – 1954

In 1952, Nasser and the Free Officers took over the Egyptian government. This was made possible in large part due to a new alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. But both sides were wary of the other and within a year the relationship soured. Washington viewed the new regime, in particular Nasser, as potentially new means to help secure its interests. In 1954, Nasser eliminated the Muslim Brotherhood from official Egyptian politics. But the group continued to function underground until the 1970s when it began to be reinstated.

In late January 1952, Cairo erupted in rioting, looting, and fire – hundreds of buildings were destroyed. The riots were in reaction to the killing of 50 Egyptian policemen by British troops in a battle the previous day. The Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the other opposition groups, held numerous protests and demonstrations.³⁰ By early 1952, nearly every political party in Egypt, including factions within the military, was disaffected with the Wafd. Their continued tolerance of the British led most groups to perceive the

27 US Department of State, US Legation in Egypt to Washington, *Confidential US State Department Central Files, Egypt, 1950 – 1954, Internal Affairs Decimal Number 774, 874, and 974 and Foreign Affairs Decimal Numbers 674 and 611.74*, microfilm collection, memo with the subject line: *Demonstration By Moslem Brothers* from the 3rd of April, 1950.

28 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Report of a meeting of Opposition and Extremist Egyptian Groups* from the 17th of July, 1951.

29 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Meetings of Political Groups Sponsoring August 26 Demonstrations* from the 30th of August, 1951.

30 Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, chap. 4 and 5.

legitimacy of the government as having completely evaporated. On the same day as the riots, the US Legation in Egypt met with the Ikhwan. The Brotherhood's representative made clear to the legation that it was displeased with the current government.³¹ Moreover, in March, Hassan Ismail al-Hudaibi, the group's newly elected leader, declared that the organization would not be participating in future elections.³² With hindsight, these references signal the Brotherhood's transition from a union with the Wafd to their new alliance in 1952 with the Free Officers, the faction in the military with whom Nasser was associated. At some point a deal was made that ensured the Brotherhood's ban would remain lifted, while in return the organization pledged its support to the Free Officers.

In late July 1952, the Free Officers successfully performed their bloodless coup. The new regime quickly declared its intention of friendly relations with the United States. Furthermore, the US Legation in Egypt reported that although young and largely inexperienced, the Free Officer's intelligence and aims were impressive.³³ In Washington, the news of the takeover was met with optimism. The Free Officers represented a promising new avenue to securing US interests in the region. If strong ties were made with the new regime, the US government might be able to now enlist Egypt in a regional security apparatus while also supporting Egyptian independence. The British would largely be left in the cold but, for US policymakers, possible means to achieve both security and stability finally seemed to present themselves.

In mid August 1952, the US Embassy in Egypt noted that the current government was aware of the dangers the Brotherhood posed and believed they could control them. But Jefferson Caffery, the head of the US Legation in Egypt, remained unconvinced.³⁴ In late December 1952, Caffery had his first official meeting with Hassan al-Hudaibi, the new leader of the Ikhwan, and reported that al-Hudaibi claimed the brotherhood is willing to accommodate the new regime as well as its future dealings with the United States. However, Caffery remained skeptical and informed Washington of his concerns.³⁵ Throughout 1953, tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government grew. General Muhammad Naguib, originally intended to be the new Egyptian government's straw man, began to acquire political clout of his own. Two factions – one aligned behind Naguib, the other behind Nasser – came to being. Al-Hudaibi and the official faction of the Ikhwan supported Naguib and hoped to use him to suppress Nasser, while the more extreme, minority group within the Brotherhood looked to directly undermine the

31 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Conversation with Sheikh Al Baquri, Executive Council, Moslem Brotherhood* from the 6th of January, 1952.

32 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Current Attitudes of the Muslim Brotherhood* from the 2nd of April, 1952.

33 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Egypt's New Era – The First Three Weeks* from the 18th of August, 1952.

34 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Role of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan El Muslimin) Under Egypt's New Regime* from the 27th of September, 1952.

35 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Views of the Supreme Guide, Moslem Brotherhood, on Current Political Situation* from the 24th of December, 1952.

entire state through terrorist action. At this point, those brothers who had been part of the “secret apparatus” largely split from the Ikhwan and started acting independently from its official command. Washington was made aware of these developments and received regular updates from the US Legation.

Throughout the summer 1953, Caffery met with al-Hudaibi several times. In cables sent to Washington, he made clear that the tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers were growing.³⁶ Nasser, in particular, had to be eliminated from the new government because, according to al-Hudaibi, his national policies, which were regarded largely as secular policies by the Ikhwan, were preventing the creation of a proper, Islamic state.³⁷ Moreover, he declared that the Ikhwan would now take all possible measures to drive out the British. The embassy’s “secret source” within the organization repeated these intentions and suggested that future action against the British would derive from civilians on the basis of commando action.³⁸ The specific relationship between Washington and Nasser in these years is hazy. What, if any, support the US government provided to him is unclear. Nevertheless, by the end of 1953, Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had successfully implemented a massive, state-sponsored propaganda campaign against the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaibi especially felt the brunt of this program, as Nasser hoped to exploit the split in the Ikhwan’s ranks as means to control the organization. While Washington may or may not have provided Nasser with intelligence and logistical support, Washington nevertheless continued its strategy of securing economic resources throughout the Middle East.

In August 1953, Washington and London coordinated the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah, or King, of Iran. Much like Syria in 1949, the Iranian government had refused economic concessions proposed by American and British oil companies and, as a result, unofficial avenues to securing those concessions were implemented. Although perhaps not aware of this development immediately, as with the Syrian coup, the Muslim Brotherhood observed US actions throughout the Middle East with more and more contempt. Prolonged support to the British, the backing of Israel, continued actions to secure the region’s oil, and now support or at the least, the perceived support given to Nasser helped move the United States towards the center of many Ikhwan members’ gaze, including Sayyid Qutb, who later became an important ideologue of the organization. Qutb, at this stage, was a mid to low level associate but his writings on the United States turned into the foundation to the Ikhwan’s belief structure in the 1960s and 1970s. Regardless, the Brotherhood, at least the official faction, was not ready yet to completely

36 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Muslim Brotherhood Probably Not Involved in Republic Move* from the 23rd of June, 1953.

37 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation with Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood* from the 5th of August, 1953.

38 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Views of the Muslim Brotherhood On Current Situation* from the 20th of July, 1953.

abandon its relationship with the RCC and aimed to lessen tensions between the two in the months to follow.

In September 1953, the organization declared that the Brotherhood and the government were not at odds with each other and it was the “imperialist trinity” of Britain, Israel, and America that was responsible for spreading such rumors.³⁹ Nevertheless, on September 16, 1953 the Egyptian government announced the establishment of a revolutionary tribunal. According to a cable transmitted to Washington, it was created, at least in part, “to disrupt and weaken, if not destroy, the Muslim Brotherhood.”⁴⁰ Consequently, the Ikhwan turned from directly challenging Nasser and returned to publicizing the role of foreign powers in Egyptian politics.

On October 30, 1953 a conference was held at the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Alexandria. Over 5,000 undergraduates of Alexandria University and various religious institutions attended. According to a dispatch to the Department of State whose subject line read, “Muslim Brothers Are ‘Ready for Battle,’” the organization declared that they soon would wage a decisive battle against the “imperialists” and they urged all Arab governments to abandon the United Nations because of its control by powers like the United States.⁴¹ Tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the RCC were growing. But the United States was now on an equal footing with the imperialist characterizations of Great Britain. No longer was London the primary foreign threat in the region. Washington’s backing of Nasser led the Ikhwan, which deemed Nasser the most dangerous element of the RCC, to finally hold the United States as a chief, if not the chief, enemy of anti-imperialism.⁴²

Throughout the next few months, the legitimate faction of the Brotherhood attempted to demonstrate the organization’s religious and non-political nature while simultaneously demanding its reinstatement. In June 1954, al-Hudaibi left to visit King Saud of Saudi Arabia, largely to assess Brotherhood support outside of Egypt. But this effectively marked the end of his leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴³ By his return, propaganda efforts against him, both by the state and from his rivals within the organization, had achieved their aims. In mid-July, the American Legation wired Washington to inform them that the “truce” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government was rapidly disintegrating. Violent clashes between the government and the Brotherhood

39 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Former Premier And Police Officers Charged With Torturing Muslim Brothers* from the 22nd of August, 1953 and the memo with the subject line: *Moslem Brotherhood Publicly Declares It Supports Present Regime* from the 12th of September, 1953.

40 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Attitude of RCC Toward Muslim Brotherhood* from the 19th of September, 1953.

41 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Moslem Brothers Are ‘Ready for Battle’* from the 31st of October, 1953.

42 US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood* from the 15th of January, 1954 and two memos marked “priority” from the 1st of March, 1954

43 Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, chap. 5.

occurred throughout July, August, and September.⁴⁴

On October 27, 1954 while giving a speech to a crowd in Alexandria, eight shots rang out in an attempt on Nasser's life. The gunman, Mohamad Abdel Latif, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had missed his mark and was soon apprehended. But this provided Nasser with the means to finally crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Thousands were arrested. The group's leadership, as well as numerous lower level members like Sayyid Qutb, was jailed, while Naguib and his followers were dismissed from the government. In the end, eight brothers were sentenced to death, including al-Hudaibi, but at the last minute his sentence was curtailed to life in prison. This effectively ended the public presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics for the next two decades.

The Brotherhood's massive popularity and sophisticated organization made it a danger to any regime in control of the government. However, Nasser's efforts allowed him to successfully liquidate the organization at the end of 1954. It is unclear what specific role US officials played in these events. But it is clear the US government continued to secure its economic interests in the region and continued to support Great Britain and Israel. This led many brothers to perceive US support given to Nasser. As a result, in the years to come the US government, as much as Nasser, was blamed by the Muslim Brotherhood for the woes of the Egyptian state.

Conclusion

From 1954 to the early 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood was officially outlawed in Egypt. However, its organization and popularity allowed it to effectively function underground. This period represents the next phase in the Ikhwan's evolution. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s thousands of brothers and associates of the organization were imprisoned and tortured by the Egyptian state. Sayyid Qutb was one such individual. His theories on *jahiliyyah*, or Western "barbarism," became the backbone to the next generation of brothers' ideology. Published throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, Qutb authored numerous texts on Islam, Egypt, and the West. His thoughts on the West were almost all critical and derived from his time at Colorado State Teachers College in 1949 or 1950 and were also heavily influenced by the events leading up to the Brotherhood's liquidation. Qutb was executed in 1966 for plotting to assassinate Nasser and as a result he and his work became extremely popular to Ikhwan followers. For the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States was the power that propped up Nasser's regime and, therefore, was just as responsible as the Egyptian state for their harsh repression. The brutal and cruel treatment many brothers suffered at the hands of the government radicalized many moderate and more liberal members of the Ikhwan and hardened in them the idea that the United States

⁴⁴ US Legation in Egypt to Washington, memo with the subject line: *Regime's Attitude Towards The Muslim Brotherhood* from the 12th of July, 1954.

was to blame.⁴⁵

In the immediate post-WWII period, the United States pursued the dual strategy of security and stability in the Middle East. However, these policies were often contradictory. Moreover, in this time, the Middle East's economic resources were deemed vital to US interests. As such, Washington implemented policies, both public and clandestine, to secure rights to oil business. Sometimes the United States worked with Great Britain in these endeavors, for instance in Iran, but usually that was not the case. Although the two nations shared a strong strategic relationship, they often competed fiercely over the Middle East's financial spheres. Most historians agree that by 1956, with the outbreak and conclusion of the Suez Crisis, the United States had become the dominant power in the region. It was also after the Suez Crisis that US officials abandoned Nasser as a potential ally and began implementing a policy of containment towards him and Arab Nationalism. But the US government's actions from 1945 to 1954 laid the foundations to anti-US sentiments in Egypt. Washington's support of British troops in Egypt, its backing of Israel, its economic policies in the region, and its perceived support of Nasser moved groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to focus on the United States as the primary foreign threat in the Middle East. These developments demonstrate the significance of non-state actors to the history of the Middle East, as well as to the history of the United States' interactions with the region. State to state relations will certainly continue to be an important part of the discourse. But many of the effects of US actions during this time have yet to fully play themselves out, particularly with regard to non-state groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, the study of these relationships have become, and most likely will remain, vital both to the history of the United States in the Middle East and to understanding the present day international situation. **GPR**

45 Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1990).

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The People's Republic of China's Pro *Status Quo* Approach in Cross-Strait Relations

Elisa Gambino

Abstract: How the relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) will evolve in the future, or will eventually see a solution, is of great importance not only to East Asia, but also to the West because of the United States' (US) involvement with both sides. This essay deals with the Cross-Strait issue between the PRC and Taiwan and will present an overview of the relations between the two sides of the Strait, as well as assessing whether or not the PRC is interested in maintaining the current status quo. This essay will take the position that the People's Republic of China is pro status quo and examine the reasons behind its position.

Keywords: *People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Taiwan, International Relations, Cross-Strait, Security.*

Introduction

How the relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) will evolve in the future, or will eventually see a solution, is of great importance not only to East Asia, but also to the West because of the United States' (US) involvement with both sides. This essay deals with the Cross-Strait issue between the PRC and Taiwan and will present an overview of the relations between the two sides of the Strait, as well as assess whether or not the PRC is interested in maintaining the current status quo.

In the essay different names will be used in reference to the parties involved. The People's Republic of China will be referred to as Mainland China or the PRC, depending on the time period (before or after 1949) or to avoid repetitions. Formosa will also be used to refer to Taiwan, since it is the name given to the island by the Portuguese in the mid-sixteenth century.¹ The island will be also called the Republic of China (the ROC), depending on the historical period.

This essay will take the position that the People's Republic of China is pro status quo and examine the reasons behind its position. The loss of credibility that would affect the PRC government if Taiwan became *de jure* independent and the possible effect on its

¹ April C.J., Lin & Jerome F., Keating, *Island in the Stream: a quick case study of Taiwan's complex history* (Taipei: SMC publishing Inc, 2000).

Elisa Gambino is Master's Candidate in Chinese Studies at the University of Edinburgh, UK.

E-mail: s1127297@sms.ed.ac.uk

ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, Global Politics Review, <http://www.globalpoliticsreview.com>

economic growth are the reasons identified. Secondly, the economic ties that link the two sides of the Strait are of remarkable importance. Furthermore, it will deal with the island's geographical position that makes it a gate to the Pacific.² Lastly, if Taiwan became independent, the PRC's internal stability could be threatened since other areas, which seek to become independent, could follow Taiwan's example.³ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seems to think that the problem of Taiwan will solve itself with time, and for this reason the PRC proposed the "one country, two systems" policy, that it had already applied in Hong Kong and Macau.⁴

The first part of the essay will present a historical overview of the relations between Mainland China and Taiwan starting from 1991. It will also aim to provide a clearer understanding of the two sides' points of view over the years. The overview presented follows the PRC's timeline, as this is the government recognized by most countries and international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN).⁵ The second part analyzes the reasons behind the PRC's pro status quo position on Cross-Strait relations. The first sub-section will deal with how Taiwan's *de jure* independence could affect the PRC's image and threaten its soft power. The following sub-section will provide an analysis of how close economic relations are one of the reasons why people on both sides want to maintain the status quo. The following sub-section will analyze the importance of the island's position. The fourth sub-section will connect the Taiwanese possible independence with the PRC's internal stability. The final sub-section will present the "one country, two systems" ideal the PRC is pursuing.⁶ The last part of the essay will deal with the scenario of reunification and the implications for Japan and the international political scene. The conclusion will provide a brief summary and reflect on implications for the future.

Evolution of Approaches

In 1991, Taiwan formally ended the war with Mainland China. In doing so, Taipei renounced its goal of militarily taking back the "lost" territories on the other side of the Strait. Moreover, the end of the war also meant that, without changing its position on reunification, the Kuomintang⁷ (KMT) recognized that the PRC and its government existed and were in the same country.⁸ As a consequence, both sides agreed on the "one

2 Alan M. Wachman, *Why Taiwan?: geostrategic rationales for China's territorial integrity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).

3 Namely the regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, as suggested by Wachman, *Why Taiwan?*

4 Shaocheng Tang, "New trends in the Cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan," *Asia Europe Journal* 4, no. 4 (2006): 555-562.

5 "United Nations Members States," last modified March 11, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/members/>

6 Jing Huang & Xiaoting Li, *Inseparable separation: the making of China's Taiwan policy*. (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010).

7 The party which had lost the civil war on the mainland (Manthorpe, 2009).

8 C.C. Hsieh, "Pragmatic diplomacy: foreign policy and external relations" In: *Take-off for Taiwan?*

China” principle expressed in the “Beijing consensus” of 1992.⁹ This could be considered as the beginning of the status quo, which sees the factions on both sides of the Strait as one China with two different interpretations.

In 1993, the PRC released the paper “The Taiwan question and the reunification of China” (also called “the White Paper”). The authors of this document argued that the island of Formosa is part of China for geographic and historical reasons. Moreover, they claimed that “Taiwan was returned to China *de jure* and *de facto* at the end of the second world war.”¹⁰ There are two different interpretations of this matter, one legal and one that reflects the state of affairs. From the legal prospective, scholars argue that the rightful government in 1945 was the ROC and so the PRC should not control Taiwan. Therefore, when Japan lost the war in 1945, the island was given back to the ROC, and since the ROC still exists the PRC is not the rightful government of Taiwan. Legal matters aside, the PRC is the successor of the ROC since the CCP won the civil war, and is recognized as such by international organizations, including the UN.¹¹ Following this logic, the “White Paper” states that the PRC is the only recognized government of China and therefore Taiwan should not be involved in international matters, meaning that they should not be represented abroad or in international organizations’ meetings. The “White Paper” then explains how the reunification of China has and will always be central to the Chinese people.¹² It also clarifies the conditions under which Taiwan would be governed in case of reunification (“one country, two systems”). In addition, the authors stress the fact that, after reunification, Taiwan would be granted the status of an autonomous province.¹³

Jiang Zemin retained Deng Xiaoping’s position of pursuing the “one country, two systems” policy with regards to Taiwan. Not only did Deng initiate this policy to try to politically outmaneuver Taiwan’s independence claims, he also kept pushing for reunification and made efforts to secure the promise of non-interference from the US. Beijing made several offers to Taipei, stating that a “peaceful reunification” would allow Taiwan to retain its economic ties with the outside world.¹⁴ Under Jiang’s leadership, there was a threat of crisis in 1995-1996, during which the PRC tested missiles in the waters of the Strait. The crisis was caused by a visit of Taiwanese leaders to the US and elections on the island. The US reacted saying that both sides should not threaten to take military action against the other party.¹⁵ Under Jiang’s guidance, Beijing had to face the

Edited by P. Ferdinand (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).

9 Huang and Li, *Inseparable separation*.

10 John F., Copper, *Words across the Taiwan Strait: a critique of Beijing’s “White paper” on China’s reunification* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995): 75.

11 Ibid.

12 John F., Copper, *Words across the Taiwan Strait: a critique of Beijing’s “White paper” on China’s reunification* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).

13 Taiwan would have to follow the same rules, and would have the same rights as the other autonomous regions, namely Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Tibet.

14 Huang and Li, *Inseparable separation*.

15 Ibid.

problem of Taiwanese nationalism.¹⁶ When Taiwan was discovered,¹⁷ it was inhabited by aborigines. The presence of the aborigines remained of great importance throughout the process of democratization. Taiwanese nationalism is a difficult concept to understand or define because of the issues between different ethnicities which coexist on the island, and also because of the loss of identity after centuries of being a colony.¹⁸ The ethnic groups are often defined as aborigines and mainlanders, according to whether they were born on the island or had moved from the Mainland.¹⁹ Moreover, Jiang Zemin had to face the refusal of the “one China” theory by President Lee Teng-hui and the consequent involvement of the US, which tried to steer the two factions towards peaceful dialogue. In this period the US also stood behind Clinton’s “Three No’s” statement of “no two Chinas”, no “one China, one Taiwan,” and “no to American support of Taiwan’s independence.”²⁰

In 2000, the CCP published a second “White Paper” to re-state Beijing’s position on the Cross-Strait issue. In this document the PRC put heavy emphasis on the “one country, two systems” policy and attacked Taiwanese President Lee because, according to the authors, he allegedly caused tensions in the Strait. The paper included a section about the possibility of a military intervention if Taiwan refused to talk about reunification with the PRC.²¹ This paper was published right before the presidential elections in Taiwan. Against all of the PRC’s predictions, Chen Shui-bian won the election. Chen had expressed his pro-independence position several times, which severely concerned Beijing. After the election, Chen’s idea on the subject changed drastically; Taiwanese independence would not be declared, unless a military attack from the PRC occurred.²² As a consequence, the status quo was clearly an equilibrium that neither of the two parties intended to break or

16 Manthorpe Jonathan, *Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

17 During the 16th century the island was discovered by the Portuguese explorers.

18 Between the discovery of the island and the establishment of the PRC, Taiwan was subject to foreign presence. It was used by Japanese and Chinese pirates as a place to hide and carry out slave trade. In 1626 the Spanish set foot in Taiwan, but quickly fled after aborigine attacks. At the same time Holland developed an interest in this territory. During the same century Ming forces belonging to the Chinese Empire invaded Taiwan but were only able to control part of the island because of the aborigines. During the Qing era the approach towards Taiwan was essentially passive and other foreign powers such as the United Kingdom, France and the US became interested in the island and tried to get hold of it. In 1885, Mainland China officially recognized Taiwan with the status of province. Unfortunately for the Qing dynasty, Taiwan declared itself a republic in 1895. The Republic of Formosa lasted only three months because it was occupied by Japan and remained so after the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. It was only after the end of World War II that Taiwan was freed from Japanese control. See: Melissa J., Brown, *Is Taiwan Chinese?: the impact of culture, power and migration on changing identities* (Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2004).

19 Baik Ji-Woon, “East Asian perspective on Taiwanese identity: a critical reading of ‘Overcoming the Division System’ of Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 11, no. 4 (2010): 591-604.

20 John F., Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* 4th ed. Boulder (Colo.: Westview Press, 2003).

21 Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian* (New York: Zed Books, 2002).

22 Manthorpe Jonathan, *Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

modify. The status quo has not changed since the consensus of 1992, as both the PRC and the ROC agree on the “one China” concept but gave different interpretation to it.

In 2002, when Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of the CCP, the PRC altered its position on Cross-Strait relations. The PRC stopped pursuing the road of reunification and decided to try maintaining the status quo. In those years, the principle of “one China” was recognized by both the PRC and Taiwan, and therefore President Hu decided to base his politics on the concept of the “peaceful development” of Cross-Strait relations and of the PRC’s economy.²³ The PRC wanted to become an important actor on the international stage and thus it could not afford to project a bad image abroad. Hu Jintao was the first to firmly adopt the position of defending the status quo. When Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian reintroduced talks on separation, arguably to gather support for the upcoming election, the government of the PRC looked for help from the US.²⁴ The US responded by sending a representative to Taipei and stressing the importance of the shared concept of “one China.” In Hu Jintao’s eyes, the most important thing was to avoid Taiwanese independence. In order to accomplish this, the Anti-Secession Law was published in 2005.²⁵ The goal of this policy was not only to avoid secession, but also to create an environment in which the PRC could keep pursuing reunification.²⁶ A stable environment was important for both the PRC’s dream of reunification and its economic development. As long as leading powers did not see the PRC as a threat they would not try to stop its development. Therefore, the keywords often used to describe Hu Jintao’s line of action are “stability and development” as they reflect the President’s policies and general political approach to Taiwanese relations (“no independence, no use of force”).²⁷ While Hu Jintao was in power, Taiwan had another round of elections, with Ma Ying-jeou as the winner. Soon after his election, President Ma declared his policy of the so-called “Three-No’s”: no *de jure* independence, no dialogue about reunification, and no force involved. In conclusion, Hu’s period was characterized by his strive for stability.²⁸ The goal of stopping Taiwanese secession was strengthened with the promulgation of the Anti-Secessionist Law. Furthermore, President Hu tried to create the basis for a possible future reunification. His approach on the matter was pro-status quo from the beginning and reflected the general idea of “peaceful development” present in the majority of the policies he promoted.²⁹

The approach of the PRC’s current President Xi Jinping is not far from his predecessor’s.

23 Huang and Li, *Inseparable separation*.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Hu Lingwei, “The Basic Features and Challenges of Cross-Strait Relations in the New Era” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 32, no. 1 (2010): 5-12.

27 Tang, “New trends in the Cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan.”

28 Huang and Li, *Inseparable separation*.

29 Ibid.

The general feeling, after the recent meeting³⁰ between Xi and Ma, is that the PRC's President is trying to narrow the gap in order to keep the relations between the two sides of the Strait prosperous. This demonstrates that a resolution remains distant.

The PRC'S Reasons to Retain the Status Quo

As the years pass, a solution to the Taiwanese issue seems further and further away. Charney and Prescott have proposed some solutions in their work "Resolving Cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan."³¹ They present two possible extreme scenarios that are currently rejected by both sides: one, complete Taiwanese independence, or two, complete reunification with the Mainland. The use of force as a tool for solving the problem is unlikely because it could affect both sides negatively. In addition, the initiator of the war could be prosecuted through international law. If only peaceful solutions are taken into account, the issue might be solved through a "third party tribunal," even though both the PRC and the ROC are reluctant to have an external body deciding their future. The preferred strategy, at least for now, is to maintain the status quo, which Charney and Prescott define as "masterly inactivity."³² In the following sections, the consequences of Taiwanese independence and reunification with the PRC will be analyzed.

PRC's credibility could be affected by Taiwanese independence

In the twentieth century both the PRC and the ROC have tried to increase their soft power,³³ although their target countries were, and still are, different. The PRC has been trying to convey itself as a model for developing and authoritarian countries. In recent years, Mainland China has also started to become economically involved with some developing African countries, in order to expand its soft power. If Taiwan declared independence, the PRC's soft power would be highly affected, since the "China model" of development (characterised by a state-driven policy system) therefore would be seen as less effective. The PRC has also been trying to emerge as a power that gives a lot of importance to stability and peace, an example being the "Six Party Talks," and does not welcome any changes in the status quo that could damage its international image. The PRC is one of the world's leading powers, it is therefore of key importance that its rise is not perceived as a threat by any other prominent power. This is one of the main reasons behind the common use of the word *heping*³⁴ (peaceful) by Chinese leaders. On

30 November 7th, 2015 in Singapore.

31 Charney I. Jonathan and Prescott R. V. John, "Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan," *The American Journal of International Law* 94, no. 3 (2000): 453-477.

32 Ibid.

33 Soft power is defined by Nye (2011:20-21) as 'the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes'.

34 和平

the other hand, Taiwanese soft power has mainly been perceived as a reflection of the US' influence, it was needed to defend the island from the growing power of the PRC.³⁵ The soft power issue is complicated, but nevertheless the PRC cannot afford to lose its influence. One way to retain its soft power is not allowing Taiwan to be independent and stressing the importance of a "peaceful dialogue" across the Strait. Maintaining the status quo is central to the PRC's agenda connected to the expansion of its influence on the international stage.

Economic ties

When the PRC began to open up, the ROC's investments in Mainland China increased drastically. As a result, trade with the Mainland became more and more important for the Taiwanese economy, to the point where the island became more dependent on the PRC.³⁶ The PRC has always positively received Taiwanese investments. In fact, it has also promulgated a law "for the Protection of Investment Made by Taiwan Compatriots"³⁷ in the 1990s and, in 2000, the PRC decided to promulgate rules to clarify and make the trade process easier.³⁸ As the years passed, the Taiwanese economy became more dependent on trade with the Mainland. This is seen as a reason for Taiwan not to change the status quo, while also being a reason for the PRC to retain it. Taiwan has been a model of economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. If Taiwanese independence was accomplished, the PRC would "lose face."³⁹ The Taiwanese "model" would win over the PRC's, and as a consequence the Mainland could also lose soft power in authoritarian countries, which look up to its development.⁴⁰ The PRC also sees the current status quo and the strong economic ties as assets that play an important role in retaining its influence over Taiwan.⁴¹

Geographical position of Formosa

In the "White Paper" published in 1993, the PRC stressed that Taiwan is geographically part of China and that its separation would create an empty space in Chinese "perfect" geography.⁴² As a matter of fact, the position of the island is important to the Mainland because it gives access to the Pacific. Some argue that this could be the real reason for the PRC to pursue reunification, since Taiwan could turn out to be an important asset for

35 Jacques deLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy," *Orbis* 54, no. 4 (2010): 493-524.

36 C.C. Hsieh, "Pragmatic diplomacy."

37 Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan*, 75.

38 Ibid.

39 *Diu mianzi* 丢面子 or *Diu lian* 丢脸 means "to feel publicly humiliated because of an action displaying your incompetence or immorality to others" (Schoenhals, 1993).

40 deLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place."

41 Fu Lin, "As Hazy as Ever, the Cross-Strait Status Quo" *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (2008): 141-147.

42 John F. Copper, *Words across the Taiwan Strait: a critique of Beijing's "White paper" on China's reunification* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).

the control of the sea, since its location provides access to resources and possibility of military advantages.⁴³ At the same time, the current status quo is better than separation. Even if gaining control of the sea is relevant to Chinese strategy, the PRC still believes that a peaceful coexistence is an acceptable solution in the short term.

Possible endangerment of PRC's internal stability

The PRC has always faced many internal threats to its stability and legitimacy. It has to be noted that the PRC has established five autonomous regions,⁴⁴ many of which have raised issues concerning independence, namely the regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia.⁴⁵ If Taiwan succeeded in gaining independence, the above mentioned regions could also try to pursue independence of their own, which would undermine the PRC's stability. Therefore, the PRC is trying to retain the status quo to avoid internal problems and avoid facing such threats of independence.⁴⁶

Goal of "one country, two systems"

The policy of "one country, two systems" was initiated by Deng Xiaoping and is currently applied to Hong Kong and Macau. This policy reflects the idea of the recognition of the principle of "one China" and allows the PRC more direct control over these areas, while allowing a certain degree of autonomy. As stated in sub-section 3.3, the PRC views Taiwan as an important part of China. As a consequence, the application of the "one country, two systems" policy on the island of Formosa could guarantee the PRC more control over it. However, in 2000, Chen Shui-bian refused this policy, because it was created before the process of democratisation started in Taiwan and therefore would not be effective now.⁴⁷ As a consequence, the PRC publically values positively the possibility of retaining the status quo.

Non Status-quo: the Reunification Scenario

It is important not only to consider the change from the status quo to Taiwanese independence, but also the opposite scenario: reunification. The process of reunification could likely only happen under peaceful terms, considering that Taiwan is under the US-Japan defence umbrella and a war would not be ideal for the PRC.⁴⁸ In case of a non-peaceful attempt by the PRC to take over Taiwan, the consequences would be enormous,

43 Wachman, *Why Taiwan?*

44 Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Tibet and Inner Mongolia.

45 Ibid.

46 Tang, "New trends in the Cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan."

47 Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?*; C.R. Huges, "Democratization and Beijing's Taiwan Policy" in: *Democratization in Taiwan: implications for China* edited by S. Tsang, and H. M. Tien (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1999): 130-147.

48 E.E. Dagdag, "China-Taiwan (Cross-Strait) Relations and the Philippines," in: *Ensuring Interests: Dynamics of China-Taiwan Relations and Southeast Asia* edited by K. Ho.

not only for the neighbouring countries, but also for other powers, such as the US. The reunification would also likely alarm Japan, which could perceive the PRC's action to be the first step towards further expansion.⁴⁹ Taiwanese return to the Mainland could be seen as a defeat for democracy by an authoritarian regime. This aspect would give birth to major concerns among world powers, since it would demonstrate an increased ability of the PRC to project its power in the region.

Conclusion

The aim of this essay is to analyze the reasons behind the PRC's interest in retaining the status quo regarding Taiwan independence. The first part of the essay provided historical background, which underlined the different approaches adopted by the PRC and the ROC over the years, in regards to the Cross-Strait issue. The relations between the two parties have undergone some crises, but have also improved, especially from an economic point of view. Since the two ruling parties agreed on the "one China" concept, the status quo has remained unaltered and relations had improved steadily until the threat of a possible declaration of independence of Taiwan. As a response to this, the PRC promulgated the "Anti-Secession Law" in 2005, putting stability before the goal of reunification.

As already stated, the current goal is stability and neither the PRC nor the ROC is interested in starting a Cross-Strait crisis that could affect their economy.⁵⁰ Currently, both Mainland China and Taiwan are focused on economic development and prosperity in a peaceful environment.⁵¹ The status quo would seem to allow continuity and certainty to this. Whether the PRC and the ROC will reach an agreement on reunification or independence in the future is currently not urgent for the PRC, because the status quo ensures both sides a certain degree of stability that no party has interest in losing.

In conclusion, the PRC is interested in maintaining the status quo in order to avoid damaging its image on the international stage and also to continue projecting its image of a "peacefully developing country." At the same time, the PRC is persistent in pursuing its goal of creating an effective "one country, two systems" scenario and not allowing Taiwanese independence. The status quo equilibrium is not as fragile as it might seem and is likely to be retained in the near future, as both sides of the Taiwanese Strait are unwilling to change it. **GPR**

49 Wachman, *Why Taiwan?*.

50 deLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place."

51 Huang and Li, *Inseparable separation*.

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Diplomatic Relations with the DPRK: India as a Global Case Study

Justin Kim-Hummel

Abstract: India's "backstage" relationship with the DPRK is an important case study from not only a historical perspective, but also as an insight into successful diplomatic relations. As one of the few countries with strong ties in both Koreas, India is a relevant example of how to "manage North Korea" as the United States normalizes diplomatic relations with Cuba and Iran. The lessons of India's past can be applied to contemporary times. The analysis of this relationship regarding solely North Korea has yet to be formalized and explored in an academic sense. With only a handful of substantive pieces written, it is important to review the diplomatic ties between these two nations from a "how to" perspective and understand the best way to utilize their future relations based on their history, including from the US perspective. With next to no formal academic research on the DPRK-India diplomatic ties outside of a few short think-tank articles, this paper will allow researchers to be more aware of this blossoming affiliation, relevant literature and ever-growing importance for the future of the DPRK. This paper facilitates discussion and interest between the two nations as the DPRK continues to define itself under Kim Jung Un's rule; additionally regarding the current US perspective in relation to Cuba and the Iran Nuclear Deal.

Keywords: *North Korea, DPRK, India, Obama Trifecta, Kim Jung Un, Iran Nuclear Deal.*

Introduction

On December 10, 1973, India opened official diplomatic relations with the DPRK, having maintained consular relations since March 1, 1962.¹ Both countries have a fully functioning embassy in each other's capital and work towards strengthening relations through cultural exchange and understanding. The relationship was founded on the cooperation as members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Korea-India Friendship Association in 1970.² At the time, India had taken an active role in respecting the sovereignty of nations and continues to today. As their relationship grew, the DPRK's arms sale to Pakistan in the 1990's proved a point where India could have reacted emotionally. Instead, this transaction seemed to open a second doorway and renewed the bilateral Indian-North Korean relations.

1 "India-DPRK Relations 2013," Indian Ministry of External Affairs Report, accessed August 8, 2015, http://mea.gov.in/indian-mission.htm?504/Korea_DPR

2 "India-DPRK Relations 2013-2015," Indian Ministry of External Affairs Report, accessed August 8, 2015, http://mea.gov.in/indian-mission.htm?504/Korea_DPR.

Justin Kim-Hummel is a Master's Candidate at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

E-mail: wkimhum1@jhu.edu

Since diplomatic relations were formed, there was little research or sources available for review outside of the most recent Indian Ministry reports starting in 2003. Therefore, I will focus on the creation of the association, solely regarding North Korea, beginning with the Korean War, Non-Aligned Movement and the year 2000 onward when the countries ramped up visits and exchanges. Only in the last few years have academics started critically analyzing the Indian-DPRK alliance. India should be viewed as a partner trying to strengthen relations with North Korea to foster stability in the region. This article draws on the few pre-2000 sources available, focusing on diplomatic cables, India Ministry reports, and treaties. Post-2000, this article used reports that analyzed the relationship as well as Indian, North and South Korean newspaper articles. With little information on DPRK's policy towards India, this article will evaluate the relationship from India's perspective and to a much lesser extent, the United States. As such, I propose using India's strategy could be useful for the US as it opens relations with Iran and Cuba; some academics speculate that North Korea may be next.³

India and North Korea: A Historical Context

To understand how India crafted their relationship with North Korea, the history must be examined between the two countries. While reviewing key differences regarding historical relations between the three published India-DPRK bilateral relations reports,⁴ the 2012 report started with a story of an ancient Korean King marrying a princess of India in A.D. 45. The report then shared a poem by Indian poet and Nobel Prize winner, Rabindranath Tagore:

In the golden age of Asia,
Korea was one of its lamp bearers, and
That lamp is waiting to be lighted once again
For the illumination in the East.

The fact this report included the ancient historical context shows the importance of the relationship between India and Korea. During this era, Tagore was thought of highly by all Koreans and his poem inspired the country during the Korean War. To this day, his work is referenced in Korean textbooks and published throughout the Koreas.⁵ From this literary connection, India took on the role of a "father-in-law" of the Kim dynasty

3 Evan J.R. Revere, "U.S. Normalization with Cuba: Is North Korea Next?" last modified December 18, 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/12/18-north-korea-cuba-revere>.

4 "India-DPRK Relations 2013-2015," Indian Ministry of External Affairs Report, accessed August 8, 2015, http://mea.gov.in/indian-mission.htm?504/Korea_DPR.

5 Kim Yang-Shik, "Tagore and Korea," accessed July 10, 2015, <http://www.euro-tongil.org/swedish/english/Tagore%20and%20Korea%20By%20Kim%20Yang-shik.pdf>.

in modern North Korea from a Confucian historical context. With this self-proclaimed role, India has taken care of North Korea through aid and cultural exchanges that will be discussed further.⁶ With this ancient Confucian patriarchal connection, North Korea built a solid foundation with India as evidenced moving towards the Korean War.

*India's Role in the Korean War*⁷

Starting before the Korean War, India maintained its stance for the independence of the "Whole Korea." To exemplify this attitude, India did not support the war with armed forces, but offered aid on humanitarian grounds. India supported Korea as a strong mediator, sitting on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). The nation of India believed Korea should be one nation and wanted to peacefully resolve the conflict if possible, as was the main view of the UNTCOK. During the war, India not only tried to stabilize the region, as a newly independent nation, but also aimed to keep China and the US appeased by not interfering militarily. India's neutral stance allowed the country to build meaningful relations with the region and become the leader of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). This led to an exchange of war prisoners between the Koreas near the end of the war.⁸ India's leadership in the repatriation exchange between the North and South was enacted through the UN and the South viewed this as pro-communist, viewing India as a North Korea sympathizer. Even before and after the Korean War, India felt that the Koreas should resolve their issues exclusively between each other and hold elections on their terms, evidenced by publicly admonishing the Rhee government in the South. India's ideas remained congruent with their actions during the Korean War, which led to strengthened relations with both Koreas.

The Non-Aligned Movement

Being an independent and sovereign nation, the premise of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, is a foundational belief between India's colonialism period, North Korea's "forced" division and self-proclaimed need for isolation and independence. This aforementioned history and need for self-created and self-enforced policies created deepening relations for India and North Korea, as well as other members of the NAM. North Korea joined NAM based on Kim Il Sung's views of Juché ideology and its parallels with the movement. This membership is one of the cornerstones of legitimacy for the DPRK government and created a group of nations that they can relate to across the world, including India.⁹ In order to specifically look at the NAM in relation to the DPRK and

6 Ranjit Kumar Dhawan, "India's North Korean relatives," *The Korea Times*, April 21, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2015/04/162_177486.html

7 Kim, Chan Wahn, "The Role of India in the Korean War." *International Area Review* 13, no. 2, (2010).

8 Ibid.

9 R.R. Krishnan, "North Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement," *International Studies* 20, no.

India, this paper references declassified telegrams and cables from 1977-78, shortly after DPRK joined NAM in 1976. Starting chronologically, a telegram from ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi 1977¹⁰ discussed the upcoming meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of NAM and the recent trends of North Korea. The ROK Minister reported that North Korea wanted India's help in proposing a resolution regarding Korean reunification. While India supported their fellow NAM member, they felt the venue was not appropriate as the NAM felt the "Korea question" should be handled between the Koreans. Due to India's advice to withdraw their agenda for discussion, North Korea decided to trust India and leave the UN out of the matter, "in light of principles from the NAM." Shortly after the meeting, another telegram was sent from the UN to the ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs providing a summary of the meeting, specifically regarding India and North Korea's motivations.¹¹ Knowing the backstory between the two from the first telegram, it is evident that North Korea carried on the North-South political negotiation even against India's advice to wait. The UN Deputy Director deemed India "pro-Korean" due to North Korea approaching India to redraft their proposal that was rejected at the previous NAM Heads of State meeting. Even though India rejected North Korea's draft, it sympathized with the North Koreans at the meeting by not providing name tags to observers and guests of the meeting so the South Korean Ambassador's presence would not be known. The Deputy Director stated that the North Koreans had little support for their proposal to renew talks on the "Korean Matter" and were discouraged from raising the issue at the meeting, as warned by India. As realized by exchanges, the relationship between India and North Korea are deeply entwined throughout the Cold War on the foundational principles of the NAM.

India-DPRK Ties: Through Diplomatic Cables in the Cold War Era (1957-1990)

1957-1974

Shortly after the Korean War, due to the strong ideals shared between India and the DPRK regarding the NAM, the countries reached out to each other to form legitimate diplomatic ties. Due to the lack of records and review during this time period and the increasing tension of the Cold War, this paper utilizes telegrams and diplomatic notes. It is evident that the DPRK was searching for a "big brother" in Asia during this historical era. December 10, 1957, a note between DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister Pak Seong-Cheol

1-2 (1981): 299-313.

10 "Telegram from the Minister of Foreign," March 8, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Roll 2007-25, File 7, Frame 73-77, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive, accessed via Wilson Center 8/2015, [Http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118383](http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118383).

11 "Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Deputy Director of the United Nations Division," April 10, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Roll 2007-25, File 7, Frame 73-77, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive: Accessed via Wilson Center 8/2015: [Http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118384](http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118384).

and German Democratic Republic (GDR-East Germany) Ambassador Fischer inquired about the DPRK's proposed foreign policy and trade relations in the region.¹² The GDR Ambassador requested answers regarding the DPRK and Bandung states, among the countries was India. On August 19, 1957, the GDR asked what North Korea's ideas were on furthering trade and what benefits they would gain by signing a bilateral trade agreement. It was found that the DPRK sent a delegation to Beijing to meet with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. While India wanted to ease into the trade agreement, waiting to formalize trade until results were seen, North Korea wanted a finalized document. DPRK Deputy Minister Pak mentioned that India was unwilling to finalize agreements due to its current trade with the United States, England, Japan and West Germany. The two countries agreed that trade would be started informally and the countries would exchange banking delegations. In the following year, March 15, 1958, the DPRK was still working diligently to establish support in the region to legitimize their nation on a global front. A note from the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK shared of Nam Il's (North Korean General and signer of Korean Armistice Agreement) mustering for support to withdraw US troops from the ROK. He hoped to achieve this by forming "economic and cultural ties" with several countries including India.¹³ Ultimately, India strengthened relations but kept to their established views on Non-Alignment regarding the Korea question. During the Cold War era, India had relaxed relations with North Korea to keep true to their neutrality. Therefore, communications with the DPRK were rare. Not until after 1973, when diplomatic relations were formalized with the North and South, did communiqués and visits restart. A partially redacted confidential cable¹⁴ discussing India House Speaker Murahari's trip to North Korea in 1974 showed India had high hopes about the DPRK and willingly retracted a press statement upon Kim Il Sung's request. It was argued that Kim nodded in agreement regarding China exerting pressure on North Korea. As the reports goes, Kim continued to confide in Murahari, evidenced by Kim's discussion of the South's plan to build tourist accommodations in North Korea. Kim continued by sharing that he thought North Korea as a member of the "third world." Murahari replied to Kim asking him to consider the South's building project; Kim then emphasized the need to have "primary relationships with the developing countries rather than be dependent

12 "Note about a Meeting on 29 November 1957 between Deputy Foreign Minister Pak Seong-Cheol with GDR Ambassador Comrade Fischer Comrade Behrens," December 10, 1957, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BA*. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer: Accessed via Wilson Center 7/2015 <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110011>.

13 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 15 March 1958," March 15, 1958, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F.0102, Op. 14, Delo 6, Listy 61-70*. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg. Accessed via Wilson Center 8/2015: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115973>.

14 "Confidential Cable from Indian Upper House Deputy Speaker Godey Murahari reflecting on trip to North Korea 1974," accessed via Wikileaks August 8, 2015: http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NEWDE15888_b.html.

on its northern neighbors.”¹⁵ As the talk continued, the leaders discussed the DPRK’s export market and commitment to expand exports to India. Knowing Murahari was strongly anti-communist, he commented that North Koreans were the “most inflexible communists he had ever encountered.”¹⁶ This conversation is one of the first Foreign Office Consultations (FOCs) of many that the two countries exchanged since 1974. Due to lack of documentation, this conversation between Murahari and Kim could show the first strong step forward for diplomatic relations. This is manifested in the purported candidness of Kim in order to bolster the DPRK during its struggle to legitimize its sovereignty. This sets the foundation for analyzing post-1974 relations.

India declares the DPRK a Most Favored Nation: Treaties of 1974-1978

On February 18, 1974, India and the DPRK signed a treaty formalizing trade between the countries, which granted the status of most favored nation to each other.¹⁷ This, perhaps from the aforementioned cable with Kim Il Sung and the exchange of embassies in 1973, marked the beginning of diplomatic relations. This trade agreement followed with an official continuation of the trade agreement in 1978¹⁸ lengthening the list of traded goods and affirming the desire to continue “successful economic and trade relations.” While there is no recorded trade data during this era between the two countries, the continuous renewal between India and the DPRK may imply a mutual benefit. While trade presumptively blossomed, in 1976, the two countries signed a cultural agreement¹⁹ that proved a springboard for relations in the 1980s during the thaw of the Cold War. This agreement set the framework for cooperation regarding humanities and reciprocal visits of delegations in order to promote the awareness of each country. Starting in the early 1990s, the exchange of academic material, culture, and training became prevalent as each country emerged from threats of the Cold War. Understanding the history of relations before 1990 helps put the future in context between the two nations.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Trade Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1974, INTSer 7: Accessed via Indian Treaty Series 8/2015 <http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1974/7.html>.

18 Trade Agreement between the Government of India and The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 3 February 1978. Accessed 8/2015 via Indian Treaty Series: <http://www.liiofindia.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1978/6.html?query=democratic%20people%27s%20republic%20of%20korea>.

19 Cultural Agreement Between the Government of India and The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2 July 1978. Accessed 8/2015 via Indian Treaty Series: <http://www.liiofindia.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1976/14.html?query=democratic%20people%27s%20republic%20of%20korea>.

Modern Relations: Analysis of Indian MEA Reports Regarding North Korea

Keeping the historical context in mind, starting in the early 1990s more documentation of cultural and economic exchange between India and North Korea became available. Specifically, five similar reports²⁰ from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) published by the Indian Embassy in Pyongyang which outlined bilateral treaties, agreements, visits, investment, and current events. Each report is no more than five pages, with only the most recent (published in 2014) being accessible from India's DPRK Embassy website. The website provides a handful of press releases from the last few years discussing events held in North Korea and relevant delegation visits. Firstly, due to a Right to Information response from the MEA,²¹ as of April 2015, the embassy employed four Indian Nationals and four DPRK Nationals in its 295 sq. meter building in Pyongyang. The request asked for more specifics regarding the roles of both sets of employees, but the MEA only partially answered three of 25 questions. Starting with the 2005 report, the first published by the MEA, it is clear across all of the reports that India takes the stance of peaceful relations between the Koreas supporting the DPRK in UN proceedings, NAM, and Foreign Office Consultations (FOCs). The 2014 report emphasizes the DPRK's support for India's campaign as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, in addition to 18 separate considerations. In return, India made note that they abstained from voting on Human Rights issues against the DPRK in all international forums. Also across all reports, the MEA highlighted the bilateral treaties and agreements enacted since 1991. Some of the highlighted achievements are the Science and Technology Agreement of 1991, continuous renewal of the 1976 Cultural Agreement, and the Sharing of Information act signed in April 2006 (which has not been finalized). Also noted are 14 visits from India and 10 visits from the DPRK, most of which had no media coverage. These visits range from 1998-2013 (as the last report was published in 2014) covering mostly ceremonial visits between officials stemming from the Cultural Agreement between the two nations.

India-DPRK Trade

The next section shows what little trade data is available between the two countries. Comparing the reports, it is seen that across all five, the Indian government prefaces the data stating a trade decline due to the DPRK's "inability to carry on foreign trade due to financial crunch" even though the numbers from the Indian Ministry of Commerce show no reliable correlation:

20 Indian Ministry of External Affairs Report. "India-DPRK Relations 2013-2015." Accessed 8/2015. http://mea.gov.in/indian-mission.htm?504/Korea_DPR.

21 "Right to Information Request (India) Regarding the Indian Embassy in Pyongyang", April 4, 2015. Accessed via Right to Information Request of unknown article author. <http://imgur.com/zjUUQd2>.

Year	Indian Exports to DPRK	DPRK Exports to India
2001-02	\$170	\$19
2002-03	\$157.86	\$4.66
2003-04	\$115.35	\$1.07
2010-11	\$329.13	\$143.98
2011-12	\$.31	\$.49
2013-14	\$186.8	\$12.48

*Data in Millions of USD, Reported by Indian Ministry of Commerce 2001-2014. ²² Compiled by Justin Kim-Hummel

The data above, according to the 2013 MEA report, stated “our commercial and economic relations with DPRK do not appear to be moving anywhere and there are no credible figures available for India’s trade volume with DPRK.” Even with the doubt and lack of data from DPRK’s Foreign Trade Office, India began participating in DPRK’s International Trade Fairs starting in 2010. The 2012 report mentioned North Korea wanting goods on a “deferred payment option” which India deemed unacceptable due to the DPRK’s lack of shipping infrastructure and banking system. India instead wanted to explore foreign direct investment, to which the DPRK agreed. The main hindrance to the trade relationship is the distance and lack of shipping infrastructure in the DPRK.

Cultural, Humanitarian, and Educational Exchange

Between the reports, two to three of the five pages of each report highlighted the benefits of cultural, educational and humanitarian contributions. Starting in 2002, India offered an IT training program to the DPRK, increasing allotments from five to ten spots available in 2013. India also offered two slots to the DPRK for defense training. Historically, the DPRK underutilized the spots due to bureaucratic reasons. All reports also emphasized the humanitarian assistance India gave to the DPRK over the years, mostly in response to “natural calamities.” The only figure available from the reports stated India provided over US\$ 1million in food assistance through the World Food Program in 2011. Cultural activities between the two countries are more relevant, having founded the Korea-India Friendship Association in 1970 and promotion of their participation and awards at the Pyongyang Film Festival each year. The Friendship Association has regular funding from the Indian Department of Culture to sustain their Friendship Farm and School in North Korea. While the reports listed minute details of the relations, there were no media reports that mentioned these activities, outside of ceremonial visits marking diplomatic relations anniversaries and each country’s independence days.

After the Death of Kim Jong-Il: Deepening Ties (2011-Present)

²² “India-DPRK Relations 2013-2015,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, accessed August 8, 2015, http://mea.gov.in/indian-mission.htm?504/Korea_DPR.

Leading up to the death of Kim Jong-Il, India intensified its relationship with North Korea and began offering aid to the famine stricken country. Knowing that the country experienced a poor harvest, India decided to reopen talks with the country. Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea's Ambassador to India, went to Indian officials and explained the hard times the country had fallen upon and requested aid, which was unusual as North Korea usually rejected aid as a sign of its self-sufficiency.²³ As a sign of trust, the two countries started to work together again. Shortly after they agreed on the aid, the DPRK briefed India's Ambassador in Pyongyang "so comprehensively that it rivalled those normally afforded in the chancelleries of free societies." India's Ambassador Pratap Singh supervised the aid distribution through the World Food Programme due to strengthened ties with North Korea's Ministry. Drawing on that momentum, normal diplomatic exchanges started to occur as outlined in the MEA reports. More recently in April 2015, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj welcomed North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong to New Delhi to discuss India's security concerns regarding North Korea.²⁴ Ri Su Yong's visit is the first to India by a DPRK Foreign Minister. The meeting symbolized commitment to "re-assessing" its relationship with North Korea. Minister Swaraj stated India would "positively" consider giving additional aid to the DPRK. The underlying tone of this meeting highlighted a nuclear Pakistan and subtle nudges were given to Minister Ri to stop supporting India's threatening neighbor. If the conversation carried any weight, North Korea may decide to lean on stable India for support during this turbulent time in Asia rather than supply arms to Pakistan. During most of their bilateral meetings, the history of Pakistani-North Korea were discussed often. Time will tell if North Korea took this meeting seriously as the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in North Korea did not publish their accounts.²⁵ A statement issued by the Indian MEA tells of the candid and friendly talks and that emphasized "peace and stability on the Korean peninsula for India's Act East Policy" revamped by Prime Minister Modi. In current times and throughout history, India standing up for itself with North Korea was mentioned when the previous Indian Foreign Minister Khurshid met with DPRK Minister Ri on the sidelines of the 2013 East Asia Summit. Khurshid denounced the DPRK's 2013 nuclear test and explained to Ri "that it was important not to get isolated. If you do not get isolated, you will have friends to help you. But if you get isolated, it becomes difficult for even your friends to help you."²⁶ These words from India may not have fallen on deaf ears. Since meeting, the chatter between New Delhi and Pyongyang have increased as India postures itself as an international power and mediator in Asia.

23 K.P. Nayar, "The food bridge India built with Kim's Korea," *The Telegraph*, Dec. 20, 2011.

24 "External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj Conveys Security Concerns to North Korea," *All India, Press Trust of India*, April 13 2015.

25 Rajaram Panda, "Significance of North Korean Foreign Minister's Visit to India- Analysis," *The Eurasia Review*, April 17 2015.

26 Ibid.

The Turning Tide: 2015 and Beyond

With India providing aid and advice to North Korea, instances of Indian meetings have sprung up in the *Rodong Sinmun* (North Korea's Worker's Party Paper) in August and September of 2015.²⁷ In celebration of North Korea's 70th anniversary of self-proclaimed liberation, India formed a committee to organize events regarding this occasion by the General Secretary of Congress. In return, a report was published telling of the "congratulations" that India sent to Kim Jong Un regarding the anniversary, highlighting the friendly ties and "efforts to boost bilateral cooperation."²⁸ North Korea is generally very selective in the stories they share in their national newspaper; the fact India has started to appear more frequently indicates warming relations to come, especially in light of the United States' new relations with Iran and Cuba. Following this press, Indian Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju and General Secretary Sitaram Yechury both visited the Indian Embassy in Pyongyang to mark the DPRK's Independence Day.²⁹ This self-proclaimed "quiet but extremely significant diplomatic move" shows India's seriousness in warming ties. The increased rhetoric proves that India wants to balance the region and further trade.

India and the Obama Trifecta

Current Press Regarding DPRK in Relation to Iran and Cuba Relations with US

While most research done prior to 2015 on India-DPRK rehashed Indian Ministry reports and the few academic perspectives written rehashed these reports, it is imperative that as we gather more data, India-DPRK relations are viewed as moving into a new era. The analysis of the reports and history are needed to understand how the two countries have arrived at their current relationship. The context shows two nations that have taken care of each other on the premise of promoting their independent thoughts without forced foreign influence. India, a rising giant in the world, and North Korea, the last secluded state, are working together to bring the DPRK out of the dark. Washington is finally beginning to realize the importance of opening the world on each country's terms. An Indian Congressman, Hamdullah Saeed, recently visited Pyongyang and remarked, "[t] here is a rush for strategic resources in the countries like North Korea that were blockaded and sanctioned away from global economy. India should be an early bird in North Korea just in case North Korean economic ties with the world undergo change in near future."³⁰

27 "Greetings to Kim Jong Un from Indian President," *Rodong Shinmun*, Sep 10, 2015; "Kim Yong Nam Meets Indian Ambassador to DPRK," *Rodong Shinmun*, Sep 22, 2015.

28 "DPRK's Important Days to Be Celebrated in India" *Rodong Sinmun*, Aug 4 2015.

29 Bhattacharjee Kallol, "India Reaches out, wants to upgrade ties with North Korea," *The Hindu*, Sep 16, 2015.

30 Ibid.

To mirror this comment from the US side, Evans J.R. Revere of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and distinguished Foreign Service Officer, wrote in December of 2014 about why the DPRK is such “an outlier in contemporary international society.”³¹ Revere mentions that many times during his career, he saw glimmers of hope for DPRK-US relations based on the agreement between the countries to open liaison offices nearly 20 years ago. It appears Pyongyang’s consistent renegeing of agreements has led them to stay locked above the 38th parallel. The general consensus of recent reports³² explains that North Korea has the winning hand to tear down its walls on their terms if they agree to cede some control of their nuclear operations. If North Korea allowed nuclear inspections, the US may follow the path they led with Iran and Cuba and allow the DPRK’s economy to modernize. The sheer force of US business interests in Iran, Cuba and China all pushed for the US government to normalize ties, as evidenced by the Iran, nuclear deal dropping most all sanctions and giving Iran access to over US\$100billion. The question is, how can India start to reason with North Korea in order for them to take advantage of this situation? An anonymous official from the US Army Pacific command, which includes North Korea expressed that “[w]e need to share their [India’s] perspectives as it can help us [the US] to improve our own understanding and perhaps approach towards North Korea,” India’s views are critical to understanding how the US might start making way towards establishing relations with the nation.³³ With Vietnam and, most recently Cuba, used as a case study for lifted sanctions and economic reform, North Korea may be starting to see the bigger picture. South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye addressed similar parallels before the UN General Assembly on September 28, 2015. She proclaimed North Korea, “the last remaining non-proliferation challenge,” and feels, “the DPRK would do well to choose reform and opening rather than additional provocations and to endeavor to free its people from hardship.”³⁴

Conclusions: Lesson Learned from India

Seeing how India slowly built rapport with North Korea over the last 100 years, the United States may need to take baby steps before gaining trust in Pyongyang. Due to the US contributing to the division of the Koreas and sanctioning the DPRK many times over, North Korea is passively searching for an olive branch. India’s main lessons to apply in the US case are that it offered aid and knowledge without asking for much in

31 Evans J.R. Revere, “U.S. Normalization with Cuba: Is North Korea Next?,” *Brookings Institute* Dec 18, 2014.

32 John Feffer, “After Iran, Is North Korea Next?” *Institute for Policy Studies*, Sept 26 2015; “After Iran, is North Korea Next?” *The Christian Science Monitor* July 20, 2015; Shweta Desai, “Why is US pleased with India’s outreach to North Korea?” *Scroll.in* accessed through the Nautilus Institute, Apr 16 2015.

33 Shweta Desai, “Why is US pleased with India’s outreach to North Korea?” *Scroll.in* accessed through the Nautilus Institute, Apr 16 2015.

34 “Pak Geun-Hye address to UN General Assembly,” *UN News Centre*, Sept 28, 2015.

return while respecting the sovereignty of the DPRK. Although India expressed concern over Pakistan, it subtly hinted at that issue over many years of educational, cultural and trade exchange, allowing North Korea to make decisions on their own accord. Yes, the United States is pushing for denuclearization of North Korea, but in order to be effective, the Six-Party Talks must be restarted and small concessions need to be made, as in the Iran Nuclear deal.³⁵ Despite North Korea's claims that it is not interested in an "Iran deal,"³⁶ the US offered a very similar plan under the Clinton administration that was agreed to by the DPRK³⁷ and again could offer a modified plan for North Korea's review. With Obama's administration coming to a close, he may be working on completing his trifecta³⁸ but will need to lay off of the hardline "denuclearize or nothing" attitude. Due to UN sanctions, the DPRK has no mainstream official channels to build infrastructure and help their impoverished citizens. Their only bargaining chip is nuclear weapons and threat of engagement they cannot afford to act on. The US realizes India is making advances with not only North, but also South Korea. Through respecting the DPRK's sovereignty, as evidenced by India, relations can be established. Once India started to warm up to North Korea, it was able to offer candid remarks and still be considered friends. Noam Chomsky expressed the best proof of how to deal with North Korea, which stemmed from India's moral foundation and understanding that the DPRK is a nation that wants to be respected: "In 1993, Israel and North Korea were moving towards an agreement in which North Korea would stop sending any missiles or military technology to the Middle East and *Israel would recognize that country*."³⁹ US President Clinton stepped in and deemed that request unacceptable. However, India knew all along: recognize and respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and relations enter a new level. **GPR**

35 Katzmann and Kerr, *Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Reports, August 6, 2015, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44142.pdf>.

36 John Feffer, "After Iran, is North Korea Next?" *The Christian Science Monitor* July 20, 2015

37 Matt Vespa, "That time Bill Clinton Said North Korea would Dismantle Its Nuclear Program," *Townhall.com*, Apr 7, 2015. <http://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2015/04/07/that-time-bill-clinton-said-north-korea-will-dismantle-its-nuke-program-n1981099>.

38 Tim Beal, "Will North Korea Make Obama's Trifecta? Don't bet on it" June 9, 2015, <http://www.nknews.org/2015/06/will-north-korea-make-obamas-trifecta-dont-bet-on-it/>.

39 Noam Chomsky, "Noam Chomsky, The Eve of Destruction," *Tomdispatch.com*, June 4, 2013, <http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175707/http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175707/>.

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Visual Metaphors in North Korean Graphic Novels for Children

Jacco Zwetsloot

Abstract: North Korea produces dozens of comic books each year for its children of various ages. Comic books for younger readers are often populated with anthropomorphized animal characters – not humans. Some of them tell stories that seem to be allegories of the Korean War. In these graphic novels, the animals represent through visual metaphor the various groups found in Korean War stories – good and pure North Koreans, traitorous and cowardly South Koreans, and their evil American overlords. This paper examines these visual metaphors to see how good and bad characters are graphically presented to young North Korean readers.

Keywords: *North Korean, Comics, Visual Metaphors, Children's Literature, Propaganda.*

“No sooner is a form seen than it must resemble something:
humanity seems doomed to analogy.”¹

Introduction²

In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (henceforth “North Korea”), many books are published each year at a number of state-owned publishing houses. Among the dry texts praising the Kim family, history books that teach a very unique view of world events, and textbooks for building a socialist utopia on the Korean peninsula, there are also works of literature. The existence of literary works presumes that people also read for entertainment, as they do in other countries. Still, in North Korea even literature must carry an educational message, in order to fulfill its role in revolution and construction. The genre of graphic novels has been effectively used by the state to provide such messages in an entertaining multi-modal form. This paper examines visual metaphors in North Korean graphic novels written for younger readers, and in particular the visual metaphors used in depicting the characters of those novels. Ultimately, the study aims to provide insights into the narrative and worldview imparted by North Korean graphic novels.

What Are Graphic Novels?

“Graphic novel” is the literary term for what are commonly called comic books. Influential

1 Roland Barthes, cited in David Silverman & Brian Torode, *The Material Word: Some Theories of Language and its Limits* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 187.

2 This paper uses the McCune-Reischauer system to Romanize Korean names and words.

Jacco Zwetsloot has a Master's Degree in Korean Studies from Leiden University.

E-mail: jacco.translates@gmail.com

ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, *Global Politics Review*, <http://www.globalpoliticsreview.com>

American comic book artist Will Eisner popularized the term to talk about a full-length stand-alone story written using comic book techniques. Eisner defined comic books as “sequential art.”³ Scott McCloud, in his seminal work *Understanding Comics*, further developed Eisner’s definition into “juxtaposed pictorial and other images in a deliberate sequence, intended to convey information and/or produce an aesthetic response in the viewer.”⁴

Comic books or graphic novels have certain common characteristics: multiple frames or panels per page, each frame containing a scene, speech balloons containing dialogue, captions or narrations in boxes at the top or bottom of a panel, and gutters between panels. The story is driven forward by a combination of images and text. Not all graphic novels have each of these characteristics on every page, but most do.

In *The Visual Language of Comics*, Neil Cohn argues that comics are not a visual language in and of themselves; rather, they are written *in* a visual language, often combined with a textual language. He defines a visual language as “structurally sequential images” that “are produced in a modality,” that “express meaning,” and that “use a system of rules and constraints for sequential expressions of meaning” (a grammar).⁵ On graphic (or visual) language, Paul Laseau wrote:

The symbols for verbal languages are largely restricted to words, whereas graphic languages include images, signs, numbers, and words. Much more significant, verbal language is sequential – it has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Graphic language is simultaneous – all symbols and their relationships are considered at the same time.⁶

By employing both a visual and a textual language, graphic novels are therefore “multi-modal.”⁷

One characteristic of images, as Barthes explains, is that they are polysemous, that is they do not signify only one thing. Every image implies a “floating chain” of signifieds underlying their signifiers, and each reader can choose how to interpret them.⁸ The text that accompanies an image acts to constrict how it should be interpreted

with respect to the liberty of the signifieds of the image, the text has thus a *repressive* value and we can see that it is at this level that the morality and ideology of a society are above

3 See for example Will Eisner, *Comics and Sequential Art* (Tamarac, FL: Poorhouse Press, 1985) and *Graphic Storytelling and Visual Narrative* (Tamarac, FL: Poorhouse Press, 1996).

4 Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art* (New York: Kitchen Sink Press, 1993), 9.

5 Neil Cohn, *The Visual Language of Comics* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 3-4.

6 Paul Laseau, *Graphic Thinking for Architects and Designers* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1989), 55.

7 Cohn, *The Visual Language of Comics*, 2.

8 Roland Barthes, “The Rhetoric of the Image,” in *Image – Music – Text*, ed. & trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Will and Wang, 1977), 156.

all invested.⁹

This function is what Barthes calls anchoring, because the text anchors the “signifier” (the picture) to a certain “signified” (an object or idea).

Another function of linguistic messages (text) that accompanies graphic messages (pictures) is called “relay.” In a graphic novel, as in a film, text and image work together across time and space (the space of the book) to create a narrative, a story. Therefore, each individual picture and piece of text is part of a larger syntagm. In fact, Barthes specifically cited cartoons and comic strips as an example of where relay is often used.¹⁰

Graphic Novels in North Korea

In East Asia, comic books, newspaper cartoons and comic strips are known by the traditional Chinese characters 漫畫 pronounced *manhwa* in Korean, *manga* in Japanese, and *mànhuà* in Mandarin Chinese. However, in North Korea, the word “*manhwa*” has come to take on a very specific meaning: satirical pictures that poke fun at social problems in class society.¹¹ The term then refers only to one particular style of drawing and one type of narrative content. Books that are labelled “*manhwa*” deal either with South Korean society or with Korea under Japanese colonial rule.¹² Instead of using the designation *manhwa*, North Korea has been labelling comics, since at least 1956,¹³ as *kūrimiyagi* (“picture story”), or, more commonly, *kūrimch’aek*, which literally means “picture book.”

In his 1992 treatise *On Fine Arts*, Kim Jong Il laid out his vision for art production in North Korea. He mentions comic books only once, at the end of a sentence, in the penultimate paragraph of a section on “graphic arts” (in North Korean *ch’ulp’an misul*, literally “published or printed art”): “The forms of illustration need to be diverse. We must also make colourful [sic] the binding that can be likened to the face of the book and develop the comic strip genre.”¹⁴ The unusual English phrasing is from the official English translation; the Korean word in the original for “comic strip” is *ryōnsok kūrim hyōngsik*, literally “sequential picture format.”

The *Korea Encyclopedia* gives this definition of *kūrimch’aek*:

A publication that shows the contents it wishes to convey chiefly through pictures. A

9 Barthes, “The Rhetoric of the Image,” 156-157.

10 Ibid., 157.

11 I have found only eight books labeled “*manhwa*,” published in 1980, 1983, 1985 (two), 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998 out of the 521 volumes that I have catalogued.

12 For a more thorough discussion of the use of the word “*manhwa*” in North Korea, see Han Sang-jōng, “Differences between North & South Korean Usage of “*manhwa*” – Focusing on the Hybridity of the North Korean ‘*kūrimch’aek*’ Sōsan Taesa [Nambukhan ‘*manhwa*’ yongbōp-ūi ch’ai – pukhan ‘*kūrimch’aek*’ [Sōsan taesa]ūi honjongsōng-eul chungshimūro],” *Hyōndae Pukhan Yōn’gu* 14.2 (2011): 7-34.

13 The earliest example I can find is *Hong’gyōng’rae* by Namgung Man, (Pyongyang: Minjuch’ōngsa, 1956), (although the publication date inside reads 1957).

14 Kim Jong Il, *On Fine Arts* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992), 115.

kūrimch'aek is characteristically based on pictures so that the contents it wishes to tell can be grasped intuitively, and the text explains the picture briefly. Therefore, a *kūrimch'aek* is put together in an easy to understand, plain-speaking way, more so than publications that are based on text. *Kūrimch'aek* represent in pictures subject matter that is both novel and has educational value, with as its content all phenomena of nature and society and human creative activity. In doing so, *kūrimch'aek* has a persuasive power that allows readers to see directly with their eyes and to feel [the message]. *Kūrimch'aek* targets a broad readership from young children to senior citizens, and is edited and published with a wide variety of content and formats. *Kūrimch'aek* do not only educate workers, youths and children, they also contribute to broadening their knowledge of nature and society. In order to make a good *kūrimch'aek*, one must choose content that can be represented in pictures and draw pictures so well that the message to be conveyed can be shown intuitively, and one must compress explanatory text to write it briefly.¹⁵

Immediately it becomes clear that *kūrimch'aek* have an educational function. Secondly, while graphic novels are often assumed to be exclusively children's literature, this is not necessarily the case. Just as in the wider world there are graphic novels written for different age groups, so there are North Korean graphic novels for younger readers as well as for adults.¹⁶ Thirdly, what is particularly noteworthy is that none of the standard features that one comes to expect in graphic novels are mentioned: panels, sequential pictures, speech balloons, and so on.

Art in North Korea is controlled by the state through the General Federation of the Unions of Literature and the Arts of Korea (*Chosŏn Munhak Yesul Ch'ongdongmaeng*).¹⁷ All literary works go through a committee of evaluation before publication to ensure that appropriate themes have been chosen and handled correctly.¹⁸ All fine arts (including painting, illustration, music and literature) must serve a purpose. Therefore, the opportunities for free artistic expression are limited.¹⁹

In *On Juche literature*, Kim Jong Il instructs the correct way to produce literary content. It is worth quoting at length what Kim says about the function of literature:

15 Chosŏn Taebaekkwajŏn, *Korea Encyclopedia [Chosŏn Taebaekkwajŏn]* (Pyongyang: Paekkwajŏn Ch'ulp'ansa, 2001) CD-ROM version.

16 Dafna Zur has written an excellent analysis of illustrated children's literature. See her "The Korean War in Children's Picturebooks of the DPRK," in *Exploring North Korean Arts*, ed. Rüdiger Frank, 276-298. Vienna: Verlag für moderne Kunst, 2011.

17 Alzo David-West, "North Korean Aesthetic Theory: Aesthetics, Beauty, and 'Man'," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring 2013), 104.

18 Kim Sŏng-hun & Pak So-hyŏn, *Understanding North Korean Comics [Pukhan manhwa-ŭi ihae]* (Seoul: Sallim Publishing, 2005), 33.

19 In *Cultural policy in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), cultural officials Chai Sin Sik and Hyon Jong Hun write, "We are wary of the principle of art for art's sake, the naturalistic tendency to recognize only the artistic value of a work to the detriment of its ideological significance. [...] [W]e have achieved the just proportion of ideological and artistic values in our literary and artistic works." (Op. cit. p. 24.)

Literature is a good way to provide cultural and emotional education to the people, as well as a powerful weapon for their political and ideological education and for giving them knowledge about life. The purpose of creating literary works is not only to provide people with a correct understanding of the world and sound ideas, but also to cultivate their emotions. Our cultural and emotional education is part of cultivating revolutionary sentiment and national emotion suited to the aesthetic feelings of the era of independence. Literature must contribute to instilling beautiful and noble emotions in the people, and improving their cultural level and human nature. Successful cultural and emotional education is of great significance in cultivating the feelings and emotions with which to acknowledge what is beautiful and noble in life and reject what is mean and lowbrow.²⁰

Therefore, even graphic novels are written not for pure entertainment value. They must also function as “a powerful weapon for their political and ideological education and for giving them knowledge about life.”

Of course, this is not a new idea. Pictures have long been used for propaganda purposes, to instill emotions and opinions in the minds of viewers. For example, Lester C. Olson wrote, “Benjamin Franklin was typical of 18th-century polemicists in his recognition of visual rhetoric as a powerful means to influence beliefs and actions.”²¹ In North Korea, where propaganda techniques have been finely honed since 1948, it can be said that visual rhetoric has been raised almost to a science.

Each year, the several state-owned publishing houses of North Korea produce a number of books with the label “*kūrimch’aek*” on the front cover.²² Looking inside, however, it is clear that this label is used not only for true graphic novels, but also for illustrated storybooks. Of the 521 books that I have catalogued in my database, 234 conform to the conventional “comic book” style, while 194 are illustrated stories, and 25 are compilation books that contain both kinds of narrative.

In more recent writing on the topic of *kūrimch’aek*, an attempt has been made to separate the two forms. For example, Ri Ch’ang-hyök, writing in North Korea’s monthly art journal *Chosön Yesul*, describes *ryönsok kūrim(ch’aek) hyöngsik*, [literally “sequential picture (book) format”], which has multiple “cuts” (panels or frames), versus *kūrimch’aek hyöngsik* [literally “picture book format”], which has only one scene per page.²³

Later that year, Ri wrote again about the characteristics of sequential *kūrimch’aek* format

20 Kim Jong Il, *On Juche Literature* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1991), 17 [page numbers refer to the English edition of this work].

21 Lester C Olson, “Visual Rhetoric as Indices of Political Change,” in *Visual Communication: Perception, Rhetoric, and Technology*, ed. Diane S. Hope (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2006), 178.

22 For example, in 2013 at least 36 *kūrimch’aek* were published, in both the graphic novel and illustrated storybook formats explained above. In 2012, that figure was at least 24, in 2011 it was 25, and in 2010 it was 24. Just four publishing houses make up 82% of total *kūrimch’aek* output over the decades.

23 Ri Ch’ang-hyök, “Illustrations of the Sequential Picture Format and Their Types [Ryönsok-kūrim-hyöngshik-üi saphwa-wa kü ryuhyöng],” *Chosön Yesul*, Issue 7, 2010, accessed July 7, 2015. www.dprkmedia.com.

illustrations, and he introduced, perhaps for the first time in North Korean theoretical writing, the idea of a speech balloon [*mal-chumŏni*, literally “word pocket”], and stressed the importance of dialogue in driving the story forward in sequential *kūrimch’aek*.²⁴ In the following year, Chŏng Hyŏn-ho, also in *Chosŏn Yesul*, distinguishes the concepts of sequential *kūrimch’aek* from children’s *kūrimch’aek* and novels with pictures, and specifies speech balloons as the basic structural element of a sequential *kūrimch’aek*.²⁵

Despite the theoretical advances in understanding graphic novels in North Korea, however, the publishing houses continue to publish books of various formats with no distinction in labelling, calling them all *kūrimch’aek*. For the purposes of the case study in this paper, we will limit ourselves to the sequential *kūrimch’aek* format, which corresponds most closely to what we call “graphic novels” in English.

There are only a limited number of specific themes and time/space settings portrayed in North Korean graphic novels. Though there are some exceptions, most stories fall into one of the following categories:

1. the Korean War (1950-1953),
2. the anti-Japanese struggle (1905-1945),
3. struggle between landlords and peasants (pre-1905),
4. biographies of historical Koreans (e.g. Wang’gŏn),
5. a “timeless present” – present day, but no reference to specific events or dates,
6. stories that place in other, often unnamed, countries in Europe or Africa,
7. anthropomorphized animals.

The last category, graphic novels that feature anthropomorphized animals, are written for younger readers (up to elementary school age). They often contain morality tales, as well as stories of conflict and violence between good animals and bad animals. Because all North Korean literature is state controlled, it can be presumed that there are strong functions of anchoring and relay at work in the graphic novels produced there.

Visual Metaphors

In verbal or textual language, a metaphor describes a figure of speech when one thing is made to represent something else in order to make a point. For example, the expression, “it’s raining cats and dogs” is a metaphor in which “cats and dogs” are used to represent how heavily the rain is falling. Lakoff and Johnson write that “the essence of metaphor is

24 Ri Ch’ang-hyŏk, “The characteristics of sequential picture format illustrations [Ryŏnsok-kūrim-hyŏngshik-saphwa-ŭi t’ŭkching],” *Chosŏn Yesul*, Issue 11, 2010, accessed July 7, 2015. www.dprkmedia.com.

25 Chŏng Hyŏn-ho, “<Platform> Plastic Combination of Pictures and Text in Artistic Illustration Compositional Organization [<Yŏndan> Yesul-saphwa-kudo-chojik-esŏ kūrim-kwa kŭl-ŭi chohyŏngjŏk-kyŏlhap],” *Chosŏn Yesul*, Issue 4, 2011, accessed July 7, 2015. www.dprkmedia.com.

understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”²⁶

John M. Kennedy, a psychologist who researches metaphor in language and pictures, argues that metaphor can be used in depiction, or visual language, just as in textual language

depictions that follow some standard canons might be called literal, and ones that are metaphoric would be those that deliberately violate the standard canons while being intended to make a valid point that can be determined by examining the depiction and its referents.²⁷

Patterned on Fowler’s 1926 list of the most common metaphors used in speech, Kennedy posits 18 metaphors used in visual language.²⁸ We will return to some of these in the case study in this paper.

Charles Forceville uses the terms “target” to mean the topic which is being turned into a metaphor (Kennedy uses “tenor”) and “source” to mean the thing which is being used to illustrate the source (Kennedy uses “vehicle”). In the example above, “raining” is the target/tenor, and “cats and dogs” is the source/vehicle. Forceville lists four actions that must take place in the mind of a viewer of a visual metaphor, the third of which is “[the viewer must] decide which facts and connotations adhering to the source domain (the sum total of which Max Black, referring to Aristotle, calls “endoxa” [...]), can be mapped onto the target domain.”²⁹

Here he means that it is up to the viewer to decide which aspects of the target he or she recognizes in the source image, and therefore if the metaphor is a valid one. This calculation is based on the viewer’s endoxa, all that he or she knows, thinks, feels and has experienced about the source.

Aspects of the source are “mapped” onto the target. If there are many things that can be successfully mapped, then the metaphor can be said to have a high degree of “resonance.”³⁰

Forceville was writing about television advertising commercials. As a form of persuasive communication, these are comparable to North Korean graphic novels in as much as both carry out a persuasive and didactic function on their audiences. He writes that in order to be persuasive, “the intended mappings from a metaphor’s source domain need to be commensurate with the envisaged audience’s ‘endoxa.’”³¹ In North Korea, where all media and education are controlled by the state, it is easy to ensure that the endoxa of graphic novel readers is very similar, if not identical. Therefore, any visual metaphors

26 Cited in Charles Forceville, “Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor in Commercials,” in *Metaphor and Figurative Language: Theoretical Issues*, ed. Rachel Giora and Patrick Hanks, London: Routledge, 256.

27 John M. Kennedy, “Metaphor in Pictures,” *Perception* 11 (1982): 589-605, 198.

28 Kennedy, “Metaphor in Pictures,” 203-215.

29 Forceville, “Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor in Commercials,” 257.

30 Ibid.

31 Forceville, “Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor in Commercials,” 258.

would be expected to have a similar impact on North Korean viewers.

Case Study: Brave Hedgehog

For this case study, we will examine the 1991 North Korean graphic novel written for elementary school children, titled *Brave Hedgehog* [*Yong'gamhan kosūmdochi*]. The 80-page book tells a story about the village of Kkottongsan (meaning “Flower Hill”), which is under attack from the “Black Devil” and his evil henchmen, who live in Du'ōmsan (meaning “Manure Mountain”).³² No reason is given for why the latter is making war on the former.

In the good village of Kkottongsan, there live animals that are kind, friendly, and peaceful. We see hedgehogs, raccoons, squirrels, a rabbit, a cat, a dog, a deer, an Asiatic black bear, and a pig. They are almost invariably smiling, their pupils are dilated, and they look cheerful and innocent. Even on the front cover of the book, the hedgehog is smiling happily as he fires his revolver at an unseen enemy.

In the bad village of Du'ōmsan, which is actually a military base, there live only animals that are soldiers in an evil army. There are weasels, fieldmice, eagles, and a fox. All of these are ruled over and ordered around by a jackal. At all times, the faces of these animals are angry, sly, sneaky, fierce, or scared. Even when the jackal receives some good news, he laughs, showing his sharp fangs, and his body is contorted into an unusual posture, in which he shows the sole of one of his feet. He is also drawn in extreme close-up, whereas the protagonists of the story are usually drawn at a comfortable, non-invasive distance.³³ Clearly the emotional response that these characters are expected to elicit in the book's young readers is a negative one; readers should feel no sympathy for them at all.

The jackal known as the “Black Devil” has sent a spy into Kkottongsan in order to steal military secrets from the good village, to make it vulnerable to an attack from Du'ōmsan. The story tells how Detective Hedgehog is sent to the village to find the evil infiltrator. Within three days, and with almost no effort, he is able to do so. It turns out that the secret agent is in fact an evil weasel disguised as a good raccoon. When his mask is removed,³⁴ suddenly we see the malignant face of the weasel beneath. He begs for mercy, but is clapped in leg irons, beaten, and tied up. We do not find out his ultimate fate, but readers are not expected to care whether he lives or dies.³⁵

At the end of the book, we see the jackal, once more in close-up, discouraged by the arrest of his spy, choosing to run away from the village he had wanted to attack.³⁶

In story terms, this book bears many similarities to North Korean graphic novels that deal

32 Kim Sang-bok & Sin Ch'ōl-kyun, *Brave Hedgehog* [*Yong'gamhan kosūmdoch'i*] (Pyongyang: Kūmsōng Youth Publishing, 1991), 1 (see Appendix II).

33 Kim & Sin, *Brave Hedgehog*, 17.

34 *Ibid.*, 62.

35 *Ibid.*, 67-69.

36 Kim & Sin, *Brave Hedgehog*, 78-79.

with the subject of the Korean War. In these books, aimed at older readers, evil American soldiers and their treacherous South Korean lackeys (sometimes also accompanied by Japanese spymasters) are outsmarted by much cleverer North Korean soldiers and spies, who often work in disguise behind enemy lines. A true Korean is never depicted as evil. Any Korean person who does bad things is somehow already compromised in his “Korean-ness” – for example, he (or she) was adopted and raised by Americans, he is an officer in the United States Army, or he is working as an agent of the Americans because he wants to reclaim the land and factory that were confiscated from him. Good and bad characters are clearly divided along ethnic lines. There are a very few notable exceptions, in which a foreign character loves Korea and respects Juche Ideology, and is therefore a good person, but these are truly exceptional.³⁷

Brian Myers has argued convincingly that Juche, North Korea’s ruling ideology is in fact a smokescreen, a fake ideology designed to show the world that, like Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung was a great thinker and philosopher.³⁸ The mishmash of universal-humanist bromides that is given the name “Juche” is only the pro-forma ideology of North Korea. The real belief system is an ethno-nationalist one that Myers sums up in one sentence: “The Korean people are too pure blooded, and therefore too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a great parental leader.”³⁹

Juche literature has but one purpose: to reinforce that message that the Korean people are innocent and virtuous, and they need a parental leader (a member of the Kim family) to guide them and protect them in the world.

It is therefore very possible to see *Brave Hedgehog* as a literary precursor of Korean War stories, in which instead of bad animals we see bad foreign characters (specifically invading Americans, Japanese helpers or un-Korean South Koreans).

Here, Forceville’s concept of “contextual metaphor” is useful:

The target of the metaphor is placed in a visual context that forces or invites the viewer to evoke the identity of the source, which is itself not pictured.⁴⁰

In this, as in other North Korean graphic novels featuring anthropomorphized animals, real humans do not appear. But these books do lay the seeds for a racialized view of the world that North Korean children learn at a later age. Although the image of the American invader is not shown directly, the actions, facial expressions and body movements of the

37 See, for example, Cho Hak-rae et al. *On Distant Shores [Mǒnbada-ŭi kisŭlk-esŏ]* (Pyongyang: Kŭmsŏng Youth Publishing, 1990) or Chŏn Yŏng-hwa et al, *The Boy Who Raised Doves [Pidulgi-rŭl kirŭnŭn sonyŏn]* (Pyongyang: Kŭmsŏng Youth Publishing: 2012) for two prominent examples.

38 Brian Myers, “Ideology as Smokescreen: North Korea’s Juche Thought,” *Acta Koreana* 11, no. 3 (2008): 161-182, and *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves – And Why it Matters* (New York: Melville House, 2010).

39 Myers, *The Cleanest Race*, 15.

40 Forceville, “Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor in Commercials,” 256.

jackal and his evil henchmen so resemble those of human antagonists in graphic novels targeting older readers that the likeness cannot go unnoticed.

The spy in the midst of Kkottongsan, stealing the secrets of the good animals, is a weasel disguised as a raccoon. This type of plot device is only possible in a fantasy involving anthropomorphized animals (because in real life an American – almost always depicted as a white man – could not successfully disguise himself as a Korean), but it is interesting that the spy could not be a good animal who had chosen to “turn bad”; it had to be an animal bad from birth who was physically disguised as a good animal, complete with good facial expressions. This suggests that, for North Korea, goodness and badness is often something that is in the blood, inherited from good or bad parents.

The use of the jackal as the chief antagonist is very instructive. The jackal (*sŭngnyangi* in Korean) has been used as a synonym for Americans since Han Sŏrya’s Korean War short story *The Jackals*, which tells the story of an American missionary family who kill an innocent Korean boy. Brian Myers noted that the North Korean *Dictionary of Korean Cultured Language* “listed ‘imperialist invader’ as a second definition of the word *sŭngnyangi* (jackal).”⁴¹ We also see the word “jackals” affixed to the word “American imperialist [*mi’je*]” as a suffix or prefix in North Korean propaganda posters.⁴²

Furthermore, note the following summary of a typical anti-American work of North Korean fiction by Tatiana Gabroussenko:

In a standard North Korean narration ‘American beasts’ emerge as an evil monolithic entity stripped of any complexity and associated exclusively with an aggressive US international policy and war crimes committed on Korean soil. The essential anti-American fictional work presupposes a plot in which American sub-humans initiate a threat against North Koreans but, being intimidated by the moral and physical might of the DPRK and its leader, instead crawl on all fours and plead for mercy.⁴³

This could almost be a summary of *Brave Hedgehog*. Turning to Kennedy’s 18 kinds of visual metaphor, we see in *Brave Hedgehog* at least four of them:

- Allegory: this story, although it appears to be about animals in a fictional universe, actually points to the North Korean understanding of the Korean War and America’s involvement in Korea.
- Cliché: antagonists (whether anthropomorphized animals or actual Americans) are always drawn with scowling, leering, angry faces, sharp teeth, small pupils, and

41 Brian Myers, *Han Sŏrya and North Korean Literature* (New York: Cornell University, 1994), 153.

42 See, for instance, David Heather and Koen De Ceuster, *North Korean Posters* (Munich: Prestel, 2008), 127.

43 Tatiana Gabroussenko, “The North Korean Philosophy of Foreigners,” in *Korea 2012*, ed. Rüdiger Frank et al., (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 247.

otherwise visually unappealing.

- Hyperbole: Negative aspects of antagonists (e.g. scowling) and positive aspects of protagonists (e.g. smiling) are often exaggerated, and caricature is often used.
- Personification: animals as people, carrying on conversations in human languages, walking on two legs, carrying guns, living in houses, etc.⁴⁴

It should by now be clear that all the young North Korean readers of *Brave Hedgehog* would be expected to see in it a world in which there are very clear good and bad characters, and that someone who does something bad must be bad from birth. Later, when they read graphic novels about the Korean War, this world view will become consolidated and expanded. By using animals rather than humans to portray the characters, children will be encouraged to feel little human empathy for human enemies. Therefore, the book can have a dehumanizing effect.

Brave Hedgehog is by no means a unique example. Appendix 1 is a table showing the results of a survey of the good and bad characters (protagonists and antagonists) of several North Korean graphic novels that feature anthropomorphized animals. In all cases, the antagonists are depicted in a way that they look angry, ugly, and unpleasant, while the protagonists are depicted as naïve, innocent, kind and polite (except when dealing with antagonists). Good and bad are clear from the beginning, and nobody ever switches sides.

As a postscript, in the multi-part animated cartoon series *The Squirrel and the Hedgehog* [*Darami-wa Kosūmdoch 'i*], produced from 1977 until at least 2005, the same anthropomorphized animals are used to portray the good and bad characters. In fact, the comic book appears to be an adaptation of the same basic storyline as the animated series.⁴⁵

Conclusion

In *On Fine Art*, Kim Jong Il wrote regarding the depiction of characters that

what is important in the proper depiction of forms is *to enable the viewers to see the personalities of the characters* through this. The depiction of people's outward appearance should be done in close relationship with that of their personalities.⁴⁶ [Emphasis added]

In a later theoretical work on graphic arts, this is expanded upon to explicitly instruct that positive heroes should have beautiful and noble features in children's illustrations. Moreover, "[t]he level to which a positive character is depicted clearly shows the subject

44 Kennedy, "Metaphor in Pictures," 203-210.

45 Some clips of the series are viewable at <http://koreansquirrelarmy.tumblr.com/tagged/stuff> (accessed February 23, 2016).

46 Kim Jong Il, *On Fine Arts*, 49.

matter ideological content of the work.”⁴⁷ The opposite must therefore also be true, that negative characters are depicted in a visually unappealing way.

In the case study above, we can see that the “source/vehicle” of perpetually good animals versus perpetually bad ones would likely have a strong “resonance” in the minds of the young readers of graphic novels, laying the groundwork for a view of the world in which divisions are clear and protagonists can be easily distinguished from antagonists. Later, when children grow up and read graphic novels in which humans play the main characters, they will immediately recognize that hedgehogs and squirrels versus jackals and weasels were “contextual metaphors” that adumbrate the real world “target/tenor” – namely pure Koreans versus evil Americans. Therefore, these graphic novels, which might appear to outsiders to have little to do with real life, work to reinforce the Juche worldview of a pure Korean race always under attack by bestial foreigners. The text and the context work as strong anchoring and relay functions across the totality of North Korean graphic novel output. Thus, the worldview of North Korea as a pure and harmonious *Kkottongsan* perpetually under threat from evildoers is cemented in the minds of North Korean young graphic novel readers. **GPR**

47 Kim Yŏng-il & Ri Chae-il, *A New Turn in Graphic Arts [Ch'ulp'an misul-esŏŭi saero'un chŏnwhan]* (Pyongyang: Literature and Arts Publishing, 2003), 126.

Appendix I – survey of graphic novels featuring anthropomorphized animals

Book title	Antagonists	Protagonists
<i>Brave Hedgehog (1991)</i>	jackal	hedgehog
	weasels	raccoons
	fieldmice	rabbit
	eagles	cat
	fox	dog
	weasel disguised as raccoon	deer
		Asiatic black bear
		pig
		squirrels
<i>Great General Mighty Wing (1994)</i>	wasps	honeybees
	spiders	cicadas
<i>The Red Ants of Golden Field (2011)</i>	pine caterpillars	red ant
	rice grasshoppers	mantis
	longhorn beetle	dragonfly
	stinkbug	black ant
	spider	
	vermin	
<i>Surefoot and his Army (2011)</i>	rats	squirrels
<i>The Pollen Bongbongi Brought (2012)</i>	wasps	honeybees
	blow flies	
<i>“The Trap of the Plot” in The Trap of the Plot (2013)</i>	jackal	bear
		goat
		raccoon
		panda
		badger
<i>“The Bullhead Who Repaid the Enemy” in The Trap of the Plot (2013)</i>	catfish	Korean bullhead
		flying fish
		carp
		loach
		sand smelt/whiting

Appendix II – figures from Brave Hedgehog [Yong'gamhan kosümdoch'i]



Image 1.



Image 2



Image 3



Image 4



Image 5



Image 6



Image 7

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ESSAYS



The Manipulation of History in South Korea seen through the Lens of Francis Bacon's Four Idols

David Andrew Tizzard

Abstract: This paper attempts to observe how a country might choose to shape its identity and image over the course of history. This constructed identity may be very different from what people perceive as reality. So why, and how, does this disparity occur? It might happen for a whole host of historical, circumstantial, or, even, nefarious reasons. Certainly, people will find it easier to follow a simplified narrative or story than the gamut of complexities and idiosyncrasies that construct the actual truth of the situation. Francis Bacon classified fallacies and misunderstandings as falling under four distinct categories: Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace and Idols of the Theatre. Having looked to establish a methodological and philosophical premise, the paper then seeks to support this argument with evidence and examples from a particular case study: South Korea. These will serve to show in real terms precisely what is meant by the distortion of truth and how it can serve or sever a state's position in terms of international relations and its position on the wider global scale. It will help us bring Bacon's theory closer to modern life.

Key Words: *Historical narrative, Philosophy, Truth, Reality, Korea, Novum Organum, Four Idols.*

Uri Kogimal (Our lie)

Throughout the twentieth century, Korea's traditional media had been plagued by government censorship and control. All through modern Korean history...the Korean media is constantly inhibited from conducting independent news coverage¹

Francis Bacon classified fallacies into four categories in his 1620 text, *Novum Organum*. These fallacies were symbolised by four idols and each one represented the manner in which people are deceived or misconstrue the reality of situations.

The idols of the Tribe he perceived as deceptive beliefs innate in the mind of man and therefore affecting the whole of mankind. They arise from proclivities concerning exaggeration and distortion. Idols of the Cave are deceptive beliefs that arise in the mind of a specific individual as a result of education, environment and accident. Idols of the Marketplace are errors that come to fruition from the misuse of words and symbols. This

1 Ian Howard, "Korea Media Bias and Government Intervention in Media," *SAIS U.S.-Korea Yearbook* (2009): 64, accessed December 21, 2015, http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2009_Yearbook_Howard.pdf.

David Andrew Tizzard is a Professor at Seoul Women's University.

E-mail: datizzardswell@gmail.com

ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, *Global Politics Review*, <http://www.globalpoliticsreview.com>

is especially true when men transfer thoughts into the form of words so that they may communicate with others or engage in arguments and discourse. The final fallacy is the idol of the Theatre. This is one constructed when a large group of people accept a set of beliefs derived from false premises in science or philosophy.² This treatise serves to differentiate truth from shadows; it aims to penetrate the illusion, and to clarify the reality of our contemporary world. Its goal is to bring to light false idols of various descriptions.

As a relatively modern nation-state emerging from colonial rule, South Korea has been confronted with the challenge of its own history. In doing so, it has found that the shaping of past can help strengthen both the present and the future.

Idols of the Tribe

In his 1996 paper entitled *South Korea's Academic Lobby*, Korean expert Bruce Cummings highlighted a rather controversial aspect of modern Korean life: "Korean funding sources now blanket the American field of Korean studies, and the resultant intellectual blight is clear."³

Writing on the 'created' culture of sexual conservatism on the peninsula, scholar Andrei Lankov pointed at the Choson Dynasty for creating models of puritan behavior which modern society has attempted to maintain today. Concepts such as chastity, fidelity (in particular on the part of the woman), and a frowning upon cohabitation have been values which have survived through social control despite the sexual revolutions that have occurred elsewhere. Both the domestic media and the academic community have championed the idea that the 'land near the Eastern Ocean' had always been a stronghold of chastity and strict sexual mores."⁴ There has been a concerted effort to paint the Korean civilization as one free from any sexual perversions and, instead, portray it as one forever in tune with something akin to Puritan American values from the 1950s.

In a world of increasing competition and capitalism, South Korea has also shown itself to being no stranger in possessing a will to win. It has furiously propelled itself from its Buddhist and Confucian roots into the Occidental created world of Christianity and Capitalism. Moreover, it has done this with a remarkable success. Its Christian population has risen dramatically while others have fallen and its well-documented economic prosperity has surprised and fascinated many observers. German sociologist Max Weber saw this pursuit of wealth and success as an innate desire among men and reaffirms its position as an Idol of the Tribe:

2 Francis Bacon, *Advancement of Learning: Novum Organum New Atlantis* (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952).

3 Bruce Cummings, "South Korea's Academic Lobby" *JPRI Occasional Paper* (1996): 7, accessed December 21, 2015, <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op7.html>.

4 Andrei Lankov, *The Dawn of Modern Korea: The Transformation in Life and Cityscape* (Seoul: EunHaeng NaMu, 2007), 361.

the impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the earth, wherever the objective possibility of it is or has been given.⁵

It is not just the acquisition of money and wealth that has been evident in the Republic of Korea as an innate desire of man. Power and military success has been sought after as South Korea seeks to emulate the larger powers that have often controlled their fate. The motivation for this being located in the concept of ‘functional equality’: the desire and motivation, if not necessarily the means, to do as others do. This was evidenced during the 1970s, when the South looked to clandestinely develop its own nuclear weapon program despite the remonstrations of the American government.⁶

The Idols of the Tribe are as strong in South Korea as they are elsewhere. The country is not a shining beacon of morality in the region. It is a state and collection of people much like every other despite what it might tell others and, more importantly, itself.

Idols of the Cave

From the top level of the Korean government down, beginning most effectively during the reign of General Park Chung Hee, there has been a conscious effort at rewriting and distorting the history of Korea.⁷ History was a set of lies agreed upon as long as it was what the Korean powers wanted and the price was right.

The reign of General Park has been well-documented; moreover, most seem to agree that it was as successful at promoting the economy as it was ignoring certain human rights. Today, a similar atmosphere prevails. In November of 2015, people lined the streets of Kwanghwamun in central Seoul in what were the biggest demonstrations for 7 years. They were protesting the policies of the current government led by General Park’s daughter, President Park Geun Hye. The reality and history of the peninsula, especially during the most turbulent times of the 20th century, has been said to have been challenged.. There is also the notion that current government is preventing scholars from expressing their views—claiming that they are too liberal—and insisting instead on state-authored textbooks.⁸ Her father General Park Chung Hee published school history textbooks in 1974 and President Park Geun Hye has planned on doing the same so that she may control

5 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner, 1958), 17.

6 Seung-Young Kim, “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean case, 1970-82,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12, no. 4 (2007): 53-80.

7 Peter Hays Gries, “The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today,” *East Asia* 22, no. 4 (2005):10.

8 Simon Mundy, “South Korea Set to Rewrite History Books,” *Financial Times*, October 12, 2015.

the image and perception of both her family and the nation at large.⁹

The problem here is that history is *not* a set of lies agreed upon. Not many people are agreeing upon it—in fact many people are protesting it. President Park has drawn even more similarities to her father’s autocratic rule by attempting to clamp down on people’s right to free assembly and protest.¹⁰

Further distortions of history occur in the debate that still rages on regarding the ‘comfort women’ issue in Korea. Having taught for some time as a professor at a university in Seoul, I have had the opportunity to engage with a great many students on a wide variety of topics. When the local media releases a flurry of these stories, students are eager to talk about it and complain vehemently that Japan should apologize for its behavior. When I inform them that, to the best of my knowledge and research, there have been multiple apologies made by the Emperor down to the Prime Minister as well as other government officials (this is to say nothing of the state financial reparations paid), they are unwilling to believe me. This is not because they do not trust me; it is because they have been told otherwise by other sources. This is not to trivialise the desperate plight that a great many people (both men and women) have faced during times of armed conflict and colonisation. Stories of such a nature sadden us wherever around the world they may appear and we hope that we can work towards them being prevented from happening again in the future. However, Korea has long used the comfort women issue to further its own moral crusade against the Japanese as well as control and manage its own domestic political situation.¹¹ After all, what better way to reduce the animosity against the government policy than to encourage stories promoting anger at the most historic and evil of enemies?

The control of Korea’s history and the lies do not just stop with the Japanese enemies; domestic rivals are also silenced.

In 1972, General Park carried out the October Revitalising Reform (the Yushin Constitution). Despite its pleasant name, it was anything but. On October 17th, Park Chung Hee - despite no real outward worries - declared martial law throughout the peninsula, dissolved the national assembly and announced that in 10 days or less, a new constitution would be put into effect. This new constitution was designed to, essentially, allow General Park to rule for life. Despite what was really happening in the world, a different truth was being written in the books and spread throughout the country: “After Park’s Yushin Constitution was declared in 1972, press freedom was further marginalized, as the constitution declared that freedom of speech could be restricted if deemed necessary.”¹²

9 As is far too often the way with politicians, Madam Park said before her election that history and textbooks should be written by experts and be free from distortion and government control. Time changes things.

10 John Power, “South Korean President Compares Protesters to ISIS,” *The Diplomat*, November 27, 2015, accessed December 21, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/south-korean-president-compares-protesters-to-isis/>.

11 This is to say nothing of the widespread prostitution in South Korea.

12 Howard, “Korea Media Bias and Government Intervention in Media,” 65.

In June of 2015, President Park Geun Hye vetoed a revision of National Assembly Law¹³ and called the then Saenuri Party floor leader, Yoo Seong Min, a ‘traitor’ as she forced him from his position in a move that much of local media described as a political purging akin to what her father did before her.

Yoo, who had only been in the position for a matter of months, won a tight battle to take the position defeating former maritime minister Lee Ju Young in the final race. Lee Ju Young was known to be the pro-Park candidate with Yoo much more critical of the administration. Yoo’s position and his demands from the president were destined not to last, remaining as he did less than 5 months in the job.

It would be wrong of us to assume that controlling of history occurs only at top level government, however. The Korean state seems to understand very well the difference between the cave and the outside referenced in Plato’s work and uses it to its advantage well: “as to the people they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them.”¹⁴ In order to convince or dissuade the public of a certain opinion or policy, it is normally only necessary to have it praised or ridiculed in popular media or culture. And this is where the Idols of the Cave become the Idols of the Theatre.

Idols of the Theatre

It is clear that a manipulated image of the past has been created and reinforced. Period dramas (*sageuk*) are rife in South Korea, more so than elsewhere. Romanticized versions of previous ages—generally the Choson Dynasty but also at times further back—are both prevalent and popular. It is quite unusual when you first notice just how many shows are made in this bent and, at first, it seems rather endearing. It comes across as a country looking to maintain a link to the past and retain some tradition that was forcibly removed from it during the colonial rule.

However, a more critical eye might easily discern that these dramas are a tool from which people can distort and impact people’s perception of the past. A lot of people have questioned the veracity and intentions of these dramas especially “disenchanted critics and history buffs who have complained that the days of authentic *sageuk* have ended since the beginning of the new millennium.”¹⁵

Korea hasn’t just stopped at the *sageuk*, however. There has also been a trend of releasing period dramas set in the much more recent past—especially the 80s and 90s. These dramas evoke a lot of strong emotions among people in the 30s and 40s. Yet, despite this, they often offer a glorified version of the time and promote misconceptions among people,

13 Tong Kim, “Obama and Park Geun-hye,” *The Korea Times*, July 5, 2015, accessed April 10, 2016, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2016/01/167_182205.html.

14 Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers* (New York: Pocket Books, 2006), 565.

15 Ja-hae Do, “Fact vs. Fiction in TV Drama,” *Korea Times*, November 3, 2013, accessed December 21, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/art/2015/11/148_145578.html.

especially the young, who were not alive or truly conscious during these years.

And it is not just the internal theatre that encourages or spreads things that are entirely different from what people perceive to be true. In his 2005 edition of his text *Korea's Place in the Sun*, regional expert Bruce Cumings spells out in no uncertain terms just how the theatre can be used not only to promote oneself, but also to vilify others: “Furthermore, nearly every major media outlet, whether television or print, accepted uncritically various information about North Korea that had either been standard rhetoric for decades (and often that put out for foreign consumption by Seoul’s intelligence services) or was demonstrably false.”¹⁶ It favors the South in many ways to demonize and vilify the North for a variety of reasons—politically and ideologically being at the forefront. However, the caricatures they paint of the state to the North have over time been accepted as true by a great many of its citizens and the Idols of the Theatre grow ever more powerful.

Idols of the Marketplace

IT is not only in television dramas that mistruths and rewritten accounts are to be found. “The power of the media in South Korea, in all forms, has a profound influence on the events that shape South Korea. There have been numerous instances of media bias, defined here as manipulation of the media to support a certain perception, cause or agenda.”¹⁷

The Internet in Korea is often lauded as the fastest in the world—and yet restrictions are commonplace. President Lee Myoung Bak introduced a ‘real name policy’ which required all websites with a readership of more than 100,000 members to possess the real names of all posters and forbid anonymity. The real name saga on the internet reached a head when the local economic Nostradamus, Minerva, proved to be nothing more than an unemployed man making predictions. His predictions were often more accurate than the government’s and because of the support he garnered and the anonymity of his postings, he was arrested for spreading false information and for his criticisms of government policies. From this, he faced up to five years in jail—he was, however, later acquitted of the charges against him.¹⁸

There have been increased clampdowns on what is considered acceptable material by the Korean government in the last 5 years. Now, anybody attempting to access blogs or news content not approved by the government—gambling sites, pornography, or sites of homosexual nature—will be greeted by an error message that informs them that the government does not permit you to view the content. While some may be in favour of the government adopting such puritan and noble values, we cannot but help see the hypocrisy in their actions when faced with the real truth. Gambling, sex, and homosexuality are very

16 Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 482.

17 Howard, “Korea Media Bias and Government Intervention in Media,” 59.

18 Rüdiger Frank, *Korea Yearbook (2009): Politics, Economy and Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 27.

much part of the reality of modern Korean life—to attempt to deny their existence is to shy away from important issues and seek merely to avoid them.

As we see more and more idols of various kinds appearing in South Korea, let us remember the words of Spinoza in understanding both their possible causes and effects:

it has been the one song of those who thirst after absolute power that the interest of the state requires that its affairs should be conducted in secret. . . . But the more such arguments disguise themselves under the mask of public welfare, the more oppressive is the slavery to which they will lead. . . . Better that right counsels be known to enemies than that the evil secrets of tyrants should be concealed from the citizens.¹⁹

Conclusions

This short essay has tried to shed light on the shadows we see around us. It attempts to encourage others to challenge our understanding of things from a national perspective—given here through a Korean lens. It hopes that this perspective might then enable others to see things more accurately elsewhere, too. In journals, essays, and articles that we write, it is far too easy for us to further support false historical narratives or constructed truths by not applying enough critical thinking or simply repeating that which we have been told.

Throughout history, humankind has often questioned the validity of not only the world around him, but also the one presented to him by those in positions of power. In his text *Novum Organum*, Francis Bacon described these misconceptions of reality as falling into four distinct categories: Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace, and Idols of the Theatre. Each of these four idols represents a different manner in which man mistakenly understands something to be true.

When using these Idols to analyse the nature of the truth in South Korea's more recent history we are able to observe that all four are present. The Idols of the Tribe appear in terms of the manner in which Korean society presents its own interpretations on certain morals and values related to sexuality, greed and power. The Idols of the Cave have often proven to be the most controversial in recent years as they are idiosyncratic to the nation. They have centered on the issues of state-authored text books, neighboring regional rivals, and domestic politics.

Idols of the Theatre fill the homes of millions every day as the popular dramas present versions of history that would be challenged by most historians. These are accompanied by news reports that vilify North Korea at any given opportunity. Finally, the Idols of the Marketplace fill the PC rooms and smartphones of the citizens—spreading, as they do, across the digital waves of the Internet and sending their constructed and manufactured messages to willing receivers.

19 Benedictus De Spinoza, *Theological-political Treatise*, edited by Jonathan I. Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Ch.6.

Of course, as the top of the paper stated, this is not a situation that is necessarily unique to Korea. However, the more mistruths and misconceptions are highlighted, the more chance the truth can be achieved. **GPR**

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REVIEWS



Hartmut Elsenhans and a Critique of Capitalism, Conversations on Theory and Policy Implications. By Neil Wilcock and Corina Scholz. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. XII, 184 pages. US\$ 110.00. ISBN 978-1-137-56463-4.

Book Review by Christoph Sorg

“Hartmut Elsenhans and a Critique of Capitalism: Conversations on Theory and Policy Implications“ is a compilation of ten interviews to introduce the reader to the main thoughts of established political economist Hartmut Elsenhans.

The two authors Corina Scholz and Neil Wilcock are two former students of Elsenhans in a Master’s program on Global Studies. Two years separate this book from a class on the “Rise and Demise of the Capitalist World-System” taught by Elsenhans which started an intellectual curiosity to finally manifest in this piece. Their curiosity is quite understandable, as Elsenhans’ opus and unconventional and provocative theories reject fitting into any larger epistemic community, be they mainstream or critical. Elsenhans takes concepts and lines of thought from classical political economy, Marxism, Keynesianism and the world-systems approach to come up with his own grand theory. This book constitutes both an excellent complement and introduction to his work-in-progress life’s work, a six-volume series on the “Rise and Demise of the Capitalist World-System.”

Through a series of ten interviews conducted with Elsenhans at his home in Leipzig, Germany, the authors aim to introduce the pivotal streams structuring Elsenhans’s approach to social reality. They begin by elaborating his – mainly economic - theory of the capitalist world-system in six conversations, to then illustrate these theoretical concepts and their political implications in three chapters on NGOs, current European developments and social movements. In a final chapter the authors fill some final gaps by conversing with the interviewee on his personal career and somewhat challenging his views on culture and environmentalism, among others. Despite this evolutionary structure and recurrent interlinkages, chapters are constructed in a standalone format.

Scholz and Wilcock aimed (and managed) to translate Elsenhans’s complicated theories and often convoluted language into a more accessible account and fortunately succeeded to do so. This is a necessary endeavor, as Elsenhans’s approach combines a sophisticated reading of heterodox theories from classical political economy, Keynesian economics and Marxist as well as world-systems social theory, owing to the fruitful background in

Christoph Sorg is a PhD Candidate at Humboldt University.

E-mail: christoph.sorg@sowi.hu-berlin.de

ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, *Global Politics Review*, <http://www.globalpoliticsreview.com>

interdisciplinary social science the interviewers share with the interviewee. The authors seem to not always agree with the interviewee, and occasionally make this transparent,¹ but sensibly opted for staying in the background as much as possible in order to leave the stage for Elsenhans's thought paradigms and leave most evaluation to the readers. They thus chose to let Elsenhans speak for himself and give his approach the attention he was unfortunately often denied.

His paradigms can best be subsumed as a historical-materialist Global Keynesianism. Elsenhans shares with Marx a materialist conception of history and the centrality of class struggle, but mainly aims to “generalise Keynesian ideas in a historical theory of the world.”² Pivotal to this approach is the distinction of rent and profit as the two forms of surplus, the latter being defined as discrepancy between return of income and amount needed to reproduce a system. Rent (chapter 2) is “surplus appropriated by political means ... and not used for mass consumption; contrasted by profit, which is earned on markets under the condition of competition.”³

Elsenhans differs from neoclassical economists and Marxists in perceiving of labor as not necessarily being value-creating, thus establishing his concept of marginality (chapter 3). If workers cannot produce as much as they need for survival, they are not value creating and thus marginal. Reducing marginality overcomes underdevelopment (chapter 4), as high demand in labor and existence of mass markets entail incentives to develop technologies satisfying popular demand. Such a conception reflects his Global Keynesian interpretation of development:⁴ underdeveloped economies devalue their currencies in order to become more competitive and thus industrialize, while rich countries and their large internal markets provide the necessary global demand. Elsenhans terms this “a convoy model of globalisation” (chapter 5). Along the same lines the current global economic crisis is perceived as a large underconsumption crisis (chapter 6), wages not having kept up with productivity and financialization constituting massive rent extension not related to the productive economy. In a rather theoretical chapter on capitalism (chapter 7), the authors then close and recapitulate these theoretical reflections by interviewing Elsenhans on his position with regards to established thinkers and epistemic communities.

In the following chapters, the reader learns more about practical applications of these theoretical paradigms, which renders the latter more comprehensible. Elsenhans sees NGOs (chapter 8) as completely integrated into capitalist power relations, as they are economically dependent on donors and thus constitute no threat to the system. In chapter 9 he then argues that the Great Divergence, i.e. the rise of Northwestern Europe to

1 Neil Wilcock and Corina Scholz, *Hartmut Elsenhans and a Critique of Capitalism: Conversations on Theory and Policy Implications* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 5, 163ff.

2 *Ibid.*, 89.

3 *Ibid.*, 7

4 For Elsenhans in particular and Global Keynesianism in general, see for instance: Gernot Köhler, “What is Global Keynesianism,” last modified Sept. 1998, <http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/kohler/kohler2.htm>.

prosperity and global hegemony, is neither related to cultural superiority (the Smithian-Weberian reading) nor colonialism (the dependency perspective). Instead, it stemmed from Europe's lack of competitiveness and the resulting need to develop internal markets, which in turn precipitated industrialization. Elsenhans then states that the formation of the European Union was crucially related to French ambitions to institutionalize potentially hegemonic German power and that the current Eurozone crisis could either be remedied by cutting Greek debt or throwing Germany and its export-dependent beggar-thy-neighbor policies out of the Eurozone.

The authors then move on to investigate the interviewee's perspective on social movements, from their historical emergence to contemporary developments (chapter 10). Elsenhans sees current Northern movements as having transformed into "network social movements," that is movement organizations not being interested in distributional conflict, but elite-level networking. In contrast, he terms contemporary Southern movements as "New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements," by which he means identity-based coalitions of different social groups emerging due to failures of state developmentalism. In the last chapter the reader finally obtains some rare personal reflections on the interviewee's career and work as well as an interesting discussion of his views on culture and the environment.

As usually with grand narratives and theorizing, there is much to be criticized and challenged in Elsenhans's approach – needless to say without discarding the manifold valuable contributions stemming from said approach. The reasons that made this book necessary at the same time render it virtually impossible to comprehensively engage with Elsenhans's theories in a brief book review. I will thus zero in on what I feel are weaknesses and gaps of his approach only in a few examples and leave more critical engagement to others.

I will start with a conceptual problem: if capitalists have no particular interest in free markets and profits because of rents and monopolies promising more and easier surplus, as Elsenhans agrees with Fernand Braudel and the world-systems approach in assuming; if "non-regular" labor constitutes the pivot of work relations instead of the capital-wage-labor-nexus, as feminists and post-colonial scholars have pointed out long ago;⁵ then what is capitalism after all? Although Elsenhans never defines capitalism exactly, and the interviewers unfortunately do not push him to do so, he seems to implicitly define capitalism as a decentralized system of market coordination within a nation-state via profit - which he does explicitly elsewhere -⁶ not as a transnational system privileging

5 For a brief overview, see among others: Maria Mies, "Patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale – revisited (Keynote lecture at the Green Economics Institute, Reading, 29 October 2005)," *International Journal of Green Economics*, no. 3/4, (2007), accessed March 16, 2016, http://collectiveliberation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/PatriarchyAccumulationOnAworldscale_Revisited2005_MariaMies.pdf.

6 Hartmut Elsenhans, *Kapitalismus kontrovers: Zerklüftung im nicht mehr so kapitalistischen Weltsystem* (Potsdam: Universitätsverlag Potsdam, 2009).

the endless accumulation of capital on a global scale.⁷ But rents and dispossession have historically always been crucial for capital accumulation and not a feudal remainder. Beneath the sphere of market exchange has always lied a huge universe of care labor, various forms of coerced labor and slavery and subsistence production rendered invisible by an excluding focus on wage labor shared by orthodox Marxists, classical economists and Keynesians such as Elsenhans alike. Or to quote Claudia von Werlhof: “Tendencies for the normal wage labor system to disappear do not mean a disappearance of capitalism, but, to the contrary, its [deepening] and expansion.”⁸

Only from such a perspective can rent be seen as a threat to capitalism necessitating statist responses, not as a classed, gendered and racialized part of it. Along the same lines he concludes that social struggles surrounding abortion or war, for instance, are (important but) not altering hegemonic capitalist logic.⁹ He seems to thus either perceive capitalism and patriarchy as separate social systems (the latter then apparently not being worth including in a theory of the world-system), or interpret “non-economic” gendered inequality as a “side contradiction” not central to social change, a tendency progressives should have buried decades ago.

Related to these conceptual questions, property is not a central issue for Elsenhans, which differentiates him from neo-classicals and Marxists on the one hand, but leaves some space for synergies with various heterodox anti-capitalist traditions on the other. Thus Elsenhans can arrive at conclusions such as: “[P]rivate property is not at all necessary [for capitalism] [...] profit does not imply that you have to maintain private property in any case. Even if you socialized all your economy, you would have profit in the company sector which you are running according to the market.”¹⁰ Such thoughts are not terribly far from market socialists à la Raúl Prebisch or Gustav Cassel demanding a combination of democratic polities, free markets and the socialization of the means of production. Innovative thinkers such as Johanna Bockman have recently pointed out the potentially progressive effects of (actually) free trade and globalization on social and global inequality, while Giovanni Arrighi combined Adam Smith and Karl Marx to point out that capitalism has historically been quite different from actual market-led development.¹¹ However,

7 Note that capital accumulation and wealth accumulation should not be conflated, as Elsenhans does not surprise Marxists by arguing that capitalists cannot increase their consumptive share under competitive pressures. Marx pointed out capitalists’ agency being limited by structural forces even before Rosa Luxemburg and more recent leftist debates have discussed this awareness as a good remedy against personalizing anti-capitalist critiques, demonizing capitalists as well as structurally antisemitic anti-capitalism. Wilcock and Scholz, *Hartmut Elsenhans*, 95-96.

8 Claudia von Werlhof, “No Critique of Capitalism without a Critique of Patriarchy! Why the Left Is No Alternative,” last modified April 3, 2007, <http://emanzipationhumanum.de/downloads/critique.pdf>.

9 Wilcock and Scholz, *Hartmut Elsenhans*, 145.

10 *Ibid.*, 104.

11 Johanna Bockman, “Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order,” *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1, (2015); Johanna Bockman, “Markets in the

these perspectives have avoided the trap of conceptually lumping together markets and capitalism, thereby avoiding the trap of reproducing hegemonic neoliberal conceptions of capitalism being about free markets and free trade.

A final point: while Elsenhans makes some observations on economic structures influencing social movements, and his concept of “New Cultural Identitarian Political Movement” is certainly very interesting, social movements studies have long pointed out that grievances do not simply translate into collective action. While grievances often exist, they do not always precipitate contentious politics. It is true that grievances correlate with protest to a certain extent, but they are mediated by subjective perception and collective action relies on resource mobilization, political opportunities and framing choices.¹² Elsenhans also follows theories about alleged new social movements in assuming that social movements have permanently changed from a class-focus to an identity-focus, while this temporary shift has more to do with the now abandoned class compromise of the post-war period and the quite necessary incorporation of identity struggles into movement-interior knowledge production. While class transformations do influence movement composition and identity, it would be economistic to reduce the causes of these process to a growing middle class (and in the South additionally to the emergence of corrupt state classes under developmentalist projects). The “identity turn” among social movements for instance also relates to responses of subalternized groups such as LGBTI rejecting the economistic class-fetishism and its exclusionary focus on (male) wage labor of the traditional labor movement.

Returning to the fact that Elsenhans is not the author, but the object of study, however, Scholz and Wilcock have presented a highly valuable and fun-to-read piece. The act of making complicated concepts easily accessible necessarily brings with it the trade-off of occasional simplification, as the authors themselves acknowledge.¹³ However, such limits are unavoidable and readers ranging from newcomers to political economy all the way to advanced theory enthusiasts looking for heterodox approaches will profit greatly from this innovative book. It is a great present Scholz and Wilcock have made them (and indeed Elsenhans himself) in making his original theories and concepts challenging conventionally accepted axioms potentially more accessible to a wider public. **GPR**

Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

12 This finding is expressed in the work of renowned social movement scholars such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Donatella della Porta.

13 Wilcock and Scholz, *Hartmut Elsenhans*, 5.

INTERVIEWS



Interview with H.E. Vasyl Marmazov, Ambassador of Ukraine to Seoul

by Rachel Leng

On Ukraine Current Affairs

1. *In an interview with the Korea JoongAng Daily in March 2015, you said that 2014 was “definitely the most difficult year since 1945 for Ukraine as well as for Europe in general” following the first anniversary of Ukraine’s regime change. Looking back now on 2015, what would you say were the main milestone events or setbacks for the people of Ukraine?*

Let me express my appreciation to the Global Politics Review for its interest in the situation in and around Ukraine as well as Ukraine-Republic of Korea relations and the place of my country in East Asia.

The main result of 2015 is that, despite Russian military and economic aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine and its people withstood and created preconditions for further national development. In this regard, I would like to draw attention to the following key achievements:

First, Ukraine, with the strong support of the international community, stopped the military escalation of the Russian “hybrid war” against Ukrainians and strengthened Ukraine’s defense capacity significantly.

We avoided default, ensured macro-economic, financial, and banking stabilization, restructured foreign debt, increased foreign exchange reserves, improved the banking system and created preconditions for economic growth.

The new law enforcement bodies – Patrol Police, National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecution – were created on new principles and with new people.

Ambassador Vasyl Marmazov received his Ph.D. in Law from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, and previously holds Law Degree from the above mentioned University. He also improved his academic skills at London School of Economics (UK), Sidney Sussex College (Cambridge, UK), International Institute of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France) and Stanford University (USA).

Previous work of Ambassador Marmazov’s experience includes acting as the deputy dean of the Faculty of Law of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, practicing law as the Lawyer at the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France) and a Partner of Yuris Law Offices, and serving as the deputy ministers in Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.

Rachel Leng graduated with an M.A. from Harvard University and B.A. from Duke University. She is currently an Affiliate Editor at GPR and Research Associate at Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

Email: rleng@post.harvard.edu

Second, the international community continued to support Ukraine both at the political and financial level. A very bright demonstration of this was the election of Ukraine, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, by the vote of 177 UN countries.

Last year ended with a decision by all 28 EU members on the prolongation of sanctions against Russia for its continuous aggression against Ukraine.

Third, despite the unprecedented migration crisis in the EU, the European Commission approved the final report on the full implementation of criteria for the visa-free regime of Ukraine. After the agreement on political association and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA with the EU entered into full force on January 1, 2016) Ukraine took another decisive step towards integration into the EU.

Fourth, we eliminated our energy dependence on Russia and took steps towards integration into the common European energy market.

2. *The Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea was occupied by Russia a month after the February 2014 ouster of Moscow-backed President Viktor Yanukovich. In your opinion, what will happen to Crimea in the long term?*

The brutal occupation and attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol two years ago by neighboring Russia was a vile act carried out contrary to international law. Unfortunately, this fact demonstrated that the global post-war security system was destroyed and it does not work anymore.

The Ukrainian Government, the people of Ukraine, as well as the entire civilized world do not recognize the Russian occupation of Crimea. That was clearly confirmed by the results of the vote at the meeting of the UN General Assembly on March 27, 2014, where 100 UN Member States supported the Resolution (68/262) “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” and affirmed their commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

Currently, there is serious deterioration of the human rights situation in occupied Crimea. According to the observations of different international institutions focused on human rights (e.g., Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International), Crimea has turned into a peninsula of fear within the two years of occupation. People are afraid to express their opinions, are fearful for their lives and future, and are afraid to practice their faith and communicate in their native language. The indigenous population of the peninsula – Crimean Tatars, as well as those Ukrainians who still live there after annexation have been frequently subjected to serious human rights violations.

One concrete example of human rights oppression was the stopping of broadcasting of the only Crimean Tatars TV-channel ATR in 2015 in Crimea. The Russian occupation authorities take every possible step to deprive the Crimean Tatars of the right to freely use their native language, receive and distribute reliable information, preserve their national identity, and to educate children in the spirit of national traditions.

Numerous arrests of journalists, activists, and NGO staff members who adversely treated annexation, have also been observed in Crimea. One flagrant example is the Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, who was detained in the Crimea, forcibly transferred to Russia, and sentenced to ten years of prison on charges of “terrorism.” Another is cameraman of the Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR, Eskender Nebiyev, who was sentenced by a “court” in Simferopol to two years and six months of prison for “participation in mass riots.”

The twelfth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine (December 9, 2015) indicated that “residents of the peninsula continued to be affected by broad curtailment of their rights due to the application of a restrictive legal framework imposed upon them by the Russian Federation.”

I would also like to draw attention of the international community to the need to support and protect Crimean Tatars from illegal actions by the Russian Federation occupation authorities in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in connection with the beginning of a so-called legal process aimed to recognize the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People as an extremist organization and prohibit activity thereof, which will entail criminal prosecution of Mejlis members who do not recognize the annexation of Crimea and defend their national priorities, as well as their indigenous people’s legal right to reside safely in the territory of Crimea.

It is noteworthy that Crimea was once the tourist pearl of Ukraine and attracted several million tourists every year. At present, regrettably, the peninsula has been transforming into a huge Russian military base. The occupation authorities failed to secure the proper social and economic state of the inhabitants, which has been getting worse since the annexation. Against this backdrop, the number of tourists, according to different sources, decreased by more than six times – from six to one million, last year. I do not believe that people in Crimea are satisfied with their current life conditions.

As such, Ukraine will never give up its sovereign rights to Crimea. Ukraine will defend by all available means the rights of people who live there.

The struggle for the return of Crimea remains one of the priorities of the Ukrainian government’s agenda. The President of Ukraine announced early this year that Ukraine would offer to establish the international mechanism on de-occupation of the peninsula. The optimal format is considered “Geneva Plus”: with participation of our partners from the EU, USA, and signatory countries of the Budapest Memorandum.

One day, I am confident Ukraine will regain control over the peninsula.

- 3. After Ukraine and Russian-backed militants agreed to a new cease-fire plan, fighting declined in September but picked up again in November, causing multiple deaths and injuries to Ukrainian troops. An estimated 9,000 people have been killed and more than 1.3 million displaced as a result of the conflict to date. Nonetheless, Russian military aggression in Donbas is receiving less attention in*

recent months as the world is focused on increased terrorism and a refugee crisis caused by conflicts in Syria and Iraq. What is your prediction for the future of this conflict – can there be a resolution? What is the biggest obstacle to implementing the ceasefire laid down in the Minsk Agreement between OSCE, Ukraine, and Russia, especially from the perspective of the Ukrainian government?

In 2015, significant efforts by Ukraine and its partners were invested into laying the ground for a sustainable peaceful resolution. The Minsk agreements were reinforced by the package of measures and the Addendum. Regular meetings in the Normandy format and activities of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) and the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) served as important contributing factors in the peace process.

At the same time, we regret that Russia and its proxies have been demonstrating consistent unwillingness to abide by their commitments, undertaken in Minsk. Full-fledged offensives last year near the Donetsk airport and Debaltseve in winter, clashes in Shyrokyne in spring, provocative attacks on Maryinka and Krasnohorivka in summer and recent escalation (December 2015-January 2016) after a two-month calm, serve as examples of ongoing violations of the Minsk agreements by Russia.

Shooting attacks on an OSCE SMM vehicles by Russia-backed militants on January 16 and April 7 2016 in the areas of Maryinka and Snizhne respectively are regarded by Ukraine as blatant attempts to intimidate the OSCE SMM observers and yet another examples of the deliberate violations by Russia and its proxies of their obligations under the Minsk agreements.

A huge gap between Russia's political declarations and its real actions in Donbas has prevented the implementation of the Minsk agreements in line with the established timeframe.

Against this backdrop, one year after the approval of the package of measures in Minsk, the situation in Donbas remains extremely fragile and is far from achieving peace and restoring security.

Ukraine seeks early restoration of peace and stability in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and is ready to do everything necessary for that except meaningless concessions and aggressor's soft-soaping.

Our position is clear – the full implementation of the Minsk agreements by Russia, verified by the OSCE.

- 4. In December 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin has for the first time conceded that military intelligence officers were operating in east Ukraine. In your assessment, will this acknowledgement of Russia's role lead to greater determination to implement and cooperate on the Minsk agreement, or does it send a more ominous message vis-à-vis international law considerations?*

The Kremlin's "peaceful" rhetoric and "gallery play" don't match its real actions in

Donbas in order to stop active hostilities. Moscow continues to transfer to Ukraine its heavy military equipment, finance mercenaries, and provoke armed clashes. Russia has not withdrawn its regular units and has never condemned any militants' terrorist attacks. Russia continues to send "humanitarian convoys" contrary to Ukrainian legislation and international law. The list of Russia's crimes is very long.

Unlike Ukraine, which has fulfilled almost all its commitments, Russia continues to neglect its obligations under the Minsk agreements and has not fulfilled any so far.

Russia is fully responsible for the fact that the situation in Donbas remains unregulated.

In this situation, the international community should continue to put strong pressure on Russia.

I believe sanctions against Russia are working and the position of the Western countries is working as well. Sanctions are not a strategy, they are tools. However, the international community should use all its available tools to maintain political pressure on Russia and force it to honor its agreements.

Aggression against Ukraine has become a real threat to global security everywhere. Hybrid proxy wars, terrorism, national radical and extremist movements, the erosion of international agreements, the blurring and even erasing of national identities: all of these threats now challenge Europe. If they are not stopped now, they will cross European borders and spread throughout the globe.

It is worth noting that by its current actions towards Ukraine the Russian Federation is setting a bad example for the DPRK and other countries as the country-violator of the security system of the European continent and the existing global nonproliferation regime. In addition, I would like to note that Professor Ihor Piliayev, a well-known Ukrainian political analyst (with whom I have written several books on European and continental integration), observes that the current Russian state and the Russian economy, based on the merger of power and property and, therefore, deeply anti-market and anti-democratic, have been obtaining "a palace" nature increasingly in direct proportion to a systemic aggravation of conflict between Russian and the West and, more broadly, with the world of modernity. He labels the modern Russian state and economy as "a palace-neopolitar," taking into account the tracking of their historical connection with so-called "palace" states and economies of antiquity.

Ukraine is in the process of improving its market economy and delegitimizing corruption as well as striving for the democratization of society and institutions after the Revolution of Dignity. At the same time, in Russia we have been witnessing the archaic and natural styles of economic activity and the strengthening of its corruptive nature, the intensification of the conversion of power into property, in addition to the increasing self-isolation of the Russian political regime and economy from the civilized world.

5. *There have been recent discussions about whether Ukraine will join NATO. What*

is your view on the role of NATO in the coming 10-20 years? How big will the influence of the U.S. be in 10 years from now in Europe? Will Ukraine want to shift to the West? Moreover, is there the sentiment in Ukraine that Europeans are inviting them to come closer, or is the Russian opposition a primary concern?

Currently, the deepening strategic partnership with NATO is one of the priorities of Ukraine in the field of foreign policy, complying with the principles of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1997) and other bilateral documents.

Since the gaining of independence in 1991, Ukraine, as a peace-loving state, has adhered to a non-bloc status and relied on number of international legally binding instruments and principles of the European collective security system.

Under the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 Ukraine eliminated all of its nuclear weapons (the third most in the world) and the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine as well as refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine.

Facing Russian military aggression against Ukraine since 2014, Kyiv appealed to the Guarantor States under the Budapest Memorandum (USA, UK, France, and China) to react immediately to prevent these unfriendly actions by the Russian side. However, we are now witnessing that this mechanism doesn't work.

In December 2014 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the law on abandoning the non-block status of Ukraine, which proved to be ineffective in the context of securing the state from external aggression and pressure.

The development of relations between Ukraine and NATO focuses on two main dimensions: political dialogue and practical cooperation. The most recent main achievements in these areas, to my mind, are the exchange of high-level visits in September and December 2015, the signing of the Roadmap for NATO-Ukraine Defense-Technical Co-operation and the launching of practical interaction with NATO aimed at achieving the full interoperability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with NATO forces.

The NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and the meeting of NATO-Ukraine Commission at the highest level on the sidelines of the Summit are considered as landmark events for future directions of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. In his invitation to Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed out that NATO-Ukraine summit in Warsaw is the clearest sign of constant and strong Alliance's support for Ukraine, as well as a clear political signal of nonrecognition of aggressive policy and any attempt to change the borders in Europe by force.

The issue of joining NATO, on the one hand, requires the consensus of all member-

states and currently there is no consensus in NATO on Ukraine's membership. On the other hand, this process requires relevant internal procedures and reforms in Ukraine. So, these processes will take a considerable amount of time.

On Embassy of Ukraine in Seoul

6. *Could you speak more on your personal experience as the Ukrainian Ambassador to Korea? What has left the strongest impression on you during your time in Korea or East Asia as a whole thus far? What do you think are the major differences (in terms of culture or society) between South Korea and Ukraine? What is your vision for Ukraine-ROK relations?*

Ukraine, like the Republic of Korea, is a multicultural and multi-confessional society. Numerous Christian communities have traditionally inhabited my country as they have in Korea, including the Catholic one. We also have a Buddhist community and there are a lot of atheists. Ukrainian people as well as South Koreans tolerate religious beliefs and respect and absorb the wisdom of the different religious and philosophical doctrines, both of the West and the East.

Touching upon differences, first of all, perhaps, I would note the high external emotional sensitivity of Ukrainians. Often, our people follow their hearts first, then rational arguments. This, probably, makes them different from the people of Confucian culture. Ukrainians are less prone to strict observance of rituals and are more inclined to overthrow than to respect authority. On the one hand, it is an advantage when there is a need for drastic transformation and the breaking of obdurate old orders, which prevent the modernization of society. On the other hand, we should learn from the people of South Korea such characteristics as great patience, rationality, a sense of personal responsibility for one's own actions, and respect for one's own ancestral traditions and rituals that make up the national identity.

7. *How many Ukrainians currently reside in Seoul? How about Koreans in Ukraine? Have there been any notable trends on Ukrainians living abroad that you have noticed during your time as Ambassador?*

According to our recent data, some 350 Ukrainians reside in South Korea. Most of them are employees of Korean companies or students. During recent years around 10 000 Ukrainian citizens visited the Republic of Korea with various purposes.

As of today, more than 30 000 ethnic Koreans reside in Ukraine. Governments of both countries entered into constructive cooperation on solving the current issues of their residence.

The Ukrainian Government established a Special Committee on ethnic Koreans in early 2007. Seven meetings of the Committee were held since its establishment. A pilot

project aimed at surveying ethnic Koreans living in the southern regions of Ukraine was conducted in order to further legalize their stay in Ukraine.

Ukraine will continue to support ethnic Koreans living in Ukraine.

8. *South Korea ranks third among Ukraine's trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region after China and India. Bilateral trade between Ukraine and Korea has been increasing steadily over the years since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 and South Korea remains one of the leading investors in Ukraine. Could you elaborate on the nature of ROK-Ukraine bilateral trade and investment? Which areas do you believe have the greatest potential for further cooperation between the two countries and why (e.g.: high-level exchanges, trade, investment, development, consular affairs, education and culture)?*

Nowadays strengthening cooperation with the Republic of Korea is one of the major priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy in North East Asia.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the Republic of Korea's principle stand and support in preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine both on the bilateral level as well as in the United Nations is highly appreciated in Ukraine.

The important step, taken by the Korean Government in 2014-2015, was the providing of humanitarian aid worth \$1.5 million to support forcibly displaced people due to the current developments in the east part of Ukraine, caused by Russian aggression. We appreciate the Republic of Korea for its essential contribution to the maintenance of the Ukrainians who were forced to leave their homes.

For 24 years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea, the two countries have been dynamically developing cooperation in all spheres of mutual interest. However, we still have a lot of opportunities for promoting our cooperation in the spheres of economy and investment, science and technology, culture, and education.

Economic cooperation is a key aspect of our bilateral relations. Ukraine considers the Republic of Korea as one of the most promising economic partners in the Asia Pacific region.

Unfortunately, the current trade turnover does not correspond to the potential of the two countries. In 2014, bilateral trade turnover decreased by 20.2% and amounted to \$988.5 million. The same trend continued in 2015 - bilateral trade turnover decreased by 24 % and amounted to \$ 651.8 million.

The enhancement of trade cooperation, especially the diversification of export and import operations, is among the priorities of our relations.

In this regard, I think that the regular sessions of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Korean Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation could play a more prominent role in the intensification of bilateral economic cooperation in various sectors. The two countries have been exploring possibilities to hold the next (Third) session of the

Commission in Seoul in the near future (the second session was held in November 2013).

I would like to note that Ukraine, as a huge market with a population of 43 million people, has many attractions for Korean investors. The Ukrainian Government is making continuous efforts to create a favorable investment climate in Ukraine. We are interested in attracting more Korean investments, particularly, in infrastructure, agriculture, construction, metallurgy, energy, and high-tech industries. As of December 31, 2015 the total amount of direct Korean investment into the Ukraine's economy accounted for \$ 161.5 million.

9. *Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin's visit to the ROK in September 2015 marked the first of its kind by a Ukrainian Foreign Minister in eleven years. The ROK was also the only country Minister Klimkin visited on this occasion. As you were with him during this landmark visit, what were some of your key impressions? What is your view on the impact of this diplomatic exchange and how the two countries will cooperate on an international level (particularly with respect to the Korean Peninsula and the situation in Ukraine)?*

We consider the official visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Pavlo Klimkin, to the Republic of Korea in September 2015 as a milestone event in bilateral relations. This visit was paid after an 11-year pause in the exchange of visits at the foreign minister level and demonstrated the importance of the further boosting of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea in political, trade and investment, and cultural spheres, as well as in international arena. Special attention was paid to the issue of further liberalizing the visa regime between the two countries (concluding the intergovernmental Agreement on the Mutual Abolition of Visa Requirements for citizens of both countries).

So, we have ahead of us very intensive work aimed at the implementation of the agreements reached during the visit.

On Ukraine in East Asia

10. *After having spent more than four years in Seoul, what is your outlook on the future of the nation? What do you see as the major opportunities or challenges for Korea or other countries in the East Asian region?*

One of the key issues in the East Asia region that will probably remain is further ensuring peace and stability. In this regard, the attention of all the countries in this region will be focused on North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the efforts of the international community, including the Six-Party Talks, will be crucial to resolving this issue.

In this sense, it is worth noting that Ukraine is a unique country in terms of nuclear safety and security: Firstly, because of the Chernobyl disaster (1986), the aftermath of which we still have to deal with today and due to which we have gained valuable experience on nuclear safety and the protection of people from nuclear disasters and their effects;

secondly, because of our historical decision to abandon the world's third largest nuclear arsenal (1994), inherited by Ukraine from the USSR; and thirdly, because of Ukraine's fulfillment of its pledge to remove all highly enriched uranium from its territory (2012).

Ukraine supports the trust-building process in Northeast Asia, put forth by the President of the Republic of Korea. At the same time, taking into account recent DPRK's provocations (fourth nuclear test and launch of a long-range ballistic missile) we, as the UNSC's non-permanent member, were completely supportive of the relevant Security Council's Resolution 2270 (2016) as well as unilateral actions, taken by Seoul in order to put pressure on Pyongyang.

We consider South Korea an influential player in the settlement of security problems in the Northeast Asia. The South Korean Government can count on Ukraine's support in actions to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

11. Concerning Ukraine's relations with Northeast Asia more broadly, what do you foresee as fundamental developments in the next 5 years? In your opinion, which aspects of Ukraine's presence in the region should be strengthened? What do you think should be priorities for Kiev to focus on in the region?

Despite the focus on integration into the EU, East Asia remains an important region in the political and economic sense for Ukraine. Last year was marked by the high-level activity of the President and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine. In particular, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko met with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Davos and held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe within his official visit to Ukraine. Top diplomat of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin paid visits to Japan and, as it was mentioned above, to the Republic of Korea. These events were aimed at paving the way for further boosting cooperation in areas of mutual interest both at the bilateral level and within international organizations.

In recent decades we have witnessed a steady trend of internationalization and the globalization of production in the world economy, which in turn leads to the necessity of forming an integrated transport and logistics systems. The new transport and logistics initiatives of China ("One Belt, One Road") and the Republic of Korea ("Eurasia Initiative") trend towards the extension of their product share into the European market and the intensification of commodity flows between Asia and Europe.

In this regard, given the favorable geographical location and scientific-industrial potential, the Government of Ukraine has been making efforts to be included in the new Silk Route from Asia to Europe and vice versa.

Thus, Ukraine accepted the Chinese offer to join the "One Belt, One Road" project and has already started work on its implementation. In this context, we are in a constant dialogue with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and other interested countries on forming efficient tariff conditions for cargo transportation using the transport infrastructure of

Ukraine.

As a result, in January 2016 Ukraine in cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan launched a pilot container train to China via a new Silk Road (through the Black Sea and Caspian Sea) bypassing Russia, which delivered cargo to China within 15.5 days.

The new route is an alternative that would allow redirecting cargo flows from the West to the East and in reverse, bypassing the territory of the Russian Federation, which, starting from January 2016, completely stopped the transit of any commodities originating from Ukraine through its territory, regardless of which country was the final destination.

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